

NEW LAMPS
FOR OLD



មេកាត ថាបពេត្តិ
វិមេកា ភ្នំសំបៃ

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*An Interpretation of Events
in Modern China and
Whither they Lead*

By

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FOREWORD

Western historians and politicians have displayed an extraordinary ability and patience in studying China, and yet, in spite of all the facts and figures in their possession, they have not entirely achieved a true understanding of the Chinese.

In saying this we do not wish to discredit, or challenge, the authority of Western historical and political science and the works of many brilliant sinologues. On the contrary, we admit that mainly in Western literature may one obtain exhaustive information regarding this country and be sure of its accuracy. But we wish to lay stress upon this: that a knowledge of politico-economic facts and exact statistics does not constitute true knowledge of the Chinese people.

We assert that the very structure of the Chinese mind, which makes the Chinese assimilate facts in a manner quite differently from us, requires a knowledge of reactions rather than actions and of consequences rather than events, and we venture to submit that only a method of historical research based on this principle will bring the West nearer to a true understanding of the East, and thus facilitate the solution of one of the most complicated international problems.

My profound thanks are due to Messrs. A. M. Preston and R. W. Davis whose inspiring directions and invaluable suggestions during preparation of manuscripts for the printers helped me to complete this work.

ANATOL M. KOTENEV

November 15th, 1930
Shanghai

TO THOSE
WHO VALIANTLY FOUGHT AND DIED
FOR THE
HAPPINESS AND FREEDOM
OF THIS
GREAT COUNTRY
THIS MONOGRAPH IS HUMBLY DEDICATED

CHAPTER I

THE HUNDRED DAYS OF REFORM

ON the 23rd day of the 4th moon of the 23rd year of his reign, the Emperor Kuang Hsu's vermilion pencil depicted the following memorable words:—

“The basis of education will continue to rest on the canons of the Sages, but at the same time there must be careful investigation of every branch of European learning appropriate to existing needs, so that there may be an end to empty fallacies and that by zeal efficiency may be attained.”*

These few characters, in the unformed and childish handwriting of the eleventh Emperor of the Great Tsing Dynasty, prefaced a new page in the history of China.

In spite of the rumours of reforms and the existence of a reform party in the Capital † and the Provinces, ‡ and a flood of memorials § urging the Emperor not to trust “the mercenary, selfish and timid advice of his ministers,” but “to use his own judgment and summon his courage in dealing with the crisis,” ¶ the frank capitulation of the Emperor before the rush of western ideas had the effect of a thunderbolt.

The Court, the ministers, the hereditary nobility, literati and gentry, both Manchu and Chinese, were dumbfounded.

The dream of a few young enthusiasts became a reality, and a very hard reality too.

* Imperial Decree, June 11th, 1898.

† The “Hanlin Reform Club,” with members drawn from the elite of the empire and an influential organ “Chinese Progress,” which at the end of 1898 had a circulation of over 10,000 and was transformed into a daily paper.—H.B. Morse, “The International Relations of the Chinese Empire,” Vol. III, p. 129.

‡ The “Reform Association” at Nanking and cities along the Yangtze River, headed by the famous scholar and viceroy, Chang Chih-tung, *ibid.*

§ Memorial of the Kwangtung gentry led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, 1894; Memorial of Kang Yu-wei signed by a thousand ku-jen (masters of art), 1895.—“North-China Herald,” December 8th, 1895.

¶ Memorial of Metropolitan Officials, 1898.

"Parrot-like plagiarisms of shallow theories are to be avoided and catch-words eschewed," sounded the Imperial command, and princes of the blood, ministers and the most respectable members of the Hanlin Academy were enjoined to go abroad and to seek education from those whom the subjects of the Son of Heaven were taught to keep in derision and hatred.*

Religion, History, highly-revered and ancient customs were challenged, with a stroke of a pencil in the hand of a single man accidentally occupying the illustrious Dragon Throne. †

They had to yield precedence to the new ideas of the West, for they could not live together: they were irreconcilable in their very nature. This idea was revolting to every Chinese and Manchu, irrespective of rank, occupation or means.

"We have heard of Chinese ideas being employed to convert barbarians, but have never heard of China being converted by barbarians," said one of China's greatest sages, Mencius, replying to the queries of his disciples regarding the nature of foreign ideas.

Indeed, it was something which had no precedent. It was a revolt proclaimed by the Emperor himself—the Guardian of China's national virtue—against the virtue of loyalty to the great covenants of his ancestors. It was a gross challenge to the commands of the Sacred Edict of the Great Emperor Kang Hsi: "Discountenance and banish strange principles, in order to exalt the correct doctrine," ‡ and neither the approval of the proposed reforms by the old Empress Dowager Tsu Hsi§ nor the extensive interpretation of the broad views expressed by the illustrious Emperor Kien Lung ¶ could dispel the odium which, from the very beginning, surrounded the plans of Kuang Hsu to reform China after the Western model.

The reform decrees were issued with bewildering rapidity. They embraced practically all branches of the Government

* Imperial Decree of the 24th day of the 4th moon (June 12th), 1898.

† The Emperor Kuang Hsu was the son of Prince Chun, the seventh prince in seniority, and had no right to the throne after the death of the Emperor Tung Chih. He was elevated to the high dignity of the Heir Apparent and made Emperor in 1875 by the Empress Dowager Tsu Hsi, in defiance of the rule of *prima geniture*.

‡ The Seventh Maxim of the Sacred Edict of Kang Hsi, 1670, translated by J. Legge, "The China Review," 1887, p. 149.

§ J.O.P. Bland and E. Backhouse, "China under the Empress Dowager," p. 186.

¶ Rescript of Kien Lung in the spring of Kap Shou (27th year of Kien Lung), 1764. Translated by C. F. Preston, "China Review," 1877, p. 15.

from educational and military matters to the right of the commoners to memorialize the sovereign and the modification of the famous system of classical examinations.*

The wrathful alarm amongst the conservative elements of the powerful mandarinatè at this last reform, reflecting one of the principles of modern democracy, can be vividly imagined. It is as immaterial to the purpose of this book as criticism of the modification proposed in the Chinese administrative and educational systems.

Each of the projected reforms was sound—since each struck at a manifest evil—and each was capable of being carried into effect. Yet the whole structure of reform by a vermilion pencil was as a pyramid standing on its apex: foredoomed to fall!

The collapse of the reforms can hardly be attributed to the personality or personal faults of the Emperor himself—a physical and mental weakling—nor to the inexperience of the reform party, led by Kang Yu-wei, a political dreamer without precedent. It cannot be attributed to the cruelty and perfidy of the Empress Dowager, whose personal charm and unlimited ambition commanded a powerful clique of statesmen and the army.

The unbiassed reader is asked to abandon for a moment the stereotyped treatment of methods of government. Let the actions of these autocrats be judged not merely as the outcome of cruelty and high-handedness, but also as the expression of real patriotism and a deep knowledge of their country and subjects.

The clash between the two parties—that of the reformers and that of the conservatives—was a logical result of the organic antipathy of the Chinese to everything foreign and the policy of the Foreign Powers in China. The ruin of the reforms was not due to the ambitious plans of the Empress Dowager, who at that time had retired from political life and lived in the seclusion of the Summer Palace, nor to the treachery of Yuan Shih-kai, as the unfortunate Emperor himself believed. †

The plot to depose the Empress Dowager and even to kill her and one of her closest friends and most loyal statesmen, Jung-lu, decided upon in principle by Kuang Hsu under the instigation of Kang Yu-wei, hastened the catastrophe, but the real cause was that, at that critical moment, the

* Imperial Edicts, September 12th and 13th, 1898.

† Bland and Backhouse, *op. cit.*, p. 210.

Imperial Reformer could not find a single broad-minded and energetic statesman to support him.

The action of the Empress Dowager in deposing the Emperor under the circumstances was the only possible course, even if her own personal safety and ambition were jeopardized. The proposed reforms were not only fraught with grave danger to the Dynasty, but also undermined the very foundation of the whole Empire.

The tragedy of the last Tsings was in that they had for over a century been compelled to exert themselves in rousing anti-foreign feeling amongst the millions of their subjects. They forgot that they themselves were of the same hated and much despised "I" and "fang kwai"—barbarians and foreign devils—who had usurped the throne of China from the lawful Chinese emperors, and that, in professing and preaching blind hatred to foreigners, they were preaching against themselves; calling people to liberate China from foreign oppression, they called them to get rid of the Manchus and their control.

They deepened the gulf between themselves and their subjects, setting at naught all efforts of the founders of the Dynasty * to abolish any distinction between the conquerors and the conquered by establishing a dual system in the Manchu-Chinese government of the country under the uniform principles of the Chinese sages. †

But there was no other effective weapon in the hands of the Tsings to stop the march of the foreigners into China except to preach blind hatred against them amongst the masses until this all-engulfing hatred became a synonym for patriotism and, perhaps, *vice versa*.

In these circumstances it was only logical that China should be dumbfounded at the reform edicts. The Sacred Emperor had betrayed them, had associated himself with those whom they had for centuries been taught to hate. The Emperor was a foreigner. ‡ The seeds of anti-foreign propaganda fell on a fertile ground.

* Shun Chih, A.D. 1644-1662; Kang Hsi, A.D. 1662-1723; Kien Lung, A.D. 1737-1796.

† Constitutional Law of the Chinese Empire under the Manchus by Kien Lung, 1764. "The Chinese Review," *op. cit.*, p. 13.

‡ "The thin oval of his (the Emperor's) face, clearly defined features, and aquiline nose gave him, in the physician's eyes (to use his own words), the appearance of a foreigner," stated in his report Chen Lien-fang, the celebrated Chinese physician, who, amongst other doctors, was summoned to attend the Emperor in 1898.—"The Times," March 31st, 1898, cited by Bland and Backhouse, *op. cit.*, p. 216.

Contempt and derision of foreigners is deeply rooted in the national conscience of China. It is a product of the whole system of Chinese civilization, based on the principle of the superiority of Chinese thought and race * which finds its fullest expression in the following words of the famous Confucian commentator, Su Tung-po: "The barbarians (fan (蕃), foreigners) are like beasts and not to be ruled on the same principles as Chinese. Were one to attempt controlling them by the maxims of reason it would tend to nothing but the greatest confusion. The ancient sovereigns well understood this, and accordingly ruled barbarians by misrule. Therefore to rule barbarians by misrule is the true and best way of ruling them." †

The expression "kwai" (鬼), meaning "devils" and denoting the foreigners, is at least 3,000 years old. In one of his odes the Shiking prince, Wen, laments the miserable corruption of the defunct Shang Dynasty, and adds: "The indignation excited at home gradually extended even to foreign (kwai) countries." ‡

Confucius and Mencius used another word, "I" (夷), denoting foreigners, which we have already mentioned, and which had been used by the Tsings in all their official documents. § The practice went so far that the British Government had to insist on the insertion of a special clause in the Treaty of Tientsin, 1858, forbidding the use of this character.

Whether this clause was strictly adhered to by the Chinese officialdom in their official correspondence, which did not reach the vigilant eyes of the foreign diplomats in China,

* "Barbari haud secus ac pecora, non eodem modo regenti sunt ut regentur Sinae. Si quis vellet eos magna sapientiae legibus instruere, nihil aliud quam summam perturbationem induceret. Antiqui reges istud optime callebant, et ideo barbaras non regendo regebant. Sic autem eos non regendo regere, praecleara eos optime regendi ars est."—Father Premare's translation of Confucian commentator, Su Tung-po, quoted by J. F. Davis. "The Chinese," London, 1836, p. 63.

† B.C. 1766-1121.

‡ Dr. Legge's comments on this passage (Shi, III., 1., 6., p. 509) are worth quoting: "What region or things the demon lands were, we cannot tell. Mao explains the phrase by (夷), distant quarters. In the Yih the same name occurs, and Kao-tsung (in the 13th century, B.C.) is said to have attacked the country. It could not be very distant from China, but still it was beyond it. It is strange that the custom of calling foreigners *demons*, still everywhere prevalent in China, should have the sanction of the Shi and of this high antiquity."

§ This expression occurs even in the letters addressed by the Chinese Emperor to Queen Victoria in 1839, while other Chinese officials like a Magistrate of Nambai (Kwangtung) used to "instruct" in the most respectful manner H.B.M.'s Plenipotentiary, calling him "barbarian eye."—ΑΥΤΗΟΝ.

or not, it is hardly possible to say, but the colloquial use of "fang kwai" * and "I" by millions of Chinese has survived to the present day.

On the other hand, the heroic deeds of Shih Ko-fa and Coxinga, the last defenders of the defunct Ming Dynasty, whom the Tsings robbed of the throne, formed a part of the Chinese national Saga.†

The remembrance of the last stand against the bold invaders was particularly strong in the South of China, where the descendants of the loyal defenders of the Mings formed the famous "Triads," a secret society which, from time to time under most fantastical circumstances, made its appearance on the Chinese political stage and called upon the people to rise against the foreign usurpers.

The Tsing Dynasty was neither worse than any of the twenty-four historic ruling houses of China, nor was the reign of its emperors less glorious or less virtuous. It produced great personalities which could rival in their statesmanship the heroes of China, Yao and Shun,‡ and which accepted without reservation the Chinese civilization and fabric of government.

The system of public examinations adopted by them ensured to their loyal subjects access to the highest honours of the State, which, in principle and to a certain extent in fact, was under the Tsings a State of literati and philosophers. Only a few of the ministers and high officials of China could boast of hereditary nobility; most of them sprang from families which did not occupy any conspicuous place in the Empire.

The tragedy of the Tsings was that, being themselves of foreign origin, they had to propagate anti-foreign doctrines,

* "Yang-kwai-tze" (洋鬼子) in the North of China.

† Shih Ko-fa, a native of Kwangtung, was a president of one of the boards in Nanking. He was a man of high reputation and a scholar of the first rank. When the Ming Emperor Tsung Chung (A.D. 1628-1644) committed suicide, Shih Ko-fa proclaimed Fuh Wang, a grandson of the Emperor Wan Li (A.D. 1673-1620), as the lawful heir to the throne of the Mings, and after his capture by the Manchus another Ming, Chang Wang. After a desperate struggle under the leadership of Shih Ko-fa, the last Ming, Tang Wang, fled to Yunnan and strangled himself. Coxinga, also a native of Kwangtung, succeeded his father as commander of the Chinese fleet after the latter's submission to the Manchus. Coxinga joined his arms with Shih Ko-fa in defence of the Mings. He made Formosa his base and cruelly exterminated the Dutch, who occupied this island and built the fort of "Zelandia," 1626. In A.D. 1662, on hearing that his son had gone over to the Manchus, he committed suicide in a fit of madness. The fate of Shih Ko-fa is not definitely known, but there is some evidence that he did not survive the last Ming.—AUTHOR.

‡ Shun Chih, A.D. 1644-1662; Kang Hsi, A.D. 1662-1723, and Kien Lung, A.D. 1736-1796.

but their misfortune was that they happened to live and rule in times when the political and economic situation in the West forced the European Powers to seek new markets in the Far East and to insist on the cessation of China's isolation.

This does not minimize the responsibility which rests with the foreigners for failing to reconcile the Chinese to their presence in China. On the contrary, it suggests that the Chinese are right in asserting that the spread of anti-foreign feeling in China was due as much to the conduct of the foreigners themselves as to any other reason.

Since the reign of the Yuan Dynasty, A.D. 1206-1333, foreigners have been allowed to reside in China, and under the government of Kublai, (A.D. 1280-1295) their number at Peking was very considerable.* They were permitted to stay and were accepted into the Imperial service in those early days only on condition that they should abide by Chinese law and customs, and leave the country only by special permission of the government.†

It is now an established fact that the Chinese have from the very beginning realized that the foreigners were attracted to China not by the charm of the Chinese civilization‡ or any desire to pursue mere "mercantile interests," but by the greed and lust of easy enrichment and the hope of conquering the country.

They were attracted by the immense opportunities which China offered to them, and they sincerely believed that they found in China a new Southern America, where they could continue unpunished the practices of the first Spanish conquistadores.§

There is no intention to delve deeply into the history of Sino-foreign relations before the Hundred Days' Reforms.

* H. Yule, "The Book of Marco Polo, Venetian," edited by H. Cordier, London, 1903, pp. 412, 414.

† Mandate of the Emperor Kien Lung to King George III, handed over to the head of the first British Embassy to China, Lord Macartney, in 1793.

‡ *Ibid.*

§ The first Westerners to come to China for the purpose of establishing trade relations were Portuguese. In 1511 Alfonso D'Albuquerque captured Malacca, and five years later Rafael Perestrello voyaged to China on a prospecting expedition. In 1517 Fernando Perez de Andrade with eight ships cast anchor in the harbour of St. John's Island. In 1533 a Portuguese colony flourished in Ningpo, but in 1545, owing to the riotous and licentious behaviour of the colonists, the colony was destroyed by order of the Emperor Shih Tsung. Over 12,000 Christians, including 800 Portuguese, were killed. Similar conduct led to the same result in 1549, in Chinchow, and only in 1557 the Portuguese succeeded in getting permission to land their cargoes in Macao.

That has been sufficiently elucidated by Western and Chinese historians. But for the purpose of analysis and in order to show the genesis of the anti-foreignism in China, which prevented the Emperor Kuang Hsu from succeeding in his noble efforts of reforming and saving China, note must be taken of certain facts, the chief being that, after more than two hundred years of intercourse with the West, the Chinese found no gain for themselves in this intercourse.*

A glance through the regulations enforced against the foreigners in the Canton "Factories" discloses the true character of the foreign trading community in China as it appeared in the Chinese eyes.

Ships of war were prohibited to enter the river; women were not admitted under any excuse into the Factories; Hong merchants were prohibited to contract debts to foreigners; foreign traders could not engage Chinese servants; foreigners could not use sedan chairs; foreigners could not row for pleasure on the river. They were allowed three days in the month to visit Fati (a small flower-garden across the river) in small parties, under the escort of an interpreter responsible, literally and personally, for all their misdeeds. Foreigners had no right to present petitions directly to the authorities: these petitions had to be presented through a Chinese Hong merchant †; in the Hong merchants' factories, where the foreigners lived, they had to be under the restraint and control of Chinese Hong merchants. The purchase and sale of goods had to pass exclusively through their hands, and all further intercourse with the natives was strictly prohibited. Foreigners could not remain at Canton out of season, but, their goods sold and ships loaded, had to return home or go to Macao.

These regulations were never relaxed and remained in force up to the first Anglo-Chinese war in 1841. After an intercourse of over two hundred years, as we have said, the Chinese Government saw no reason to mitigate the prison-like régime under which the foreigners were compelled to live in Canton. In the eyes of the Chinese they got what they deserved. If they protested against the treatment, representing it as misrule, the latter mattered very little to the Chinese—"to rule barbarians by misrule was the true and best method of ruling them."

*Edict of Kien Lung, 1757.

†A Corporation of Chinese merchants who enjoyed the monopoly of trading with the foreign firms; abolished by the Treaty of Nanking in 1842.—AUTHOR.

Other considerations supported the obstinate enforcement of the monopoly of foreign trade under the control of a Hoppo or Administrator of the Canton Customs. The Hoppo was an accumulator and transmitter, and a share in his personal profits and customs revenue—legal and illegal—found its way into the Imperial Palace, where it was distributed amongst the members of the Court, from the highest down to concubines and eunuchs.

There were also very important motives which actuated such clever rulers as Kang Hsi and Kien Lung, and such patriots as Tou Kwang,* in ignoring the existing practices behind the throne and in turning a deaf ear to the persistent protests, demands and threats of the numerous foreign embassies which came to Peking in an attempt to settle the problem of Sino-foreign relations. They remained adamant even in the face of the consent on the part of some of the foreign envoys to perform the notorious "kotow," or three kneelings and nine prostrations. The performance of these prostrations was not only a customary form of courtesy to the Sovereign of China, † but also a sign of complete submission required by the Chinese court etiquette from all foreign envoys since the Yuan Dynasty, when China boasted amongst her tributaries the proudest rulers of Asia and Eastern Europe. ‡ Evidently the impression made on the minds of the Chinese emperors by the sound of cannonades announcing the arrival of the foreign traders could not so easily be dispelled. §

* A.D. 1821-1851.

† Sir G. Staunton, "Lord Macartney's Embassy", p. 130.

‡ Dutch envoys Peter de Goyer in 1655, Peter van Hoorn in 1664, and Isaak Titsingh and A. E. van Broon in 1795. In 1793 Lord Macartney, British Ambassador, performed a kind of mitigated "kotow" by bending his knee before the Emperor.

Russian envoys Everard Isbrandt Ides in 1693 and Lev Ismailoff in 1720.

§ In 1516 the arrival of Portuguese ships and the establishing of their colony at St. John's Island signalled the opening of hostilities between them and the Chinese, which ended in the entire annihilation of the Portuguese.

The Spanish were the next to come to China in 1575, but hardly had they succeeded in establishing trade relations with this country when, being afraid of the influx of Chinese colonists into the Philippines, they ordered their general massacre in 1603. Over 20,000 Chinese having settled in the islands were killed in a few days. In 1639 this massacre was repeated with the same cruelty.

The Dutch ships were for the first time sighted on the Chinese coast in 1606, but were not admitted to Canton. Three years later they appeared again—this time numbering fifteen—bombarded Macao and, after having been repulsed, retired to the Pescadores, from where they proceeded to commit acts of piracy along the Chinese coast.

The arrival of the British ships under the command of Captain John Weddel in 1637 was signalled by the bombardment of the Chinese batteries of Bogue when they were not permitted to proceed to Canton.

Neither this nor the subsequent claim of the foreigners to be exempted from the general Chinese jurisdiction was in the opinion of the Chinese Government, a matter of paramount importance, which prevented any solution of Sino-foreign intercourse satisfactory to both Chinese and foreigners.

Aggression and unwarranted pretences could be resisted by force of arms, but there was no remedy against a drug which slowly and infallibly poisoned the soul and the body of the nation and which the foreigners carried along with them.*

The opium-smoking habit was assuming dangerous proportions. From the modest amount of 200 chests in 1727, the year of the issue of the first anti-opium edict by the Emperor Kien Lung, it reached in the subsequent sixty years the amount of 4,054 chests, and 40,200 in 1839. † The value of the drug imported into China in the period between 1800-1839 amounted to the enormous sum of \$285,307,200, which was paid by China in hard cash, while the value of the whole of China's export for the same period was scarcely one-half of this amount.

In 1796 the successor of Kien Lung, the Emperor Kia King, had to decree capital punishment for those violating the Imperial commands and smuggling opium, but neither this edict nor the edict of 1800 prohibiting the cultivation of the poppy in China, and the exportation of silver from China, had any other effect except the immediate revision of the methods of smuggling the drug into China and silver out of China. The ingenuity of the Eastern mind, coupled with the inherited skill of the native merchants and unscrupulousness of the native officials, over-rode any obstacle.

A project was advanced to legalize the trade and to save what was still left to be saved—the national finances, ‡

* Opium-smoking was introduced into China with tobacco-smoking, although the latter was strictly prohibited by the Imperial edicts of the last Mings and the first Tsings. In the eighteenth century it had spread and could not be stopped by any legislative measure or prosecution until, finally, China has become the greatest consumer of opium in the world. The practice of mixing opium with tobacco was first introduced into Formosa by the Dutch from Java. It was used as a remedy against malaria fever. From Formosa the habit spread to China through Amoy, and after the occupation of Formosa by the Chinese in 1683 it came into general use in the south of China. As far as the use of poppy for purely medicinal purposes is concerned, it was known in China as early as the days of the Tang Dynasty (from A.D. 618).—АУТНОР.

† H. B. Morse, "The International Relations of the Chinese Empire," 1634-1860, p. 174.

‡ Memorial of Hsu Nai-tai, 1836.

but considerations of morality prevailed.* An Imperial High Commissioner, Lin Tse-su, an "intimate acquaintance with all the arts and shifts of the outer barbarians," † was commissioned to stop the illicit trade carried on by "the red-haired English who introduced it into China, imitating in that the other red-hairs, the Dutch, who by means of it conquered Java." ‡

On March 28th, 1839, the foreign merchants at Canton were compelled under the threat of arms§ to deliver to the Chinese authorities 19,760 chests of opium to the value of £63,266.¶ This resulted in the development between the Chinese southern forces and the British of hostilities which gradually extended to the North of China.

The resistance of Official China was crushed. By the Treaty of Nanking, and subsequent treaties with other Powers, five Chinese ports—Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Shanghai and Ningpo—were thrown open to foreign trade, and the Canton regulations and Hong merchants were abolished. But it is utterly incorrect to say that China was conquered, or the Chinese nation brought to her knees before the victors.

China's resources for defence were far from having been exhausted against a handful of foreigners who occupied a few points along the coast. || The spirit of the population was not crushed, for the nation at large claimed the right, "as from God and nature, to over-ride the artificial restrictions of unjust treaties." **

The opium problem also remained unsettled. Neither of the High Contracting Parties—China and Great Britain—dared to touch upon this delicate point. †† The trade remained illegal and contraband, and the British subjects engaged in it received no support or protection from British officials. ‡‡ Moreover, it was formally prohibited, §§ yet

* Memorial of Chu-Tsun, 1836.

† Decree of the Emperor Tau Kwang, 1838.

‡ Memorial of Chu-Tsun, *op. cit.*

§ Commissioner Lin's order, March 18th, 1839, Corr. relating to China, 1840, p. 350.

¶ Captain Elliot's (H.B.M.'s Trade Superintendent in China) declaration, 1839, *ibid.*, p. 375.

|| Canton, Amoy, Tinghai, Ningpo, Chapu, Shanghai and Chekiang.

** C. Grant Robertson on William Pitt, Lord Chatham, "Quarterly Review," October 1908, p. 325.

†† Return of House of Lords, May 8th, 1857, p. 1; Chinese Repository, January 1843; Sir Pottinger's Instructions to the British Merchants, December 28th, 1842.

‡‡ Proclamation, August 1st, 1843; Chinese Repository, August 1843.

§§ Return of House of Lords, May 8th, 1857, p. 9.

the treaty was silent on that point. Only the treaty with the Americans expressly stated that citizens of the United States engaged in opium or any other contraband trade should receive no protection from the American Government, nor should the flag of the United States be abusively employed by other nations as a cover for the violation of the laws of China.*

The atmosphere of hostility against the invaders remained, and cries of "Kill the foreign devils!" "Beat the foreign devils!" rang and re-echoed throughout the country. †

It was admittedly difficult for the Chinese Imperial Government to withstand the temptation of taking advantage of this popular indignation and not to lean upon the anti-foreign movement as the best means to counteract foreign aggression. ‡

A new war broke out in the South, and again, spread along the China coast to the North.

On December 29th, 1857, the allied Anglo-French troops occupied Canton, and on October 13th, 1860, after protracted negotiations and indecisive actions, they entered Peking, triumphantly forcing the Imperial Government to flee to Jehol.

The plundering and looting of the priceless Imperial Palace at Yuenmingyuen at the hands of the allied troops followed the fall of the Capital.

Western historians do not like to direct the attention of students of Sino-foreign relations to this act of barbarity committed against the Chinese by foreign soldiers. They touch this subject very slightly, but lay stress on the perfidy and atrocities of the Chinese against foreign prisoners of war, which caused the incident, § and on the importance of concessions wrung from China as the result of this war. ¶

But if, this time, the foreigners succeeded in wringing from China the cancellation of rules "regarding certain com-

*Treaty of Wanghia, 1844. Mr. Cushing to Mr. Nelson, U.S. Secretary of State, July 5th, 1844; Chinese Repository, December 1845.

†Chinese Repository, July 1846.

‡H. B. Morse, *op. cit.*, pp. 367-398.

§Proclamation of Lord Elgin, H.B.M.'s Envoy to China, October 8th, 1860. Cordier, "Expedition de Chine" 1860, p. 353; H. F. MacNair, "Modern Chinese History," p. 315.

¶The memory of the outrage committed during this war by the allies is still alive amongst the Chinese. The anniversary of the destruction of Yuenmingyuen by Anglo-French troops, October 18th, 1860, is still observed by Republican China as a day of national mourning and humiliation.—

AUTHOR.

modities heretofore contraband" and the relaxation of "restrictions affecting trade in opium" and the opening of a couple of additional ports for foreign trade; * if, in consequence of new victories, the Foreign Powers were in course of time able to wring from China still more concessions, build up the proud edifice of so-called extraterritoriality and control Chinese finances by means of the Chinese maritime customs, the Western diplomats and self-governing communities in China failed utterly to win Chinese goodwill.

The Foreign Ministers were received with the greatest honours by the Emperor and the Empress Dowager in the Grand Hall of the Imperial Palace in the Forbidden City, † but the same foreign dignitaries and their nationals remained in the eyes of the Chinese masses greedy and cruel barbarians. ‡

Foreign missionaries were permitted by treaties to preach Christianity, and enjoyed in theory the exclusive protection of the authorities, but neither they nor their missions' or charitable work inspired any reverence or gratitude on the part of the Chinese—either officials or commoners. §

The Christian doctrine inspired only aversion, and the activity of the ministers of the Christian Church—terror. The highly-incensed populace saw in the Christian ritual an abominable blood-thirstiness and denial of filial piety, and accused the missionaries of kidnapping Chinese children for the purpose of tearing out their eyes for medicinal and magical use. ¶

Moreover, Christianity, in Chinese opinion, was the cause of the formidable Taiping Rebellion, which lasted for over fifteen years and cost China over twenty million human lives. It poisoned the minds of the people, made them declare themselves equal to God, || and caused them to

* Rules of Trade, Rule V, 1858. Justice requires us to mention that the Chinese Government also obtained its redress. The question of punishment of the celestials for the use of the foreign imported drug was left to the discretion of the Imperial authorities, who were at liberty to decapitate every and each opium smoker and trader residing outside the foreign concessions and settlements.—AUTHOR.

† The first solemn audience granted to the Foreign Ministers at Peking took place on November 12th, 1894.

‡ In spite of the express provisions of the Treaty of Tientsin prohibiting the use of the character "I" (barbarian), the Tsungli Yamen, nine years later, issued a circular to the viceroys and governors of the provinces, which started with the words: "The barbarian question is one of old standing," etc.—AUTHOR.

§ R. Hart, "These from the Land of Sinim," p. 68.

¶ S. Wells Williams, "Middle Kingdom," Vol. II, p. 706.

|| See Chapter XIII.

rise against everything and everybody, thus exposing China to the lasting disgrace of seeking foreign help to quell the blasphemous revolt.

To the true followers of Confucianism it was a political doctrine, highly adverse to their own national religion. The foreigners' obstinacy in the matter of Christian propaganda seemed only to confirm the truth of this idea.

In spite of the pompous Imperial edict and the Treaty of Tientsin expressly providing for the liberty of the Christian Church in China, * the official reports of Western diplomatists were full of information concerning Chinese outrages on Christian workers. † The more pressure that was brought to bear upon the Chinese Government by the Foreign Powers, and the heavier compensations it had to pay for the murder of apostles of the Christian faith, the more frequent became the massacres of missionaries and plunder of Missions.

The whole matter appeared in the eyes of the Chinese as if the foreigners were intentionally sending scores of their missionaries to suffer death in China and so furnish a good excuse for the extraction of new privileges and new territorial concessions.

In fact, some months prior to the first decree of Kwang Hsu the whole country was roused by the surrender of Kiaochow Bay to Germany as compensation for the murder of two German Roman Catholic missionaries in Shantung. ‡ The action of the German Government gave an opportunity to Russians to seize Port Arthur, and to the British Government to claim and obtain Weihaiwei. §

In Kwangsi, Shantung, Hainan, Shasi, Sungpu, Yangchow, Kweichow, Kuchowien and Ichowfu anti-foreign outbreaks followed with increasing vigour, while in Hupeh a secret society, led by the notorious bandit Chow Han, incited the people to a wholesale slaughter of all missionaries and native converts. ¶

This popular movement was rampant, embittered by the realization of China's own weakness, and the ignominy suffered at the hands of the despised Japanese in the un-

* Imperial Edict, December 28th, 1844.

† H. B. Morse, "The International Relations of the Chinese Empire," Vol. II, p. 223.

‡ Sino-German (Kiaochow) Convention, March 6th, 1898.

§ The Conventions were signed on March 6th and July 1st, 1898, respectively.—*Author*.

¶ Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, China, No. 1, 1899, pp. 71, 78, 85, 102, 119, 140, 163.

fortunate war of 1895. It proceeded with the knowledge and traditional encouragement of the authorities, when suddenly the Throne, under the influence of a small group unknown to the country, announced its resolution to introduce into China the much-hated "barbarian" principles.

Indeed, the situation was tragical. One move more and it seemed that the whole country must plunge into a state of anarchy.

"Is it possible that I, the Emperor, am to be regarded as a mere follower after new and strange ideas because of my thirst for reform? My love for the people, my children, springs from the feeling that God has confided them to me and that to my care they have been given in trust by my illustrious Ancestors. When I reflect how deep is the ignorance of the masses of the dwellers in the innermost parts of the Empire on the subject of my proposed reforms, my heart is filled with care and grief. . . ." So lamented Kuang Hsu, addressing his people,* but no response came to the pathetic call of this unfortunate monarch entangled in contradictions of Chinese reality.

On the 1st of the 8th moon Kuang Hsu received in audience Yuan Shih-kai, then Judicial Commissioner of Chihli. He implored him to assist him in the proposed reforms and, having been assured of his loyalty, instructed him to take charge of army reform.

Upon having been informed about this audience, the Empress Dowager immediately summoned Yuan Shih-kai to her presence and commanded him to wait for further orders. On the other hand, she sent for the Emperor and informed him that Kang Yu-wei, the moving spirit of the reform party, was immediately to be put under arrest as a traitor.

The die was cast. The Emperor saw clearly that any further delay on his part would mean a catastrophe to him and his followers. He immediately ordered Kang Yu-wei to proceed to Shanghai to take charge of the Government Gazette Bureau, to which post he had been recently appointed. Others were informed of the danger and advised to make good their escape.

On the morning of the 5th, the Emperor again summoned Yuan Shih-kai and ordered him to go to Tientsin and secretly put to death the Viceroy of Chihli, Jung-lu, the trusted servant and friend of the Empress Dowager and one

* Imperial Decree of the 27th day of the 7th moon (August), 1898.

of the most influential Manchus at the Court. Kuang Hsu also commanded Yuan Shih-kai to bring Chinese troops stationed in Tientsin to Peking and assume the guarding of the Imperial Palaces.

The next step to be taken was the imprisonment of the Empress Dowager and, if necessary, her execution.

Yuan promised to obey his august master, faithfully, but on reaching Tientsin he went directly to Jung-lu and told him about the Imperial commission.

At 5 p.m. on the same day, Jung-lu, travelling by special train, reached Peking and proceeded forthwith to the Palace of the Empress Dowager.

In less than two hours the Grand Council of the Empire was summoned. Terrified officials besought the Empress on their knees to leave her retirement, assume the supreme power, and save the dynasty and the country from impending peril. The conference terminated at midnight.

On the 6th, early in the morning, the Emperor was seized by the guards belonging to the troops of Jung-lu and eunuchs, conveyed to a pavilion on a small island in the middle of the lake within the precincts of the Lake Palace, to the west of the Forbidden City.

Profound silence reigned in the palaces. Only the beautiful Pearl Concubine, faithful to her august husband, raised her voice in defence of the lawful Chinese Sovereign whose Heavenly mandate the Empress Tsu Hsi was about to set aside. The Empress Dowager ordered her to be confined in another part of the Palace, where she remained until, in 1900, there came an opportunity for the Empress to get rid of this presumptuous woman who dared to oppose the will of the nation. She was thrown down a deep well, by the Empress' orders, as the Court prepared for flight after the entrance of the allied troops into Peking.

A decree issued in the name of Kuang Hsu announced the assumption of the supreme power of the Empire by the Empress Dowager.

A few hours later the crowned reformer at the head of Manchu Princes and Ministers was prostrating himself before the Regent in the Hall of Diligent Government, performing the ancient ceremony of the three kneelings and nine prostrations. . . .

CHAPTER II

THE REACTION TO THE REFORMS OF THE EMPEROR KUANG HSU: THE BOXERS

THE Chinese have never been able to understand the motives underlying the policy of the Western Powers in China. Their mind, brought up in classical primitives, is unable to grasp the complicated nature of the political and economic situation in Europe, America, and even Japan, their closest neighbour. They have accepted things at their face value and formed their conception about the West according to their own standard. The refinement of their culture did not help them to see in the repeated attempts of the Westerners to introduce into China modern civilization anything but aggression encroaching upon China's sovereign right and the rights of her sole masters—the Chinese.

Neither have the foreigners ever been able to realize that even a superficial introduction of Western civilization into China—in the form of railways, mines, steamships, etc.—has affected deeply the political and social structure of her innumerable population. The naïvete of their idea about China and things Chinese, in fact, is astonishing.

Serious thinkers from the West, who lived and worked in China and learned to love and to hold in esteem this country of surprise and unlimited possibility, thought in earnest that the scholars and officials of China needed only to be given an opportunity to study the Western system and they would promptly adopt it, bringing China into harmony with the modern world.*

With an unaffected simplicity they brought pressure to bear upon the Chinese Government, urging it to develop

* Amongst these thinkers and well-wishers of China we can name such highly-reputed diplomats and sinologists as Sir Rutherford Alcock, Sir F. Bruce, Sir Robert Hart, and Mr. Anson Burlingame, whose works in China were invariably animated by a deep belief in the ease with which Western culture might at an early date be introduced into China.—AUTHOR.

China's immense opportunities: to build railways, ships, open mines, erect telegraphs and telephones. They could not understand that the obstinate resistance of the Chinese to these most useful institutions was not the result solely of a retrograde and corrupt Manchu officialdom.

Captivated themselves by the technical and economic progress of the West, they wished to see the same progress in China—at any cost. They forgot that the materialistic methods of the West appealed very little to the mind of the Oriental, and that to the Chinese Western progressive ideas and institutions appeared to be a menace to the independent existence of their nation.

The Chinese have never denied the usefulness and the necessity of reforms, but they wish them to come forth in their own time as a result of China's national growth: they wish to have them imposed upon them neither by suave persuasion nor force; they hate the idea that it is not China inventing and introducing them by herself, but the strangers whom they have accustomed to hold in derision; they hate the very principle on which these most useful public utilities were based, for they are the product of "barbarian" genius—the product of progressive Christianity—which is inimical to the canons of their sages.

"You are all too anxious to awake us and start us on a new road, and you will do it; but you will all regret it, for, once awakened and started, we shall go faster and farther than you think: much farther than you want,"—used to say Weng-siang, one of the most prominent political personages in China under the Empress Tsu Hsi in the earlier sixties.*

The Capital and the greater part of China approved the deposition of the Emperor. The act of the Empress Dowager was entirely justified in the opinion of the Chinese public, and stress was laid on the Emperor's most unfilial conduct against his aged and august aunt by plotting against her life. The interest and sympathy displayed by the foreigners towards the unfortunate Emperor and the Reform Party aroused indignation even in the hearts of the most progressive patriots. †

The foreigners in China were deeply disappointed by the failure of the proposed reforms, which they heartily acclaimed, and in the success of which they not less heartily believed. ‡

* Sir R. Hart, "These from the Land of Sinim," p. 52.

† Bland and Backhouse, *op. cit.*, p. 213.

‡ Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury. Blue Book, China No. 1, 1899, letter No. 266.

They hastened to display their opposition against the new policy of the Chinese Government by offering help to the fugitive reformers.

The Imperial Government offered Taels 100,000 as a reward for the capture of Kang Yu-wei, and though the latter succeeded in escaping from Peking his life was still in danger. The British Consul-General at Shanghai received instructions to do everything in his power to save him. He was conveyed to Hongkong, where he found shelter in the Police barracks. This act again caused new bitterness in China.

The cause of Chinese Justice was defeated: the arch-plotter against the sacred life of the Empress escaped the fate meted out for him by Chinese law, while all his kinsmen—also liable to be punished—succeeded in fleeing from China without leaving any trace behind them.* Somebody using the foreign telegraph warned them of the impending danger, and at the same time stretched out a helping hand to another arch-plotter—the famous scholar and brilliant writer, Liang Chi-chao—who took refuge in Japan.

According to the old Chinese criminal code and dynastic customs and rules of the Manchu House, the act of the Emperor Kuang Hsu in plotting against the august person of his aunt and adopted mother, the Empress Dowager, was a capital offence, and therefore it was freely rumoured that his days were numbered. The fear of causing a bad impression in foreign countries and provoking foreign intervention alone arrested the striking hand of the Chinese Nemesis. The foreign Ministers informed the Tsungli Yamen (Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs) that the persistent rumours that the Empress Dowager was about to proceed to extreme steps in regard to the Emperor "are viewed with the utmost displeasure by their Governments, and that any accident to his person may place the foreign representatives in a very awkward position, as they were directly accredited to the person of the Emperor and not the Regent."†

The life of the Emperor was saved, but the news of the foreign intervention in a purely domestic question, for which no precedent was found in Chinese history, was again interpreted as an act of undue indiscretion on the part of the foreigners. ‡

* "North-China Herald," October 7th, 1898.

† Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, October 18th and 29th, 1898; China No. 1, 1899, pp. 270, 278.

‡ Bland and Backhouse, *op. cit.*, p. 215.

The *coup d'état* at Peking, approved in the Capital and in the North, made a different impression upon other parts of the country. The Southern provinces learned the news about the deposing of the Emperor and the prosecution of the Reformers with the greatest reservation.

It so happened that the majority of the Reformers were Chinese from Canton, where they had large affiliations.

The natives of Kwangtung and Hupeh represent the most energetic and alert portion of the population of China—more subject than their Northern countrymen to any emotional moye. They had been the last to recognize the power of the Manchus in the seventeenth century, and their opposition to the rule of the latter had never shown signs of lessening. On the contrary, it grew with time and the constant failure on the part of the Tsings to resist the foreign aggression. Canton was the place where the population refused to carry out the express Imperial command to lay down arms and to admit the foreigners within their walls.* It was the home of the most irreconcilable anti-foreignism in China and the home, as we have stated, of the last defenders of the Mings, Shih Ko-fa and Coxinga, and the "Triads." †

The persecutions of the Reformers aroused bitterness and stirred up a movement which could easily have taken the form of open rebellion against the Peking Government, particularly as the news that the Emperor's life was in danger added a new impulse to the general excitement and gave an aspect of legality to the popular indignation.

The Cantonese Guild at Shanghai expressed its gratitude to the British Consul-General at Shanghai for the saving of Kang Yu-wei. ‡ The Prefect of Shanghai, Ching Yuangshan, sent in a memorial, in the name of "all the gentry, scholars, merchants and public of Shanghai," imploring the Empress, the Imperial Clansmen and the Grand Council "to allow his Sacred Majesty to resume the government, notwithstanding his indisposition, and to abandon all thoughts of his abdication" §; finally, Liu Kun-yi, the powerful Viceroy of Nanking, represented to the Throne the advisability of ceasing prosecution and sparing the life of the

* Riots of December 6th, 1842; June 15th, 1844; March 18th, 1845; January 15th, February 5th, July 4th, July 10th, October 17th, 1846; March 17th, April 29th, November 27th, and December 8th, 1847; June and July, 1856, etc.

† *Cf. antea*, p. 8.

‡ "North-China Herald," October 7th, 1898.

§ Bland and Backhouse, *op. cit.*, p. 219.

Crowned Reformer, as he (the Viceroy) was not sure that any further action in that direction would not provoke a revolt in his province.

The true meaning of all these manifestations did not escape the attention of the Empress Tsu Hsi, reputed by both Chinese and foreigners as a woman and ruler of exceptional intelligence and gift. She realized at once that the sentiments of the Southern people were roused not out of any particular sympathy for the proposed reforms,* nor by the personality of the Emperor himself, for the legality of his appointment to the Throne was open to very serious doubt in the opinion of the majority of the population.† It was a new anti-dynastic movement, a movement directed against the Manchu control as an unjust control of foreign origin, highly insulting to the Chinese nation.

In October 1898 the Censor and Imperial Clansman, Hsi Chang, taking advantage of his privilege and duty as a member

* After a *coup d'état* there were serious anti-foreign riots at Canton on October 25th and November 10th, and an English missionary, Mr. Fleming, was murdered in Kweichow.—"North-China Herald," October 31st, 1898; Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, November 20th, 1898; China N. J., 1898, p. 360.

† The validity of the Imperial succession after the death of Tung-Chih was a matter of grave concern to all loyal Chinese. The Empress Tsu Hsi was openly accused of having violated the traditions of the Chinese Ruling Houses by appointing a member of a junior branch to succeed the Emperor Hien Feng as his adopted son. The Emperor Tung-Chih was left without an heir—which in the opinion of the orthodox Confucianists constituted a very serious breach of ancestor-worship. The memorials and remonstrances of many high officials resulted in the Empress Tsu Hsi becoming irritable on this subject, but nevertheless the wrong was not corrected. The Empress issued several decrees announcing that in due time the late Tung-Chih would be provided with an heir, but the matter still was not settled, causing further dissatisfaction amongst the conscientious supporters of the Dynasty. As an example of the importance which the Chinese attached to this question we may point to the suicide of the Censor, Wu Ko-ty, in 1879. This fearless and upright scholar of the best Confucianist type committed suicide at the tomb of the Emperor Tung-Chih, leaving behind a memorial to the Throne in which he implored the Empress and Emperor to regulate the future succession and to appease the disinherited ghost of Tung-Chih. This memorial is an example of Chinese classical style, and gives some idea of the devotion of the Chinese to their Monarchs and their stoic readiness to sacrifice their lives for the sake of principle. The concluding passage of this memorial contains the following words:—"I pray the Empress and Emperor to remember the example of their Majesties Shun Chih and Kang Hsi in tempering justice with mercy; that they may make peace and prosperity by appointing only worthy men to public offices; that they may refrain from striving for those objects which foreigners hold dear, for by such striving they will surely jeopardize the future of our Middle Kingdom; that they may never initiate any of the innovations disdained by their ancestors, which would assuredly leave to posterity a heritage of woe. These are my last words, my last prayer, the end and crown of my life."—AUTHOR.

of the Censorate to speak the truth to his Sovereigns, wrote as follows:—

“Of late many rumours have been in circulation, due to the fact that the criminals executed by order of the Throne are all Chinese, and your Majesties are therefore accused of desiring to promote the interests of Manchus at the expense of your Chinese subjects. Although it should be well known and recognized that our Dynasty has never held the balance unevenly between Manchus and Chinese, yet the followers of Kang Yu-wei are undoubtedly taking advantage of these rumours, and the result threatens the State with danger.”

To appease this bitterness was not so easy as to repeal the reforms, which, in fact, were disposed of in the same manner in which they had been promulgated—by the vermilion pencil.

Already the first decree,* with the humble prayer of the Emperor to the Empress Dowager to assume the supreme power in the State and to act as a Regent, contained an indirect repeal of all reform edicts. The subsequent decree † made a clean sweep of the reforms and, amongst others, abolished the general right given to all persons to memorialize the Throne and the changes made in the classical system of examinations.

The same methods were useless when applied to dispel the odium around the Throne created by the prosecution of the Chinese members of the Reform Party and the deposition of the Emperor.

Decrees, issued in rapid succession by the Empress Dowager, laying stress on the strict impartiality of the Throne, its love of abstract justice, its freedom from any prejudice, whether against Manchus or Chinese, were received with distrust and ill-hidden mockery. The dismissal of a number of Manchu officials and the reference of Jung-lu himself to the Board of Civil Appointments for the determination of a suitable penalty for his alleged offence in recommending the Reformers for employment ‡ had also very little effect. The fermentation of minds, stirred up by the reform movement, proceeded. There was a revival of virulent anti-

* September 22nd, 1898.

† September 26th, 1898.

‡ One of the most energetic Reformers, Chen Tse-tung, the son of the Governor of Hupeh, sentenced to death and executed, was recommended to the attention of Kuang Hsu by Jung-lu.—AUTHOR.

dynastic propaganda in Southern China which began to assume the character of a general anti-foreign movement.

There was hardly a place in the Empire, great or small, significant or insignificant, where antagonism against the foreigners in general, and the missionaries and native converts in particular, was not manifest. The situation was critical in such a degree that special measures for the protection of the missionaries and native converts had to be devised.

On March 15th, 1899, the Imperial Government, acting under the pressure of the French Minister, issued a decree granting official status to missionaries.* Bishops were ranked with viceroys and governors and were entitled to communicate directly with them on equal terms; archdeacons and deans with *sze-tai* (*fantai*, *nichtai*, *taotai*) and other corresponding ranks; ordinary missionaries with *foo* and district magistrates. The decree dealt nominally with the Roman Catholic missions, but other missions were, of course, entitled to equal privileges, and, though the Protestant Missions un-animously refused to take any advantage of the newly-created situation, the exceptional status enjoyed by their Roman Catholic colleagues served indirectly to enhance their prestige in the eyes of the provincial authorities and thus to increase the hostility of the masses against all missionaries, irrespective of creed.

The general confusion was further aggravated by the scarcity of food throughout the whole country as a result of enormous floods from the Yellow River.† The distress was so great that in March 1899 there came reports from Northern Kiangsu of "people pallid like ghosts," children sold for the rescue of their parents at 1,000 cash (or 20 cents) each, and thousands of unburied corpses.‡

The Imperial Treasury was empty. The old system of taxation and collection of revenue was unable to meet the requirements of the moment and to make good the deficit in the exchequer caused by the unhappy war with Japan in 1895. The greater part of the revenue derived from sources within easy reach of the Government served as security for

* Mr. Bax-Ironside to Lord Salisbury, April 27th, 1899, China No. 1.

† The Imperial Government hastily despatched to the scene of the disaster Li Hung-chang. The latter, after investigations on the spot, reported that a complete scheme of conservancy would require Tls. 40,000,000, and so the plan was dropped.—AUTHOR.

‡ "North-China Herald," March 20th, 1899.

loans contracted abroad,* and there was no hope of pledging the rest in view of the aggressive attitude assumed by Germany in Shantung and by Italy over the question of an Italian naval station in China, which the Imperial Government had no other alternative but to resist with armed force. † It seemed impossible to straighten out the national finances. ‡

Under these circumstances it was, of course, childish for the foreigners to expect that decrees or the granting of special privileges § would check the growth of the traditional anti-foreign feeling. These palliatives could not reach the deep-rooted hatred and excitement which gripped the whole country, spreading like an epidemic and infecting thousands and thousands of people. Every night Christian villages were raided and burned, missionaries killed and missions plundered ¶. The emotional stimulus provoked a perverted form of religion. Religious sects sprang into being, which for some obscure reason took the name of "Boxers," || pledged to the extinction of the foreigners and foreign religions.

They assumed other titles also: the "Association for Justice and Harmony," the "Fist of Patriotic Union," and the "Big Swords," but they are best known under the collective title of "Boxers"—men who, in their imagination, through incantations and mystic rites, rendered themselves invulnerable, by sword, spear or bullet, through the spirits of the dead hovering over them. The leader of this sect openly described himself as a descendant of the Ming Emperors. **

* In 1895, just before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, the national debt of China on foreign loans amounted only to £300,000. During the war, and after, China had borrowed from the Foreign Powers £6,750,000 and £40,000,000. These £47,050,000 were guaranteed by the most effective sources of the Imperial revenue, the customs revenue and the revenue from Salt Gabelle and Likin Collectories.—H. B. Morse, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

† Imperial Decrees, May 26th, June 5th and 12th, 1899.

‡ In May 1899 the Imperial Government appointed one of the assistant Grand Secretaries and President of the Ministry of War, Kan-gui, as a High Commissioner to investigate the conduct of all officials and the possibility of an increase of provincial assessments. This commission aroused great indignation amongst the population owing to the high-handed actions on the part of this mandarin, known in the foreign press under the nickname "Lord High Extortioner." All his efforts of alleviating the financial difficulty of the Imperial Government were, of course, from beginning to end a complete failure.

§ "U.S. Foreign Relations," 1899, p. 154.

¶ "North-China Herald," August 28th, September 4th, November 6th and 20th, 1899.

|| *Ibid.* October 9th, 1899.

** Letter of Jung-lu to Hsu Ying-kwei, the Viceroy of Fukien, July 1900, cited by Bland and Backhouse, *op. cit.*, p. 246.

The inability of the Government to cope with the situation was apparent. In addition to the liquidation of the reform movement it was hopelessly entangled in the intricate problem of the succession to the Imperial Throne, which once more occupied the foremost place in China's internal politics. The Imperial Clan and Court were split into two parties: one headed by the well-known Jung-lu, in favour of the postponement of its solution according to the law of primogeniture, and the other by Prince Ching, a personal enemy of Jung-lu and chief personage among the ultra-conservatives, in favour of the immediate appointment of a successor to the Emperor Kuang Hsu, and his abdication.

The Empress Dowager herself was inclined to favour the latter, and, as a preliminary step to the proposed scheme, ordered a decree to be issued in the name of Kuang Hsu, dated September 4th, 1899, in which the latter was made to plead his bad state of health and to beg leave from the Empress Dowager to abdicate.* In this way it was expected to draw the teeth of the opponents of the Dynasty should the new movement assume dangerous proportions, but the results were contrary to expectation. A flood of memorials followed from Chinese officials and dignitaries,† to whom the meaning of the preliminary decree was clear, firmly demanding that the Emperor should abstain from his intention to abdicate. Moreover, the indecisiveness displayed for some time by the provincial authorities in the suppression of the Boxer movement became more accentuated.‡ The growing unpopularity of the Government and the possibility of an external war forced the officials to seek the sympathy of the masses on the spot. Imperial commands were disobeyed; troops sent from provinces less afflicted by the insurrection did their work half-heartedly§; military commanders could hardly be expected to act firmly against people whose aim was to drive out the common enemy—an enemy whose possible invasion they had to check.¶

The Imperial Government saw clearly that it was rapidly losing ground and that an end should be put to vacillation. It was at this juncture that the Empress Dowager cast aside all precedents and traditions which made the Chinese

* "North-China Herald," September 11th, 1899.

† "North-China Herald," December 4th, 1899.

‡ Jung-lu to Hsu Ying-kwei, *op. cit.*

§ "North-China Herald," December 4th, 1899.

¶ H. B. Morse, *op. cit.*, p. 178.

Emperors constitutional monarchs with a limited power rather than absolute autocrats. In defiance of the Grand Council's advice, and numerous protests of the censors, she ordered the announcement of the appointment of a successor to the Emperor Kuang Hsu and heir to the late Emperor Tung Shih. The selection fell on Paochun, the son of Tsai-yi—Prince Tyan—a youth of fourteen.*

The Gordian knot of the Imperial succession was cut. The high officials could still continue to protest against the "arbitrary" action of the Empress, † the scattered remnants of the unfortunate Reformists could exert themselves in spreading anti-dynastic pamphlets and memorialize the Throne ‡ upon the transgression by the Dynasty of the state canons, but the successor was appointed. That, from the specific Chinese point of view, was by far more important than any exhortations of a clique of malcontent officials or Reformers.

The firmness of the Empress failed her as soon as she approached the Boxer problem. Once more the Grand Council and her ministers divided themselves into two inimical factions—one against the Boxers and for their immediate suppression as a political party antagonistic at the bottom to the Dynasty: another in favour of the Boxers and for winning their sympathy.

This time the opinion of the Grand Council could not be disregarded as in the matter of the selection of an Heir Apparent to the Emperor, which, after all, according to the ancient traditions of the Chinese ruling houses, was a family affair. The destiny of the whole nation depended on the step to be taken, and the Grand Council, practically speaking, was the only channel by which the opinion of the nation on the subject could be ascertained. It was a link between the Throne and the population—a very imperfect link, but one which was sanctified by ancient custom.

The situation was still more complicated, since one of the parties, although in the minority, was headed by the all-powerful Jung-lu, who this time was supported by Prince Ching, his old enemy, and Yuan Shih-kai, Governor of Shantung, § with

* The decree announcing the appointment of the Ta Ah-ko or Heir Apparent was issued in the name of Kuang Hsu on January 24th, 1899. —H. B. Morse, *op. cit.*, p. 184.

† "North-China Herald," January 27th and 30th, 1900.

‡ Memorial of Kin Lien-shan and 1,230 others, *ibid.*, March 21st, 1900.

§ Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, June 4th, 1900, "U.S. Foreign Relations," 1900, p. 139.

large connections amongst the higher authorities in the Southern provinces.

Jung-lu expressed himself openly antagonistic to the Boxers. He ridiculed the idea of their invulnerability and their mystic rites, and saw in the whole movement a customary form of Chinese rebellion directed against the Government. He was inclined to see in the Boxers the "White Lily Sect" under another name, or even remote relations to the "Triads," whose ultimate aim was to overthrow the Dynasty and to plunder and loot the country.* In his opinion any further leniency displayed towards them or delay in their suppression would embroil China in an acute conflict with the Foreign Powers and result in catastrophe for the Dynasty and the nation.

The seriousness of these arguments was apparent, and the Empress hesitated.† The magic arts claimed by the Boxers were too clumsy to inspire any earnest belief in their efficiency; but their enthusiasm, and that of their leaders and supporters at the Court, appealed strongly to the impressionable and passionate nature of the Empress.

The pro-Boxers believed that the Boxers were sent by Heaven to save China in these critical times.‡ Manchu nobles and high ministers—foremost amongst them Prince Twan, Duke Lan, Hsu Tung, Changyi, Kangyi, and the commander of the Kansu troops, Tung Fu-siang—believed (and it would not be an exaggeration to say believed sincerely) in the possibility of using the Boxer movement for "driving foreigners into the sea." The Boxers were regarded as true patriots who had risen against the foreign invaders, and the Government was bound to treat them as such, in spite of certain excesses on their part against the provincial authorities. The movement had, therefore, to be encouraged, organized, and supplied with arms. The Boxers' readiness to fight and face death for their country could not be denied even by their opponents.§ Millions of people in the provinces were enlisted into train-bands, and with the large popular support which they already enjoyed the Imperial Government was able to raise an immense force.¶

* Jung-lu to Hsu Ying-kwei, *op. cit.*

† In the reign of Shun-ti of the Yuan Dynasty, A.D. 1333-1368, there were many heterodox cults which asserted that they could render themselves, through their magic arts, invulnerable.

‡ Princess Der Ling—"Two Years in the Forbidden City," p. 357.

§ Jung-lu to Hsu Ying-kwei, *op. cit.*

¶ *Ibid.*

For the Empress these ideas had still further and much deeper significance. She did not relax for a moment her attention to the superstition which surrounded the Boxers, for she herself was intensely superstitious—an attribute of her race and education—and knew better than anybody else its value in a popular movement. She was herself prepared to declaim their incantations, should this be necessary for the popularity of the movement amongst the masses.* She was fascinated by the idea of seeing North and South, Manchus and Chinese, reconciled and the whole nation united around the Throne, the stability of which, she could not be unaware, was shaken by the events which had passed before her own eyes during the fifty years of her regency. The Anglo-French War of 1860, the Taipings, the capitulation at Shimonoseki, Kiaochow, Port Arthur and Weihaiwei, the confusion arising out of the reforms, and the deposition of Kuang Hsu formed a perpetual source of disgrace and loss of face at the hands of the foreigners, who “in matters of vital principles ignored the sacred doctrines of the Sages; in matters of detail insulted customs and cherished beliefs of the Chinese people.”† She was captivated by the stupendousness and boldness of the plan of throwing the Chinese masses against the eternal enemies of China, who “trusted in the strength of their arms and forgot about the innumerableness of these masses.”‡

It was quite natural for her to be entirely obsessed by the idea of combining with this elementary movement and, by this act of self-denial of the sovereign power, sacrificing its prerogative for the sake of the country to reinstate the broken concord between the Throne and the nation. It is an idea which, under similar political and social circumstances, has always dominated the thoughts of all autocrats in Europe as well as Asia.

And while the Court, the Grand Council, the numerous Manchu and Chinese officials, and the population of the Capital passionately discussed the step to be taken in connection with the movement, the provinces said their word:—

“The Imperial Association of Justice and Harmony: you are summoned to meet on the 7th day of the 9th moon. Cherish the Dynasty, exterminate the foreigners!”

* Bland and Backhouse, *op. cit.*; Ching Shan, Diary, June 22nd, 1900.

† Ching Shan, Diary, June 20th, 1900.

‡ Empress Tsu Hsi's own words quoted by Ching Shan, *ibid.*

So ran the order of the Boxers,* and officials, gentry, soldiers and peasants were hastening under their banners.† The tide seized the Tsings and swept them upon the crest of the wave, ‡ and only the foreign diplomats at Peking continued to entertain any further illusions as to the nature of the movement.§ Reassuring decrees lulled their suspicions; ¶ the Imperial Government tried to win time and prepare itself for the coming struggle. On June 13th, 1900, the gates of the Capital were thrown open and the Boxers let in. Seven days later the Empress decreed the wholesale slaughter of foreigners and Christians in China. ||

The events which followed are well known. On June 17th the forts of Taku were seized by the combined landing parties of the Foreign Powers, and three days later, when this news reached Peking, the Empress Dowager summoned the Grand Council and, in the presence of the Emperor, the leading members of the Imperial Clan, the Princes Kung, Ching and Twan, princes of blood and dukes, the Manchu and Chinese co-presidents of the six ministries and nine courts, the lieutenants-general of the twenty-four Banner divisions, and the comptrollers of the Imperial household, made a long, and impassioned speech, inveighing against the insolence of the foreigners, their culminating insult being the despatch of the Foreign Ministers demanding her abdication and the reinstatement of the Emperor Kuang Hsu.**

* "North-China Herald," October 29th and November 13th, 1899.

† Hunan, Hupch, Yunnan, Kwangtung, Chekiang, Shantung, Chihli. The armies of Prince Ching—50,000; Prince Twan—10,000; the Imperial Guard under Kangui—12,000, etc.

‡ Jung-lu's telegrams to the Viceroy of Canton, Nanking and Wuchang, June 22nd, 1900.

§ Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, May 21st, 1900, China No. 3, 1900, pp. 103, 109; "U.S. Foreign Relations," 1900, p. 129, *Doc. Dip.*, 1900, p. 24.

¶ Imperial Decrees, May 17th, 24th, 29th and 30th, 1900.

|| On June 20th, 1900, the Empress issued a secret decree addressed to all high officials in the Empire, which ran as follows:—"Slay all foreigners whosoever you find them; even though they be prepared to leave your province, yet must they be slain." The Governors of Shansi and Honan, together with the high officials in Mongolia, received the edict in a very different form, for the word "slay" had been changed to "protect." Both Ministers, Yuan Chang and Hsu Ching, responsible for this alteration were, by order of the Empress, summarily executed.—AUTHOR.

** On the morning of June 19th, 1900, the leading foreign newspaper in China, "The North-China Daily News," published an editorial denouncing the Chinese Government in strong terms and urging the Foreign Powers to take measures and drive out "the usurping Government" with the Empress Regent at its head. This editorial was telegraphed to Peking and shown to the Empress as a despatch emanating from the Diplomatic Body.—AUTHOR.

The only voices against war were those of the Manchu Lishan and the Chinese Yuan Chang and Hsu Ching, who were soon to pay for their boldness with their lives.* The foreign envoys, with their families, their staffs, the guards, and all foreigners were ordered to leave the Capital for Tientsin, but before they were able to move they were besieged in their legations by the angry mob. War on all Foreign Powers was declared. Nobody thought of the consequences of this step, as nobody thought seriously of the coming struggle. The few individuals who boldly stated the folly and the deficiency of means at the disposal of the Imperial Government to fight the whole world paid, as we have said, with their lives.

The awakening was terrible. • The hordes of Boxers and undisciplined soldiers swarmed like locusts in the streets of Peking, killing, looting and plundering the Capital. Thousands of native Christians perished at the swords of executioners; missionaries, with their wives and children, were pitilessly tortured and massacred; but as far as the actual fight against the foreigners was concerned, the Boxers proved to be utterly worthless and, besides killing one foreign Minister and Chancellor, could not claim a single success. †

The few foreigners besieged in the legations stubbornly resisted all the attacks of the combined forces of Boxers and regular troops, and hundreds of "invulnerables" fell before their improvised barricades, whilst the only man able to overcome their resistance, Jung-lu, under the ridiculous excuse of the "sacredness of the persons of foreign envoys," refused to take arms against them.

On July 14th the allied troops by assault took Tientsin. Gloom and despair filled the hearts of the inhabitants of the Capital. The Viceroy of Nanking, Wuchang, Canton, and Foochow, and the Governors of Shantung, Anhwei and Kiangsu, following the entreaties of Jung-lu, declared their neutrality and pledged themselves to suppress any disorder in their provinces. ‡ To retreat was too late. § Neither the semi-truce declared on July 14th nor the subsequent peace negotiations could alter the general situation by one iota.

* H. B. Morse, *op. cit.*, p. 220.

† Baron von Ketteler, German Minister, killed by a Manchu soldier on June 20th; and Mr. Sugiyama, Chancellor of the Japanese Legation, killed by Tung Fu-siang's troops on June 10th.

‡ Jung-lu's despatch to Yuan Shih-kai, the Governor of Shantung, dated June 22nd, sent by a courier, with the request to forward it to the Viceroy of Canton, Nanking and Wuchang.

§ Ching Shan, Diary, August 6th, 1900.

On July 29th the attack on the legations was renewed with increased force, but with the same success; and on August 12th the first news of a complete defeat of the Imperial troops defending the approaches to the Capital and the suicide of their commanders reached the Capital.*

On August 14th Peking awakened to the sound of a remote cannonade. After much delay and disconcerted action the allied forces of the Japanese, Russians, British, Americans and French, with a small detachment of Austrians and Italians, appeared before the Capital and began the attack. At noon the Tungpien Gate was taken by the Russians, and at 3 p.m. the Americans hoisted their flag on the wall of the Tartar City.

On the next day, at the early Hour of the Tiger (about 3 a.m.) three common carts left the sacred precincts of the Forbidden City carrying the Empress and the Emperor dressed as peasants in blue cloth garments. No suite followed them except three Grand Councillors on horseback.

The carts, blocked from all sides by the stream of fugitives from the Capital, moved very slowly. With the utmost difficulty they reached the gates and took the road towards the North, leaving behind them in the darkness the agonizing Capital, † the palaces and the deep well in which the beautiful Pearl Concubine was dying for the Imperial dignity of one of the last Tsings.

Before leaving the palace the Empress Tsu Hsi ordered all the Court ladies to appear before her. The Pearl Concubine came with the rest and dared to suggest that the Emperor should remain in Peking. The Empress was in no mood for argument. Without a moment's hesitation, she shouted to the eunuchs on duty: "Throw this wretched minion down the well!"

At this the Emperor fell on his knees in supplication, but the Empress angrily bade him desist. "Let her die at once," she said, "as a warning to all undutiful children and to those 'hsias' (birds) who, when fledged, peck out their own mothers' eyes. . . ." So the eunuchs took the Pearl Concubine and cast her down the large well outside the Palace. ‡

* The Viceroy of Chihli, Yu Lu, and General Li Peng-heng.

† Ching Shan, Diary, August 15th, 1900.

‡ *Ibid.*

CHAPTER III

TRIUMPH AND FALL OF THE TSING DYNASTY

ONE day, when the siege of the foreign legations was in full progress, Jung-lu, the *chevalier sans peur et sans reproche* (who after the flight of the Court, to Sianfu remained in Peking rallying his scattered troops), asked the Empress what she would do if the Boxers were defeated. In reply the Empress, being a scholar of no mean rank, cited the words of Chia-yi, a sophist of the Han Dynasty, said by him in reference to the Court's diplomacy *vis-à-vis* the Khan of the Hans:—

“If the Emperor wishes to gain the allegiance of other countries, he can only do so by convincing their rulers that he possesses the three cardinal virtues of government and by displaying the five allurements.

“These allurements are : (1) Presents of chariots and rich robes, to tempt the eye ; (2) Rich food and banquets, to tempt the palate; (3) Musical maidens, to tempt the ear ; (4) Fine houses, to tempt the instinct of luxury ; and (5) The presence of the Emperor at the table of the foreign ruler, to tempt his pride.

“The three cardinal virtues of government are: (1) To simulate affection; (2) To express honeyed sentiments; (3) To treat one's inferiors as equals.” *

Two years ago, added the Empress, she had invited the ladies of the foreign legations to her Court and she noticed their delight at the splendid reception accorded to them, although they were all united against her on account of the deposition of the Emperor and suppression of the reforms.†

The Empress did not make any mention whatever about her own subjects and the course to be taken in connection with the possible outburst of popular indignation as a result of the defeat of the Imperial armies and the capture of Peking. She was far from any idea of responsibility as far as her own country was concerned, though only a few months ago

* Ching Shan, Diary, July 13th, 1900.

† *Ibid.*

she had trembled before the same idea in the matter of succession to the unpopular Emperor. She was sure of the loyalty of her subjects. She formed an indissoluble part of the nation, animated by a single feeling of hatred against the foreigners and united in a single motive to "drive them into the sea." In her opinion the only factor with which the Chinese Throne had to reckon in the event of defeat was the Foreign Powers, and we must admit her judgment was correct.

Never in the history of the Tsing Dynasty had the principle of the Imperial power in China been so strong as during the period of the Boxer movement and just after the fall of Peking, when the Capital and Imperial palaces were mercilessly looted and plundered,* thousands of innocent people killed in a wild orgy of slaughter, † and the best Chinese patriots executed under pressure of enlightened foreign diplomats. ‡ The atrocities committed in 1860, all the acts of the utmost cruelty committed by the Chinese against native Christians and missionaries in the rapture of hatred and rage, were nothing in comparison to the cold-blooded massacres committed by the Germans during their punitive expeditions ordered by Field-Marshal Count Waldersee at the express command of his august Master §; and it may be in the eyes of true Christians

* Putnam Weale: "Indiscreet Letters from Peking," pp. 227-301.

† McCarthy: "The Coming Power," p. 95; U.S. War Department Report, 1901, IV, pp. 482, 487.

‡ Lord Salisbury to Mr. Hardinge, September 29th, 1900, China No. 1, p. 175; "U.S. Foreign Relations," 1901, App., p. 23; Mr. Hill to Baron Speck von Sternberg, September 21st, 1900; "U.S. Foreign Relations," 1900, App., p. 24; Mr. Whitehead to Lord Salisbury, September 22nd, 1900; China No. 1, 1901, p. 180; Wu Ting-fang to State Department, October 2nd, 1900; "U.S. Foreign Relations," 1900, App., p. 25; *ibid.* p. 25; Memorandum of French Ambassador, October 10th, 1900; China No. 5, 1901, p. 5; "U.S. Foreign Relations," 1901, App., p. 26; Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, October 27th, 1900, "U.S. Foreign Relations," 1901, App., p. 43.

§ On July 27th, 1900, the German Emperor, addressing the first detachment of the expeditionary forces being despatched to China from Bremerhaven, said as follows:—

"When you meet the foe you will defeat him. No quarter will be given, no prisoners will be taken. Let all who fall into your hands be at your mercy. Just as the Huns a thousand years ago, under the leadership of Attila, gained a reputation by virtue of which they still live in historical tradition, so may the name of Germany become known in such a manner in China that no Chinese will ever again dare to look askance at a German."

Report of the Tientsin Provisional Government, December 20th, 1900; Decennial Reports, pp. 526, 527, 528; Lord Lansdowne to Sir E. Satow, January 1st, 1901; China No. 6, 1901, p. 1; General Chaffee to Adjutant-General, November 20th, 1900; "U.S. War Department Reports," 1901, IV, p. 450; Roster of all expeditions made by allied forces, December 12th, 1900, to May 10th, 1901; German Headquarters, Peking, Winter Palace, May 10th, 1901, in U.S. War Department Reports, 1901, IV., p. 495.

the profanation of the very principle of Christianity on the part of some Christian workers in China, who had taken into their own hands the matter of punishing the Boxers and had constituted themselves, at the same time, prosecuting attorneys and judges and had executed the writs of their own courts.*

The stern severity of the action taken by the Allied Powers, especially the Germans, for the suppression of the Boxer movement in 1900-1901 in China set up a deep feeling of resentment which forced Manchus and Chinese, North and South, to forget for a moment their dissension and to unite themselves around the Throne, the humiliation of which symbolized the humiliation of the entire nation. The opposition subsided. Expressions of loyalty, assertions of readiness to serve the Throne and to die for its sake began to arrive from all quarters.† The Yangtze viceroys and governors of Shantung‡ and Hupeh, who after the flight of the Court to Sianfu virtually held the power in the State, formed a solid front against any attempt on the part of the Foreign Powers to hold the Empress Tsu Hsi responsible for the Boxer movement, and demanded entire immunity for her person.§

Most of these officials were Chinese by birth and opponents of Boxerism as an "utopia" which could never be realized. Their stand *vis-à-vis* the Throne could not even be shaken by the apparently provocative steps on the part of the Court, which dismissed from Sianfu several of them and appointed in their place Manchus.¶

It is to be regretted that the foreign envoys at Peking were far from realizing the actual position which existed at that time in China and sincerely believed that Her Majesty, the Empress Tsu Hsi, in Sianfu, was entirely in the hands of

*H.B. Morse, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 314. General Chaffee to Mr. Conger, October 23rd, 1900, U.S. War Department Reports, 1901, IV, p. 463.

†As a striking example of the feeling which at that time animated the Chinese, we may point to the instance of Hsu Chih-chung, a noted Reformer, one of the many who by the Empress's decree was condemned to life imprisonment. He was released by the allies after the capture of Peking in August 1900. He refused, however, to accept liberty at the hands of foreigners and promptly proceeded to Taiyuanfu, the place where at that time the Imperial Family had its sojourn, and handed himself over to Chinese Justice. (Hsu Chih-chung was a Chinese, and a native of Kwangtung.)—AUTHOR.

‡Yuan Shih-kai.

§Consul Warren to Lord Salisbury, August 18th, 1900; China No. 1, 1901, p. 95; Viceroys to Lo Feng-lu, August 21st, *ibid.* p. 99; Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, September 30th, *ibid.* p. 200.

¶Consul Warren to Lord Salisbury, October 6th, 1900; China No. 5, 1901, p. 7; "North-China Herald," October 24th, 31st, 1900.

pro-Boxers, who prevented her from acting freely and from punishing the Princes Twan, Chung and the Commander of the Kiangsu troops, Tung Fu-siang, whom they eagerly wished to see beheaded.*

The Chinese Imperial Government realized more than ever its popularity amongst the masses and their extreme readiness to continue the fight in spite of the *débâcle*. The scattered remnants of the Boxers spread the news of the atrocities committed by the "foreign devils" in Peking, and the country breathed vengeance.

But the same Government now realized that there was no means of carrying on the struggle at the present juncture, and by a temporary capitulation hoped to win time and consolidate its forces.† It was not afraid of punishing the mandarins, as required by the Foreign Powers, but it naturally wished to save them. In its eyes, as well as in the opinion of the whole country, they were true patriots, having fearlessly followed the commands of their Sovereigns and the wishes of their nation. The Chinese Government was able to inflict any punishment and sacrifice on any of its functionaries and at the same time be justified, in public opinion and the law of the realm, as were justified the Yangtze viceroys and the governors of Shantung, Anhwei and Shensi, who suppressed Boxers in their provinces during the movement.‡

It was the custom of the Chinese emperors to punish no less promptly and certainly than they rewarded; and a minister or a commander who did not at once succeed, or who failed to carry out his promises, or even boasts, was degraded and otherwise punished more or less severely.

This doctrine of public responsibility was the keynote of the entire administrative and judicial system of the Chinese State under the emperors, which strictly adhered to the maxim that if there is a wrong there must be someone responsible, liable to be punished, with little regard for western ideas as to evidence or extenuating circumstances. The senior members of the family were liable for crimes

*Sir E. Satow to Lord Salisbury, October 30th, 1900, *ibid.*, p. 55; "North-China Herald," November 21st and 28th, 1900.

†Wang Wen-shao, Grand Secretary, Diary, September 8th, 1900.

‡The Viceroys Chang Chih-tung of Wuchang and Liu Kan-yi of Nanking, and the Governor of Shantung, Yuan Shih-kai, issued early in June stringent orders to arrest all members of the Boxer party and execute them promptly on the spot.—"North-China Herald," June 13th and 27th, 1900.

committed by their juniors, and *vice versa*; members of a household, slaves and servants were all liable for offences of other members of the same household; neighbour for neighbour, and so on, extending and developing this principle until the head of the village was responsible for every person in his village, the viceroy and governor of a province for his subordinate officials and provincials, and the Emperor for the entire nation. It could exhaust the mandate of Heaven and make it lawful for its subjects to rise and overthrow it.

In face of this doctrine it was not only easy to make each Boxer responsible for the failure of the scheme for freeing China from foreign invasion, but also imperative to punish them in order to restore the equilibrium between the evil and good should the Throne itself not wish to assume any responsibility for the collapse of the movement.

At the end of February 1901, nearly two months after the Chinese plenipotentiaries had accepted the draft note of the Peking Protocol, the Foreign Ministers forwarded the final list of officials designated by them for punishment. This list contained one hundred names. Ten had to be executed, and the rest cashiered and exiled.

The Imperial Government succeeded in saving the lives of three of those sentenced to death—Prince Twan, Duke Lan and Tung Fu-siang,* who were degraded, banished and imprisoned for life; but the rest had to die.

By a decree issued in the Emperor's name, Prince Chuang, previously cashiered, was, as a mark of special clemency, ordered to commit suicide. The Governor of Shansi, Yu-hsien, already cashiered and on his way to banishment in Turk-estan, was ordered to be instantly decapitated. The Grand Councillor Chao Shu-chiao, one of the favourite ministers of the Empress Dowager, and the Grand Councillor Ying Nien were ordered to commit suicide; the Grand Councillor Chi Hsien and a son of the Grand Secretary, Hsu-tung, were sentenced to decapitation. Posthumous decapitation, a grievous disgrace in the eyes of the Chinese, was ordered for Kang-yi. All died with perfect calmness and dignity, loyal to their

* The saving of these lives was in no small degree due to the generosity of the American and Russian Governments, which declared that the effusion of blood should cease, and no more heads should be required from China for the siege of the legations, only the officials in the provinces receiving punishment for the massacres of missionaries.—Mr. Rockhill to Mr. Hay, February 28th, 1901, "U.S. Foreign Relations," 1901, App., p. 94.

Sovereign and the canons of their national sages, and their last words were passed from mouth to mouth :—

“Remember that it is your duty to do everything in your power for your country; at all costs these foreigners must not be allowed to possess themselves of the glorious Empire won for us by our ancestors.”

These were the last words of Prince Chuang addressed to his son. After that he proceeded to the death chamber, where a silken cord was hung from a beam of the roof. Fearlessly and calmly he passed the cord around his neck, and in a very few minutes life was extinct.* It was a triumph of the Imperial authority; it was a wreath of martyrdom which crowned the Boxer movement in the eyes of the nation.

And yet it was obvious that the Imperial power had ceased to be a reality in China. Since that moment when the three carts carried into exile the Empress Dowager and the unfortunate Emperor Kuang Hsu, it was an empty sound without real significance, a shadow of the past glory of the Chinese Throne.

The Convention signed on behalf of China by Yik Wang, Prince of the first rank, Chieng, and the Earl Li Hung-chang, who, since the beginning of the Boxer rebellion, tried in vain to negotiate peace between China and the Powers,† on September 7th, 1901, and which later became known as the Peking Protocol of 1901, presents in itself a very peculiar document. At the beginning of the Boxer movement the Foreign Powers declared that no state of war existed between them and the Chinese nation, and that the Powers, in sending their troops into China for the defence of their nationals and assistance of the Chinese Government in suppressing the Boxers and restoring peace, had no intention whatever to fight the Chinese, and still less to conquer China.‡

This attitude was modified by the actual course of events, some of them beyond Allied control, and the Protocol plainly regarded China as a belligerent. Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, and 10 provided for the reparation due for the murder of Baron von Ketteler, German Minister at

*Bland and Backhouse, *op. cit.*, pp. 371, 373.

†Lord Salisbury to M. Delcasse; Sir C. Scott to Lord Salisbury, June 24th, 1900, China No. 3, 1900, p. 73; M. de Reverseaux to M. Delcasse, June 22nd, 1900; Mr. Barriers to same, June 22nd, 1900; M. Jules Cambon to same, June 23rd, 1900, Documents Diplomatiques, pp. 50, 52.

‡Declaration of Foreign Admirals at Taku, June 20th, 1900. Admiral Bruce to Admiralty, Taku, June 20th-21-st., 1900, China No. 3, 1900, p. 70; Interchange of Notes between the Cabinets of London, St. Petersburg, Paris, Washington, Vienna and Rome, Documents Diplomatiques, pp. 50, 52.

Peking. An Imperial Prince of first rank, Chun, born brother of the Emperor, had to go to Germany and express in person to the German Emperor the regret of the Chinese Emperor and Government for his assassination. A monument and an arch must be erected on the scene of the murder, with an inscription expressing regret and condemnation of the act. The highest ministers of the State and officials must be decapitated or banished, and their estates confiscated.

Most detailed provisions were inserted as regards the punishment of the officials in the provinces who executed the lawful orders of their Sovereigns and put to death the "foreign barbarians" and the traitors to the Chinese State, the native converts.

As a further punishment for the acts committed by order of the lawful Chinese Government, public examinations for the official degrees, which constituted the foundation of Chinese official and public life, were suspended in forty-five cities for five years (Art. 10). An envoy extraordinary, Natung, had to go to Tokyo to express to the Emperor of Japan regret for the murder of Mr. Sugiyama, Chancellor of the Japanese Legation at Peking, and expiatory monuments with suitable inscriptions were to be erected on all Christian cemeteries where foreign graves had been desecrated.

In the meantime, however, Article 5 prohibited the importation of arms and war material for two years, and Article 6 imposed heavy indemnities on China. China had to pay about £67,500,000, or Tls. 450,000,000,* to the Foreign Powers in settlement of damages suffered by their nationals at the hands of the Boxers and in satisfaction of claims in connection with their expeditions into China.†

This sum, out of any proportion to the actual loss suffered by the Foreign Powers except America, Great Britain and

*In addition to this already heavy burden, this sum was expressly declared to be a gold debt at the rate of three shillings, and corresponding rates in other currencies, for one tael.

† Out of this sum Russia received Tls. 130,371,120; Germany Tls. 90,070,595; France Tls. 70,878,240; Great Britain Tls. 50,620,545; Japan Tls. 34,793,100; U.S. of America Tls. 32,939,055; Italy Tls. 26,617,005; Belgium Tls. 8,484,345; Austria-Hungary Tls. 3,979,520; Netherlands Tls. 800,000; Portugal Tls. 278,055; other claims, Tls. 100,000. In 1908 the unpaid portion of indemnity due to America was remitted by her to China, on condition that the money so remitted should be devoted to education. Furthermore, the U.S. of America was the only Power which restored to China all silver seized by the American troops in the Yamen of the Salt Commissioner in Tientsin, which was equivalent to G.\$376,000, while all other Powers which seized very considerable sums in silver under similar circumstances retained it.—AUTHOR.

Japan,* was to be paid within thirty-nine years, with interest at four per cent. per annum, which brought the whole amount to be paid to the huge sum of Tls. 982,238,150, and the amount of the total national indebtedness of China on foreign loans to about Tls. 715,000,000, or £107,191,361, which she was not apparently able to pay without resorting to the flotation of new foreign loans, and so on *ad infinitum*.

All these payments were secured by revenues from the Maritime Customs, plus the proceeds of increased tariffs on foreign imports, which were raised to 5 per cent.†; by the revenues of the Native Customs at each Treaty port, which were to be thereafter administered by the Maritime Customs under foreign supervision, and the balance of the salt revenue, which also had to be controlled by the foreigners. In consideration of this re-adjustment of the tariffs, China was made to pay for the improvement of the channels of the Peiho and Hwangpu, which, in theory, had to facilitate navigation both of foreign and Chinese shipping, but in practice benefited mostly the foreigners.

Furthermore, Article 7. stipulated that "the quarter occupied by the legations shall be considered as one specially reserved for their use and placed under their exclusive control, in which Chinese shall not have the right to reside, and which may be made defensible."

The Powers grasped the opportunity of enlarging the territory of this quarter by seizing more than one hundred and ten acres, including the site of the Imperial Carriage Park, a property valued alone at many millions of taels. This compound, in the heart of the Capital, was transformed into a strong fortress able to range its guns at the Forbidden City and dictate to its inhabitants its will.

This fortress, commanding the most important strategical points of the Capital, was by far superior in arms and equipment (2,100 "Legation Guards," with 30 guns and 31 machine-guns) to the poorly-armed and drilled Chinese banner-men, particularly in view of the provisions of the next two Articles of the Protocol, which provided for the demolition of the forts at Taku, and "those which might impede free communication between Peking and the sea," and the right of the Foreign Powers to occupy with their detachments certain places along the Peking-

*H. B. Morse, *op. cit.*, p. 354.

†The tariff of 5 per cent. which existed since the first treaties, and which was based on the obsolete values of 1858 (1), was corrected in China's favour to the basis of the years 1897-99, excluding opium.—*Ibid.*, p. 369.

Tientsin Railway (Articles 8 and 9), twelve in all, including Shanhaikwan. The strength of these detachments was not determined, and was left to the discretion of the Powers concerned.

The Imperial Government was bound (Article 10) to publish during two years in all district cities "certain Imperial decrees already issued" prohibiting membership in any anti-foreign society; enumerating the punishments inflicted on the guilty; warning the provincial authorities that they would be held personally responsible for any anti-foreign troubles or other infractions of the Treaties.

China agreed in advance (Article 11) to "the amendments deemed necessary by the foreign governments" to the existing treaties, and that the Office of Foreign Affairs (Tsungli Yamen) should be transformed into a Ministry, and that special "ceremonial" had to be applied at the reception of foreign representatives. The Allied Forces, except the Legation Guards, had to evacuate Peking not later than September 17th, and troops stationed elsewhere in the province of Chiji, except those garrisoning the twelve points enumerated in Article 9, not later than September 22nd, 1900. Finally, it was declared that as the Protocol, with its annexes, originated with the Foreign Powers, "the French text only is authoritative."

The policy of the Chinese Imperial Government, under the immediate influence of the Empress Tsu Hsi,* in counteracting the disastrous effects of the Peking Protocol and the reinstatement of China's sovereignty, proceeded along the lines defined by the celebrated sophist of the Han Dynasty, Chia-yi, cited by her to Jung-lu, and given at the beginning of this Chapter.

In all her actions the Empress adhered strictly to this specifically Chinese political philosophy and firmly refused to deviate from its maxims, as had been frequently done by one of her greatest statesmen, Li Hung-chang, who in his dealings with the foreigners adopted their methods and who, therefore, has never been understood and liked by his fellow countrymen.

The Empress Tsu Hsi realized full well that as a Chinese Sovereign she could not discard the ancient traditions of the State or become for a moment estranged from her subjects.

*Bland and Backhouse, *op. cit.*, p. 359.

She also realized that there was no hope of alluring the Foreign Powers with presents of chariots and rich robes or musical maidens, following the primitive methods depicted by the cunning diplomatist of the Han Dynasty, but she knew very well that there was still ample opportunity of displaying the three cardinal virtues of government—to simulate affection, to express honeyed sentiments, and to treat one's inferiors as equals.

At noon on January 7th, 1902, the solemn Imperial *cortège* entered the Capital. The streets were lined with troops, who knelt reverently before the Imperial sedan chairs. As the Empress Dowager was borne past the balcony on which the party from the legations stood she leaned forward in her chair and returned their salutations with evident cordiality.*

On the 28th day of January the Foreign Ministers were received, in an audience which was conducted "with more formality and dignity and with a greater outward show of respect for the foreign representatives than heretofore." † The Empress appeared at the audience in person, and not behind a curtain as before. Three days later she received the ladies of the diplomatic corps, asked that those who went through the siege should be presented to her, and showed "great feeling in greeting these ladies and wept as she spoke to them." ‡

The beginning was made, but neither the Empress nor her suite nor ministers could deceive themselves as to the effectiveness of all these courtesies to erase from the memory of the foreigners the events of the Boxer movement and the part played in it by the Court.§ They realized that only extraordinary commercial and political advantages could induce them to lift the pressure, and not only help to reinstate the Imperial authority in China, but

* Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, January 7th, 1902, "U.S. Foreign Relations," 1912, p. 142.

† Same to same, February 5th, 1902, *ibid.*, p. 205

‡ *Ibid.*

§ Imperial Edict of February 13th, 1901, ordered the withdrawal and cancellation of all documents issued under the Imperial seal which evidenced the active participation of the Imperial Government in the Boxer movement. At the same time the son of Prince Twan, the Heir Apparent, was deposed from his high office and a decree informed the public that the selection of an heir to the disconsolate spirit of the Emperor Tung Chih would be postponed "until a suitable candidate should be found." The Empress was well aware that it was impossible to reconcile the foreign Powers with the heir to the Throne and future Emperor, the son of a man whom they considered as the one most responsible for the Boxer movement, and she decided to sacrifice the sacred law of succession to the interests of the moment.—AUTHOR.

to become its ardent supporters. This meant, of course, nothing else but a return to the reform programme of the Emperor Kuang Hsu, whereby all the existing obstacles to foreign trade would be removed and the Chinese population taught to consume foreign commodities in such quantities and manner as would transform China into a suitable market for Western products. It was a very risky step; the anti-foreign feeling still continued to run high, but there was no other way left to the Imperial Government of reaching the desired effect. It had to "simulate affection and express honeyed sentiments," and persuade the foreigners that China was going to introduce reforms after the Western model.

At the beginning of February 1901 the Imperial Government accepted the terms of the Peking Protocol, and almost simultaneously the Empress caused an edict to be issued in the name of the Emperor Kuang Hsu, entitled "A Penitent Decree",* in which she approached the question of the reforms, stating that "friendly relations with Foreign Powers and freedom of speech and employment of trustworthy servants are to be encouraged, while the taxation shall be rearranged in such a manner as to enable the repayment of foreign indemnities."

The commercial treaties negotiated with the Foreign Powers one year and a half later, according to the terms of the Peking Protocol,† proceeded exactly along the lines indicated in this edict, and provided for reforms enabling the free movement of foreign commodities into China. The Imperial Government agreed that "all barriers collecting likin (provincial duty) or such like dues or duties were to be permanently abolished"‡—a measure which was largely advertised as a beneficial one for China, but which, in fact, in the absence of an efficient Civil Service in the country, was advantageous only to the Foreign Powers.§

Under the same treaties the latter received an extension of bonding privileges and additional facilities for inland steam navigation, which made them virtually masters over all main waterways in China. Mukden, Antung and Tatungkow

* February 13th, 1901.

† Great Britain—September 5th, 1902; U.S. of America and Japan—October 8th, 1903.

‡ British Treaty, 1902, Article VIII; and American Treaty, 1903, Article IV.

§ In view of the difference of opinion amongst the Foreign Powers, this clause has never been put into operation.—AUTHOR.

in Manchuria, Changsha in the province of Hunan, and Kongs-moon were opened to foreign trade as Treaty Ports.

The treaties also included provisions which guided China further along the path of reforms, the gist of which again was to foster foreign trade. They provided for the introduction of a uniform national coinage and uniform national currency; for unification of the weights and measures; for the right of foreigners to engage themselves in mining enterprises on an equal footing with the Chinese; and for judicial reforms. China was assured that Great Britain and America would "be prepared to relinquish extraterritoriality rights when satisfied that the state of the Chinese laws, the arrangements for their administration and other considerations warranted them in doing so."*

All these provisions were undoubtedly perfect if China were in possession of the necessary silver and gold to introduce a national coinage and uniform currency and of sufficient experts to supervise the introduction of the unification of weights and measures in her vast provinces and the complicated reform of her judicial system. But all these provisions were, none the less, undoubtedly bad and detrimental to Chinese interests if in order to put them into effect China had to invite foreign capital and foreign experts—expensive and enjoying exceptional privileges; if the Chinese capitalists had no experience nor sufficient funds to compete with the foreign companies in the exploitation of China's mineral resources.

As for the rest, the Foreign Powers agreed that China might prohibit the importation of morphia and of instruments for its injection, unless imported for medical purposes.† This importation was heretofore free, and, in addition to opium, served to complete the ruin of China's national health. For this generosity the Chinese Government had to pay dearly: it was to grant full protection to missionaries and their work. The American missionary societies received the right to hold property in all parts of the Empire, which caused a new stream of Christian workers to enter China and a new spasm of anti-foreignism amongst the Chinese.‡

* Sino-British Treaty, 1902, Article XII; Sino-American Treaty, 1903, Article XV.

† British Treaty, 1902, Article XI; American Treaty, 1903, Article XVI.

‡ "U.S. Foreign Relations," 1902, p. 159., *seq.*; 1904, 200, *seq.*; 1906, p. 308, *seq.*

On the other hand, two decrees—dated February 1st, 1902, and issued in the sole name of the Empress Dowager—abolished the old prohibition of inter-marriage between the Chinese and Manchus and reprobated the ancient custom of binding the women's feet; and on January 10th it was Imperially commanded "to classify the members of the Hanlin Academy according to their abilities and re-establish the Imperial University at Peking, abolished in 1898."*

The Shansi Governor was permitted to enter into independent negotiations with Dr. Timothy Richard, the well-known American philanthropist and educator, who acted as a missionary in that province, for the establishment of an educational system along Western lines, for the maintenance of which the province bound itself to furnish the necessary funds. This was done in order to liberate the province from punishment for the cruelties committed on the missionaries and native converts by the population during the Boxer movement.† Finally, the Central Government itself established a Ministry of Education and adopted a scheme whereby many Chinese students were sent abroad to study Western science.

• All these measures, however, failed to produce the desired effect. The grip in which the foreign Powers held China was not relaxed, whilst the Imperial authority was losing with every new reform the sense of its existence for the country as a unifying political factor. It was, rather, a burden on the provinces, which had now to contribute heavily to its maintenance.

The futility of all efforts of the Imperial Government was apparent. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 demonstrated once more its entire helplessness to save the territory and dignity of China from encroachment on the part of the foreigners, while the loss of its authority amongst the masses, with every innovation undermining the fundamental doctrines of the national sages, became a matter which seriously alarmed the Court.

On December 30th, 1906, an Imperial decree raised Confucius from the level of the Sun and Moon, which, in the ranks of the Chinese deities, were entitled to the worship of the ministers of the State—to the level of the Heaven and

* The highest educational and scientific institution of China under the Tsing Dynasty.—AUTHOR.

† In consequence of this scheme the province was relieved from any punishment according to the Peking Protocol, and a University in Taiyuanfu, the provincial Capital, and schools in principal cities were established.—AUTHOR.

Earth, to which the Sovereigns alone made sacrificial offerings. A college, devoted exclusively to the perpetuation of his teaching, was established at Kufow-hsien in Shantung, the birth-place of the Sage, and on January 14th, 1907, an Imperial decree declared that Western teaching was to be subordinate to Chinese studies.

Meanwhile, the vast majority of the Chinese population accepted all the innovations with absolute indifference, although members of the radical groups made all efforts to stir up fresh troubles in connection with the increased and novel taxes introduced by the provincial authorities to make good the deficiency in the provincial treasuries caused by the necessity of the maintenance of the Imperial Court and Government at Peking.

The foreign settlements and concessions in the Treaty Ports became hot-beds of radical activity. Here, under the protection of the foreign authorities, the leaders exerted themselves in preaching against the Manchu Dynasty as a foreign one, and the Confucian ethics as serving it to enslave the Chinese nation.* From the Treaty Ports the flood of anti-dynastic propaganda swept all over the country; but while the success of all endeavours to revive anti-dynastic feelings amongst the masses was very doubtful in most parts of China, it was strikingly effective amongst the Chinese emigrants, whose anti-foreign tendencies had in course of their sojourn abroad become almost extinct.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen and his followers, having settled themselves in Japan, found there a very hospitable reception. They carried on a very effective revolutionary work in the Straits Settlements, the Malay Peninsula and in the United States. The rich merchants in Penang, San Francisco and Singapore contributed large sums to the support of this campaign,† but the main support which the party received came from the Japanese Government, which at that time was hastily preparing itself for the coming struggle with Russia. Anyone who knows Japan at all will understand that any activity on the part of the Chinese revolutionaries established in Japan could proceed only with the express consent of the Japanese Government,‡ which otherwise

* Kotenev: "Shanghai: Its Mixed Court and Council," p. 109.

† James Cantlie and C. Sheridan Jones: "Sun Yat-sen and the Awakening of China," p. 51.

‡ Dr. Sun Yat-sen, "Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary," pp. 196, 197.

would never have tolerated the presence of a foreign revolutionary organization in its territory.*

Since the Sino-Japanese War of 1895 the policy of the Chinese Imperial Government *vis-à-vis* Russia aroused great suspicion in Tokio. The Japanese Government had good grounds to believe that in spite of strenuous denials on the part of both the Imperial Court at Peking and the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, they were secretly proceeding to discuss terms of settlement in respect to Manchuria and Korea.† The fall of the Tsing Dynasty was a question of prime importance for Japan, for she realized full well that the irreconcilability of China's policy in the matter of these two countries, which had to form the Japanese outposts on the continent, could only cease with the disappearance of the Tsings from the political stage of China.

The striking victory of Japan over Russia in 1905 made beyond any doubt a very deep impression on China. It was the first time in the history of her intercourse with the white races that a European Power was so hopelessly defeated by an Asiatic nation. It was an example of what could be achieved by the Chinese if they would adopt the Western learning, reform their army, dress themselves in European clothes and cut their cues. It was also an example of the might of a national unification and properly-led national movement, which China lacked in 1900. The first manifestation of the newly-aroused feelings was the boycott of American trade in May 1905, declared in reply to the restrictive measures adopted by America in respect to Chinese immigration into the United States. It was a great popular movement engineered from Canton and San Francisco, and secretly supported and encouraged from Peking, which lasted over five months and which taught the Chinese to realize deeply that the principle revealed by the Boxer movement was quite correct and that China's power was not in her armies or diplomats, but only in her masses.‡

**Ibid.*, p. 194.

†"The Times," January 3rd, 1901; Sir C. Scott to Lord Lansdowne, January 6th; Lord Lansdowne to Sir C. MacDonald, January 12th; Chinese Minister in London to Lord Lansdowne, January 15th, 1901, China, No. 6, 1901, pp. 4, 11, 13; Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, May 4th and July 23rd, 1903; "U.S. Foreign Relations," 1903, pp. 54, 56, 68; China, No. 2, 1904, pp. 58, 59, 63.

‡The boycott movement faded away in September 1905, chiefly because the Chinese merchants who had bought American cotton piece-goods on long-term contracts started a very extensive agitation against its continuation.—
AUTHOR.

Once more Luck smiled upon the old Empress Tsu Hsi; once more the Tsings appeared at the head of a popular movement*; but this luck was ephemeral, in spite of the decided success obtained by the Imperial Government† in the next year on the question of the restriction of the importation of opium into China.‡ More and more concessions were to be made to the foreigners whereby the national character and the popularity of the Dynasty amongst the masses was proportionately lessened.

On September 1st, 1906, the Empress Tsu Hsi ordered a decree to be promulgated in the name of the Emperor which declared that, "the weakness and inefficiency of our country is due to the lack of close touch between the Government and the people, and the entire separation of those who are in office and those who are not," and as a solution to this predicament the introduction of a constitutional government within a few years was announced. This edict was followed by a second, creating a Government Council which, in conjunction with the Grand Council, should form the foundation of the future Parliament, and Provincial Assemblies, the members of which were to be appointed by the viceroys and governors.§ The preparatory period for the inauguration of the Parliament was fixed at nine years.¶ This was the last attempt of the Dynasty for the recovery of its lost authority.

On November 15th, 1908, the Empress Dowager Tsu Hsi passed away at the age of seventy-three. Her death was preceded twenty hours earlier by the death of the unfortunate Reformer, the Emperor Kuang Hsu. He died after refusing to allow himself to be removed from the "Ocean Pavilion," in which he was confined in 1898, to the "Pavilion of Peaceful Longevity," in which a Chinese emperor should properly die, according to the ancient customs of the Empire; he died without having donned the robes emblazoned with the dragon, prescribed by the same

*Statement of the Chinese Consul in San Francisco, July 17th, 1905; "U.S. Foreign Relations," 1905, p. 204.

†Imperial Decree, November 21st, 1906, prohibiting the cultivation of opium in China.

‡Sino-British Agreement of December, 1906.

§Imperial Edicts, September 20th and October 19th, 1907.

¶*Ibid.*, August 27th, 1908.

customs for a dying emperor,* and cursing the man who betrayed him. †

The Throne was occupied by Prince Pu Yi, the three-year-old son of Prince Chun, appointed to be Regent and Controller of the nation. It was the choice of the Empress Dowager. ‡ On November 14th, 1908, in spite of her sickness and weakness, the Empress Dowager mounted for the last time the Dragon Throne, and with all her wonted vehemence and lucidity announced her decision.

"At a critical time in a nation's affairs a youthful Sovereign is no doubt a source of danger to the State, but do not forget that I shall be here to direct and assist Prince Chun," said she, when Yuan Shih-kai, then Viceroy of Chihli, and other senior dignitaries of the State respectfully submitted to her that it would, under the circumstances, be far better to leave the Throne to an adult person. §

But the hour having struck, she "mounted the Dragon and proceeded to the place of Nine Springs," ¶ leaving the control of the State to persons who, under existing circumstances, were less qualified than anybody in China to assume it.

As a matter of fact, hardly anyone at the Court or amongst the State ministers understood fully the complicated nature of the changes brought about by the last legislative acts of the deceased Empress. Hardly anyone in the whole Empire, including the few thousands of the most enthusiastic

* H. B. Morse, *op. cit.*, p. 441.

† During the last night, feeling the approach of his death, Kuang Hsu had written out his last testament, prefacing it with these significant words:—"We were the second son of Prince Chun when the Empress Dowager selected Us for the Throne. She has always hated Us, but for our misery of the past ten years Yuan Shih-kai is responsible, and one other (the second name is said to have been illegible). When the time comes I desire that Yuan be summarily beheaded."—Bland and Backhouse, *op. cit.*, p. 460.

‡ Announcing her decision, the Empress Dowager stated that long ago she had decided that the eldest son of Prince Chun and his wife, the daughter of Jung-lu, should be the Heir to the Throne, in recognition and reward of Jung-lu's life-long devotion to her person and his paramount services to the Dynasty at the time of the Boxer rising.—*Ibid.*, p. 458.

§ Prince Pu Yi (reign title "Hsuan Tung") was adopted as son and heir to the Emperor Tung Chih, but in order to settle the problem of the ancestral sacrifices, which had puzzled the Court, as we know, since the accession to the Throne by the Emperor Kuang Hsu, and set at rest the spirit of Kuang Hsu, the Empress Tsu Hsi decreed that the new Emperor, although heir by adoption to Tung Chih, should perform "joint sacrifices at the shrine of His Majesty Kuang Hsu."—AUTHOR.

¶ Chinese allegory used to indicate the death of an emperor or empress.—AUTHOR.

partizans of the reforms,* realized the significance of the proposed constitution and its effect upon the entire social order of China.

As to the first proposal, it was a cunning political bolt rather than an earnest measure, a "simulation of affection," according to the maxim of Chia-yi; while the last was but a dream far from any realization. As far as the Chinese nation itself was concerned, it was a strange and incomprehensible project, setting at naught all the achievements of national civilization, a project with which the nation could have nothing in common.

The Provincial Assemblies met for the first time in October 1909, and their demand that the meeting of the National Parliament be expedited, and should take place within two years, was refused by the Imperial Government.†

The first National Assembly, opened on October 3rd, 1910, reiterated the same demand and petitioned that the Grand Council should be abolished and a responsible Cabinet appointed. The Court hesitated. It did not expect to meet opposition on the part of a body largely drawn from amongst the metropolitan and provincial officials and gentry. The Assembly was prorogued,‡ but a decree announced the convocation of the Parliament in the year 1913.

However, an Imperial decree issued on May 8th, 1911, dismissed the Grand Council and inaugurated in its stead a Cabinet and Privy Council. Prince Ching, President of the late Grand Council, was appointed Prime Minister, an appointment which caused general dissatisfaction in the provinces, for he was known as "a decrepit old man, irresolute, wily, corrupt and inefficient."§ The new Court could not dispense with the services of this statesman, for after the death of Jung-lu he was the oldest Imperial clansman, well-known abroad as one who had

*According to the estimates given in "A Century of Protestant Missions in China" (Shanghai, 1907), in 1905 the total number of mission schools where in some Western knowledge was taught reached the figure of 2,585, of which only 14 may be said to have been of full collegiate standing; the number of pupils was 57,683, including 47,754 males and 9,929 females. Under the new scheme of State education at the end of 1909 there were to be established five universities, 85 technical schools, 440 high and normal schools, and 50 primary schools, with 90,095 teachers and 1,637,441 pupils. If one assumes that in 1911 all pupils brought up in these schools, including the 50,011 primary schools, were instructed in respect to the nature of constitutional reform, which is obviously impossible, the number of people having any idea about the proposed reform would still be a hopeless minority of the total population in China, estimated at 400,000,000.—AUTHOR.

†Imperial Decree, January 10th, 1910.

‡Imperial Decree, January 11th, 1913.

§"The Times," May 17th, 1911.

signed the Peking Protocol and as the former head of the Chinese Foreign Office. The latter had a particular importance for the Imperial Government, as it was just negotiating a loan for the construction of the Hukwang Railway and the reform of the currency according to the provisions of the Commercial Treaties of 1902 and 1903.

Both loans were duly contracted in the Spring of 1911, but by this time definite opposition to the terms of the railway loan had developed in the provinces in which the railway was to be constructed. These provinces firmly expressed themselves against the authority of the Central Government to dispose of the money, claiming this right for themselves. The provincial gentry insisted that the construction of railways in the provinces was entirely within the scope of the provincial government and that the Central Government exceeded its power in pressing its schemes on the provinces and entering into arrangements with foreigners regarding loans which had to be repaid out of provincial treasuries. Some anti-foreign and anti-dynastic tendencies were also expressed, and a matter which ended in an easy compromise in 1907 now became an issue of paramount importance. Feeling ran high, and disturbances broke out in Szechuen, which, between October 9th and 11th, were followed by a revolt of troops stationed in Hankow and Wuchang, the capital of Hupeh. This revolt suddenly assumed considerable proportions, and the Viceroy had to take refuge on a Chinese cruiser.*

The rebel generalissimo, Li Yuan-hung, one of those advanced military officers who received their education in Japan, notified the Consular Body at Hankow that he had constituted a government which would respect existing treaties and engagements with Foreign Powers and would guarantee efficient protection to all foreigners so long as they refrained from rendering assistance to the Manchu Government.†

In a few days the revolt had spread throughout the provinces along the Yangtze River and to the South—Kwangtung and Kwangsi—assuming a decided anti-dynastic character, and meeting with little opposition on the part of the Imperial troops. It appeared that there was no authority whatsoever to render any resistance to the small detachments

* Sir John Jordan to the Secretary of the Foreign Office, October 16th, 1911.

† *Ibid.*

of mutinous soldiers, assisted by a handful of radicals and students and the mob, eager to grasp the opportunity to revolt and to loot unpunished.

Peking was seized by panic. The Second National Assembly had been hastily summoned, but it was unable to save the situation. For over ten years the Imperial power of the Tsing Dynasty had been a mere phantom, and it seemed that there was nobody who wished to defend it. And yet there was one man who possessed all the necessary qualifications for the difficult task of defending, if not the defunct Dynasty, at least the principle of monarchism in China, a man whom the Emperor Kuang Hsu had damned on his death-bed and whom the Prince Regent, the brother of Kuang Hsu, had summarily dismissed from all his posts and ordered to retire to his native province.

On October 14th, 1911, an Imperial edict restored the former President of the Army Reorganization Council, Member of the Grand Council and Senior Guardian of the Heir Apparent, Yuan Shih-kai, to all his former posts and ranks, and appointed him Viceroy of Hufan and Hupeh, with orders to "direct the suppression and pacification of the rebels."

CHAPTER IV

THE BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC: YUAN SHIH-KAI AND DR. SUN YAT-SEN

THE newly-appointed Viceroy of Hupeh and Hunan was not only a Chinese by birth, but also by education, beliefs and mode of life. He was born in 1859 in a prominent Honanese family which lived in retirement in Changtehfu, a town in the province of Honan.* According to native biographers, Yuan Shih-kai failed in his youth to pass the classical examinations or obtain an official rank. Only the protection of one of his remote relatives, a provincial official, brought him an appointment in the military intendency. However, in spite of lack of education and his somewhat modest origin, he rose with extraordinary swiftness to the highest position in the country, and at the age of twenty-eight he occupied the responsible post of Imperial Commissioner in Korea. Here during nine years he managed with particular dexterity to counteract the aggressive plans of Japan in Korea, action which accelerated in no small degree the final rupture of Sino-Japanese relations and the war of 1894-1895.

Subsequently to this tragical finale of his career in Korea, which might have cost any other in China his life, Yuan Shih-kai was recommended by Li Hung-chang, then Viceroy of Chihli, to take charge of reforming the old-style troops, in which he distinguished himself as a man of exceptional energy and for which he was favourably commended to the Throne. In 1898 the Emperor Kuang Hsu selected him as the man to whom he could entrust his long-cherished plans of deposing the Empress Dowager. This trust he finally betrayed.

It is impossible to ascertain the true motives which led Yuan Shih-kai to this act of wily betrayal of his Sovereign; he himself strenuously denied any knowledge of His Majesty's

* According to some foreign biographers, the parents of Yuan Shih-kai "were nothing more distinguished than farmers possessing a certain amount of land."—Putnam Weale: "The Fight for the Republic in China," p. 21.

plans or that he had received orders from him to move the troops under his command to Peking* ; but the one indisputable fact is that he was amongst those who clearly understood the anti-national nature of the projected reforms, and was amongst their opponents.

For his participation in the counter-move, against the Reformers Yuan Shih-kai gained for ever the benevolence of the Empress Dowager, Tsu Hsi, and the governorship of the Province of Shantung, where, following the example of his former commander, Jung-lu, he firmly refused to execute the order of the Empress to exterminate the foreigners in his province and join the Boxer movement. He remained, however, in every respect loyal to her cause up to the time of her death.

In 1908, after having occupied the Viceroyalty of Chihli Province for over six years, succeeding in this capacity Li Hung-chang, he was dismissed from the post of President of the Army Reorganization Council and concurrently Metropolitan Viceroy and Commander of six divisions of modern troops, stationed at Peking by the Regent, Prince Chun, the brother of the Emperor-Reformer, who considered it his sacred duty to execute the will of his august brother.

Strictly speaking, Yuan Shih-kai's very life was at that time hanging by a thread, for the testament of Kuang Hsu could easily be interpreted as a death warrant against him ; but the Regency did not venture to resort to extreme measures against Yuan Shih-kai in view of his popularity amongst the troops forming the garrison of the Capital.

Yuan Shih-kai retired to his native place in Honan, and lived there like a patriarch, surrounded by his large family and trusted servants, until the Imperial Edict of October 14th, 1911, again called him to political activity. He accepted his new appointment of Viceroy with great reluctance, pleading that ill-health prevented him "to requite in an infinitesimal degree the great kindness shown to him by the late Empress Dowager during his whole life," † and only after repeated Imperial commands did he proceed to Peking. ‡

With his keen knowledge of his people and the actual position of the Imperial Government and the country, which

* Interview between "The Times" correspondent at Peking and Yuan Shih-kai, reproduced in "The North-China Herald," December 16th, 1911.

† Yuan Shih-kai's Memorial to the Throne, October 16th, 1911.

‡ Imperial Rescript, October 18th, 1911.

since the day of the signing of the Peking Protocol had been at the mercy of foreign politicians and creditors,* Yuan Shih-kai realized clearly the impossibility of saving the Dynasty from its inevitable end. The Regency did not enjoy even a tittle of the popularity enjoyed by his late Mistress, and if it was then impossible to restore the Imperial authority and independence, it was a hopeless matter to dream about obtaining it now.

However, with his usual energy he moved the troops under his command against the triple city of Hankow, Han-yang and Wuchang, on the mid-Yangtze, and on November 27th, 1911, the chief base of the revolutionists was captured and destroyed. It remained to the Generals commanding the Imperial troops, Feng and Wong Chow-yuen, to deliver the last blow to the retreating revolutionaries, when Yuan Shih-kai suddenly stopped the victorious march of his troops and ordered the evacuation of Nanking, which gave to the revolutionaries an opportunity to concentrate their forces in the lower Yangtze.

There is not sufficient evidence for the suggestion that this move on the part of Yuan Shih-kai was an act of treason to the Dynasty, but one is certain that nobody in China knew better than he that "The Great Chinese Revolution," at this phase of its development, was just a revolt of a very insignificant group of ill-paid and under-fed Chinese soldiery, supported by a few enthusiasts and the idle mob, † and that the moral and material assistance of the Southern Provinces and the overseas Chinese was insufficient to keep alive the rebellion for any considerable time.

It was not an elementary movement of the masses, which, according to the ancient traditions and political doctrines of the Chinese Sages, were entitled to rise against unpopular rulers and remove them, proclaiming in their place a new ruler selected for them by Providence, for the greater part of the population displayed an entire indifference to the proceedings and hardly knew anything about the revolt in the Yangtze Valley. ‡

It also could not be called a national movement, for it aimed not at the consolidation of the country but at its

* China's indebtedness in foreign loans reached at the moment of the outbreak of the revolution the substantial sum of £139,123,673, showing an increase of £31,932,312 since the signature of the Peking Protocol, 1901.—Morse, *op. cit.*, p. 447.

† "North-China Herald," November 30th, 1911.

‡ Yuan Shih-kai's statement to "The Times" correspondent, *op. cit.*

disintegration, a complete provincial autonomy,* and the destruction of the very idea of monarchism which still continued to form an integral part of the entire religio-social structure of China. †

Under these circumstances the attitude of Yuan Shih-kai *vis-à-vis* the revolutionaries, in ordering his troops to stop the pursuit of the defeated revolutionary army and withdraw from Nanking, opened the way for all sorts of guesses as to the true motives underlying his actions. ‡ There was also a factor of a no less indisputable nature which Yuan Shih-kai could not ignore in taking steps for the suppression of the revolt. This was the judgment of the Powers, signatories to the Peking Protocol, on which the Chinese Government was dependent in its foreign and domestic policy after the collapse of the Boxer movement.

From the very outset of the rebellion the opinion of the foreign Press in China and abroad, § impressed by the enthusiasm and propaganda of the Chinese residing in the foreign settlements and concessions of the Treaty Ports and Chinese communities in foreign countries, proclaimed it to be a revolution of the Chinese nation against the despotism and inertia of the Chinese monarchs, and advocated its early recognition as a new factor of Chinese political life. ¶

The reason of this attitude on the part of foreign public opinion was clear. It was the same as in 1901, the same

* Proclamation of the Imperial Commissioner, Tuang Fang; "North-China Herald," October 7th, 1911.

† Yuan Shih-kai's statement to "The Times" correspondent, *op. cit.*

‡ "North-China Herald," October 25th and 28th, 1911.

§ *Ibid.*, November 18th, 1911; January 13th, 1912.

¶ In order to appreciate fully the extent to which the foreign communities in China went in their endeavours to assist the cause of the Republicans, it is interesting to point out that on January 12th, 1912, the Shanghai British Chamber of Commerce addressed a telegram to the ex-Prince Regent, Prince Chung and Yuan Shih-kai, urging them to induce the Throne that the settlement of the present struggle "must be democratic in nature and preceded by renunciation of the autocratic power." This striking tactlessness on the part of a foreign merchant body in China, supported by an identical appeal of the Hankow British Chamber of Commerce to the Diplomatic Body at Peking, dated January 16th, 1912, compelled Sir John Jordan, H.B.M.'s Minister at Peking, to give in his despatch to Sir Edward Grey of January 16th, 1912, the following explanation:—"Foreign public opinion has been pressed into the service of the movement, and the Chambers of Commerce at the different treaty ports have been given to understand that it would facilitate matters if they were to represent the loss which the present state of uncertainty is causing to trade, and to intimate to the Throne the advisability of adopting such measures of conciliation as are likely to satisfy the aspirations of the great bulk of the population."—China No. 3 (1912); "Further Correspondence," pp. 113, 114, 122.

as had been adopted during Sino-foreign intercourse from the first; it was the everlasting longing for the forbidden markets of the interior of China, for the unlimited economic, if not political, domination which the old Empress Dowager tried unsuccessfully to use for the recovery of the lost Imperial authority, and which could be attained only as the result of the destruction of the oligarchical form of government in China and her modernization along the lines of Western culture.

This, of course, could not be ignored by Yuan Shih-kai if he were a true statesman and patriot. To strangle a movement which was declared to be a highly patriotic and national movement not only by enthusiasts and Southern leaders, but also by China's controlling power—the foreigners—before their sympathies were turned in favour of the cause that he defended, was an action which could hardly bring relief to the tottering authority of the Chinese monarchs.

On October 27th, 1911, the National Assembly at Peking, which was urgently re-summoned, passed a series of resolutions dealing with the question of the national Constitution which, under the influence of Yuan Shih-kai, were accepted by the Regency without reservation.* According to these resolutions, known later as "the Nineteen Fundamental Articles," the Tsing Dynasty was to be maintained in China in perpetuity, but the prerogatives of the Emperor had to be limited by a Constitution drafted by the Senate and promulgated by the Emperor. †

In assuming this course of action Yuan Shih-kai was, perhaps, exaggerating a little the immediate danger of any move on the part of the Foreign Powers in favour of the rebels, but we must agree that his point of view in general was correct, for the other side also took steps to strengthen the sympathy of the foreigners towards the revolution.

In the Manifesto to the Foreign World, dated November 17th, 1911, the revolutionists boldly recognized the righteousness and friendliness of the policy of the Foreign Powers towards China during the whole course of Sino-

* In bringing pressure to bear on the Regency on this occasion Yuan Shih-kai acted not in his own name but in the name of his subordinate generals, with General Tuan Chi-jui at the head, who through him presented to the Throne a memorial saying "that they would not fight the rebellious South unless these resolutions are accepted."—"Memorial of Sixteen Northern Generals," October 21st, 1922.—АУТНОК.

† Imperial Decree, October 30th, 1911; Articles 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5.—H. F. MacNair: "Modern Chinese History," p. 712.

foreign relations as well as the righteousness of their future aspirations.*

Beyond this the revolutionists did not go, but it was sufficient for the time being. It was a master stroke applied to the cause of the monarchy in China by Dr. Wu Ting-fang, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Nanking Provisional Government, formerly Imperial Minister to Washington and now an ardent partizan of Young China.

As a matter of fact, the self-styled Provisional Government at Nanking, the ancient Capital of the Chinese Empire under the Ming Dynasty, unlike Yuan Shih-kai displayed in its actions an extraordinary swiftness and boldness; and, hardly having recovered from the defeat at Hankow, it demanded in the name of the entire nation the abdication of the boy-Emperor, Hsuan Tung, and the surrender of the supreme power in the State to the National Assembly at Nanking summoned under its orders.

In response to this demand the Regency appointed Yuan Shih-kai to the supreme civil and military command, making him thereby virtual dictator of the Empire,† and on November 26th proceeded to the sacred shrine of the Imperial Ancestors where, in the presence of a vast number of State officials and representatives of the Diplomatic Corps, it took, on behalf of the Emperor, a solemn oath to uphold the new Constitution of Nineteen Articles passed by the National Assembly.

On December 6th the Imperial Decree issued in the name of the Empress Dowager Lung Yu, the consort of the late Emperor Kuang Hsu, to whom, according to the last will of the Empress Tsu Hsi, Prince Chun, the Regent, had "to apply in person for instructions in any question of vital importance, and act accordingly,"‡ announced the resignation of the latter from the Regency.§

* "The Foreign Powers individually and collectively," states this document, "have stood hammering at the door of China for centuries pleading for the diffusion of knowledge, a reformation of national services, the adoption of Western sciences and industrial processes, a jettisoning of the crude, out-of-date and ignoble concepts which have multiplied to keep the nation without the pale of the great family constituting the civilized world. They have failed . . ."—*Ibid.*, p. 713.

† Imperial Decree, November 12th, 1911. Five days prior to this appointment the National Assembly, under the presidency of Prince Pu Lun, appointed Yuan Shih-kai Premier in place of Prince Ching, who tendered his resignation on November 1st.—*AUTHOR*.

‡ Imperial Decree, November 14th, 1908.

§ Sir John Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, December 6th, 1911.—China No. 1 (1912), "Correspondence," p. 95.

This was a decided concession on the part of the Throne to the Nanking revolutionaries and foreign public opinion, which was soon followed by another, whereby the Imperial Government, acting on the friendly advice of the foreign Ministers at Peking, agreed to enter into pourparlers with the Nanking Provisional Government with a view to reaching a compromise between the warring parties.

On December 17th Tang Shao-yi, a lieutenant of Yuan Shih-kai from the days of his service in Korea and Minister of Communications, armed with full plenipotentiary powers by the Throne and Yuan Shih-kai, met Dr. Wu Ting-fang and his associates, representing the Nanking Government, at Shanghai, which was selected as a neutral place under foreign protection.*

The Nanking Provisional Government was firm: it insisted on the abdication of the Dynasty and the inauguration of a Republic in China.† All compromises advanced by the Imperial representatives were flatly refused, although Yuan Shih-kai attempted to get into personal contact with the leaders of the Nanking Government, and amongst them General Li Yuan-hung, the generalissimo of the rebels, and secure from them concessions in favour of a constitutional monarchy.‡

The position was very critical, and an open rupture between the two parties, after the meeting of delegates on December 19th, seemed to be imminent. The local foreign Press expressed grave concern in respect to the possible loss of foreign trade in case of a renewal of hostilities in the Yangtze Valley. § However, events took quite a sudden turn.

* Yuan Shih-kai insisted first that the meeting of the representatives of both parties should take place at Hankow and that the Nanking Government should be represented by General Li Yuan-hung, the generalissimo of the revolutionary troops. In this way he hoped to evade any possible interference on the part of the Foreign Powers with the negotiations, but finally, under the pressure brought to bear on him by the Diplomatic Body at Peking, he agreed on Shanghai.—Sir John Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, November 12th, 1911, *ibid.*, p. 111.

† The republican delegates entered the conference with the following four propositions framed:—1. That the Ta Tsing (Manchu) Dynasty must go; 2. That a republican form of government must be established; 3. The revolutionaries agree to the pensioning of the Court and the Imperial Princes; 4. All other Manchus will be dealt with generously.—"North-China Herald," December 23rd, 1911.

‡ The compromise advanced by Yuan Shih-kai was as follows:—1. The Emperor shall be maintained upon the Throne, but the authority shall be in the hands of the President of the Council; 2. The President of the Council shall be elected by the people and shall have the same prerogative as a President of a Republic; 3. Upon these conditions the autonomy of the provinces shall be recognized.—"North-China Herald," December 23rd, 1911.

§ *Ibid.*, December 19th, 1911.

On December 20th, at about 11 o'clock in the morning, the Consuls-General of the six great Powers at Shanghai—Great Britain, United States of America, Germany, France, Russia and Japan*—acting directly under telegraphic instructions from their Home Governments, delivered to Tang Shao-yi and Dr. Wu Ting-fang a formal memorandum in which it was stated that "their Governments consider that the continuation of the present struggle in China exposed not only the country itself, but also material interests and security of foreigners, to grave danger," and that the Powers they represented "deem it their duty unofficially to call the attention of the two delegates to the need of arriving, as soon as possible, at an understanding calculated to put an end to the present conflict." †

This memorandum, very innocent and friendly at first glance, made, however, a very deep impression on Chinese public opinion, and particularly at Peking. In the opinion of the Chinese politicians and publicists it was tantamount to an official recognition of the international status of the newly-proclaimed Nanking Provisional Government, which in the eye of Chinese law still continued to be a mere rebel against the lawful government recognized by the Foreign Powers. Furthermore, it was freely rumoured that the verbal statements by the foreign Consuls, which accompanied the memorandum, were couched in more definite terms, whereby Tang Shao-yi was informed that, in case the Imperial Government was unable to find any other solution of the predicament except resorting to arms, the Powers might be compelled to bring into play other means for the persuasion of the Imperial Government and safeguarding the interests of their nationals in China. ‡

It appeared that the work which the Foreign Powers had commenced in 1901 by imposing upon China the terms of the Peking Protocol, thus destroying the authority of the supreme power in China, was now going to be completed by the entire elimination of the name of the Emperor as a factor in Chinese political life. Under these

* Messrs. E. D. H. Fraser (Great Britain), A. P. Wilder (U.S. of America), P. von Buri (Germany), Dejean de la Batié (France), V. Grosse (Russia), and A. Ariyoshi (Japan).

† Sir John Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, December 15th, 1911.—China No. 1 (1912); "Correspondence," p. 116.

‡ Memorial by the Cabinet to the Throne concerning the convocation of a National Assembly.—China No. 3 (1912); "Further Correspondence," p. 78.—"Sin Wan Pao," a leading Chinese Daily in Shanghai, December 24th, 1911.

circumstances, it was natural on the part of the revolutionary leaders to display more persistence and to resort to more energetic action.*

In fact, nine days later seventeen provincial delegates in Nanking, elected by the revolutionary organizations in their provinces,† proclaimed in the name of the Chinese nation a Republic in China and elected Dr. Sun Yat-sen President of its Provisional Government at Nanking.

The audacity of the pretension on the part of the provincial delegates at Nanking to represent and act on behalf of the entire Chinese nation ‡ need not be commented upon, particularly taking into consideration that, as the result of the Foreign Powers' representations, the chief delegate of the Imperial Government, exceeding his powers, agreed on its behalf to leave the decision of the question regarding the form of government to a National Convention to be summoned at an early date.§

The leaders of the revolutionary South were not inclined to wait for the decision of this Convention ¶ and expose their cause to the least risk, although the constitution of the Convention gave ample ground to believe that the Provincial Assemblies, which had to elect the delegates, would largely be in favour of a complete decentralization of authority, and thus in favour of a republican form of government.||

* "North-China Herald," December 23rd, 1911.

† In connection with this it is interesting to mention the fact that out of these eighteen delegates purporting to represent the Chinese nation, fourteen were members of revolutionary organizations who had found hospitality in Japan during the period subsequent to the unfortunate reforms of the Emperor Kuang Hsu.—AUTHOR.

‡ "The substitution of a Republic for a monarchical form of government," stated the Republican Manifesto, January 5th, 1912, "is not the fruit of a transient passion. It is the natural outcome of a long-cherished desire for broad-based freedom making for permanent contentment and uninterrupted advancement. It is the formal declaration of the will of the Chinese nation."

§ Imperial Decree, December 28th, 1911.

¶ It is asserted in some quarters that the acceptance of this compromise, incompatible with the dignity of the Throne claiming the right to the supreme power by "divine grace," was not only due to the pressure brought to bear upon Tang Shao-yi by the Foreign Powers, but also to his personal sympathy for a Republic. The representation of the Consuls served him as a good excuse for his act in respect to the monarchical cause. Tang Shao-yi, a Cantonese by birth, expressed himself openly in favour of a Republic, and immediately after the signing of the Convention tendered his resignation, which was accepted on January 2nd, 1912.—J. O. P. Bland: "Recent Events and Present Policies in China," pp. 165 and 166.

¶ Tang Shao-yi to Yuan Shih-kai, December 27th, 1911.—China No. 3 (1912): "Further Correspondence," p. 77.

|| Sir John Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, December 31st, 1911.—China No. 1 (1912): "Correspondence," p. 126.

They realized that their cause was already won and that there was no further ground for postponing the inevitable. They were backed morally by the Foreign Powers, and, what was far more important, by Japan,* ready at any time to come to their assistance with money and arms, and, if required, men.

But if the situation had been appreciated in Nanking and Shanghai, it was not less realized in Peking by the man who was selected to defend the monarchical principle in China. Yuan Shih-kai knew very well the actual attitude of the Foreign Powers towards the revolution and the policy of Japan, who, having failed to enlist the sympathy of the Tsings, now made another attempt to use the good offices of those members of Young China to whom she had accorded hospitality and support during their compulsory retirement to Japan in 1898-1912. He knew that all arms procured by Nanking were bought on credit in Japan,† that the group of Japanese financiers had already advanced money to Dr. Sun,‡ and, further, that even Russia was willing to support Nanking, and that negotiations to that effect were near completion.§ From his personal experience in Korea, he had ample ground for believing that the Japanese, in order to attain their object, would not hesitate to help the revolutionaries to the end. A glance through the list of political and military advisers, generals and officers attached to the different branches of the military and civil service of the newly-established Republic, and the personal suite of the President-elect, ¶

* Japanese representations to the Cabinets of St. James and St. Petersburg in respect to the necessity of maintaining a monarchical form of government in China limited by a Constitution, proclaimed by the Imperial Edict, October 30th, 1911, in December 1911.—AUTHOR.

† Statement of General Ishimoto, Japanese Minister of War, in the Imperial Diet, February 3rd, 1912. According to this statement, the value of the arms supplied to the Revolutionaries since the outbreak of the Civil War was Yen 3,000,000.

‡ Loan of Tls. 10,000,000 made to the "China Merchant Co." by the Mitsui Bishi Co. in January 1912, and of which Tls. 2,000,000 were paid to Dr. Sun Yat-sen through the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation in Shanghai.

§ Loan of Tls. 5,000,000 negotiated with the Russo-Asiatic Bank in Shanghai.

¶ According to the record of the Secret Journal of the Russian Consulate-General at Shanghai, a copy of which is in the possession of the Author, Dr. Sun Yat-sen arrived from London in Shanghai on December 17th, 1911, accompanied by twenty-five Japanese political and military advisers.—AUTHOR.

¶ Bland, *op. cit.*, p. 158.

was sufficient to suggest a most gloomy conclusion as far as the rôle of Japan in the Chinese Revolution was concerned.* The personal friendship and courtesy extended to him by the Diplomatic Body at Peking, amongst whom there were many sincere sympathizers with the cause that he defended and admirers of his statesmanship since the Boxer movement, could not be of any real importance to him. He knew that the opinions of the Foreign Ministers did not always constitute a decisive factor in the definition of the policy of the Powers in China, which was ultimately shaped in favour of that party which promised the greatest advantage. His promises were not so advantageous as those offered by the Republicans.

As a true son of his country, who really knew his people, and with whom he was indissolubly bound by virtue of education, tastes and beliefs, he could not destroy the chapter of the history of China dealing with foreigners and legalize all acts committed by them which, in the opinion of his countrymen, were wrongful; and if he did so, he knew nobody would believe in him.

Yuan Shih-kai's first move, after receiving Tang Shao-yi's report regarding the concessions made to the Republicans, was to repudiate the arbitrary actions of his delegate. He promptly accepted Dr. Wu Ting-fang's resignation and informed him that he could not recognize any acts signed and sealed by his delegate in excess of his power and against his (Yuan Shih-kai's) instructions.† He was full of indignation over the proclamation of the Republic in the name of the nation, but he had no means to fight the Republicans, backed by Japan and foreign public opinion; no chance to defeat them, in spite of a comparatively large contingent of troops

* It was generally believed at that time in Peking that the sudden departure for Nanking of Professor Terao, immediately after the inauguration of the Nanking Provisional Government, was due to an order from Tokyo directing him to assist the newly-established government in drafting the Republican Constitution. Professor Terao was the Japanese Adviser to the Imperial Government who enjoyed a high reputation in China as an authority on constitutional law and who was largely responsible for the scheme of a gradual constitutional reform of the late Manchu Government.

The author endeavoured to ascertain the truth of this belief and has satisfied himself to the effect that the document known as the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China of 1912 (南京約法) is, in fact, the work of Professor Terao.—AUTHOR.

† Yuan Shih-kai's telegram to Dr. Wu Ting-fang, January 2nd; Dr. Wu Ting-fang to Yuan Shih-kai, January 3rd, 1912.—"North-China Herald," January 6th, 1912.

under his command. These troops were not paid, and the Imperial Treasury was, as usual, empty.*

Upon his arrival at Peking on October 27th, 1911, Yuan Shih-kai succeeded with the greatest difficulty in extracting from the Empress Dowager one million dollars for the immediate payment of loyal troops at Hankow, and later on, in January 1912, about Tls. 3,000,000 in gold bars, all of which he immediately converted for the use of the Government.† The two loans floated by the Imperial Government for the construction of the Hukwang railway and the currency reform were partly expended, and the so-called Four Nation Syndicate (American, British, French and German bankers) which floated them declared a temporary suspension of payment of the remaining instalments.‡ All other financial schemes intended for the alleviation of the stringent financial situation were also defeated owing to obstruction on the part of the French and British Governments,§ in spite of the entreaties on the part of the British and American Ministers in Peking personally in favour of a Constitutional Monarchy in China.¶

The declaration of the Republican Government that "any defeat of the revolutionary plans would be placed by the Chinese people at the door of the foreigners who aided the other side with money,"|| and the threat of anti-foreign risings and boycott,** did not fail to produce their effect. The "i" was dotted when Tang Shao-yi, following his policy of consolidating the Republican position, agreed that, pending the decision of the National Convention regarding the future form of government, "the Manchu Government should not accept, or attempt to obtain, foreign loans," †† leaving open, however, the problem of contracting loans by the provinces and the Nanking Government, †† and further pledging the Imperial Government to evacuate Hankow and Nanyang.

The narrative must be interrupted here in order to deal with events of another nature which happened at Peking

* Sir John Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, January 6th, 1912.—China No. 3 (1912): "Further Correspondence," p. 93.

† *Ibid.*

‡ *Ibid.*, October 21st, 1911.

§ Bland, *op. cit.*, p. 156.

¶ Sir John Jordan and Mr. W. W. Rockhill.

|| Dr. Wu Ting-fang's telegram to the "European Press," January 4th, 1912.

** Republican Manifesto, January 5th, 1912.

†† Tang Shao-yi to Yuan Shih-kai, December 29th, 1911.—China No. 3 (1912): "Further Correspondence," p. 87.

‡‡ Bland, *op. cit.*, p. 155.

in December 1911, and which had a very definite effect upon the trend of events at this period.

On December 16th an attempt had been made to assassinate Yuan Shih-kai at Peking. Two bombs were thrown, and both exploded with terrific force, but Yuan Shih-kai escaped unhurt. An investigation conducted by the metropolitan authorities revealed a largely developed plot to assassinate the Premier, the Cabinet Ministers and Manchu Princes by agents of the Nanking Government. This was soon followed by two more bomb outrages, one of which caused the death of the Manchu General Liang Pi.*

The impression of these first acts of modern terrorism in China was tremendous. The Imperial Family, Princes and the Manchu nobility began to realize that their sacred lives were far from being secure, and their firm stand against abdication was shaken.† Under these circumstances it was only natural that many of the defenders of their cause also began to waver, and a number of influential Northern Generals expressed themselves inclined to bow to the inevitable.

On February 12th, 1912, an Imperial Edict announced the resolution of the Throne to abdicate, "thus assuring peace to the people and tranquillity to the Empire, and forming the one Great Republic of China by the union, as heretofore, of the five peoples, namely: Manchus, Chinese, Mongols, Mohammedans and Tibetans, together with their territory in its integrity."‡

The Edict bore the Imperial Seal and the signature of Yuan Shih-kai as Premier, who by virtue of the same Edict was authorized "to organize with full powers a provisional Republican Government and confer with the Republican Army as to the methods of union."

With the greatest care Yuan Shih-kai resolved to save what could yet be saved—the dignity and prestige of the supreme power and its legal continuity—and drafted personally the abdication acts known as "Articles of Favourable Treatment." According to these acts, the Emperor "resigned only his political power"§ and retained his Imperial title and all other traditional prerogatives of the Chinese

* *Ibid.*

† "The Times," January 25th, 1912.

‡ Imperial Edict, February 12th, 1912.

§ *Ibid.*

Emperors. The Republican Army, *i.e.* the future Republican Government, undertook to hold itself responsible for the perpetual offering of sacrifices before the Imperial Ancestral Temples and the Imperial Mausolea, and the completion, as planned, of the Mausoleum of the late Emperor Kuang Hsu. The Emperor had to continue to perform the religious ritual at the Imperial Ancestral Temples and Mausolea, which were to be protected by guards provided by the Republic. He also retained his body-guards and the right of occupying several Imperial palaces.

In addition to this, the Republican Government had to pay to the Emperor an annuity in the sum of Tls. 4,000,000, and the Eight Banners, which formed the hereditary Imperial guard, were to be provided with means of livelihood. The Imperial House, Princes and Nobles, as well as all Manchus, Mongols, Mohammedans and Tibetans, had to receive courteous treatment and enjoy the same rights as the Chinese.

The Imperial Edict adjured "the Imperial Clansmen, Manchus, Mongols, Mohammedans and Tibetans to doff all distinctions and to unite for the maintenance of order and peace, accepting the measures that had been devised by the Throne for the welfare of the whole nation." *

But in his efforts to save the principle of legal succession of sovereign power of the Republic from the source of all power, the Emperor, the agent of Heaven, and to give to the birth of the Republic an aspect of legality whereby the Emperor conceded voluntarily his sovereign rights to the nation, Yuan Shih-kai went further. †

* *Ibid.*

† Wang Chang said: "Was it the case that Yuan gave the Empire to Shun?" Mencius said: "No! The Emperor cannot give the Empire to another."

"Yes; but Shun had the Empire. Who gave it to him?"

"Heaven gave it to him," was the answer.

"Heaven gave it to him! Did Heaven confer its appointment on him with specific injunctions?"

Mencius replied: "No. Heaven does not speak. It simply showed its will by his personal conduct, and his conduct of affairs."

"It showed its will by his personal conduct, and his conduct of affairs; how was this?"

Mencius' answer was:—"The Emperor can present a man to Heaven, but he cannot make Heaven give that man the Empire. A prince can present a man to the Emperor, but he cannot cause the Emperor to make that man a prince. A great officer can present a man to his prince, but he cannot cause the prince to make that man a great officer. Yuan presented Shun to Heaven, and the people accepted him."—"The Book of Mencius": Dr. J. Legge, Volume II, pp. 230 and 231.

In the following Edict of the same date, also drafted by him personally and bearing his signature, the Imperial Board of Civil Administration, the General Officers commanding the Imperial Gendarmerie, the Viceroys and Governors were commanded "to go on with their duties as usual, the chief of each office seeing to it that his subordinates do not neglect their duties. In this way, We, the Emperor, demonstrate Our love for the people."

Truly it was a demonstration of love to the people on the part of the retiring Dynasty, or, better to say, of political foresight on the part of Yuan Shih-kai, who knew what destruction of prestige * or any doubt thrown upon the nature of supreme power meant to the Chinese. †

Each word of the acts of abdication states that the origin of the supreme power of the Republic lay with the Imperial power of the last Tsings, who, "hating disorder and desiring peace, and anxious to follow the teaching of the People," ‡

* "Tsze-kung asked about government. The Master said:—"The requisites of government are that there be sufficiency of food, sufficiency of military equipment, and the confidence of the people in their rulers."

Tsze-kung said:—"If it cannot be helped, and one of these must be dispensed with, which of the three should be foregone first?" "The military equipment," said the Master.

Tsze-kung again asked:—"If it cannot be helped, and one of the remaining two must be dispensed with, which of these should be foregone?" The Master said:—"Part with the food. From of old, death has been the lot of all men; but if the people have no faith in their rulers, there is no standing for the state."—"Confucius, Analects;" Dr. J. Legge, Volume I, p. 118.

‡ As an instance of the importance which the Chinese attributed to the question of an uninterrupted and lawful succession of the supreme power of the State, it is interesting to mention one of the most peculiar customs of Imperial China. From time immemorial it had been the custom that in the event of an emperor leaving his throne to his heir during his lifetime, or an emperor announcing his accession to the throne, the decree announcing this had for its validity to be sealed with a special seal bearing the inscription, "a lawful succession." This seal, made of gold, was supposed to be always in the personal care of the emperor, and, without its affixing, any proceedings connected with the change of rulers were irregular and not binding.

In 1861 the Empress Tsu Hsi, known at that time by the name of Yohonola, one of the many concubines of the Emperor Hsien Feng, could become Empress Dowager and co-Regent of the Chinese Empire only owing to the existence of this custom. Just before his death Hsien Feng appointed Princes Tsai Yuan, Tuan Hua and Sae Shun to be Regents upon his death, with full powers during the minority of the Heir Apparent, while Yohonola was expressly forbidden to exercise any form of control over the latter, her son, later Emperor Tung Chih. But as the necessary seal bearing the inscription "a lawful succession" could not be found (it was taken secretly by Yohonola), the proceedings were recognized as irregular, and Yohonola was able to issue a new document, in the name of the Empress Dowager, the consort of Hsien Feng, and her own proclaiming a new Regency composed of the Empress Dowager and herself.—AUTHOR.

‡ Imperial Edict, February 12th, 1912.

granted it of their own accord to the nation, and as such it passed into Chinese history in spite of all the indignation and theoretical speculations of the modern ideologists of Chinese Democracy.

Moreover, the same abdication acts did not contain any pledge on the part of the Throne waiving the right of the Dynasty to withdraw them in the event of the Republic failing to attain the end which led to their promulgation—peace and order in the country. This characteristic omission, intentional or unintentional, was too apparent not to arouse suspicion on the part of the Republicans, but Yuan Shih-kai left it uncorrected in the name of the Throne.

"The day of the promulgation of this Edict," stated he in his telegram to Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the Provisional President, announcing the abdication of the Dynasty and his readiness to co-operate with the Nanking Government in the organization of the Republican Government according to the Imperial commands, "shall be the end of the Imperial rule and the inauguration of the Republic. Henceforth we shall exert our utmost strength to move forward in progress until we reach perfection. Never shall we allow monarchical government in China."

This telegram startled the leaders of the Nanking Republicans. It was too candid, too bold for a man whose cause seemed to be defeated, but the logic of his contention could not be denied. The Imperial mandate in his hands furnished him with indisputable authority in the eyes of the Chinese masses, which had never known any supreme power except that of their emperors, or the delegation of this supreme power and government except by Imperial command.

"But the Republican Government cannot be organized by any authority conferred by the Tsing Emperor. The exercise of such pretentious power will surely lead to serious trouble. As you clearly understand the needs of the situation, certainly you will not accept such authority," cabled the Provisional President of the Republic to Yuan Shih-kai; but the latter kept silence.*

On February 15th, 1912, the Nanking National Assembly accepted the resignation of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, and, upon his recommendation,† elected Yuan Shih-kai President of the

* Dr. Sun Yat-sen to Yuan Shih-kai, February 14th, 1912.

† Same to the National Assembly, February 14th, 1912.

Republic and despatched a special delegation to Peking to insist on Yuan Shih-kai coming to take the Presidential Oath before the Assembly at Nanking.

At the same time the Provisional President, at the head of a solemn procession * and surrounded by his numerous Japanese advisers, generals and officers and Chinese students, proceeded to the shrine of the Emperor Hung Wu, the founder of the Ming Dynasty. Here he offered a prayer to the spirit of this ancient Chinese monarch and autocrat, extolling the virtues of the Mings and denouncing the despotism and cruelty of the Tsings, which led to their present overthrow, and the ultimate liberation of the Chinese nation from the yoke of these "foreign barbarians." †

The President reverently submitted for Imperial perusal the present achievements of the nation which, under the protecting influence of His Majesty's spirit in Heaven, had resulted in the inauguration of the first republic in the Far East.

"Your legions line the approaches to the sepulchre, a noble host stands expectant. Your people have come here to-day to inform your Majesty of the final victory. May this lofty shrine wherein you rest gain fresh lustre from to-day's event, and may your example inspire your descendants in the times which are to come. Spirit! Accept this offering!" ‡ concluded pathetically the President of the Republic, established by virtue of sovereignty vested in the body of the People. §

We feel that at this juncture our readers may ask us who was this Young China's leader who displayed such an inconsistency in his opinions and actions and resorted to such

* In connection with this ceremony it is interesting to quote a dispatch of Mr. F. E. Wilkinson, H.B.M.'s Consul at Nanking, to Sir John Jordan, in which he describes another Republican ceremony held on the occasion of the arrival and inauguration of Dr. Sun Yat-sen as President of the Republic of China on January 1st, 1912.

"They were arranged," says Mr. F. E. Wilkinson, "by the military authorities, the people of Nanking, who, as I have mentioned before, are anything but satisfied with their experiences up to date of revolutionary government, taking no part, nor apparently any interest therein."—Mr. F. E. Wilkinson to Sir John Jordan, January 5th, 1912. China No. 3 (1912); "Further Correspondence," p. 177.

† *Ibid.*

‡ *Ibid.*

§ Articles I and II of the Provisional Constitution promulgated by the National Assembly at Nanking, March 10th, 1912, read as follows:—"The Republic of China is established by the people of China. The sovereignty of the Republic of China is vested in the whole body of the People."

cheap effects for winning popularity amongst the orthodox Chinese masses. Who was this leader of China's modern Nationalists whose political theories form the gospel of the present Chinese youth ?

Dr. Sun Yat-sen, or Sun Wen, whose name we have mentioned several times in connection with the revolutionary and anti-dynastic movement in China, and who suddenly emerged from the shadow of a secret revolutionary activity into the limelight of political prominence, was a Christian. He was born in a village in Canton in 1866. His father was a Chinese Christian evangelist, a Congregationalist, and he gave his son a thorough Christian education under the auspices of the missionaries of the London Mission. His uncle took part in the famous Taiping Rebellion, and, as a boy, Sun Yat-sen was fed on thrilling stories of this anti-dynastic movement.*

In 1884 Sun Yat-sen became a student of the newly-opened College of Medicine of the same London Mission at Hongkong, in which colony he naturalized himself, obtaining the privilege of being a subject of Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain—a privilege much coveted in China owing to the exceptional Consular protection and extraterritorial rights which the British enjoy in this country. Later on, when his political opponents began to use this as an argument against him, he renounced his British citizenship, declaring that during all his revolutionary activities he had never sought to take advantage of the privileged position exempting him from Chinese jurisdiction.

After graduation from the college in 1892, Dr. Sun Yat-sen became a Christian practising physician in Macao, and since then became known in China and abroad as "Doctor." By virtue of his graduation from the College of Medicine of the London Mission in Hongkong he was not entitled to this degree: he was only a Licentiate of Medicine and Surgery, permitted to practise medicine in China. In Macao he came into close touch with the Kwangtung revolutionaries, the lineal descendants of the "Little Swords." Ten years later he joined the reform movement, and, after its collapse, as an active worker and propagandist he narrowly escaped arrest by the agents of the Imperial Government by fleeing to Hongkong, and later to Japan.

In the next year, in co-operation with the revolutionaries from Swatow, he organized an armed raid on Canton, but had

* J. S. Thompson : "China Revolutionized," p. 5.

no success. In spite of the large support which he received from the Japanese Government in the way of arms, munitions, and even officers to direct the attack, the raid failed, and he had to take refuge again in Japan and turn his eyes towards the revolutionary propaganda amongst the Chinese emigrants in the Straits Settlement, Java, Honolulu, Vancouver, San Francisco, New York, and even London, where he had more success than in his own country. He wrote political pamphlets and collected funds for the various Chinese revolutionary organizations. He was a brilliant speaker in English and Chinese, and had a decided influence upon his countrymen scattered in foreign countries, but he was scarcely known in his own province, and still less among the people who fired the first successful shots in Wuchang and Hankow in October 1911.*

The first time that his name became widely known among foreigners was in 1896, when he was kidnapped and kept a prisoner for several days in the Chinese Legation in London as a lunatic to be sent back to China, where, of course, he would have been put to death as a prominent revolutionist. The intervention of the British Foreign Office, moved thereto by one of his former professors and admirers of his talent, Dr. J. Cantlie, saved him. He was released, and made good his escape from the emissaries of the Chinese Government, which offered an enormous reward for his capture or death. †

It is beyond any doubt that Dr. Sun Yat-sen was one of the ablest of the Chinese revolutionaries and that his personal honesty, patriotism and readiness "to endure all for his country's sake, even torture and death," ‡ won him sincere sympathy amongst his immediate followers and foreigners who had a chance to come into personal contact with him. He was a typical foreign-educated Chinese, an idealist of pure water, of whom Prince Ito, the famous Japanese statesman, in a fit of frankness said: "They have hardly any roots in the country, and they can hardly be said to form a class capable of directing and controlling any political course of action." §

With his opinions moulded by his missionary education and the democratic ideas which he had absorbed in America and England, Dr. Sun Yat-sen was an ardent partizan of a republic

* *Ibid.*, p. 18

† Cantlie, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 66.

§ "Quarterly Review," April, 1912.

in China, * but as soon as he was compelled by circumstances to lead the Chinese masses he was unable to find in his theories anything in common with the people whom he had all his life hoped to lead with the benefits of foreign civilization. Hence we saw him at the shrine of an ancient Chinese autocrat performing the three kneelings and nine prostrations.

The outbreak of the revolution and the proclamation of the first Provisional Government at Wuchang, and later at Nanking, found Dr. Sun Yat-sen in England. He received in London the telegram offering him the Presidency of the proposed Republic, and immediately embarked for Shanghai. † In Hongkong he was met by his Japanese friends, who formed his immediate suite up to the time of his resignation.

It seemed that his nomination as President was arranged beforehand by his partisans, who had in view more the overseas Chinese and the Powers which backed the revolution from outside, but, nevertheless, he himself regarded it only as a temporary one—"until the disturbances within the nation have disappeared, and until the Republic has been established as a prominent nation on this earth, duly recognized by all nations." ‡

He was forced to resign in favour of Yuan Shih-kai before these ends were attained, but he had no other option: the Presidency in his hands meant an immediate resumption of civil war, which was hardly in the interest of the party that he headed. The attitude of the masses was far from being certain, and signs of their sympathy towards the North were seriously troubling the minds of Young China's leaders.

* Morse, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

† Cantlie, *op. cit.*

‡ Provisional President's oath, January 1st, 1912.

CHAPTER V

THE TRAGEDY OF YUAN SHIH-KAI

THE declaration of the Republic caused a complete confusion of mind in the provinces, the population of which interpreted the newly-proclaimed principles of democracy as a revocation of all obligations towards the Central Government.* The Provincial Assemblies and various military and civil authorities, partly appointed by the late Imperial Government and partly by the new Republic, saw a fitting opportunity of asserting their independence from outside control, irrespective of its origin or nature.

Yunnan, Szechuen and Shantung declared independence, and, in spite of all official declarations about the pro-foreign sympathies of the population, signs of the revival of Boxerism and anti-Christian propaganda were noted in many instances.†

Chihli, Shansi and Shensi were in the grip of rebellion; Mukden, the capital of Manchuria, Kalgan, Jehol and many other places to the east and north of Peking were, to use the words of the Abdication Edict, "boiling cauldrons of unfettered passions."‡

Canton and the whole Southern coast were in the hands of a notorious pirate, Luk, who succeeded in capturing the historic Bogue, Yuchu, Whampao and Fumen forts, and commanded the arsenal and admiralty buildings in Canton.§

The Foreign Powers were hastily reinforcing their garrisons and naval forces in Chinese waters,¶ consolidating, in the meantime, their position in the Treaty ports by eliminating the

* Sir John Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, February 9th, 1912.—China No. 1 (1912): "Further Correspondence," p. 174.

† Sir John Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, December 9th, 1911, June 6th and 7th, July 6th, 1912.—"Blue Book," China No. 3 (1913): "Correspondence," pp. 100, 57, 60, 56, 27.

‡ "North-China Herald," March 10th, 1912.

§ Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

¶ Sir John Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, April 5th, June 21st-26th, December 6th, 1912.—China No. 3 (1913) "Correspondence," pp. 11, 55, 57, 59, 82.

last traces of Chinese jurisdiction over the native population of the foreign concessions and settlements.*

In the middle of February a mutiny occurred amongst the troops of Generalissimo Li Yuan-hung, now the Vice-President of the Republic, and amongst the troops stationed in Kwangtung.† This mutiny was due to the same cause which animated the soldiers of General Li Yuan-hung to revolt against the Imperial Government in October 1911, viz., the non-payment of salaries to the soldiers, and at the time of Yuan Shih-kai's installation in the Presidential office there was no sign of the suppression of this riot. On the contrary, things went from bad to worse, for neither the Government at Peking nor that at Nanking had sufficient funds to pay off their armies, the total number of which had swollen to about one million.‡

The Mongols, led by their religious head—the Hutukthu or Living Buddha of Urga, the Capital of Mongolia—refused to join the Republic, claiming that their allegiance was due entirely and solely to the Manchu Dynasty, and that, with the disappearance of the latter, no link remained to bind them to the Chinese.

At the instigation of Russia, and with her financial help, they declared independence, forced the Chinese garrisons to evacuate Mongolia, and proclaimed the Hutukthu as their ruler, with the powers of an autocrat.§

The same occurred in Tibet. In November 1911 the Chinese garrison in Lhasa mutinied against their commander,

* Acting under the instructions of the foreign Ministers at Peking, the Consular Body at Shanghai took over the control of the Mixed Court, a Chinese judicial institution, and the Chinese prisons. According to the Consular declaration, dated November 10th, 1911, this measure was only a temporary one, but, as soon as the Republican Government made an attempt at getting the Court back, the Foreign Powers under various excuses refused to comply with this request. The restoration of the Court to the Chinese authorities took place on January 1st, 1927, when the events of the "May 30th, 1925, incident" at Shanghai and the popular movement of 1925-1926 compelled the Powers to yield to the Chinese demands.—A. M. Kotenev: "Shanghai: Its Mixed Court and Council," p. 170; "Shanghai: Its Council and the Chinese," pp. 171-188.

† Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

‡ E. Th. Williams: "China Yesterday and To-day," p. 489.

§ December 1st, 1911. On November 3rd, 1912, Russia officially recognized the independent status of Mongolia and signed with her an agreement pledging herself to render assistance for the maintenance of Mongol Autonomy, thus forcing China to recognize the new status and to content herself with a nominal suzerainty of this country.—November 5th, 1913. This was re-confirmed in the tripartite agreement between Russia, China and Mongolia, signed on June 7th, 1915.—АУТНОР.

Amban Lien-yu, and a few months later the Tibetans, by order of the Dalai Lama—the religious head of Tibet—revolted against China and forced the Chinese troops to evacuate Tibet. A Chinese expedition was sent to suppress the movement, but Great Britain protested and caused its withdrawal.* Under these critical circumstances quick and resolute action on the part of a government vested with extraordinary powers alone could relieve the situation.

In the meantime, the Southern delegation, sent to Peking by the National Assembly to watch the President-elect, exerted itself in obstructing his actions, fearing the usurpation of the whole power by him and the lessening of the authority of the popular representatives. It insisted that Yuan Shih-kai should go to Nanking to take the Presidential oath, which in its form should be analogical with that of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's, which recognized the source of the sovereignty of the Republic in the whole body of the people, and would make Yuan Shih-kai entirely dependent upon the will of the political factions forming the majority of the Assembly.†

Yuan Shih-kai delayed any definite reply. He realized full well the motives underlying this persistence on the part of the radical factions and did not wish to see the Government deprived of its essential independence. On February 29th the 3rd Division of picked Northern troops stationed at Peking revolted against their commanders as a protest against deferred payment of their salaries and, as it was alleged, Yuan Shih-kai's leaving the Capital for the South.

It is quite possible that this costly manœuvre, whereby a good portion of the metropolis was plundered and burnt by

* In August 1912 Great Britain presented a Memorandum to China asking her to refrain from despatching troops to Tibet, as such an act would constitute a violation of the Anglo-Chinese Treaty and the autonomy of the Government of Tibet. Great Britain also imposed an embargo on communications between China and Tibet via India. On October 1st, 1913, a Tripartite Conference was opened in Simla, attended by the representatives of Great Britain, Tibet and China. Tibet demanded complete independence and extension of her Eastern boundaries, and was supported in her claim by Great Britain. China refused to entertain this claim, whereupon Great Britain entered into an agreement with Tibet—July 3rd, 1914—providing special safeguards for the interests of Great Britain and Tibet in the event of China continuing not to recognize the independent status of Tibet. The Tibetan problem remains still unsettled as far as China is concerned.—AUTHOR.

† F. E. Wilkinson, H.B.M.'s Consul at Nanking, to Sir John Jordan, February 16th, 1912.—China No. 1 (1912): "Further Correspondence," p. 206. Dr. Sun Yat-sen to Dr. Wu Ting-fang, January 22nd, 1912, *ibid.*

the rebellious soldiery during the revolt, was deliberately arranged by Yuan Shih-kai in order to intimidate the Southern delegation and secure for himself the maximum freedom of action.* The delegates gave in, and on March 10th, 1912, Yuan Shih-kai was enabled to take his Presidential oath at Peking and in terms which did not contradict the principles laid down by the Imperial Abdication Acts.†

An amnesty declared in his name as Provisional President, styled officially "the Great President," pardoning all prisoners, except murderers and robbers, and remitting all overdue land taxes, and a Mandate stating that for the present the old laws would stand except where they were obviously contrary to the spirit of republicanism, announced the official beginning of the Republican Era in China.

The settlement of this controversy and the assumption of the Presidential office by Yuan Shih-kai on the conditions which he succeeded in wringing from the Southern party was a well-timed act, for the country was on the verge of general anarchy. The mass of the population, farmers and peasants, artisans, workers, and even the greater part of the gentry, resisted any measure which had the slightest tendency to affect the ancient customs or to introduce the newly-declared democratic principles. They refrained from taking part in public balloting, leaving the election of the delegates of the Provincial and National Assemblies either to the élite minority of the Republicans and their partisans or at the discretion of the traditional provincial authorities.‡

* Putnam Weale: "The Fight for the Republic in China," p. 42.

† The ceremony of the formal inauguration of Yuan Shih-kai as Provisional President of the Republic was held in the modern building of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Peking, where Yuan Shih-kai, in the presence of the Ministers the Nanking Assembly delegates, military and naval officers and many foreigners, read the text of the oath, which stated that he, Yuan Shih-kai, "will exert his utmost to promote the democratic spirit, to remove the dark blots of despotism, to obey strictly the Constitution and to abide by the wish of the people, so as to place the country in a safe, united, strong and firm position, and to effect the happiness and welfare of the divisions of the Chinese race." The last passage—"to abide by the wish of the people"—was particularly objected to by the Assembly delegation as enabling Yuan Shih-kai to resort to other means for obtaining "the wish of the people" besides those laid down in the Constitution, and in such a way to upset its operation. The ceremony was concluded by two Buddhist lamas, who presented Yuan Shih-kai with two honorary scarves bearing the inscription: "The Great President."—AUTHOR.

‡ Sir John Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, February 9th, 1912.—China No. 1 (1912): "Further Correspondence," p. 175.

Abstract forms of thinking in terms of institutions and general legal principles, in which the people were now forced to think by the republican theories of government, were, as we have already stated, incomprehensible to the mass of the population, and therefore the Constitution which destroyed the personal relationship between the masses and their rulers was doomed to remain a dead letter.* Even the fundamental principles concerning personal freedom contained in the Constitution were so far from their ideas that the practice of slavery remained intact. The trafficking in children and women continued to flourish with official connivance not only in the interior but also in such centres of Western civilization as the Treaty ports.† The Republican Government was compelled to resort to the most extravagant measures to stop such practices, which, according to the assertion of the radicals, were signs of Chinese national ignominy and foreign oppression. People wearing their hair in a queue—a custom introduced by the Manchus in the eighteenth century in token of China's submission—were caught on the streets by the republican police and, in spite of vigorous protests, forcibly shorn of their traditional adornment.‡

This reform was initiated by the Peking National Assembly in 1910, but the Imperial Government was very slow in enforcing it, realizing the opposition which even this innocent innovation would meet amongst the masses, which had long ago forgotten the real meaning of the custom and saw in the queue a sort of national emblem.§

The National Assembly, which was transferred from Nanking to Peking, and opened its session on April 29th, and

* Liang Shih-yi, Minister of Finance; Reinsch, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

† Slavery in China, in spite of all official denials and express provisions of the Republican Criminal Code dealing severely with the violators of personal freedom, has survived up to the present day. Chinese society displays an astounding leniency towards this custom, considering it as an event inevitable, and sometimes even beneficial, under existing social and economic conditions in China. Since the proclamation of the Republic in 1911 and up to 1924 the International Mixed Court at Shanghai heard 700 cases, wherein 888 persons were charged with trafficking in children of both sex and women, and 956 applications for a declaration of personal freedom.—Kotenev, *op. cit.*, pp. 295 and 316.

‡ "North-China Herald," November 1911. Sir John Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, February 9th and June 24th, 1912.—China No. 1 (1912): "Further Correspondence," p. 174; China No. 3 (1913): "Correspondence," p. 66.

§ The custom of wearing the queue is still in force in the interior of China, Manchuria, Mongolia, Tibet and Chinese Turkestan, where the rural population refuse to part with it.—AUTHOR.

the National Council, its successor, pending the promulgation of the permanent constitution,* were not inclined to acknowledge their helplessness *vis-à-vis* these facts or the necessity of returning to the method of governing the country by the personal decrees and orders of the head of the nation, which notion was, in the eyes of the masses, associated with the person of the President.†

The first open breach between the National Council and the Kuomintang or People's Party, ‡ which formed the leading parliamentary faction, occurred in connection with the so-called Reorganization Loan. The flotation of the first Republican Loans contracted from a Franco-Belgian syndicaté § and in England ¶ did not arouse any protest on the part of the popular representatives. The advisability of prompt action on the part of the Government, headed by the Great President and Tang Shao-yi as Premier, and trusted men of the opposition was too apparent to awake jealousy amongst the Kuomintang as an infringement of the prerogative of the National Assembly. ||

These loans, of course, could not satisfy the financial need of the Republican Government, which, owing to the

* Provisional Constitution, 1912, Article 16.

† "It is worthy of remark," states F. E. Wilkinson, H.B.M.'s Consul at Nanking, to Sir John Jordan in his despatch dated January 6th, 1912, "that amongst the lower classes here Dr. Sun Wen (Sun Yat-sen) is commonly referred to as the new Emperor, the term President, which they do not understand, being merely regarded as a euphemism for the higher title."—China No. 1 (1912): "Further Correspondence," p. 177.

‡ The Kuomintang was formed in the fall of 1911 as the result of amalgamation of various revolutionary groups and secret societies under the general leadership of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who was the moving spirit of this amalgamation. The first reference to the formation of this party appears in the foreign Press in November 1911, when the "North-China Herald" published a report concerning the revolutionary activities of the Kuomintang in the interior of South and Central China.—AUTHOR.

§ Franco-Belgian Loan, 1912—£2,000,000.

¶ Crisp Loan, 1912—£10,000,000.

|| China was entirely in the hands of the so-called Four Nation Group, which since its formation in 1910 enjoyed virtually the monopoly of floating loans for her. The Russian and Japanese bankers were excluded from this powerful combination, which prescribed its law to China. In 1912, when the Republic was in pressing need of money and the loan-making business promised great profits, pressure was brought to bear through the respective diplomatic channels, and on June 21st, 1912, the Russian and Japanese financiers were admitted into the Group, from then on known as the "Six Powers Group." In contracting loans from the Franco-Belgian syndicate and in England, the Chinese Government succeeded in breaking for a short while the cordon line drawn around China by the monopolists and in obtaining more favourable terms at the issue of the Great Reorganization Loan.—AUTHOR.

chaotic conditions of the country, was deprived of any revenue from the provinces and had to resort to an extensive issue of foreign loans to cover its current expenses.

The same chaotic state of affairs did not permit the Government to proceed with the immediate election of the National Assembly which, according to the Provisional Constitution, had to be summoned within two months, *i.e.*, before November 1st, 1912,* if it did not wish to see the future Parliament entirely in the hands of the Southern Party and the funds obtained abroad used for the disintegration of the Government rather than for its stabilization. †

The method applied by Yuan Shih-kai for the crushing of his political enemies was very simple. It was based upon terrorism and murder ‡—the traditional weapons of Asiatic politics. When, after much delay, Parliament was opened and the Kuomintang prepared for the fight, there were few amongst them who, in fact, presented any real danger. The most influential and active ones took refuge in Japan. Amongst them was Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who, after his resignation, was appointed head of a railway bureau, and had been busy in propagating the construction of an extensive railway system in China. §

On April 27th, before all the formalities connected with the election of Speakers to both Houses had been completed, the last document concerning the Reorganization Loan sanctioned by the outgoing National Council was signed, and

* Provisional Constitution, Nanking, 1912, Article 53.

† According to Article 19 of the Provisional Constitution the Assembly had the entire control of the issue of public loans and their expenditure.—AUTHOR.

‡ On August 15th, 1912, General Chang Chung-wu, one of the heroes of the Wuchang Revolt, was suddenly arrested at a banquet given in his honour by the metropolitan authorities, and shot without trial.—Putnam Weale, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

§ On March 20th, 1913, one of the most gifted Southern leaders, Sung Chiao-jen, was assassinated at the North Station of the Shanghai-Nanking Railway at Shanghai just at the moment when he was entraining with a number of parliamentarians for Peking.—Shanghai Municipal Council's Annual Report, 1913, p. 101-B.

A special Military Court was established at Peking to deal summarily with offences committed against "peace and order of the Republic," which enabled the Government very quickly to get rid of its enemies in the Capital. The Military Court, or Chih Fah Chu, was abolished by the successor of Yuan Shih-kai, the President Li Yuan-hung, on June 17th, 1916.—AUTHOR.

§ Publicity Department of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang; "Dr. Sun Yat-sen, his life and achievements," Shanghai, 1919, p. 5.

Yuan Shih-kai obtained funds freeing him from the necessity of co-ordinating his actions with the wishes of the Kuomintang.* Yuan Shih-kai's victory was complete, and there were no other means of depriving him of its spoils except a resort to arms.

On July 10th, 1913, the Northern garrisons¹ in many places along the Yangtze River were suddenly fired upon by the troops of General Li Lieh-chun, one of the Southern military leaders, which signalled the commencement of the so-called Second Chinese Revolution.

The campaign was short. Deprived of assistance from outside and the support of the population, the Southern Party was quickly defeated.† Nanking, Shanghai and Canton were occupied by the Northern troops, while the garrisons in other parts of the Yangtze Valley and remote Southern provinces remained loyal to the Central Government.‡ A liberal sum was distributed amongst the parliamentarians at Peking, which appeared to be sufficient to reconcile

* The terms of the Reorganization Loan, the amount of which was fixed at £25,000,000, were similar to those on which China had obtained money abroad since 1901. It meant an increase of foreign control over Chinese finances and administration. This time the security was the Government Salt Monopoly, which, according to the loan contract of April 27th, 1913, was to be entirely reorganized and placed under exclusive foreign control. More than one-half of the amount of the loan was devoted to the repayment of old loans and interest to foreign banks, and only a little over £10,000,000 was actually advanced to the Chinese Government. It should be admitted that the terms were hard and the amount scarcely adequate to defray all the administrative expenses of the Republic, and wholly insufficient to make it independent from foreign credit. But the Chinese Government had to content itself with the result achieved. Under existing conditions, it was hardly possible for China to secure better terms on the foreign money market, but justice requires us to mention that, as soon as the conditions of the loan became known at Washington, President Wilson expressed himself against the participation of the American bankers in the proposed loan on the ground that "its terms seem to touch very nearly the administrative independence of China itself, which is contrary to the American policy in China." This resulted in the resignation of the American bankers from the Six Powers Group, so that the British, French, German, Japanese and Russian banks were left alone to divide between themselves the rich profits of the transaction.—**AUTHOR.**

† In his "The Fight for the Republic in China," Putnam Weale, in reference to the defeat of the revolutionaries, states as follows (p. 54):—"Thoroughly disappointed in this and many other directions the Southern Party was now emasculated; for the moneyed classes had withheld their support to the end, and without money nothing is possible in China."

‡ It is worth while to note that General Li Yung-hung, the ex-Generalissimo of the first Revolution, who still continued to live in Wuchang, and many other prominent Southern leaders and the entire navy refused to join the revolt.—**AUTHOR.**

them * and induce them not only to pass in advance of the Permanent Constitution a set of articles dealing with the election and term of office of the President, but also to elect Yuan Shih-kai full President for the term of five years. †

The Foreign Powers (except the United States, which had accorded formal recognition to the Republic on the election of the Speakers of the two Houses of Parliament on May 2nd, 1913) selected a very peculiar moment for according recognition to the Republic—a moment when it seemed that the very idea of popular representation in China was stultified to such an extent that no voice was raised in protest against the wholesale unseating of the members of the Kuomintang on account of their connection with the Revolutionists, ‡ which was tantamount to a *coup d'état*.

It seemed that very little prevented the country from reverting to the old form of government. If an energetic attempt to restore the monarchy had then been made the principle of government under one head might have triumphed but for the undoubted fact that not a single man amongst the Tsings was capable of assuming the burdens of a Sovereign. The Emperor Hsuan Tung was a minor. The Princes and Imperial Clansmen did not command the slightest respect amongst the population or the army, which hardly knew their names. Still occupying the vast premises of the Winter Palace, they were engaged in the old Court intrigues and questions of intricate etiquette. The "Imperial Gazette" regularly announced Decrees granting honours and decorations to the courtiers, but as soon as any serious attempt was made

* During the entire revolution against Yuan Shih-kai's régime in July and August, the Parliament maintained secret contact with the commanding officers of the rebel troops. A special Constitutional Committee was entrusted with the task of a speedy drafting of a permanent Constitution, which had to replace the Provisional Constitution of 1912. These deputies held meetings in strict secrecy in the Temple of Heaven at Peking, but it was known that the primary reason of this secrecy was that the Committee was planning to effect a *coup d'état* and put the President under the strict control of a Parliamentary Committee, making him thereby a puppet in the hands of the Kuomintang.—AUTHOR.

† The Presidential Election Law, October 4th, 1913, Article III.

‡ Presidential Mandate, November 4th, 1913, countersigned by the entire Cabinet.

According to the official list published for general information, the number of members of the Lower House who were unseated and ordered to leave the Capital was 252, besides 98 senators. In addition to this, about 50 members and 30 senators left Peking, being afraid of possible prosecution on the part of the Government, so that no further sittings of Parliament were possible owing to the lack of a quorum, fixed by the Provisional Constitution at one-half of the total membership.—AUTHOR.

by the members of the Imperial family to come into contact with the people this attempt failed.* They were alien to the Chinese people not only because they were Manchus, but also because they were unable to understand the spirit of their former subjects.

The only personality who, perhaps, preserved some degree of popularity and the charm of the Imperial dignity was, in spite of the strenuous propaganda of the Republicans, † the Dowager Empress Lung Yi, the wife of the Emperor Kuang Hsu, who was forced by the circumstances of the Revolution to sign the Abdication Edicts on behalf of the boy-Emperor Hsuan Tung. But on February 22nd, 1914, she expired unexpectedly, succumbing to the sorrow and tears in which, since the day of the abdication, she had spent all her days. Her death created a very profound emotion in China, and countless multitudes ‡ of the metropolitan population and people from the adjacent districts passed in solemn and orderly procession before the altar supporting the portrait of the Empress, paying their respects to this representative of the once glorious Tsing Dynasty.

Meanwhile, the situation clearly showed that China was rapidly shifting back to the traditional political ideas and that the restoration of the monarchical form of government was only a question of time and of form acceptable to the Foreign Powers.

It was also clear that the same situation would, sooner or later, force Yuan Shih-kai, as the sole person in China capable of assuming the supreme power, to make an attempt to ascend the illustrious Dragon Throne with no regard either to his personal inclination or ambition. For, if the Constitution had not to remain a dead letter, but to become a part of the State system in China, it had to be adapted to the primitive political notions of the population, which, in its final result, meant a return to the principle of autocracy.

* The secret society in Manchuria and Mongolia known under the name "the Imperial Clan Society" was able to foment some trouble during 1912-1913, but owing to the lack of organization amongst its leaders was unable to achieve any practical advantage. The same can be said of the efforts of Prince Twan to stir up a movement in favour of the Tsing Dynasty in the Province of Kansu in March 1912.—Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 108.

† Liang Chi-chiao's Appeal, 1915.—H. F. MacNair: "Modern Chinese History," p. 750.

‡ Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 491; Putnam Weale, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

China's history repeated itself, and what had happened in 1898, when the Great Empress Dowager took out of the feeble hands of the crowned reformer the supreme control of the State, was happening now.

As a matter of fact, according to the Chinese political doctrine the supreme power in the State was not only a political factor but also a religio-ethical agent. The Chinese emperor was not only a ruler, in the Western sense of the word, but, as we have stated, also the guardian of the national virtue. He was a link between the Earth and the Heaven, the people and the Supreme Ruler in Heaven, the assimilation of all national deities. He was the Pontifex Maximus whose state functions were full of metaphysical significance and whose life was in itself the expression of the Heavenly will.* And if Confucianism in its present form was professed in China by the very mode of the life, if Confucian doctrines formed a religio-ethical system transmuted into life itself, the Chinese emperor was the personification of this mode of life.

The Chinese emperors lived strictly as did their subjects. They worshipped the same national deities and their ancestors, and performed the same rites. They professed the same ideas, shared the same superstitions, read the same books. They lived in houses of the same architecture, surrounded by the same objects; wore the same clothes, got up at sunrise, and went to bed at sunset. They did these things in exactly the same manner as the poorest of their subjects, and the only difference was that they did it in a more elaborate manner corresponding to their high Imperial dignity.† The Imperial ministers and officials followed the example of their august masters and carried on the same life, only less elaborately. And so on down to the commoner, who followed the example of his superiors, whose life in its turn was the life of their subordinates. It was a whole, the integral parts of which were inter-connected with bonds of uniform thought, feeling and taste. It was a chain which

* "Mencius replied:—"No, Heaven does not speak. It simply shows its will by his (the Emperor's) conduct, and his conduct of affairs."—"Book of Mencius"—Dr. J. Legge, Vol. II, p. 231.

† "Tsze-loo asked about government. The Master said: "Go before the people with your example, and be laborious in their affairs."—Confucius: "Analects," *ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 126.

"When a prince loves what the people love, and hates what the people hate, then is he what is called the parent of the people."—Confucius: "The Great Learning," *ibid.*, p. 238.

linked up the humblest subject of the Son of Heaven with his Sovereign.*

The Revolution broke this chain without being able to forge any new link, and it was now the gigantic task of the Republic to reinstate this political, social and religious harmony without which no peace was possible in China. It was a tremendous task, because the whole process had to be shaped into a form comprehensible and satisfactory not only to the Chinese, but also to foreign public opinion, which was particularly sensitive to any curtailing of the prerogatives of the representative organs as a fundamental principle of Western culture. It was definitely against the restoration of the monarchical form of government, without which the religio-social structure of China was an absurdity.

On November 26th, 1913, Yuan Shih-kai caused a Mandate to be issued which restored the official worship of Confucius. "China's devotion to Confucius began with the reign of the Emperor Hsiaowu, of the Han Dynasty, who rejected the works of the hundred authors, making the six Confucian classics the leading book," stated his mandate declaring Confucius "the fountain of Republicanism" and announcing that "after studying the history of China and consulting the opinions of scholars, he, Yuan Shih-kai, found that Confucius must remain the Teacher for thousands of generations." †

This mandate was soon followed by another reviving the official cult of Heaven. "I have decided to perform the

* As a symbol of this unity, the Chinese emperors used to perform in the mid-month of Spring the ceremony of worshipping Shennung, the Patron Saint of Agriculture, in which they appeared as humble tillers of the soil. The emperors ploughed eight furrows in the Field of God. After the emperor, various princes and dignitaries of the State also ploughed each his allotted number of furrows according to rank; the field was then sown with grain, which later in the year was harvested and made into flour to be used in temples for offerings.

At the same time as the emperor, princes and officials performed this ceremony, the empress, accompanied by Court ladies, proceeded to the shrine of the Goddess of Silk and performed the ceremony of feeding the silkworms. The silk obtained later from the rearing of these silkworms was also used for offerings.

Both ceremonies dated from a great antiquity and were performed in the provinces by local authorities while the farmers were actually engaged in the same work in their fields.

† This Mandate has been in force up to the present time throughout the whole of China. The Magistrates performed the sacrificial ceremony according to the traditional ritual on the dates prescribed for the worship of the Sage by the ancient Imperial decrees. In December 1925 the Nationalist Government prohibited their officials from taking any part in this ceremony, so that at the present time the worship of Confucius is preserved only in the North of China.—AUTHOR.

worship of Heaven on the day of the winter solstice," said Yuan Shih-kai.*

These two declarations caused an agitation amongst the radical groups, which was echoed in foreign missionary circles, who felt it to be a step backward for the Republic to recognize any form of belief. †

The Presidential mandates being issued in the name of the Republic suffered from an apparent want of logic. But they were perfectly logical if it were possible to substitute the words "Republic" and "President" for the words "Emperor" and "His Majesty," which was, as we have stated, bound to come as soon as any attempt was made to adapt the Constitution to the rational life.

The same can be said about the pompous Imperial ritual revived in connection with the restoration of the official cults. ‡ It was utterly at variance with the customs of the Republic, but it had a definite significance in the eyes of the masses, for whom, as we have stated, the President was not only the head of the Government, but also the Head of the Nation, who took the place of the emperor and who, therefore, had to perform the duty of representing the people on all occasions and with all the solemnity prescribed by the ancient rites. §

In this respect the Constitutional Compact and the Presidential Succession Law, dated May 1st and December

* Presidential Mandate, December 20th, 1913.

† Reinsch, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

‡ "It would be dangerous for the Republican Government to neglect the worship of Heaven," stated Chu Chi-mien, Minister of Interior and one of the well-known Chinese scholars, to P. S. Reinsch, U.S. Minister to China. "The entire farm population observes the ceremonial relative to sowing, harvesting and other rural occupations according to the old calendar. Should the worship of Heaven be omitted on winter solstice day now that the Government has become established, and should there follow a leanness or entire failure of crops, the Government would surely be held responsible by the farmers throughout the land."—*Ibid.*, p. 24.

§ The imposing ceremony of the worshipping of Heaven took place on December 23rd, 1913. In the dark of the morning Yuan Shih-kai, accompanied by the Master of Ceremonies, Ministers and a numerous *cortège* of other high officials and generals, proceeded to the Temple of Heaven, the famous circular altar at Peking. Here he and his suite changed their uniforms for sacrificial robes as worn in China during the time of the Dukes of Chow, B.C. 1112, and in solemn procession, followed by ancient music, mounted the altar. Jade, silk and meat were offered to Heaven, and Yuan Shih-kai pronounced the following short prayer:—

"Heaven, Thou dost look down on us and givest us the nation. All-seeing and All-hearing, everywhere, yet how near and how close. We come before Thee on this winter solstice day, when the air assumes a new life; in spirit devout, and with ceremony old, we offer to Thee jade, silk and meat. May our prayer and offerings rise unto Thee together with sweet incense. We sanctify ourselves and pray that Thou accept our offerings."—AUTHOR.

29th, 1914, respectively, expressed exactly the idea corresponding to the national conception regarding the Government and the State in its inter-relations and the responsibility of the Head of the Nation before the entire body of the people, and not before any part of it claiming to represent its will.*

In short, these two acts were unanimously declared to be unconstitutional and arbitrary by the Republicans and foreign critics, for, simultaneously with the definition of the power of the President † and his right of selecting his successor, the power of the Parliament was made subject to a very considerable limitation, bringing it down to that of a merely consultative body similar to the late Grand Council of the Empire. ‡

The constitutional reform was followed by the reform of the provincial system, which was effected on the same principle as the previous reform. The control in the provinces was concentrated in the hands of a few administrative functionaries responsible to the Head of the Nation. The Provincial Assemblies were dissolved. Special measures were also taken to emasculate the most independent provincial military leaders by transferring them to the Capital, where they received lucrative and honorific posts without any actual power. § The Government promulgated a series of laws, ¶ the object of which was to restrict the activity of the radical groups which were opposed to the new order and the fundamental principles of Chinese life. ||

In his efforts to consolidate the position, Yuan Shih-kai not only met with the opposition of the Chinese Republicans,

* Constitutional Compact, Articles 14, 15 and 16.

† According to Articles 23, 24, 25 and 27 of the same Compact, the President was simultaneously the Commander-in-Chief of the National Army and Navy and had the right of declaring war, concluding peace and making treaties, provided that the latter did not affect the territory of the Republic and increase the burdens of the citizens. The President had also the right of conferring titles of nobility, decorations and other insignia of war.—AUTHOR.

‡ *Ibid.*, Article 43.

§ For this purpose a special institution called "The Palace of Generals" was inaugurated, where its members received very high salaries but did not enjoy a tittle of real power or influence.—AUTHOR.

¶ Press Law, Law of Publication and Regulations for the Preservation of Order, 1914.—A. M. Kotenev: "Shanghai: Its Municipality and the Chinese," 1917, pp. 78, 196, 197, 203, 445, 460.

|| "The greatest evil nowadays is the misunderstanding of true principles," declared Yuan Shih-kai in one of his Mandates of this period. "The Republicans on the pretext of public interest try to attain selfish ends, some going so far as to consider the forsaking of parents as a sign of liberty and regarding the violation of the laws as a demonstration of equality."—AUTHOR.

but came under deep suspicion in Japan, where his methods aroused anxiety as tending towards the restoration of the monarchical form of government in China and the resumption of the old irreconcilability towards her. The first sign of anti-Japanese feeling was demonstrated in the well-known Notes of the Chinese Government whereby it insisted on the limitation of the war zone around Kiaochow Bay and protested against Japanese occupation of the Shantung Railway.*

The outbreak of the Great War found China in one of the most painful phases of her political development. Her direct participation in the hostilities was, of course, out of the question, and the two Notes were the only outward expression of her attitude towards the proceedings.

Meanwhile, the catastrophic events in Europe had a very far-reaching effect upon the psychology of all thinking Chinese. For the first time in the whole history of Sino-foreign relations they saw the concert of the Foreign Powers in China broken. They saw clearly that the time had come when they could settle their domestic problems without being forced to look to the foreigners and be afraid of their rude interference.

The occupation of Kiaochow and the Shantung Railway by the Japanese did not arouse any particular apprehension. The Japanese seemed to have replaced the Germans and, though it was less dangerous for China to have the latter as tenants, † yet the issue of the war was far from being settled, and there was ample ground to believe that the Germans might ultimately win. ‡

In this Yuan Shih-kai and his Cabinet made a fatal mistake. They exaggerated the might of the Central Powers and underestimated the importance of the fact that the war in Europe untied the hands of Japan, and that the latter would never agree to the return of a monarchy and the restoration of

* September 3rd and 30th, 1914. This protest was reiterated on October 9th, 1914, in the Note of the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sun Pao-chi, to the Japanese Minister at Peking, Hioki Eki.—AUTHOR.

† "Aggressive Japan in Shantung is different from an European tenant," said Admiral Tsai to P. S. Reinsch, U.S. Minister to China, in September 1914.—Reinsch, *op. cit.*, 129.

‡ The present narrative refers to the period between September 15th, 1914, and January 15th, 1915, when the German armies seemed to be invincible on all fronts, which, coupled with the extremely clever policy of the German diplomats at Peking and the propaganda of the German communities in the Treaty ports couched in pro-Chinese terms, made a very deep impression in China.—AUTHOR.

China along national lines unless induced thereto by a complete assurance that the new *régime* in its politics would strictly follow the directions of Japan. This could hardly be expected from China under the leadership of Yuan Shih-kai, a Nationalist to the marrow of his bones, whose only wish was to see the Japanese troops leaving Chinese territory. *

On January 18th, 1915, Mr. Hioki Eki, Japanese Minister to China, asked for a personal interview with the President. In the course of this interview he presented to Yuan Shih-kai the well-known Twenty-one Demands, the acceptance of which by China had to make her for ever a participant and associate in the world politics of Japan.

The words "participant and associate" are intentionally quoted apart from other expressions covering the characteristics of the situation. A study of all the available documents relating to this period shows that in presenting her demands Japan was very far from the idea of reducing China to the state of a Japanese vassal. Her step was the result of the general political situation in Europe, which gave her the chance of getting rid of her Western competitors in China by replacing them in all spheres of Chinese political and economic life. She demanded nothing in excess of that which had been gained and enjoyed *de jure* and *de facto* by the Western Powers in China since 1901. †

* Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs to the British and Japanese Ministers at Peking, January 7th, 1915; same to the Japanese Minister at Peking, January 9th, 1915.

† The Twenty-one Demands were sub-divided into five groups.

Group I dealt with the Shantung problem:—Japan asked in respect to this province the same rights which had been granted to Germany by China since 1898.—Sino-German Convention, March 6th, 1898; Agreement respecting Kiaochow-Tsinan Railway, March 21st, 1900; Sino-German Convention, November 28th, 1905; and Agreement between the Provincial Authorities of Shantung and China-German Mining Co., July 24th, 1911.

Group II referred to Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia:—Japan claimed the same rights in these regions as were enjoyed by Russia in North Manchuria, the adjacent districts of Mongolia and the Alienation zone of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

Group III dealt with the problem of the industrial development of the Yangtze Valley and Japanese special rights in regard to the Hanyehping Co., a Chinese mining enterprise financed by Japanese bankers. Japan demanded that in view of the considerable capital invested in this enterprise, and outside competition, all mining concessions in this district should, if at all, be granted exclusively either to Chinese or to the same company—a privilege enjoyed *de facto* by many foreign mining enterprises in other parts of China.

Group IV contained an express demand of the Japanese Government for the exclusion of all foreigners of non-Japanese nationality from the Chinese coast, which aroused particular indignation on the part of the Chinese "foreign friends."

The edge of the demands was primarily directed against the Western Powers and their interests in China, and not sovereignty and the interest of her citizens,* as the foreign Press, after the details of the demands leaked out, cried in terror at the idea that the Europeans might lose the spoils of their former conquests in China.†

But His Excellency Hioki Eki said to the President of the Chinese Republic something which had more importance for China's destiny than the question of who would enjoy the advantage of guiding China along the path of modern civilization. With an unparalleled cynicism the Minister spoke of the Chinese revolutionaries and their relations "with many Japanese outside of the Government." The revolutionaries had "means and influence," and it might so happen that the Japanese Government would not be able to restrain them from stirring up a struggle in China "unless the Chinese Government should give some positive proof of friendship." The President was unpopular in Japan, but if he would assent to the Japanese claims the Imperial Japanese Government would find ways to help him in setting the Chinese house in order.‡

Yuan Shih-kai sat silent throughout this ominous conversation. The blow stunned him. He could only say: "You cannot expect me to say anything to-night."§

Group V stated that the Chinese Government shall employ influential Japanese citizens as advisers in political, financial, and military affairs, the majority of which up to the present were of American, English, German and French nationality. Japanese religious missions, charitable and educational institutions had to be conceded the right of owning land—a privilege enjoyed by the Roman Catholics and American Missionary and Educational Societies.—Sino-American Treaty, 1903.

The Chinese Government had to employ Japanese in the Police Service in all important places of China as instructors and actual members of the force. In many places of China, including Peking, the Chinese Government used to employ foreigners as police instructors and actual members of the force, while the river police in all Treaty ports formed a department of the Chinese Maritime Customs and was entirely in the hands of Europeans. China had to purchase about fifty per cent. of all munitions of war from Japan. The latter was almost exclusively procured by China in England, France, Germany, and Italy. In the event of need of foreign capital for developing railways, harbours, etc., in the Province of Fukien, China had, before borrowing money abroad, to consult Japan. This was a privilege enjoyed *de facto* by financiers belonging to the Four Nation Group and its successor, the Five Nation Group, in respect to all Chinese foreign loan transactions.—AUTHOR.

* Memorandum of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 1st, 1905.

† "The Foreign and the Chinese Press has since been paying considerable attention to this question and frequently publishing pro-Chinese or pro-Japanese comments in order to call forth the World's conjecture, a matter which the Chinese Government regrets."—*Ibid.*

‡ Reinsch, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

§ *Ibid.*

He did not break the silence for four long months, during which he sought to counteract the effects of the Japanese political move,* trying to save China from the necessity of joining her fate with a foreign power.† On May 7th, 1915, the Japanese Government delivered to China an ultimatum declaring that, in the event of China's refusal to comply with her demands, "the Japanese Imperial Government will take whatever steps they may deem necessary." ‡

On May 8th the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs informed the Japanese Minister that the Chinese Government, "with a view to preserving the peace of the Far East," accepts the Japanese demands, with the exception of those articles containing provisions regarding the expulsion of Western Powers from China, which were postponed for "later negotiation." This was followed by an exchange of notes and the signing of two Treaties, § subject to the ratification by the President of the Chinese Republic and the Emperor of Japan.

The Chinese Government had good reason to congratulate itself upon the fortunate solution of the predicament, taking into consideration that the concessions made to Japan were all of secondary importance to China and that the Foreign Powers expressed themselves as so deeply concerned in the matter that the political and territorial integrity of China could be regarded for the time being as safe. ¶ On the other hand, the acceptance of the greater part of Japan's demands minimized the danger of inimical actions on her part in the event of an attempt being made for the restoration of the monarchical form of government in China.

As soon as the final treaty was signed, the Peace Planning Society, Chou An Hui, which, according to the high-flown Chinese style, had "to investigate the advantages and disadvantages accruing from the republican form of government," but which, in reality, was formed with official support

* Note of Japanese Minister at Peking to Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs containing the revised Twenty-one Demands, April 26th, 1915.

† Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Japanese Minister at Peking, May 1st, 1915.

‡ Japan's Ultimatum to China, May 7th, 1915.

§ May 25th, 1915.

¶ On May 16th, 1915, the United States of America served notice on both China and Japan that "it cannot recognize any agreement or understanding which has been entered into or which may be entered into between the Governments of China and Japan impairing the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy commonly known as the "Open Door Policy."—AUTHOR.

to lead public opinion in the provinces, and substitute it, if necessary, started a very extensive propaganda in favour of China's return to the traditional form of political and social life. The services of prominent native and foreign journalists and experts on political questions were enlisted, but in spite of large publicity given to their arguments in favour of the monarchy the imitation of the Western methods of political struggle imported into China by the revolutionaries proved to be utterly worthless in a specific Chinese problem.

A storm of criticism and insinuation greeted the publication of Dr. Frank Goodnow's well-known memorandum on the republican form of government in China and Yang Tu's defence of the monarchical movement, which cast a very deep shadow on the personality of Yuan Shih-kai, who was accused of a violation of his Presidential oath and of a treacherous conspiracy against the liberty of the Chinese people.[†]

Still less success attended the contemplated measure of a national referendum, which had to decide the question of restoration, passed by the Senate sitting in its capacity of Legislative Chamber.* This measure had no precedent in the history of China, and was obviously impossible under existing conditions and in view of the complete inability of the Chinese masses to take any active part in the political life of the country. It was clear that to resort to a referendum presupposed a higher standard of political education than the mass of the population possessed, and that the Government would have to resort to the methods applied by the Southern leaders at the time of the inauguration of the Republic.[†] However, the instinctive fear of the intervention of the constitutional Foreign Powers in favour of the Republic in China was so strong amongst the Peking politicians that they stopped at nothing to give to the movement the semblance of a constitutional act.

* October 6th, 1915. According to Regulations concerning the National Referendum, each provincial district was to elect one representative. The district delegates from each province were to meet at their provincial capitals and ballot on the question.

† After the outbreak of the so-called Third Revolution, the Southern Republican Party published a pamphlet, entitled satirically "The People's Will," which contained the reproduction of a series of telegrams supposed to be sent by the Minister of Interior, the Military Governor at Mukden, Commander-in-Chief of the Land and Naval Forces, and National Convention Bureau to various provincial authorities with instructions how to secure unanimity in favour of the restoration of the monarchy at the national referendum, which did not leave much doubt that the Government had used all means in its possession to ensure the desired result.—AUTHOR.

As far as the personal attitude of Yuan Shih-kai towards the movement at this phase of its development was concerned, it may be characterized as that of reserve.* He did not display enthusiasm or his usual energy in this particularly critical moment of his political career, as if the whole movement had been started against his will. † As a man of specific Chinese psychology and exceptional abilities he could not overlook the falseness of his position *vis-à-vis* the national conception regarding the origin and nature of the supreme power and the contradiction between the methods applied by the partisans of the restoration and the history of germination of new dynasties in China.

Although forces beyond his personal control moved him swiftly towards the Throne of China, he was not a national hero who had performed one of those great deeds which, according to Chinese traditions and beliefs, entitled a man to claim the right to the supreme power *gracia dei*. He neither "united the country, thrown into utter confusion and cut up into small independent states, into one powerful empire nor achieved a decisive victory over a foreign foe." ‡ The country was still in a chaotic condition, and only drastic measures kept it from falling to pieces, while the foreigners held China in a grip stronger than ever. It was true that he saved the principle of monarchism and the legal continuity of power in China, but he saved them for the Tsings, who alone had the right of withdrawing their abdication according to the meaning of the Acts of February 12th, for no "peace and order" reigned in China.

As a shrewd politician and diplomat, Yuan Shih-kai could not overlook the fact that since the signing of the Convention in May 1915 the Japanese Government did not display any further interest in the matter of its strict performance by the Chinese. It seemed that the Convention in its final form did not satisfy Japan, and, in fact, the position of the

* Yuan Shih-kai to Li Yuan-hung and the Provincial Tu Tuhs, June 26th, 1912.—China No. 3 (1913): "Correspondence," p. 67. Yuan Shih-kai's declaration to P. S. Reinsch, U.S. Minister to China; Reinsch, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

Same to General Feng Kuo-chang; Putnam Weale, p. 211.

† This supposition is founded on the statement of numerous foreign and Chinese contemporaries that Yuan Shih-kai was dragged into the monarchical movement against his own will by his followers, and particularly by his eldest son, Yuan Ko-ting, who exercised a very considerable influence over him and who persuaded him to give the monarchy advocates a free hand in starting the movement.—AUTHOR.

‡ Liang Chi-chiao, *op. cit.*

Western Powers in China was not only unshaken by the provisions of the two treaties, but, on the contrary, it was even strengthened. Under "the most favoured nation" clauses of their treaties with China, the Western Powers were entitled to the same privileges which were obtained by Japan as the result of all her efforts. But if this was so, there could be no assurance that in the last moment the Japanese Government would not resort to those measures at which the Japanese Minister had so cynically hinted during the memorable interview of January 18th.

As a matter of fact, on October 28th the Japanese Minister, accompanied by his Russian and British colleagues, made official enquiries at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the monarchical movement and gave "friendly counsel" to the effect that it would be desirable to stop it; but the movement had gone too far to be stopped.*

On December 9th, 1915, the convention of district delegates at Peking registered the unanimous desire of the provinces to have Yuan Shih-kai assume the Imperial dignity. On the basis of these elections the Parliament passed a resolution conferring upon Yuan Shih-kai the title of Emperor of China and calling him to assume the duties connected therewith.

* October 28th: Mr. Obata, the Japanese *Chargé d'Affaires* in Peking, M. Kroupensky and Sir John Jordan proceeded to the Waichiaopu, and being received only by Lu Cheng-hsiang, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, each addressed His Excellency separately and in an informal manner. Mr. Obata, taking the lead, stated that his Government had observed the rapid progress of the monarchical movement and had noticed with considerable misgiving the adverse sentiment which, contrary to expectation, it had provoked.

The Chinese Government replied formally on the evening of November 3rd. The main points were (a) that there had been for some time a strong section of the people in favour of monarchy and that recently their ranks had been greatly increased until they included the most powerful and influential men in the country; (b) that the Government had always opposed the movement but had been obliged, in deference to the popular wish, to organize a convention of citizens' representatives; (c) that it felt perfectly confident of being able to carry the change through without trouble. On November 4th Mr. Obata called again—this time alone—on Lu Cheng-hsiang and asked for an explanation of this reply, and on the previous day M. Conty, the French Minister, informed the Waichiaopu that he had been instructed to associate the French Government with the advice. By this time more than half the provinces had voted in favour of a monarchy; there had been no evidence whatever of dangerous opposition to the movement, and only a few days before the advice was tendered Count Okuma, Baron Kato and Mr. Hieki, the Japanese Minister in Peking, had all three expressed the opinion that serious trouble was unlikely, the last named in the following terms:—"The bulk of the Chinese Nation," he said, "do not appreciate the difference between a republican and a monarchical régime; it is all one to them whether they have over them a President or an Emperor."—"North-China Herald," February 19th, 1916.

Three times, according to Chinese etiquette, Yuan Shih-kai declined this honour, but, under pressure brought to bear upon him by his followers and family, finally agreed. The official proclamation was to take place in January 1916.

Preparations were started for the final ceremony of the inauguration (or, rather, restoration) of the monarchy, when suddenly, on December 25th, a report came that a revolt had broken out in the remote and semi-independent Southern province, Yunnan.

A young General, ex-Generalissimo of the revolutionary army in Yunnan in 1911 and a very energetic and ambitious man, Tsai Ao, who was one of those military leaders to whom the Government gave a nominal post in the Capital and who was closely watched by the police on account of his well-known affiliation with the Southern leaders and the Kuo-mintang, succeeded in escaping unnoticed from Peking, to Tientsin. By a strange coincidence, this officer, who had lived for quite a long time in Japan, where he received his military education, took shelter with his family in the Japanese Concession in Tientsin. Again, by a strange coincidence, he boarded a Japanese steamer, and, under the protection of the Japanese flag, landed in Japan.*

At the beginning of December, together with the well-known political writer and modernist, former Minister of Justice Liang Chi-chiao, who pretended to represent the moderate progressivists, and other Southern revolutionaries, he appeared richly supplied with war munitions and funds † in Yunnan, where he induced the local military and civil governors to proclaim independence from the Central Government and to start a movement against the Emperor-elect.

The details of the Yunnan campaign are very little known, but on December 31st the "Peking Gazette" published two telegrams addressed to Yuan Shih-kai signed by the two Governors of Yunnan, accusing him of breaking his oath as

* Putnam Weale, *op. cit.*, pp. 243, 244, 245.

† In this connection it is interesting to cite a telegram of Dr. Sun Yat-sen sent by him through the Ministry of Finance at Peking to the Sourabaya Chinese Chamber of Commerce, dated January 30th, 1917, in which he stated, *inter alia*, as follows:—"I, for the support of republicanism and to work the downfall of monarchism, have borrowed Yen 1,000,000 from the Japanese merchants (italics ours) and Yen 1,744,318.12 from Chinese emigrants abroad."

After the downfall of Yuan Shih-kai, Dr. Sun Yat-sen made a claim upon the new Government for the restitution of these funds, alleging that every cent he borrowed was obtained on the understanding that it was to be repaid as soon as the country had settled down.—"North-China Herald," February 3rd, 1917.

President and, by restoring the monarchical form of government, slighting public opinion and giving an opportunity for the foreigners "to encroach on our (Chinese) rights." In conclusion the telegram demanded the immediate execution of all concerned in the monarchical movement. The revolt in Yunnan* was followed by a small mutiny in the area occupied by the Japanese in Shantung and a night attack on the Foreign Settlement boundary in Shanghai, which was participated in by several Japanese.

On the surface the movement seemed to be of no particular importance, and as sufficient troops were rushed to the scene of the revolt the preparations for the Grand Ceremony proceeded uninterrupted.

Meanwhile, the military operations against Yunnan and Szechuen, the Governor of which also joined General Tsai Ao, presented great difficulty on account of the remoteness and inaccessibility of the mountainous region occupied by the rebels. The troops of the Government advanced very slowly, which encouraged the revolutionaries in other provinces and which made some of the military leaders hesitate and declare their neutrality.† The port of Tsingtao in Shantung, occupied by the Japanese, was being used as a base for revolutionary activities with the connivance of the Japanese authorities.‡

The situation was gradually becoming intolerable, and finally it was decided to postpone the formal proclamation of the Empire and to send a special embassy to Japan to settle the matter and, if necessary, to offer concessions in exchange for non-interference with Chinese domestic affairs.§ But

* In order to appreciate fully the "particular interest" to the revolutionary movement in Yunnan displayed by the Japanese Government, it is worth while to note a fact that just at the beginning of the revolt in Yunnan the Japanese Government opened a Consulate there and despatched a military mission by a Major-General to "investigate the military situation."—"North-China Herald," February 12th, 1916.

† General Feng Kuo-chang, the Military Governor of Nanking.

‡ Reinsch, *op. cit.*, p. 188.

§ At the beginning of the revolution in Yunnan, the Japanese residents in Peking organized a "Yuchihtuan," or "Ambitious Society," which issued a statement in the Japanese language concerning the Japanese fundamental policy of Japan towards China. The following are the most interesting extracts from this statement:—

"President Yuan Shih-kai is one of those Chinese who know how to employ skilful words towards those ignorant Japanese who favour the establishment of good and friendly relations with China and with President Yuan Shih-kai, and they are doing so simply because they have been deceived by his skilful and sugary words or through the offering of small privileges to the Japanese. We firmly believe that with President Yuan Shih-kai at the

the Japanese Government hastened to inform the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs that on account of "personal reasons His Majesty the Emperor of Japan cannot receive a Chinese embassy at the present time."

The mask was thrown away. The authority of Yuan Shih-kai was broken down. China had to pay with her right of progressing according to national ideals for the refusal of her emperors and the Great President to acknowledge the political supremacy of Japan in the Far East. One province after another* demanded the resignation of the Great President and the Emperor-elect. On March 22nd Yuan Shih-kai issued a decree cancelling the monarchy and announcing that he would retain the Presidency and form a responsible Cabinet. But it was very doubtful if after this open capitulation he would be able to retain in his hands even a semblance of supreme power.

The Military Republican Government proclaimed at Canton under the leadership of Tang Chi-yao, Military Governor of Yunnan, demanded the abdication of Yuan Shih-kai and the restoration of the Nanking Constitution in full.†

head of the Government in Peking, it is absolutely impossible for the two countries to become real friends. Hence Japan must fix her fundamental policy towards China without further delay.

"As President Yuan Shih-kai is not the person to make real friends with Japan, so it is necessary for Japan to select one of those Chinese who can do so. In view of the prosperous position of Japan in the Far East on account of the European War, there should be no difficulty for the Japanese Government and people to carry out their policy, which, if actually put through in Japan's favour, will not only solve the long-cherished fundamental China policy of Japan once and for all, but also save our children and children's children from suffering great injury in future. This is certainly the best moment for Japan to carry out her policy in China, and such a favourable time will not occur once in every one thousand years.

"Japan must not be induced by China to give up her original policy in the monarchical restoration question simply in exchange for certain special privileges, for this will not only increase the contempt of the Chinese towards the Japanese, but also alienate friendly feeling from the Entente Powers. Thus the newly-secured active position of Japan in the Chinese diplomatic field will be lost through the loss of diplomatic credit among the Powers."—*"North-China Herald,"* February 16th, 1916.

* Hunan, Kwangse, Kwangtung, Szechuen, Kweichow.

† On May 10th, 1916, the revolutionary leaders and Generals proclaimed the completion of the formal organization of the independent Southern provinces, with Canton as the provisional Capital, into a Central Government, with Li Yuan-hung, the Vice-President, as Great President and Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, in supersession of the Central Government. They established a War Cabinet, which included Ministers of foreign, financial, military, legal and administrative affairs. The Tutuh of Yunnan had been elected Chairman of the Cabinet and Tsen Chun-hsuan Vice-Chairman. However, the Vice-President, Li Yuan-hung, refused to accept the Presidency of this confederation.—AUTHOR.

The old Parliament, composed of the Kuomintang, re-assembled at Shanghai, and there, under the protection of the extra-territorial rights enjoyed by the Foreign Settlement, joined its voice with Canton. The military leaders of the Yangtze provinces, who first declared their neutrality, were now holding a meeting at Nanking, ready at any moment to proceed against Peking, which was not only bankrupt politically but also financially, being driven to such extremes as to proclaim a moratorium suspending payment on all State banknotes.*

Like a wild beast in a trap, Yuan Shih-kai was helpless and at the mercy of his enemies and the enemies of his country. His nerves failed him, and his once powerful mentality was undermined. It seemed that the political ideals of his people, which helped China to pass safely through the most critical periods of her long history, were dead. They were dead in the heart of the masses in which he so blindly believed and which remained indifferent and silent during his struggle for their right to remain Chinese and not to become an imitation of the hated "foreign invaders."

"The President's power of quick decision has left him; he is helpless in the troublesome alternatives that confront him. Formerly it was 'yes' or 'no' in an instant, to my proposals. Now he ruminates, and wavers, and changes a decision many times," stated Chow Tzu-chi, Minister of Finance and one of the closest followers of Yuan Shih-kai, to Paul S. Reinsch, U.S. Minister to China, in March 1915.

Yuan Shih-kai was slowly dying. The European physician † summoned to attend him found him suffering from Bright's disease, but the real cause of his sudden and swift death has remained unexplained up to the present. His immediate friends and members of his family say that he died from mental depression, from that strange specific Chinese disease produced by sorrow and want of the will to live which caused the death of the unfortunate Empress Lung Yi, and which is incomprehensible to Westerners.

* The financial confusion was further aggravated by the opposition of the Japanese Government to the handing over to the Chinese Government of the surplus of the Salt and Customs revenues, which was usually handed over every few months by the authorization of the Directors of the Salt Inspectorate and the Inspector-General of the Chinese Maritime Customs. The delay in payment of this money to the Chinese Government in the most critical period of China's political life under Yuan Shih-kai was primarily responsible for the declaration of the moratorium and the economic chaos which ensued.—AUTHOR.

† Dr. J. A. Bussiers, of the French Legation.

Early on June 6th, 1916, he passed away, leaving behind him, in accordance with the ancient custom of the heads of the Chinese nation, a valedictory decree which started with the words :—

“The Min Kuo (Republic) has been established for five years. Unworthily have I, the Great President, been entrusted with the great task by the citizens. Owing to my lack of virtue and ability I have not been able fully to transform into deeds what I have desired to accomplish ; and I blush to say that I have not realized one ten-thousandth part of my original intention to save the country and the people. . . .”*

* Presidential Valedictory Mandate, dated June 6th, 1916, and countersigned by Tuan Chi-jui, Secretary of State and Minister of War ; Tsao Ju-lin, Minister of Foreign Affairs ; Wang Yi-tang, Minister of Interior ; Chow Tzu-chi, Minister of Finance ; Liu Kuan-tsiung, Minister of Navy ; Chang Tsung-hsiang, Minister of Justice ; and Chang Kuo-kan, Minister of Education.

CHAPTER VI

CHINA AND THE GREAT WAR

CHINA'S direct participation in the Great War as a combatant was, of course, an event in which no sober-minded politician or military leader had seriously believed, or, very probably, had ever earnestly desired.* However, with the gradual exhaustion of the resources of Europe, the attention of the Allied Powers turned upon the immense national riches of China, which, if properly handled, could not only materially assist their cause during the War, but also rehabilitate their national economics after the conclusion of peace.

It was also important for these Powers to create a temporary weakness of their enemies in China, so that after the cessation of actual hostilities her vast markets might be entirely in their hands. This end could apparently be attained only by the severing of all political and economic relations between China and Germany, whose trade expansion in the Far East during the last two decades had inspired great apprehension and jealousy amongst her political and business rivals. On the other hand, the Governments of these Powers, dependent to a greater degree upon public opinion than the semi-autocratic Governments of the Central Powers, could well estimate the moral value of an alliance with China.

On February 4th, 1917, the United States Minister at Peking handed to the Chinese Government a message from his Government to the effect that America "had not only broken off diplomatic relations with Germany, but that it trusted that this step would be supported by all neutral Powers who would

* In November 1915 Yuan Shih-kai and his Government sounded the Allied Powers as to the possible terms on which China could join them. The project was met very coldly in Japan and did not go beyond general discussion. Later the Allies resorted to the formation of Chinese labour battalions, which successfully completed the deficiency of man-power on different European fronts and formed one of the most steady cadres of the Red Guards in Russia after the Bolshevik Revolution of November 7th, 1917.—AUTHOR.

associate themselves in its protest against the German submarine war, and, in such a way, accelerate the approach of the peace."

It was stated that in the event of China's association with the declared policy of the United States she would greatly strengthen herself internally and externally, and thus minimize the effect of the Sino-Japanese Convention of 1915, whereby Japan obtained virtually the right of disposing of the entire Shantung issue at the future Peace Conference without any reference to China.

This message was supported by a Note of the United States Minister, in which he expressed his sincere conviction that his Government would be "just and liberal in effecting this or other arrangements to enable the Chinese Government to meet the responsibilities which it might assume upon the suggestion of the President."*

Neither President Li Yuan-hung, who during the lifetime of Yuan Shih-kai had kept aloof from active politics and was suspected of pro-republican sympathies,† nor the majority of the Cabinet, nor the old Parliament, re-assembled‡ according to the demands of the Southern Party,§ were prepared to consider any international problem of such magnitude.

The sudden collapse of the power of Yuan Shih-kai and his death once more revived the question of the nature and extent of the supreme power in China, and, though the Northern military leaders¶ and the Southern provinces|| pledged themselves to support the new President, his authority as a Chief Executive and that of his Cabinet were far from commanding general respect or obedience. The position was scarcely improved by the reinstatement of the Provisional Constitution of 1912, the repeal of a number of laws enacted under Yuan Shih-kai,** and the punishment of the main personages of the

* U.S. Minister to China, February 7th, 1917.

† President Li Yuan-hung succeeded Yuan Shih-kai according to Article 29 of the Constitutional Compact of 1914.

‡ Presidential Mandate, July 20th, 1916.

§ Southern Military Council to President Li Yuan-hung, June 15th, 1916; Provincial Assemblies of Yunnan, Kweichow, Kwangsi and Chekiang to same, June 21st, 1916; Ultimatum of the Chinese Navy at Shanghai June 21st, 1916.

¶ Generals Chang Hsun, Nyi Tsze-chung, and Chang Teo-lin to President Li Yuan-hung and the Cabinet.—"North-China Herald," June 17th, 1916.

|| Tang Chi-yao, the Military Governor (Tu Tuh) of Yunnan and Senior Member of the Southern Military Council, to President Li Yuan-hung, June 15th, 1916.

** Presidential Mandate, July 16th, 1917.

monarchical movement,* for the same Parliament, graciously revived by the new President, was first amongst those who refused to recognize his authority on the ground that he succeeded Yuan Shih-kai not by virtue of the Presidential Succession Law passed by the Parliament in October 1913, but in accordance with the Constitutional Compact promulgated by Yuan Shih-kai in defiance of the Provisional Constitution.†

The support which the Southern Party promised to the new Government upon the reinstatement of the original Constitution and the largely advertised cancellation of the Southern autonomy, and dissolution of the Military Council at Canton, were also only on paper. The South refused to recognize any order of the Government which tended to affect its independent status.‡ The desperate appeals and orders of the President regarding the sanctity of the Salt Revenue pledged to foreign creditors, the cessation of recruiting and disbandment of superfluous troops, the remittance of taxes to the all-national Government, and termination of hostilities between the different provinces remained without response.§ The fighting between the rival parties in Kwangtung, Szechuen, Yunnan, Hunan, Hupeh, and Eastern Mongolia continued with short intervals, and the Government was helpless to stop it.¶

The election as Vice-President of General Feng Kuo-chang, who controlled the situation in the Yangtze Valley, and whose personal opposition to Yuan Shih-kai was also responsible for the latter's downfall, did not stabilize the position of the Government nor reconcile the powerful cliques of Tuchuns || with the revived republican régime.

It appeared that the institution of the Tuchuns was more intimately connected with the masses than any other republican organization, and that the seeming collapse of the new principles of national life which followed the downfall and death of Yuan Shih-kai was not complete. The organic process of adaptation continued to proceed, and the Tuchuns (the only State officials whose power corresponded to the

* *Ibid.*, July 13th, 1916.

† Declaration of Members of Parliament, June 16th, 1916.—"North-China Herald," June 17th, 1917.

‡ *Ibid.*, July 22nd, August 5th, 1916.

§ Presidential Mandate, July 22nd, 1916.

¶ "North-China Herald," July 29th, August 5th, September 20th, 1916; May 26th, 1917, etc.

|| On July 6th, 1916, President Li Yuan-hung issued a Mandate confirming military appointments made by the late Yuan Shih-kai and establishing a uniform system of directing the military affairs of the various provinces under superior military officials to be styled "Tuchuns."—AUTHOR.

traditional notions of the people) at this phase of its development were the defenders of Chinese National Life against the domination of strange theories.

The study of Chinese classics was abolished in all schools of the Republic.* Parliament rejected the proposal of certain members of the House to include in the Permanent Constitution a provision declaring Confucianism a State Religion,† and the more moderate groups‡ were helpless to reverse this decision. At this critical moment the Northern Tutchuns came forward as one man in defence of the national religion. They publicly declared that "a State religion be established on the basis of the doctrines taught by Confucius," and, further, that "this question should be decided not by the Parliament, but by a special convention of delegates directly elected by the people."§ They were supported by a number of provincial organizations and prominent men¶ representing various classes of the population, who appreciated the fact that only the Tutchuns could present a real authority capable of defending the national belief and of challenging the authority of Parliament, whose attitude in regard to the problem of the State religion was so obviously against the feelings of the population as a whole that, in spite of pressure brought to bear upon President Li Yuan-hung by the radical members of the Cabinet, he ordered the continuance of the official cult of the Sage and the worshipping of the spirits of the dead.||

The close relationship of the Tutchuns and their mutual understanding with the mass of the population whom they controlled, and the national principles of whose life they defended, were accounted for by the fact that as a general rule most of them had risen into prominence from amongst

* Circular Order of Ministry of Education, October 19th, 1916.

† The proposed article of the Constitution ran as follows:—"Citizens of Chung Hua Min Kuo (Republic of China) shall be under obligation to receive first grade primary education. In the education of the Citizens the Confucius doctrine of self-cultivation shall be the principal foundation."

‡ "North-China Herald," January 20th, 1917.

§ Joint Telegram of Tutchuns, Governors and Civil Officials to President Li Yuan-hung, February 26th, 1917.—*Ibid.*, March 3rd, 1917.

¶ Amongst them Kang Yu-wei, the leader of the Reform movement under the Emperor Kuang Hsu, must be mentioned.—AUTHOR.

|| Presidential Mandates, September 3rd and 25th, 1916, and February 14th, 1917, re State worship of Confucius and the Gods of War; the same, November 2nd and 11th, 1916, and January 30th, 1917, directing the respective officials to offer sacrifices on behalf of the State to the spirits of the deceased Field-Marshal Huang Hsing, Generals Tsai Ao and Yih-kuang, and Prince Ching, the last President of the Grand Council of the Empire and Premier of the Imperial Government.

the numerous Chinese small bourgeoisie, artisans, farmers, etc., from amongst the rank and file of the Chinese army and even the social outcasts.

Yen Hsi-shan, of Shansi, Chu Jui, of Chekiang, Chen Kuang, of Kiangsi, Nyi Tsze-chung, of Anhwei, Liu Ho-shi, of Fukien, and Tien Chung-yui, of Kalgan—all were the scions of petty provincial officials, merchants and shop-keepers. General Li Shun, of Kiangse, was the son of a fisherman; Chang Huai-chi, of Shantung, a coolie; Tsao Kun, Tuchun of Chihli and later President of the Republic, a pedlar; General Wang Chan-yuan a stable boy; Feng Kuo-chang, former Tuchun of Kiangse and present Vice-President of the Republic, a fiddler. General Wu Pei-fu and Feng Yu-hsiang both rose from the rank of privates; Chang Tso-lin, the powerful Tuchun of Manchuria, started his political career as a brendit; the Tuchuns Chang Hsun, Lu Yung-ting and Mu Yung-hing were leaders of a secret semi-political society known in China as the "Black Flags" and largely composed of people of the lowest classes and criminals.

All these men rose to power owing to their personal ability and with the support of their fellow-citizens, colleagues and comrades in the ranks of the army, with whom they never severed relations. They were full of personal ambition and the lust of personal aggrandizement, but it must be admitted that many of them, in the course of a long career, acquired the shrewdness of real politicians and diplomats and the refinement of true courtiers and classical Chinese scholars.* It was the personal ambitions of these war-lords that resulted in the present appalling conditions in China, and provided the germ of future provincial autonomy † which the Provincial Assemblies were ultimately helpless to effect.

The strength of the Tuchuns and the importance of close connections with them did not escape the vigilant eyes of the Japanese politicians. The leadership assumed by the United States in inducing China to join the neutral Powers in protest against the German submarine war was viewed in Japan with

* Reinsch, *op. cit.*, p. 262.

† Appreciating this, the Tsing Emperors never permitted their high officials to hold office in their native provinces lest they should become too closely affiliated with their fellow provincials and form an opposition to the Central Government. This practice was revived by Yuan Shih-kai, but on August 16th, 1916, the Chinese Press at Peking reported that in view of the Cantonese demand for the appointment of the leaders of the Southern Party to the military and administrative posts in the Provinces of Kwangtung, Kweichow and Yunnan, the Cabinet decided to rescind the order of the late Yuan Shih-kai.—AUTHOR.

great apprehension. It deprived her of the moral hegemony in China which she had enjoyed since the Revolution of 1911; it deprived her also of advantages which she might have obtained from guiding China along the war path, for it is now a well-known fact that on the very day of the presentation of the American Note to the Chinese Government the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs was urging the Russian Ambassador at Tokyo to get from his Government assurances of various benefits if Japan undertook the task of inducing China to join the Allies.*

To frustrate the growing influence of America there was only one way: to gain the friendship of the Tsuchuns who, as men of practical life, were fully aware of the meaning of Japanese sympathy, which, if turned to their own use, presented an unlimited source of money and arms required for the consolidation of their power, and, if turned against them, meant the same fate which befell the Tsings and the Great President, Yuan Shih-kai.

The intercourse between the Northern Generals and Japan was regarded with deep suspicion and jealousy by the leaders of the Southern Party. President Li Yuan-hung was also against any positive and active foreign policy. He shared the views of the Republicans † and, like Yuan Shih-kai and other Chinese Generals who received their military instruction from German officers, sincerely believed in the invincibility of the German armies. In these views he was upheld by Dr. Sun Yat-sen and Tang Shao-yi, who expressed reluctance to support the Government in severing diplomatic relations with Germany at once and advocated first to send her a protest and wait for further development, ‡ which was done on February 9th, 1917.

The attitude of indecision and hesitation of the Chinese leading Republicans caused by the fear of the Northern military party was not changed by the Memorandum of the Allied Ministers at Peking, which stated that "the Allies take a sympathetic interest in the step taken by China in regard to Germany and are, in the event of China effectively severing relations with Germany and Austro-Hungary, prepared to consider favourably the questions of the suspension during

* Reinsch, *op. cit.*, p. 253.

† "Would not positive active foreign policy, particularly if it should lead to war, strengthen the militarist party?" asked President Li Yuan-hung in reply to the verbal representation of the U.S. Minister at Peking on February 4th, 1917.—Reinsch, *op. cit.*, p. 245.

‡ "North-China Herald," February 17th, 1917.

the war of the Boxer Indemnity payments and the revision of the Customs tariff." * Dr. Sun Yat-sen, representing the progressive thought of China, addressed a telegram to Mr. Lloyd George, British Prime Minister, protesting against the endeavours of the Allied Powers to coerce China to join them, on the ground that a war with a foreign country under the present unsettled conditions in China would mean an outbreak of inter-factional struggle and result in a new Boxerism, for, in spite of all efforts on the part of the Republicans, anti-foreign feelings were still virulent amongst the masses. †

This view of China's participation in the European War, as subsequent events have proved, was absolutely correct, and was largely supported by other political leaders in China. ‡ In spite of the assertion of most foreign writers on Chinese politics, that China's step in joining the Allies was dictated by political wisdom and that in doing so she started a new era in her foreign relations, China's entry into the Great War was just a phase of her inter-factional struggle, an episode in her traditional anti-foreign movement.

Neither the population at large nor even the political leaders in Parliament had any idea about the issue confronting China. Only owing to the exceptionally skilful and energetic tactics of the Prime Minister, Tuan Chi-jui, one of the moving spirits of the Northern military party, was it possible to put the question about the severance of diplomatic relations with Germany through Parliament, which, after lengthy and stormy debates, agreed to endorse the policy of the Cabinet. §

The start was made. On March 14th the German Minister was handed his passports, but the decision of the war problem still presented great difficulty. The

* Memorandum of February 17th, 1917.

† "Since our revolution," stated Dr. Sun Yat-sen in his telegram dated March 7th, 1917, "anti-foreign feelings have been suppressed by us, but the anti-foreign spirit lives and may take advantage of the critical time and rise in another Boxer movement with general massacre of foreigners. If war is declared against any country, the ignorant classes cannot distinguish one nation from the other, and consequences would be more fatal to England, owing to her larger interests in the Orient, than to the Central Powers."

‡ Tang Shao-yi, Wen Tsung-yao, and General Li Lieh-chun to President Li Yuan-hung, March 12th, 1917.

§ The German reply to the Chinese Note of February 9th, demanding the cessation of the submarine war, was received only on March 10th, on the very date of the parliamentary session which had to decide the question. The reply having been circulated amongst the members of the Lower House, proved to be almost fatal for the Cabinet. In its reply the German Government adopted a very conciliatory attitude towards China and expressed its entire readiness to "open negotiations to arrive at a plan for the protection of Chinese life and property."

Republicans and Parliament were obviously afraid to approve the final step, realizing that a declaration of war would transfer the entire power into the hands of the military chiefs. This attitude was strengthened by the tactlessness of some of the Allies, which affected the national susceptibilities of the Chinese,* but the climax was reached when Premier Tuan Chi-jui summoned a conference of the provincial military commanders and their delegates at Peking, which unanimously voted in support of the war policy,† and, after succeeding in persuading the President—a very weak man in general—on May 7th presented for the approval of Parliament the text of the declaration of war on the German Government.‡

The question was referred to the House of Representatives, sitting as a Committee, while the discussion of the issue in the Upper House provoked stormy scenes. A great number of senators expressed themselves against such a course of action. The position became still more complicated as a hostile crowd of several thousands surrounded the Parliament and demanded its dissolution and the declaration of war.§ Under these circumstances Parliament refused to proceed further with the discussion of the issue, while the entire Cabinet, with the exception of the Minister of Education and Premier Tuan Chi-jui himself, tendered its resignation. However, on May 19th Tuan Chi-jui, supported by the military, sent in for the second time the text of the declaration, which was similarly returned to him by Parliament, which refused to consider it until the Cabinet had been reorganized.

The firm stand displayed by both Houses in the matter caused bitter indignation on the part of the war-lords, who accused them of wilful obstruction and submitted a joint memorandum to the President demanding their immediate dissolution. The memorandum was supported by a threatening movement of troops around Tientsin aiming at the cutting of the railway communication between the Capital and the port city. It was a challenge to the Republican Government, and though the latter had still enough moral force to accept the

* The Cheng Chia-tun Incident, August 13th, 1916—January 26th, 1917; the Lahosikai Affair, December 1916; French claims regarding the construction of railways in Kwangsi Province, April 1917.

† April 28th, 1917.

‡ Presidential Despatch to Parliament, May 7th, 1917.

§ According to foreign witnesses, the hostile demonstration was organized by the military party with the connivance of Premier Tuan Chi-jui, and half a battalion of infantry in plain clothes under their officers formed the backbone of the demonstrators.—AUTHOR.

resignation of the Premier, who now frankly associated himself with the militarists, and to appoint the well-known Southern leader, Dr. Wu Ting-fang,* to act in his place, it was obvious that it was helpless to cope further with the situation.

On June 2nd, early in the morning, the Chief Executive of the Chinese Republic caused a mandate to be issued in which he frankly admitted his inability to solve the crisis and requested General Chang Hsun, the High Inspector of Yangtze Provinces and one of the pillars of the Tuchun confederation, to come to Peking and take part in the reorganization of the Government.† This was tantamount to the recognition of the failure of the Republic to enlist sufficient public support and to ensure minimum peace and order against a group of individual militarists who, according to the Republicans, did not enjoy the least popularity.

In admitting the bankruptcy of methods and means at the disposal of the Republic, the Presidential Mandate brought forward automatically the entire problem of the form of government in China. It was imperative to reinstate immediately some supreme authority able to command general respect and obedience and, at the same time, outside and above any political faction or selfish interest—a supreme power enjoying unquestionable authority by virtue of its nature and origin.

The conference of the Tuchuns, transferred from Peking to Tientsin, was assuming the character of a provisional government. Opinions regarding future action were divided, ‡ but a complete unanimity prevailed amongst all leaders concerning the inevitableness of a radical change. And all eyes instinctively turned to the boy-Emperor, Hsuan Tung, who was now eleven years old and lived in the seclusion of the Winter Palace at Peking, far from any politics, enjoying the prerogatives of Chinese monarchs in respect to the religious and spiritual life of the nation.

The Republican authorities and the President tried to find a compromise between the two antagonistic groups which

* May 23rd, 1917.

† "On account of my lack of virtue and ability, as well as the fact that my prestige is insufficient to command respect, some officers, whose duty it is to defend the country, have joined together in a hostile demonstration," stated the Presidential Mandate. "Events have turned out against my wish, and I am smitten with regret and remorse. General Chang Hsun, who is highly meritorious and respected as well as public-spirited and patriotic, is requested immediately to come to Peking in order to confer with us regarding affairs of State."

‡ "North-China Herald," June 16th, 1917.

were about to clash, threatening to plunge the country into still deeper chaos. A scheme was formulated which provided for a House of Elders to be constituted of members who would possess the power of nomination of Cabinet Ministers and supervise the functioning of Parliament, and even of the President himself.*

The rumours about the impending restoration, disturbed the peace of the forbidden precincts, and a conference of the Imperial Family despatched a telegram to the Tsuchuns at Tientsin informing them that the Manchus had no intention of attempting to regain political power.†

The Foreign Powers were also disconcerted. The Government of the United States learned with "the most profound regret" of the dissension in China and, on June 5th, notified the Chinese Government of its "most sincere desire that tranquillity and political co-ordination might be forthwith re-established." In the face of this, "the entry of China into war with Germany or the continuance of the *status quo* of her relations with that Government were matters of secondary importance."‡

The United States were deeply interested in the maintenance by China of one central, united and responsible government, § which alone could ensure the open-door policy in China, but their sincerity could hardly appeal to the Chinese, striving for the reinstatement of their national, political and social equilibrium, which was endangered by the onslaught of those principles of Western democracy represented by the United States.

* It is worth while to give some details concerning this constitutional scheme, which is peculiar in itself and has scarcely a parallel in the legislation of any other country. The following is a summary of the duties and power of the House of Elders, which was intended to minimise the evils of Western democracy in China:—(1) To frame and adopt the Law of Constitution, to make amendments and to interpret its meaning. (2) The consent of the House must be obtained to a declaration of war and the conclusion of peace. (3) To ratify any international treaty. (4) The consent of the House must be obtained before granting a general amnesty or any special pardon. (5) To enquire into and scrutinize the qualifications of elders. (6) To control or attend to any other affairs provided in the Law of Constitution.

According to the project, only five Chinese statesmen were qualified to be members of the House of Elders, viz.—Mr. Hsu Shih-chang, future President of the Republic; General Tuan Chi-jui, ex-Premier; Vice-President Feng Kuo-chang; General Chang Hsun, and General Wang Shih-shen.—
AUTHOR.

† Shi Hsu, the Guardian of the Emperor Hsuan Tung, to General Li Chen-chun, June 9th, 1917.

‡ Note of the U.S. of America to China, June 5th, 1917.

§ *Ibid.*

On June 9th, 1917, General Chang Hsun, having completed the concentration of his troops at Peking, demanded the dissolution of Parliament and the handing over of the entire power to him. Although Dr. Wu Ting-fang, the new Premier, refused to countersign such a Mandate, and tried in vain to avert the deadly blow, it appeared the next day under the personal seal of the President. It was rumoured that the President was persuaded that the dissolution of Parliament was the sole means of saving the Republic and preventing the sack of Peking, as well as an open armed attempt to restore the boy-Emperor.*

We do not see any reason to doubt the sincerity of the Mandate in which Li Yuan-hung, with striking frankness, repeated once more that "Parliament represented a dead body and that it was beyond the power of the Government to infuse life into it.†

On June 16th the *de facto* Dictator, General Chang Hsun, accompanied by his principal officers, paid his respects to the Emperor, observing the ancient etiquette of the Manchu Court and presenting a large amount of money to the Emperor as a token of his loyalty; and, on June 29th, Government circles learned with indignation of the arrival at the Capital of the famous leader of the first Chinese constitutional reforms.

Since the collapse of the movement of 1898 and his flight to Hongkong, Kang Yu-wei had not played any conspicuous rôle in modern Chinese politics, confining himself to historical and philosophical research. His deep knowledge of the classics and his courageous defence of the teachings of Confucius as a State religio-ethical system, coupled with literary talent, won him the title of the "Modern Sage of China." His arrival at Peking, which remained unnoticed by the public at large and the majority of foreign observers, had a decided

* Putnam Weale, *op. cit.*, p. 347.

† "Of late petitions and telegrams have been received from military and civil officials, merchants, scholars and others containing similar demands," stated the President in his Mandate of June 10th, 1917, explaining the motives of his resolute action. "The Senate and the House of Representatives have held a Constitution Conference for about a year; yet the Constitution has not been completed. Moreover, at this critical time most members of both Houses have tendered their resignation; hence it is impossible to secure quorums to discuss business. There is, therefore, no opportunity to revise the Articles already passed, and unless means are devised to hasten the making of the Constitution, the hearts of the people will never be satisfied.

"I, the President, who desire to comply with the will of the people and to consolidate the foundations of the nation, grant the requests of the Tuchuns and the people."

effect upon the trend of the following events, for he supplied a definite political ideology to the indefinite theory of the restoration of the boy-Emperor to political power. It was largely due to his immediate influence upon General Chang Hsun that the unspoken but dominant idea of the Tuchun conference at Tientsin suddenly materialized into an attempt to enthrone the boy-Emperor.* Just after midnight on June 30th General Chang Hsun at the head of his troops entered the Imperial City, forced the guards to open the gates leading to the palaces occupied by the Emperor, and escorted him to the Throne Hall, where, at 4 o'clock on the 1st July, 1917, he was enthroned before a small assembly of princes, nobles, eunuchs, and officers of General Chang Hsun's army.

The Imperial Edict announcing the re-establishment of the political power of the Emperor of China disclosed the true nature of the proceedings, which were indissolubly bound with the whole history of the abdication of the Manchu Dynasty and were a logical sequel of Yuan Shih-kai's struggle for the salvation of the principle of monarchism in China. The Throne claimed back the political power voluntarily handed over to the people on the strength of reservations contained in the Abdication Acts of February 12th, 1912, and alas! we must admit it was a perfectly logical and legal claim. The express provision of the grant was not fulfilled by the grantee—neither peace nor tranquillity reigned in the Empire.†

The Edict set forth articles of faith or guarantees on the part of the Throne that a constitutional monarchy should be established on the lines proposed by the Emperor Kuang Hsu in 1898.

A Privy Council was inaugurated, and all military and civil officials were confirmed in their former ranks and offices except ex-Premier Tuan Chi-jui, in whom the Imperial Government had no confidence and whom it accused of being too closely associated with the Japanese.

The documents, countersigned by General Chang Hsun, acting in the capacity of a member of the Imperial Privy Council, contained an allegation that President Li Yuan-hung, Vice-President Feng Kuo-chang, and General Lu Yung-ting,

* General Chang Hsun to the Foreign Legations, Peking, July 10th, 1917.

† Imperial Edict, July 1st, 1917.

Military Governor of Kwangsi, jointly memorialized the Emperor to "ascend to the Throne in obedience to the mandate of Heaven and men."

This allegation was strenuously denied by all concerned. President Li Yuan-hung issued a telegraphic mandate* denouncing Chang Hsun as a national traitor and requesting Vice-President Feng Kuo-chang to exercise temporarily the power and functions of the President. He himself took refuge in the Japanese Legation, where, according to the official *communiqué* issued by the Japanese Minister on July 3rd, 1917, he arrived at 9.30 on the evening of July 2nd. From here he succeeded in telegraphing to General Tuan Chi-jui and appointing him Premier with full power to act at his discretion.†

The news of the events at Peking was received in the North with some perplexity. The straightforwardness of General Chang Hsun startled the more irresolute military, but the two powerful war-lords—Chang Tso-lin, of Fengtien, and Nyi Tsze-chung, of Anhui—sent in their memorials expressing their gratitude to the Emperor for their re-appointments, while General Tsao Kun, in obedience to the Imperial command, assumed the office of Military Governor of Chihli. ‡

The effect of the same report on the politicians in the South was different. The dissolution of Parliament and the enthronement of the boy-Emperor caused an uproar of indignation, and the Provinces of Kwangtung, Kwangsi and Shensi—or, better to say, their military governors §—declared independence from the Central Government. The unseated parliamentarians were invited to come to Canton and to continue there their sessions, whilst the Provincial Assemblies allocated the necessary funds for their maintenance. ¶

The fate of the bold attempt of restoring the Monarchy depended upon the attitude of the military leaders of the

* Presidential Mandate, July 1st, 1917.

† *Ibid.*, July 3rd, 1917.

‡ "North-China Herald," July 1st, 1917.

§ General Lu Yun-ting, Inspector-General of Kwangtung and Kwangsi, and General Chen Su-fan, Chief of the Administrative Department of Shensi.

¶ On August 6th, 1917, it was discovered at Peking that the seals of Parliament had been taken by the Speaker and Chief Secretary of the Lower House, both Cantonese, who escaped with them to Canton. Finally, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, Dr. Wu Ting-fang, and Tang Shao-yi succeeded in inducing a number of parliamentarians to come to Canton and continue the interrupted sessions. The first extraordinary sitting took place on September 7th, 1917, with over 140 members of the Senate and 330 members of the House of Representatives present.—АУТНОБ.

Yangtze Valley who, with Vice-President Feng Kuo-chang in Nanking at their head, declared neutrality as soon as friction between the President and the association of the northern military leaders occurred, and the Foreign Power which had already once frustrated a similar attempt on the part of Yuan Shih-kai.

The widening of the breach between the North and South in the grip of the Republicans, and even a final rupture between them, and the division of China into two politically independent bodies was a matter of the greatest importance to Japan, as making easier for her the acquisition of political and economic domination in the Far East. But beyond this consideration the restoration of the monarchy in China was not material, and therefore Japan was amongst the first to supply the newly-appointed Premier, Tuan Chi-jui, with the necessary funds for the campaign against General Chang Hsun* and to bring pressure to bear upon General Chang Tso-lin, the Manchurian war-lord, and his associate generals to abandon the Emperor. †

In less than three days, before even Vice-President Feng Kuo-chang had been able to move a single soldier, the authority of the last Tsing and his Government was reduced to a mere farce. On July 8th the American Legation had to give shelter to the ideologist of the monarchical movement and the real author of the Imperial Edicts, Kang Yu-wei, and three days later, shortly before noon, General Chang Hsun was brought by his loyal officers to the Dutch Legation. ‡

* Reinsch, *op. cit.*, pp. 275, 276.

† On July 4th, 1917, Generals Tsao Kun, Tuchun of Chihli, Chang Tso-lin, Tuchun of Fengtien, and Nyi Tsze-chung, Tuchun of Anhui, who only two days previous reverently obeyed the Imperial commands, declared themselves in favour of the Republic and placed their troops at the disposal of Tuan Chi-jui.—AUTHOR.

‡ In a telegraphic manifesto jointly issued by the Acting President, Feng Kuo-chang, and Premier Tuan Chi-jui, July 4th, 1917, the crimes committed by Chang Hsun were declared "countless in number."

A warrant for his arrest was issued and a Special Supreme Council was established to deal with his crimes. However, in a little over one year, which he had to spend under the hospitable roof of the Dutch Legation, he was pardoned by President Hsu Shih-chang and appointed to the post of Commissioner of Forestry and Agriculture in Jehol in 1921.

As far as Kang Yu-wei was concerned, no particular charge was laid against him. He was proscribed by order of the Ministry of Interior, which compelled him to retire to the foreign concessions of the Treaty Ports, paying only occasional visits to his friends amongst the military leaders who to his death in 1926 held him in the highest esteem.—AUTHOR.

The Tsing Dynasty was defunct,* and if it had been the intention of Japan to see China under the control of the Northern military party, with its outspoken wish to consolidate its position as an independent political factor, this is exactly what happened. China was in the hands of the Northern militarists, and there was only one more step left to obtain the much-needed funds and arms for the consolidation of this victory to declare war on the Central Powers under the leadership of Japan, who alone was able and willing to subsidize them to the full extent.

On August 14th, 1917, President Feng Kuo-chang, who succeeded Li Yuan-hung after his refusal to re-assume the office of President, announced "that a state of war exists between China on the one hand and Germany and Austria-Hungary on the other, from 10 o'clock of this, the 14th day of the 8th moon of the sixth year of the Republic of China."

"I cannot bear to think," the President was pathetically exclaiming in his address to the Chinese nation, "that through us the dignity of International Law should be impaired, or our position in the family of nations should be undermined, or the restoration of peace and happiness of the world should be retarded. Let the people of the entire nation do their utmost in this hour of trial and hardship in order to safeguard and develop the national existence of the Ching Hua Republic, so that we may establish ourselves amidst the family of nations and share with all mankind the prosperity and blessings drawn from our common association."†

The Southern Party was taken unawares. With ill-hidden wrath it had to bow before the inevitable, and on August 21st, after short deliberation, the military and civil governors of the six South and South-Eastern provinces, who

* "During all these six years we have been most generously treated," stated the Imperial Decree communicated to the Government by the Board of the Imperial Household on August 10th. "As we have never entertained any selfish view as regards the political power, wherefore should we have broken our words? Unexpectedly, on July 1st, Chang Hsun led troops into our Palace, forcibly occupied it and issued false Imperial Decrees, changing the form of our nation unwarrantedly in disobedience to the Edict of Her Late Majesty. We, being a mere boy and living in seclusion in the Palace, were utterly powerless in regard to his action. Considering the circumstances in connection with this matter, we will doubtless be condoned by the world. Let the Board of the Imperial Household address a despatch to the Government of the Republic requesting that this be published both in China and abroad for the information of all."

† Presidential Mandate dated August 14th, 1917, containing the declaration of war on the Central Powers.

refused to recognize the new President and Cabinet, proclaimed war against the Central Powers. *

On September 10th this proclamation was sanctioned in the name of the Republic by the Parliament at Canton. A Cabinet was elected and Dr. Sun Yat-sen appointed to act as Generalissimo, an act which was received in Peking as a new proof of treachery to the national cause by the Southern Republicans and resulted in the issue of a warrant against the newly-appointed Generalissimo and his Cabinet. †

If the war against the Central Powers had been an issue of domestic rather than foreign policy and a means of consolidating the power of one of the two main factions in China, it did not mean at all that the Chinese politicians either of the North or South did not seriously believe that in declaring a state of war on the Central Powers they were upholding "the dignity of the International Law," and did not intend "to establish the Chinese people amidst the family of nations and share with all mankind the prosperity and blessings drawn from the common association."

The prospect of securing a seat at the future International Peace Conference and the settlement of the Shantung problem was a matter which deeply interested Peking as well as Canton, particularly as there was a hope to raise in connection with the Shantung question the whole issue of Sino-foreign relations.

This hope was very strong, as it was based on the assurances of the Allied Powers, who solemnly promised "to allow China to benefit in her international relations from the situation, and from the regard due to a great country." ‡ This was interpreted and largely advertised in China as a promise of abolition of all unjust provisions of treaties highly insulting to China's national dignity.

However, at the moment when the United States Minister at Peking urged China to join Washington in the protest against German submarine war, the fate of Shantung and other questions connected therewith had already been decided. § The Governments of Great Britain, France, Russia and Italy pledged themselves "to support Japan's claim in regard to

* "North-China Herald," August 28th, 1917.

† Presidential Mandate, September 29th, 1917.

‡ Joint Declaration of the Allied Powers, August 14th, 1917.

§ Stenographic Report of the Conference between President Wilson and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations at the White House, August 19th, 1917.

the disposal of Germany's rights in Shantung and possessions in islands north of the Equator on the occasion of the Peace Conference."*

The Chinese began to realize very soon the true nature of the promises of the Allied Powers, who showed themselves not only reluctant in extending new credits; but also very slow in the revision of the Customs Tariffs, promised simultaneously with the suspension of the Boxer Indemnity.† It was a very deep disappointment to those of them who sincerely believed in the possibility of a readjustment of China's finances with American assistance, and thus of saving China from the snare of Japanese diplomacy.

In no uncertain terms the United States' Minister at Peking pointed out to the Chinese Government the difficulty of an independent American loan unless there were a Parliament whose authority was recognized by the whole country.‡ The National Council, composed of members whose qualifications were approved by the Minister of Interior and who were appointed by the military governors,§ convened to give a constitutional aspect to the new régime, could not, of course, satisfy the American Bankers or their Government.

Meanwhile, the Japanese banks readily agreed to advance to China on behalf of the Four Nation Group, which enjoyed the monopoly of floating loans for China on foreign markets, Yen 10,000,000 against the so-called "Second Reorganization Loan" to be negotiated in future with the Four Nation Group.¶ This loan was soon followed by a series of other loans readily offered by the Japanese banks|| with the express encouragement of the Japanese Government,

* H.B.M.'s. Embassy at Tokyo to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 16th, 1917; French Embassy to same, March 1st, 1917; Russian Embassy to same, March 5th, 1917; and Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Japanese Ambassador at Rome, March 23rd, 1917.

† The work of the Tariff Revision Conference, which was opened at Peking, very soon came to a standstill owing to the difference of views between Japan and the fourteen other Powers. In August 1918 the question of the increase of the Customs Tariff was still in the same position, and only in December 1918 did China succeed in obtaining a very insignificant increase.—
АУТНОК.

‡ Reinsch, *op. cit.*, p. 292.

§ Provisional Regulations governing the convention of the National Council, August 1st, 1917, Articles 1, 2 and 3.

¶ The Yokohama Specie Bank Loan, August 29th, 1917.

|| Tsinan-Shuntch and Kaomi-Hsuechow Railway Loan (Yen 20,000,000), September 24th, 1918; Manchurian and Mongolian Railway Loans (Yen 40,000,000), September 28th, 1918; Fengtien Loan (Yen 3,000,000), April 22nd, 1918; Kirin Forest Loan (Yen 30,000,000), July 3rd, 1918, etc. Twenty-nine in all, to the total amount of Yen 246,400,000.

which did its utmost to impress upon the Chinese public that the reluctance of the Western Powers to come to the financial rescue of China was due to their bankruptcy as the result of the exhaustion of war.*

All these loans were obtained on the most extravagant securities, embracing practically all branches of China's State economy. † No loan exceeded the sum of Yen 40,000,000, according to the negotiations, but as far as the actual payments to the Chinese Government were concerned they were considerably less and were appropriated in such manner that they did not exceed the amount immediately required for the settlement of China's pressing needs.

It is needless to say that such a method of payment made the Chinese Government entirely dependent on Japan, enabling her virtually to enjoy in China that influence which she had failed to secure in 1915. Her position in this respect was further strengthened by an incautious act on the part of America, which was interpreted in China and Japan as a direct recognition of "Japan's special interests in China" by the Washington Government. ‡

As a matter of fact, the United States of America, represented by Secretary Robert Lansing, did not attach much importance to the wording of their agreement with Japan of October 1917, which later on became known as the "Lansing-Ishii Agreement," § and the deep impression created by the publication of this document ¶ was very little affected by the subsequent disclosure of the substance of the Lansing-Ishii Notes. ||

All the funds and arms procured by the Chinese Government in Japan went direct to the different Tuchuns, who did not scruple to adopt most high-handed actions in order to obtain them, and turned against their Southern rivals.**

* Lectures of Professor Hori before the Sino-Japanese Association at Peking; Memoranda of Dr. Kobayashi and Baron Sakatani, Japanese financial advisers to the Chinese Government.

† In January 1918 the Chinese Ministry of Finance secured from Mitsui Bussan Kaisha, Ltd., a loan of Yen 2,000,000 on a mortgage of the Printing Office of the Ministry of Finance.—AUTHOR.

‡ Declaration of Dr. Wellington Koo, Chinese Minister to the U.S., November 10th, 1917; telegram of the Members of the Peking Parliament to President Wilson, November 11th, 1917.

§ Testimony of Hon. Robert Lansing before the Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Senate, August 11th, 1919.

¶ Reinsch, *op. cit.*, pp. 307, 308, 309.

|| U.S. Minister at Peking to Chinese Foreign Minister, November 12th, 1917.

** General Chang Tao-lin, Tuchun of Fengtien, after the refusal of the Government to supply him with a portion of the arms shipped from Japan, sent in February 1918 a brigade to Chinwangtao, where they forcibly took possession of 20,000 rifles and ammunition in spite of the urgent instructions of the Government.—AUTHOR.

The hostilities between the North and South commenced almost immediately after the declaration of war on the Central Powers. The Tientsin Conference, representing the military governors of the thirteen Northern provinces, demanded the prosecution of this war with all resources.* The South was also in a fighting mood, and Generalissimo Dr. Sun Yat-sen in a circular telegram denounced the National Convention and the election of the new National Assembly, which Peking decided finally to summon in order to counteract the effect of the re-assembling of the old Parliament at Canton, as illegal and similar to the revision of the Provisional Constitution of 1912 by Yuan Shih-kai. Moreover, in his capacity of Generalissimo of the Republic of China, Dr. Sun Yat-sen issued orders for the arrest of Premier Tuan Chi-jui, Minister of Finance, Liang Chi-chao, and other leaders of the Northern group, which aroused derision at Peking, but which, at the same time, served to increase the antagonism between the rival parties. †

It was said that the horrors of fighting attained such a degree that soldiers of both sides used to cut off the breasts of their fallen enemies, draw out their hearts and devour them in the belief that this would make them fearless in battle. But, in spite of this, the hostilities between the North and South never attained the character of a real war. It was just a game, a means whereby the leaders of both parties were enabled to enrich themselves and accumulate power in their provinces at the expense of the peaceful population and to demand from the Government more and more money. High-sounding declarations about the readiness of both parties to stop fighting for the sake of the "peaceful population and the benefit of the Chinese State" were from time to time issued, but they were regarded by all concerned as a mere tribute to the sentimentalism of foreign public opinion, which had nothing to do with the actual state of affairs in China. ‡

* "North-China Herald," December 8th, 1917.

† *Ibid.*, October 13th, 1917.

‡ General Lu Yung-ting, Inspector-General of the Kwangtung provinces, Generals Chen Ping-ken and Tan Hao-ming, Tuchuns of Kwangtung and Kwangsi, and Admiral Pi-kuang, Commander of the Southern Navy, to President Feng Kuochang, October 3rd, 1917; Exchange of telegrams between Dr. Wu Ting-fang and same, December 1917; Statement of the Intelligence Bureau at Canton, March 18th, 1918.

In connection with these peace overtures, it is worth while to note the individual efforts of Mr. Edward S. Little, British subject and Shanghai resident, who offered to mediate peace in the name of Right, Justice and Humanity, and addressed a series of letters and telegrams to both parties. He

As far as the securing of funds for the continuation of the struggle was concerned, the Southern republican leaders were not less quick in contrivance than their Northern opponents.* Besides borrowing money from the Chinese emigrants in the Straits Settlements and America—amongst whom, as we know, Dr. Sun Yat-sen was very popular—seizing the Salt Revenue and making a forcible levy on the population, they issued special Military Bonds, which were realized by the Japanese bankers. †

Finally; the war between South and North was a matter entirely dependent on the judgment of Tokyo, which was able to stop it at any time by the suspension of credit to the contesting parties. But the Japanese Government was very far from this idea, in spite of all her official assurances to that effect. ‡

In point of fact, China's participation in the Great War on the side of the Allied Powers was a mere parade. Its main objective—the destruction of German economic power in the Far East—was futile in the event. The Chinese Govern-

suggested an Internal Peace Conference to be held at Shanghai under the neutral protection of foreigners, seriously embarrassed in their trade by the reigning chaos, which, as we will see later, was ultimately followed by the concerned.—AUTHOR.

* On March 11th, 1918, the Military Government at Canton announced that it had taken over the Salt Revenues, which resulted in a loss to the Gabelle during one year of about \$8,000,000 in Kwangtung, \$2,500,000 in Yunnan, and \$10,000,000 in Szechuen. An attempt was made to seize the Customs revenues, but the Foreign Powers displayed in this case more firmness than in the matter of the Salt Gabelle, and the attempt failed.—AUTHOR.

† In January 1918 the Chinese Press published a report, which has never been refuted, that the Military Bonds, bearing 8 per cent. interest, to the amount of Mex. \$10,000,000, issued by the Military Government at Canton, were going to be exchanged for a cash payment of Mex. \$3,000,000 by a Japanese syndicate. Such a discount had never been heard of before, however low republican loan bonds might have been held in the esteem of both Chinese and foreigners.—AUTHOR.

‡ In March 1918 the Japanese Minister at Peking made representations to the Chinese Government emphasizing the importance of national unity by stopping internal disputes. The memorandum was on much the same lines as tendered by the U.S. Minister on June 5th, 1917.

On April 29th of the same year Baron Hayashi, the Japanese Minister at Peking, called personally at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and stated that he had received formal instructions from his Government to offer himself as a mediator for peace between North and South. Before doing this he was to ascertain the views and obtain the consent of the Northern and Southern military leaders. He planned a very extensive tour across the country, which he subsequently effected, having personally interviewed almost all responsible Northern leaders. This, however, resulted in the conclusion of the two famous loan transactions known as the "Shantung" and "Manchurian" loan agreements, September 24th and 28th, 1916, which gave a new impulse to the internecine war.—AUTHOR.

ment readily took over the German and Austro-Hungarian concessions in the Treaty Ports, cancelled the extraterritorial privileges enjoyed by their nationals,* and promulgated a set of regulations regarding the registration of enemy subjects. But it was far from being inclined to go further and destroy for the sake of her new Allies the power which in case of emergency could be used as a counter-balance against their own aggression.

This course of public opinion was largely due to shrewd propaganda on the part of the German diplomats at Peking and the communities in China, and their absolute abstention from any interference in internal Chinese politics since the early days of the Chinese Revolution in 1911. The regulations for registration of enemy subjects, which had theoretically to restrict the activity of Germans in China, were, as a matter of fact, regulations providing adequate protection for "the peaceful and lawful avocations" of enemy subjects residing in China.† Only the operations of financial institutions, munition factories, and publishing concerns were stopped.‡

The Chinese Governments at Peking and Canton paid very little attention to the most strenuous efforts of the Allied diplomats and residents§ to have all nationals of the Central Powers deported and their business compulsorily wound up and confiscated, although these efforts were supported by some factions of the Chinese mercantile community anxious to seize the opportunity of obtaining possession of some of the most valuable properties belonging to the German merchants in China.¶

* Provisional Regulations for Trial of Germans in Criminal Cases, 1917.

† Provisional Regulations for the Registration of Enemy Subjects, 1917, Section 2, Article 5.

‡ *Ibid.*, Section 7, Article 3. As a result of the last provision the Chinese Government ordered the closure of all branches of the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank and the sealing up of German-owned newspapers at Peking and the Treaty Ports.—"Annual Report of the Shanghai Municipal Council, 1917," pp. 120-A and 126-A.

§ In April 1918 the foreign residents at Shanghai forwarded through Mr. D. Siffert, Consul-General for Belgium and Senior Consul at Shanghai, to Sir John Jordan, Doyen of the Diplomatic Body at Peking, a petition urging the Allied Ministers to make a joint representation to the Chinese Government to secure the deportation of enemy subjects from China on the ground that they continually enjoyed all liberties enabling them to conduct subversive propaganda against the Allied Powers. The representation was accordingly made, but failed to produce the desired effect.—"North-China Herald," April 20th and June 22nd, 1918.

¶ Telegraphic appeal of the Chinese Merchants' Association at Shanghai to the President, Cabinet and National Union of the Chambers of Commerce at Peking, September 26th, 1917.

In July 1918 a certain interest was aroused in Peking by the Allied intervention in Siberia, and on July 23rd the Cabinet, upon the representation of the Entente Powers, decided to send 1,000 troops to Vladivostok and to co-ordinate their actions with those of the Allied forces. The War Participation Bureau, established for the purpose of administering military affairs during the war, was instructed to direct the expedition and to raise the necessary funds.

This was the sole action on the part of China bearing any semblance of real hostility against the Central Powers and solely due to the same motives which determined the entire policy of China during the Great War. The despatch of troops to Siberia was connected with a Military Convention and the so-called "Government of China War Participation Contract" with Japan, which ensured to the Northern leaders a new supply of arms and ammunition and a subsidy of Yen 20,000,000.

This state of affairs did not undergo any considerable modification in the course of subsequent changes in the construction of the political power of China. The inauguration of a National Assembly, which replaced the National Council, and the election of a new President, Hsu Shih-chang, a Hanlin graduate and ex-Grand Councillor and Viceroy of Manchuria under the Tsings, in the North,* and the reconstruction of the Military Government and the resignation of Dr. Sun Yat-sen as Generalissimo in the South,† and his subsequent departure to Shanghai, were matters which affected only the relative

* The first session of the National Assembly was opened on July 20th, 1918. The Military Party, concentrated around the so-called Anfu Club, obtained a decided majority at the elections. On August 1st the Tuchun Conference at Tientsin unanimously agreed to the nomination of Hsu Shih-chang, a politician of large repute and political influence, to the post of President, and on October 10th, 1918, he was solemnly inaugurated in this office by the Assembly. As far as the election of the Vice-President was concerned, no unanimity was displayed by the militarists, and although General Tsao Kun, the Tuchun of Chihli, offered a great price for his election and tried to bribe the parliamentarians, his candidature was defeated by a large majority.—AUTHOR.

† On May 18th, 1918, the Extraordinary Session of the Parliament at Canton promulgated a new Constitution of the Military Government of the Republic of China (South and South-Western provinces of China), whereby the post of the Generalissimo was abolished and an Administrative Council was established. On May 20th the Parliament elected Messrs. Tang Shao-yi, General Tang Chi-yao, General Lu Yung-ting, Dr. Wu Ting-fang, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, Admiral Lin Pao-yueh, and General Tsen Chun-hsuan as Directors. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, disappointed by the procedure of the reorganization of the Government, although he was originally its initiator, left Canton for Shanghai. The Peking Government issued confidential instructions to the Shanghai authorities to negotiate with the local Consular Body for his arrest, but the latter, upon communicating with the Diplomatic Corps at Peking, firmly refused to entertain this request.—AUTHOR.

weight of different leaders in their parties, but not the general direction of China's foreign policy.

The statement of the new President extolling the sacrifices of the Chinese nation for the benefit of humanity and international law * were met with irony on the part of the Allied Powers, who accused China of insincerity and neglect of her obligations towards her Allies.† It was a serious rebuff to the responsible Chinese politicians, for it was followed by the refusal of the Allied Governments to release the Customs surplus, amounting to some Tls. 2,250,000, on the ground that a compromise must first be reached between North and South China. The renewed representations of the Allied Powers concerning the necessity of an immediate restoration of peace only added fuel to the fire, ‡ in spite of the fact that the senselessness of further internal struggle was apparent. §

In reply to these representations the Chinese Government assured the Allied Ministers at Peking that the President had already issued orders to the effect that China should fulfil her duties to the Allies, and the foreign Press in China reported that the Presidential instructions were acclaimed wholeheartedly by the entire population and "the Chinese officials were enthusiastically devoting themselves to this task, in which all, from the President downwards, were taking part." ¶

* Presidential Mandate, October 29th, 1918.

† The text of the Note of the Allied Powers to China was published in the Chinese Press at Peking and was later reproduced by the "North-China Herald" at Shanghai on November 9th, 1918.

‡ At the end of October, 1918, the Japanese Government, through its Minister at Peking, renewed its proposition to mediate for peace and invited other Allied Powers to take part in the proceedings, but the Chinese Government firmly declined this offer.—AUTHOR.

§ In the fall of 1918 the majority of the Northern and Southern Generals signified their readiness to cease fighting. The two principal leaders of the South—Inspector-General Lu Yung-ting and General Tang Chi-yao—expressed their willingness to join in a peace with the Northern Party. A scheme was advanced according to which the South would recognize all agreements contracted by the North in connection with the declaration of war on the Central Powers and the President elected by the Peking National Assembly of 1918, while the North would accept the Permanent Constitution to be drawn up by the old Parliament and the Peking National Assembly sitting together.

The unofficial peace negotiations carried on by the commanders of the fighting forces at the front received an impetus on the part of General Wu Pei-fu, commanding the Northern army at the Southern front.—AUTHOR.

¶ "North-China Herald," November 16th, 1918.

A fact which occurred at this time at Peking characterizes the true nature of these instructions and how they were understood by the Chinese population and officials. On October 29th, 1918, a crowd of several thousand persons, headed by the Police in civilian clothes, stormed the beautiful marble monument erected to the memory of the late Baron Ketteler, the German Minister, killed by a Chinese soldier during the Boxer rebellion in 1900. In a few hours the monument was reduced to pieces.—AUTHOR.

The conclusion of the Armistice on November 11th, 1918, still found the political factions in China engaged in a hopeless struggle for theoretical supremacy. Only in respect to the enemy subjects was the Chinese Government beyond the reproach of her Allies.

The Chinese Government, in spite of the cessation of hostilities on all fronts, hastened to make up for lost time and to destroy the economic power of Germans in China in order to appear at the forthcoming International Peace Conference with a clean record.*

On December 2nd, 1918, the representatives of the Associated Governments of Great Britain, France, Italy and the United States were received in audience by President Hsu Shih-chang and handed to him an *aide mémoire*, in which the attention of the Chinese Government was formally drawn to the appalling state of affairs due to the division of the country, "no less harmful to foreign interest than disastrous to the welfare of China herself," which "hampered the effective co-operation of China with the Allies." The document expressed an earnest desire of the Powers to see an early reconciliation of the parties "which will enable the Chinese nation to bear the more worthily of its own traditions its part in the reconstruction which the nations of the world are now hoping to attain." †

* Twenty large temples in the Western Hills in Peking were assigned for the internment of Germans and Austrians, and in December 1918 a large number of prominent Germans were interned there. Similar internment camps were also established in the Treaty Ports. German professors were dismissed from Chinese Universities, and only popular Chinese intercession saved some of the best-known German physicians from being deported from China.

The affairs of the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank were hastily wound up, and proceedings against Germans and Austrians for the recovery of their debts, before their maturity, were instituted in the Chinese Courts and the International Mixed Court at Shanghai.

On January 25th, 1919, a Presidential Mandate ordered the repatriation of all enemy subjects, and the English, French, Japanese, Belgian and Russian banks having branches in China advanced to the Chinese Government Mex. \$500,000 to cover the cost of the repatriation. In the Spring of 1919 the last groups of Germans and Austrians were escorted to the ships under strong military convoy.—"North-China Herald," December 14th, 1918; January 11th, February 1st, March 1st, 1919; Kotenev, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 219, 220.

† On December 3rd, 1918, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a *communiqué* with the full text of the *aide mémoire*, in which it was pointed out that the initiative of the joint representation by the Allied Powers belonged to the Japanese Imperial Government, and "that this Government confidently hopes that the Chinese people of all classes, and political affiliations will appreciate the singleness of purpose by which this measure has been actuated."—AUTHOR.

A similar representation was simultaneously made to the Military Government at Canton by the Consuls of the same Powers.

On the following December 3rd an extraordinary meeting of the Cabinet at Peking and the leaders of the military party,* personally presided over by the President of the Republic, decided to reach an understanding with the South and arrange for an early conference at Shanghai.† However, the first sessions of this conference showed clearly that the discordance between the North and South was far deeper than the Allied Powers had imagined when presenting their *aide mémoire*. It was not due to "any personal sentiments and legal technicality," as the Allied Ministers naively stated in the *aide mémoire* †—it was the product of a fundamental divergence of ideas on the construction of the State and its form of government. The South insisted that it represented the only lawful Government in China, and as such was not only entitled to recognition as a rightful belligerent at the coming Internal Peace Conference at Shanghai, but also at the International Peace Conference at Versailles. ‡

The Internal Peace Conference at Shanghai opened on February 20th, 1919. The belligerents were represented by twenty-two delegates, § and both Governments pledged themselves not to interfere with the terms of peace, allowing them to be decided by the delegates themselves. ¶

In order to facilitate the reconciliation of the parties whose mutual antagonism affected their vital interests, the Allied Powers, on the application of the Canton Government, || decided to divide the Customs surplus, which was

* Generals Tsao Kun, Chang Tso-lin, Nyi Tsze-chung, Wang Chang-yuan, Meng Hu-yuan, and Chang Huai-chi.

† A proposition was first made to summon the Internal Peace Conference at Nanking, and to call it "Reorganization Conference," but the Southern leaders firmly refused to agree to this proposition. They insisted on holding the Conference in the International Settlement at Shanghai and styling it "Internal Conference," which ensured for them an equal standing with the representatives of the Peking Government.—АУТНОР.

‡ Declaration of the Chinese Government (Northern), December 21st, 1918.—"North-China Herald," February 15th and 22nd, 1919.

§ The North was represented by a delegation headed by Chu Chi-chien, Director of Chung Hsin Mines, Minister of Interior under Yuan Shih-kai. The Southern Party, besides sending provincial representatives of Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Szechuen, Kweichow, Hunan, Fukien and Shensi, headed by the chief delegate, Tang Shao-yi, delegated to the Conference Tseng Chih-chao, Hu Han-ming, and Tseng Yen, who represented General Tseng Chung-hsuan, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, and General Lu Yung-ting individually.—АУТНОР.

¶ "North-China Herald," January 28th, 1919.

|| *Ibid.*

to be released and handed over to the Chinese Government, between both Governments proportionately.*

But both parties accused each other of bad faith and the deliberate breaking of the terms of the armistice,† and on May 22nd, 1919, after having extended their appreciation to the Shanghai Foreign Community for the hospitality accorded to them, the delegates left Shanghai. ‡

Only concerted pressure on the part of the Allied Powers and the fear of losing the seat at Versailles was able to bring the antagonists together, but as soon as the hopes entertained by them in regard to the Peace Conference had vanished, there was scarcely a power on earth to effect even their temporary reconciliation.§ The indefinite aspirations cherished by China of a readjustment of her treaty relations with Foreign Powers ultimately took the form of a boldly advanced demand, which was unmercifully rejected by the victorious Powers.

As a matter of fact, neither the Chinese Government nor its delegates at Versailles, who included a representative of the Southern Party,¶ expected that the memorandum submitted by them to the Conference, and largely inspired by the Fourteen Principles of President Wilson,|| would meet with such unanimous support on the part of all classes of

* The Custom surplus of Mex. \$12,000,000 was released on January 25th, 1919—upwards of Mex. \$5,000,000 in Shanghai, and the balance in the North.

† In spite of the official orders of the Peking Government and the Southern Military Government for the suspension of hostilities, fighting proceeded as late as February 17th in the provinces of Shensi, Fukien, and the western part of Hupeh. The sessions of the Conference were interrupted. The Southern delegation refused to discuss any other matter until the Northern troops had retired to the River Wei-ho.—Statement of the Southern delegation, February 10th, 1919; Chu Chi-chien, Northern chief delegate, to Tang Shao-yi, Southern chief delegate, March 29th, 1919.

‡ Shanghai Municipal Council, Annual Report, 1919, p. 223-A.

§ On March 1st, 1919, the Internal Peace Conference was definitely suspended. What took place after the resumption of the negotiations on April 10th was not made public, but the bulletins issued stated that matters were progressing satisfactorily until May 14th, when Tang Shao-yi, Southern chief delegate, presented eight demands which included the question of the legality of the Presidential Mandate of June 13th, 1917, dissolving Parliament, when the sessions of the Conference were again interrupted. In June the Allied Ministers at Peking presented a new *aide mémoire*. However, despite repeated propositions on the part of the Northern chief delegate, Wang I-tang, who, under instructions from Peking, appeared to be more reconcilable than his predecessor, Chu Chi-chien, the Southerners refused to renew the negotiations.—*АУТНОР*.

¶ Dr. C. T. Wang.

|| Introduction to the Chinese Memorandum to the International Peace Conference at Versailles, 1919.

Chinese society which supplied to it an aspect of unflinchingness.* It was the work of enthusiasts who themselves scarcely believed in the realization of their wishes,† which "did not primarily arise out of this World War," ‡ nor in the sincerity of the high-sounding declarations on the part of the Allied and Associated Powers,§ but which suddenly appeared to be able to produce a movement directed not only against the Japanese, primarily responsible for China's failure at the Conference, but also against all foreigners who had contributed their share to the humiliation of one of the proudest nations of the world, which in spite of its present degradation still believed in the unsurpassable perfection of its spiritual civilization. Of all recent political documents concerning China the Chinese Memorandum to the Peace Conference at Versailles was the most striking, fully expounding as it did the nature of the foreign stranglehold on China.¶

* Forty-six Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Leading Merchants to "Governments of Peace—Great Britain, Italy, Japan, U.S. of America, and other Associated Allies," January 24th, 1919.—"North-China Herald," January 25th, 1919.

† The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs was beforehand informally advised by the United States Government that "it would be inexpedient for China to raise all those questions at Paris, and she had better confine her case at the Conference to questions directly relating to and which were outgrowths of the War."—Th. F. Millard: "China's Case at the Peace Conference," "Millard's Review," July 17th, 1920.

‡ *Aide mémoire* of the Allied Powers to the Central and Southern Governments of China, December 2nd, 1918.

§ Chinese Memorandum to the International Peace Conference, 1919.

¶ The Chinese Memorandum contained seven groups of articles besides a special "Provision for insertion in the Preliminaries of Peace with Germany," which was wholly devoted to the Shantung problem and questions immediately arising out of the war with Germany.

The *first* group dealt with the problem of the so-called spheres of influence or interest. China demanded that the Powers should renounce such spheres of influence or interest, if any, and declare their readiness to revise all treaties and agreements previously concluded with third parties which might create such spheres.

The *second* contained the history of the right of Foreign Powers to maintain in China their troops and police agencies, and China demanded their immediate withdrawal and the cancellation of Articles VII and IX of the Protocol of 1901. The Legation Guards from Peking should be withdrawn within one year from a date to be fixed by the Peace Conference.

The *third* presented the picture of the state of affairs in regard to the Postal Service in China, and the Chinese Government asked for the withdrawal of all foreign Post Offices and agencies for wireless and telegraphic communications before or on January 1st, 1921.

The *fourth* dealt with the extraterritorial jurisdiction of Foreign Powers in China, and abuses connected therewith. China demanded that upon fulfilment of her undertaking by the end of 1924, firstly to promulgate the Five Codes and secondly to establish new courts, the Foreign Powers should

Disclosure of the secret agreements between the Japanese, British, French, Russian and Italian Governments—till then unknown in China—at a session of the so-called Council of Ten was a severe blow to the Chinese. In spite of all the humiliation* and the diplomatic and financial pressure brought to bear upon them, the Chinese Delegation and Government at Peking,† both conscious of the powerful support of the Chinese nation,‡ which demanded the disclosure and annihilation of all secret agreements with Japan, remained firm, refusing to make any concessions. §

promise to relinquish their Consular jurisdiction and the jurisdiction of their special courts, if any.

The *fifth* contained a full history of the foreign leased territories in China, which the Chinese Government asked should be restored to China upon her undertaking to safeguard the property-owners therein.

The *sixth* gave a vivid description of the anomalies connected with the existence of the so-called foreign Settlements and Concessions in China, which formed integral parts of China's domains but in which the Chinese were deprived of all elementary civil rights. It was asked that these Settlements and Concessions should be restored to their legal owner by the end of 1924; and that, pending their final restoration, the Chinese population within these territories should enjoy equal rights with the foreigners.

The *seventh* declared that at the end of a definite period to be fixed by mutual agreement China should be free to regulate her Customs Tariff and that during the said period China should be free to negotiate with the various Powers tariff conventions, which should be reciprocal in treatment and should differentiate luxuries from necessities, and should have as the basis of a new conventional rate for necessities a Customs import duty of not less than 12½ per cent. China on her part promised to abolish *likin* as soon as new conventions were concluded.—AUTHOR.

* Statement of the Chinese Delegation to the Press, May 3rd and 4th, 1919; Chinese Delegation to the President of the Council of Three, May 4th, 1919; "Millard's Review," *op. cit.*

† On February 2nd, 1919, Mr. Obata, the Japanese Minister at Peking, paid an official visit to the Chinese Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chen Lu, and made representations concerning the unfriendly attitude of the Chinese Delegation *vis-à-vis* Japan at Versailles and their threat to disclose the agreements signed between China and Japan. The Japanese Minister pointed out that as these agreements were concluded between the two countries according to diplomatic usage, mutual consent must be obtained before any such step could be undertaken. Further, he demanded that the Chinese Government should immediately telegraph the Chinese Delegation instructing them to modify their attitude, adding "that if these demands were not accepted Japan would take actions she deemed necessary to preserve her national interests." The latter contained an ill-concealed threat of withholding the unpaid balance of Mex. \$17,000,000 of the War Participation Loan, which, in view of the chronic emptiness of the Chinese exchequer, was tantamount to an ultimatum.—Statement of the Chinese Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Foreign Press, February 8th, 1919.—"North-China Herald," February 13th, 1919.

‡ Joint telegram of the Internal Peace Conference at Shanghai to the Chinese Delegation at Versailles, May 6th, 1919.

§ The authority to the Chinese delegates to disclose the secret agreements was cabled to Versailles by the Chinese Government on February 12th, 1919. In conformity with the instructions the Delegation presented to the

(Continued on next page)

The Allied Powers refused flatly to take notice of the existing conventions between China and Japan or to discuss the compromise concerning the internationalization of Tsingtao advanced by the Chinese Delegation to alleviate the retreat of Japan in accordance with her announcement to restore Shantung to China.* China's prestige was obviously insufficient to neutralize the powerful influence of her adversary, and, such as it was, it was entirely due to national pressure actively at work in China itself. The student riots at Peking and Shanghai in May 1919 and the anti-Japanese boycott, which lasted over six months, were largely inspired and upheld by the Chinese Government itself in a desire to demonstrate to the foreigners the popularity of its position. Some invisible strings connect² the actions of the Chinese Delegation at the Conference with the movements of the crowd in China, which, in the most critical moments, assumed formidable proportions.† Moreover, it appeared that the most confidential proceedings and documents of the Conference were known to Chinese students and workers. ‡

Conference the full text of two agreements concerning the Tainan-Shuntch and Kaomi-Hsuechow Railways, dated September 24th, 1918, and the construction of four railroads in Manchuria and Mongolia, dated September 28th, 1918, together with all diplomatic notes on the subject. The Japanese Government on its part hastened to publish in the Japanese Press the text of the remaining secret agreements—the Armament Loan Agreement and the War Participation Agreement.—AUTHOR.

* Statement of Baron Makino and Viscount Chinda, chiefs of the Japanese Delegation at Versailles, to the Council of Four, April 30th, 1919.—“Millard's Review,” *op. cit.*, p. 16.

† On May 4th, 1919, three thousand students held a mass meeting at Peking. After passing a resolution against China signing the Treaty of Peace, if Japan secured Tsingtao and Kiaochoo Bay, they paraded through the Legation Quarter and then demonstrated before the house of the President of the Bank of Communications, Tsao Ju-lin, known as sharing pro-Japanese sympathies. Tsao Ju-lin succeeded in escaping the wrath of the crowd, but his house was set on fire. The crowd also attacked the house of Chang Tsung-hsiang, Chinese Minister to Japan, just returned to China, seized him and beat him so severely that he had to be taken to hospital, where he died in consequence of the injuries sustained. In both cases the police did not interfere, and only after the demonstration was at an end did they arrest several ringleaders. This incident signalized the start of a wave of unrest throughout the whole of China. The unrest was particularly serious in Shanghai, where the students formed a body known later on as the Students' Union, which directed the subsequent anti-Japanese boycott campaign and the general strike declared in support of Chinese demands at Versailles. In spite of the Presidential Mandate of May 6th, 1919, prohibiting public demonstrations, the student riots lasted until June 11th, when the Government dismissed the two above-mentioned officials “as national traitors.” The anti-Japanese boycott, followed by all kinds of excesses on the part of the students and workers, lasted until the middle of December, when it gradually died out.—AUTHOR.

‡ The proposal designed to enable Japan to come to a compromise with China regarding Shantung, advanced by China at the Conference on April

The exceptionally clever policy of the Chinese Government and the popular movement which it so ably handled caused a deep impression upon the foreign communities in China. They readily joined their hands with China against their new rivals, whose political and economic conquests threatened to excel those of Germany.*

On May 26th, 1919, the Chinese Delegation informed the President of the International Peace Conference that "in view of the unanimous demand of the country it had decided to sign the Treaty of Peace with Germany only with the reservation in respect of the clauses relating to the transfer of German rights in Shantung whereby China reserved for herself the right of demanding at a suitable time the reconsideration of the Shantung question," † which was categorically rejected by all other signatories. ‡

China had to bow to the force of circumstances or refuse to sign the treaty in the redaction adopted by the Conference. § She chose the latter, ¶ appealing to the world for justice. || On September 15th President Hsu Shih-chang announced the termination of the state of war with Germany and Austria-Hungary, which concluded one of the most peculiar periods in Chinese history passing under the high-sounding title of China's struggle for "the preservation of International Law and restoration of Peace." **

23rd, formed a part of the most confidential documents of the Conference. Meanwhile, on May 7th a deputation of students presented a petition to the Allied Legations which was a duplicate of this proposal:—(1) That the fiduciary functions hitherto exercised by Japan alone be replaced by administration by a Commission of the Five Great Powers; (2) that the Treaties exacted from China by Japan since the beginning of the War be abrogated; (3) that the Commission of Five Powers shall be guided through the period of its administration by the expectation that when a final settlement was reached one of the terms of that settlement should be the handing back to China of all privileges enjoyed in Shantung by Germany and of all privileges in increment thereof that Japan had established for herself in Shantung.—"Millard's Review," *op. cit.*, p. 7; "North-China Herald," May 17th, 1919.

* American Chamber of Commerce of China to the U.S. Minister at Peking and leading Commercial Organizations in America, December 16th, 1918; Report of Associated British Chambers of Commerce in China and Hongkong to H.B.M.'s Minister at Peking, June 20th, 1920.

† Reservation forwarded to G. Clemenceau, President of the Peace Conference, by the Chinese Delegation, June 28th, 1919.

‡ Peace Conference Secretariat-General to the Chinese Minister at Paris, June 28th, 1919.

§ Treaty of Versailles, June 28th, 1919: Articles 156, 157, 158 relating to Shantung.

¶ Chinese Delegation to G. Clemenceau, June 28th, 1919.

|| Statement of the Chinese Delegation to the Press, June 28th, 1919.

** Presidential Mandate, September 15th, 1919.

CHAPTER VII

BIRTH OF CHINESE NATIONAL OPINION : CHINA'S FEUDALISM

IN spite of the evident failure of the popular movement to force the Allied Powers to assent to China's demands at Versailles—a movement which was regarded by some authors as China's national protest against the traditional policy of foreigners in China, and by others as an effervescence of exalted youth—it was undoubtedly a very important event in Chinese modern history. It introduced a new political and social factor, an united public opinion,* known amongst the Chinese as the "New Culture Movement." †

This newly-born opinion was sponsored by a number of organizations which sprang into being in the centres of foreign commerce in China, and its edge was directed against the foreigners. With an infallible instinct the Chinese youth and bourgeoisie, carrying along with them the masses, realized the depth of the organic change in the political and social structures of Europe and Japan caused by the war, and the fact that if China was ever to regain her political and economic freedom, now was the moment, in spite of her apparent weakness and imperfection. They felt that the secret of China's recovery from political chaos and her social soundness were dependent on the attitude of the Foreign Powers, and on it alone. The problem of China's form of government, the rise into power of her war-lords, their mutual struggle for supremacy, and even the forcible planting of foreign ideas into her virgin soil, were all just matters of a transient

* "Japan," said Dr. T. H. Lee, President of Fuh-tan College and Chairman of the Chinese World's Students' Federation, in one of his addresses to his students, "has been our best friend, and when we come to write the history of present events we shall thank her sincerely for causing this great awakening of public opinion in China to-day."—"North-China Herald," June 21st, 1919.

† Hu Shih, F.H.D., Chinese National Association for Advancement of Education, 1922, Bulletin No. 6.

nature, a short phase in China's thousand years' history, while the steady advancement of the foreigners into China, and their grip on her most vital parts, threatened her integrity as a nation. A comparatively minor event, the promulgation of the Presidential Mandate * announcing that "hereafter all non-treaty countries wishing to enter into treaty relations with China should do so on the basis of equality and will not be allowed to enjoy special rights and privileges," was, in the eyes of the Chinese public, tantamount to a declaration of a new era in China's foreign intercourse. †

Furthermore, the admittance of China to the membership of the League of Nations, which followed automatically the signing of the St. Germain Treaty with Austria, ‡ secured for her an aspect of unusual dignity and weight which led the Chinese leaders to forget the utter hopelessness of her political and social situation and to feel with redoubled acuteness the humiliation suffered at the hands of the Allied Powers at Versailles.

The Shantung problem in itself became, as already stated, but a slight scar amongst the many grave wounds dealt to them, in the belief of the Chinese, by the foreigners. The Japanese claim to inheritance of their German possessions was only an incident, the nature of which was probably very little understood by the Chinese public, which, however, appreciated that it formed a link in the long chain of China's national development.

The student movement and the anti-Japanese strike and boycott of 1919 resulted not only in the moral breaking down of the Versailles Conference as far as Japan was concerned, but, what was far more important, it created a precedent whereby Chinese social organizations entered into direct contact with the Governments of the Foreign Powers. And though the latter tried outwardly to ignore this shocking violation of traditional international usage, and the Chinese Government made all efforts to suppress it, § both had to reckon with this unconventional manifestation of public opinion.

* Presidential Mandate, April 28th, 1919.

† In conformity with the principles of the Mandate of April 28th, 1919, the Peking Cabinets decided that China should not sign the Turkish Treaty, as being inconsistent with China's policy in regard to the abolition of extra-territoriality, inasmuch as it provided for its continuation.—AUTHOR.

‡ St. Germain Treaty, September 10th, 1919.

§ Presidential Mandate, February 6th, 1920; Circular Order of the Minister of Interior, April 24th, 1920.

The first result of the pressure brought to bear upon the Chinese Government by this newly-organized public opinion was the abrogation of the Sino-Japanese Military Pact, the formal necessity for which ceased to exist with the ratification of the Austrian Treaty and the withdrawal of the Allied troops from Siberia.* The minor incidents caused by the anti-Japanese movement of 1919-1920, and the presence of Japanese troops in Manchuria and the occupation of Nikolaevsk on the Amur, were also adjusted favourably to China. The Japanese Government expressed its entire readiness to settle all outstanding questions, including the Shantung controversy, in order to put an end to the growth of anti-Japanese feeling amongst the Chinese masses, which steadily refused to buy Japanese goods; † but before the formal notification to that effect had reached the Chinese Government, and was made public, ‡ a flood of protests inundated the official yamens of Peking and Canton.§ The pressure of public opinion was so great that even the most alluring promises made to the influential members of the Peking Cabinet were unable to induce it to enter into negotiations regarding the adjustment of Sino-Japanese relations.¶ Only on May 22nd, 1920, after having delayed the reply for about three months, did the Chinese Government confess that "in view of the violence of the popular protest" it was thought that "any negotiations with Japan would not be profitable."||

The adjustment of China's relations with Japan formed in the minds of a great number of Chinese a subject for consideration of the League of Nations, which, in their imagination, represented the proper forum—a constituted supreme authority through which China could appeal to the world's

* Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Japanese Minister at Peking, June 10th, 1920.

† Japanese Yarn, Piece Goods and Silk Dealers' Association in Tientsin to Mr. Funatsu, Japanese Consul-General at Tientsin, January 1920; Tientsin Chamber of Commerce (Chinese) to same.—"North-China Herald," January 17th, 1920.

‡ Statement of Mr. Obata, Japanese Minister at Peking, at the Waichiaopu, August 12th, 1919; Japanese Note, January 20th, 1920.

§ Kiangsu Provincial Educational Association, Shanghai District Chamber of Commerce, the World's Chinese Students' Federation, the Overseas Chinese League, the Western Returned Students' Union, Shanghai Commercial Federation for Nation Salvation, the Shanghai Students' Union, Provincial Assemblies of Twelve Provinces, Chambers of Commerce and 100 Guilds of various provinces and towns in China to the President, the Cabinet, the Waichiaopu and the Military Government at Canton, and the two Houses of Parliament, January 16th, 18th and 20th, 1920.

¶ Mr. Obata to the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, April 26th, 1920.

|| Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs to same, May 22nd, 1920.

conscience and obtain a judgment in her favour. This idea appeared invariably in all petitions, telegrams and protests addressed to the Chinese Government by various Chinese social, educational and professional organizations, and we must admit that there was hardly a people or country which surrounded this much-criticized issue of the Treaty of Versailles with such sincere reverence and admiration as China.

The attitude of the country did not undergo the slightest change with regard to the problem in consequence of the announced evacuation of the Shantung Railway by the Japanese troops, and in this respect it found complete sympathy on the part of the foreign trading communities in China, which did not for a single moment lose sight of the danger of the Japanese policy to their commercial interests. Japan was placarded as a selfish and impudent exploiter and enslaver of weak nations in the Far East.* The Sino-Japanese controversy attained the magnitude of a world problem. In fact, the policy of Japan in China, Manchuria, Korea and Eastern Siberia was a policy of undoubted aggression, but its foreign and Chinese opponents forgot that, in advocating an uncompromising attitude towards her, they were neither helping China nor European and American interests in China. They were just forcing Japan to forego the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance, which expired on July 13th, 1920, and which formed the last link that connected Japan with the West and prevented her from assuming an openly hostile attitude to the foreigners in China.

The attention of the Chinese Government was drawn to the statements which appeared in the world's press regarding Anglo-Japanese relations. Instructions were sent to the Chinese Minister in London to make formal enquiries regarding these press reports and to point out to the St. James's Cabinet that "while obviously the international arrangements of other Powers did not in the ordinary course of events concern others than the High Contracting Parties, the treatment of China merely as a territorial entity in the written text of any such agreement would no longer be tolerated by the public opinion of the country, and would indeed be viewed as an unfriendly act." †

It is difficult to ascertain the degree of sincerity which animated the Peking Government in this new anti-Japanese

* "North-China Herald," May 10th, 1919; May 22nd, 1920; December 4th, 1920, etc.

† Statement of the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Press, June 6th, 1920.

departure. The Chinese public definitely refused to trust it and, encouraged by past success, hastened to cut the possible retreat of its Government.

A memorandum designed to inform the British Government of the rapidly growing opposition to the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was presented to Sir Beilby Alston, H.B.M.'s Minister in China, and telegrams were despatched to the British Cabinet and Parliament and to the Governments of the United States, Italy, France, Canada, and Australia by the representatives of prominent organizations of Shanghai and the provinces,* which contained a hint that, in case of non-compliance with the Chinese popular demand, Great Britain would have to face in China a boycott of her imports.† The Chinese public had every reason to distrust the Peking Government. In spite of the announcement of the organization of a New International Consortium,‡ designed to replace the Five Powers' Group, which met with a very cold reception,§ the monopoly of making loans to China still remained with the Japanese bankers,¶ who continued to subsidize the Peking politicians.

Public indignation was further aroused by the reckless and surreptitious export of rice out of the country, which was suffering from a serious famine afflicting between thirty and forty millions of people. The calamity was so terrible that in many places the heads of families were poisoning their wives

* Shanghai Chinese Chamber of Commerce, Shanghai General Export Association, Manchuria and Shantung Silk Association, Shantung Guild, Shantung-Honan Pongee Guild, Skin and Hide Guild, Nanking Provincial Association, Fur Guild, Wookiang Association, Egg Products Association, Shaosing Association, Ningpo Provincial Association, Hupeh Guild, Hankow Cotton Merchants' Association, Waste Silk Association, Tobacco Merchants' Association, Cantonese Guild, National Students' Union, etc.—"North-China Herald," June 18th, 1921.

† Statement of Sir Walter de Frece in the House of Commons, June 13th, 1920.

‡ October 15th, 1920. The New Consortium included banks and bankers of four countries—Great Britain, France, America, and Japan. The latter joined the Consortium after some delay, for the Japanese Government insisted on the reservation of South Manchuria and Mongolia from its scope. In spite of the much-advertised plan of consolidation of China's finances, the Consortium never started operations, and all its projects of huge loans to China were never realized in view of her chaotic political situation.

§ Statement of Chow Tau-chi, Chinese Minister of Finance, November 26th, 1920.—"North-China Herald," December 4th, 1920. Chamber of Commerce of Kiangse Province to Mr. F. W. Stevens, representative of the American Banks, December 15th, 1920.—*Ibid.*, January 1st, 1921.

¶ The National Organization Union of China, Shanghai Associated Bodies, National Students' Union, and Shanghai Students' Union to the Foreign Ministers at Peking, February 14th, 1920.

and children with arsenic so as to avert certain death by starvation.*

The smuggling proceeded under the immediate protection of the Government, regardless of the official prohibition of the exportation of rice.† It was stated that General Hsu Shu-tseng, the so-called "Little Hsu," accumulated enormous wealth by diverting rice destined for his army for export to Japan.‡ The same was said about almost all, more or less, influential members of the Peking Cabinet belonging to the Anfu political party, or Club, who, realizing their complete immunity from punishment, negotiated and signed an agreement with the Japanese bankers that in return for an immediate loan of Yen 9,000,000, Peking would grant to Japan the right of purchasing rice in China whenever and wherever she pleased.§

It was the most extravagant loan which had ever been negotiated by China since the inauguration of the Republic, and it is not surprising that the prestige of the Central Government at Peking and the Parliament of 1918, known as the "Tuchun Parliament," was swiftly melting away. Even the military leaders responsible for its inauguration hastened to denounce it as "a gang of bandits."

An open conflict between General Chang Tso-lin, Inspector-General of Manchuria, and Tsao Kun, Inspector-General of Chihli, Shantung and Honan, and the Central Government was imminent. Neither President Hsu Shih-chang or the Anfu Club, led by the ex-Premier, Marshal Tuan Chi-jui, and his favourite, General Hsu Shu-tseng, better known in China as "Little Hsu," were disposed to surrender their power without a struggle, particularly as they found support in Dr. Sun Yat-sen and his faction.

It is very difficult to explain the real motive of this sudden *volte-face* on the part of the most irreconcilable opponents of the pro-Japanese policy in the Peking Cabinet, but there is no doubt that an understanding of mutual support was entered into between the Anfuites and Dr. Sun Yat-sen just at the moment when the Government at Peking was on the verge of collapse.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen explained his decision to sustain the Anfu Cabinet by the fact that its spiritual leader, Marshal

* Reuter, Peking, September 11th, 1920.

† G. Gramada, "North-China Herald," June 19th, 1920.

‡ "Sinwanpao," August 5th, 1920.

§ G. Gramada, *op. cit.*

Tuan Chi-jui, was the only man in the North who could be trusted—the “only militarist in Peking who was not a liar.”*

This explanation may at first glance strike the reader as being too ingenuous even for such an expansive statesman as Dr. Sun Yat-sen, but, taking into consideration the impulsiveness which characterizes all his actions after his appearance on China's political stage and the eccentricity of most of his deductions, we are inclined to accept it.†

Dr. Sun Yat-sen and his associates were, as we know, far from being irreconcilably anti-Japanese, as it is now asserted by their numerous admirers. Their close relations with the official Japanese policy during the revolutions of 1911, 1913 and 1916 were such that it is difficult to draw a line of demarcation between their patriotic revolutionary acts and the pursuit of the Japanese General Staff. They admitted not only the possibility but also the desirability of a full co-operation between China and Japan.‡

Nor was the Southern Party opposed to the financial assistance rendered by Tokyo to Peking so long as it tended to consolidate the authority of the Republican Government and was not used to strengthen the position of the war-lords. The Southern Republicans realized full well that the latter would, sooner or later, bring about a separatist movement of the provinces under their control and consolidate the ultimate triumph of the monarchical principle in each of the newly-established feudal states. They dreaded this idea, as they were aware that it must inevitably cause the ultimate reunification of the country in the same monarchical principle and kill the feeble sprouts of Chinese democracy.§

In this their views coincided with those of Marshal Tuan Chi-jui, who, though himself one of the early leaders of the Anhwei military party—the predecessor of the Anfu political Club—was an ardent partisan of a strong central government and an implacable opponent of provincial autonomy in any form.

* “North-China Herald,” November 27th, 1920.

† “The qualities upon which General Tuan's great influence is founded,” states Dr. Paul S. Reinsch, “became apparent only upon a longer and more intimate acquaintance. Despite his real indolence, his wisdom, his fundamental honesty and his readiness to shield his subordinates and to assume responsibility himself have made this quiet and unobtrusive man the most prominent leader among the Chinese militarists.”—Reinsch, *op. cit.*, p. 243.

‡ Statement of Viscount Shibusawa to General Chiang Kai-shek, December 1927, *ibid.*, December 24th, 1927.

§ Dr. Sun Yat-sen, “Sun Min Chu I,” China Committee, Institute of Pacific Relations, Shanghai, 1927, pp. 255, 425.

Negotiations between the faction of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and the Peking Government began with a message from President Hsu Shih-chang* and the withdrawal from Hunan of the Northern troops under General Wu Pei-fu. The Southern Peace Delegation, still represented by Tang Shao-yi, handed a new set of terms to the Chief Northern Delegate, General Wang I-tang, one of the most prominent Anfuites and more favourably inclined to Republican methods than his predecessor, Chu Chih-chien. It was proposed to recognize President Hsu Shih-chang and the international agreements contracted by the North; that the Old Parliament at Canton and the new (Anfu) at Peking should simultaneously be dissolved and a fresh election take place, and that the military and administrative officials in the Southwest be confirmed in their respective offices; that the Vice-President of the Republic should be elected by the Southwest; and that, finally, the deficits and liabilities incurred by the Southern Government should be made good and discharged by Peking.†

These terms were readily accepted by the Peking Government, with slight modifications, leaving very little doubt of the ultimate success of the negotiations, and on June 5th, 1920, the delegates of both parties met at the home of Tang Shao-yi at Shanghai. However, the hope of peace was premature. In the afternoon of that very day when the delegates came together for the first time and telegrams were informing the world of this happy event, ‡ the Southern Delegation received a cable from the Council of the Military Government at Canton stating that Tang Shao-yi was dismissed from his post as Chief Southern Delegate.

The Canton Government, represented by the Southern tuchuns, was definitely opposed to the re-unification of the South and North and the combination between Dr. Sun Yat-sen's faction and the leaders of the Anfu Club. They liked to see their independent status continued indefinitely, and refused to recognize any authority on the part of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and his associates, Tang Shao-yi and Dr. Wu Ting-fang, to represent the Southern people. The latter had only a few months earlier left Canton, carrying with him the Customs surplus revenue allotted to the Canton Government by the Foreign Powers and placed in his care as Minister of Finance. This was, according to his statement, the only way

* Presidential Mandate, March 29th, 1920.

† "North-China Herald," April 17th, 1920.

‡ Reuter, June 6th, 1920.

of saving the meagre resources of the Southern Government, for the mutual struggle between the rival generals in Kwangtung, Yunnan and Kwangsi proceeded as before, and all funds were diverted to military expenditure.* The old Parliament, without authority or moral weight, dragged out a miserable existence and was, of course, unable to alter the situation. Its unpaid members gradually deserted Canton, and over two hundred and fifty of them found shelter in Shanghai, where it was hoped to revive its function.†

The message from Canton was a blow to the Peking Government, abandoned by the League of Northern tuchuns. Its tottering prestige could only be reieved by immediate peace with the South, which now seemed to be more remote than ever. The troops of the Southern tuchuns were at any moment ready to re-open hostilities. They advanced into Honan and occupied the Capital of the province, Changsha, forcing the local military governor to seek safety in hasty flight. ‡ To neglect this and continue pourparlers with Dr. Sun Yat-sen's group, which in spite of its protestations did not enjoy the slightest real power, § was apparently senseless. Nevertheless, it was decided not to interrupt the negotiations ¶

* Circular Telegram of Dr. Wu Ting-fang, Hongkong, April 9th, 1920.

† This project was favoured by General Lu Yung-hsiang, the Tuchun of Chekiang, but the opposition on the part of the famous Nanking Military Governor, Li Shun, ruined it. After a number of conferences held in May 1920, it was decided to transfer the Parliament to Yunnanfu and to form there a new provisional government to compensate for the failure in Canton. This plan discomfited seriously both Peking and Canton, and steps were taken to frustrate it by buying over the parliamentarians, which succeeded to the extent that when the Parliament assembled in Yunnanfu the number of members was very insignificant. The Parliament had to apply Article 4 of the Law regarding extraordinary sessions passed in August 1917 at Canton, which said that the quorum of such sessions should consist of members from 14 or more provinces irrespective of their total number.—Wu Ching-lien, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Shanghai, August 19th, 1920.

‡ General Chang Chin-yao.

§ Manifesto signed by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, Tang Shao-yi, Dr. Wu Ting-fang and Tang Chi-yao, June 3rd, 1920.

¶ Statement of General Wang I-tang to the Press, June 10th, 1920.—"North-China Herald," June 12th, 1920.

The first meeting of the re-opened Internal Peace Conference took place on July 2nd, 1920, at Shanghai; but in spite of all efforts of both parties to add weight to the proceedings in the public eye, it very soon became clear that neither the Northern nor the Southern Delegations were really representing the contesting factions of North and South. The session of the Conference lasted till the middle of July, when, after the fall of the Anfu Club, the new Peking Cabinet summarily dismissed General Wang I-tang, ordered his arrest, and appointed Tuchun Li Shun of Nanking as Chief Northern Delegate. Dr. Sun Yat-sen's group withdrew also, leaving the matter to the appointee of the Military Government. No progress was, however, made, and after the promulgation of the Unification Mandate of October 30th, 1920, the Conference came to an end without achieving anything.—AUTHOR.

and to send to Canton an ultimatum demanding explanations and the immediate withdrawal of troops from Honan.

The reply of the Cantonese Government was laconic. It stated that the object of the advance was to bring about the downfall of the local tuchun, a member of the Anfu Club, while further investigations revealed that the unchecked advance of the Southern troops into Honan and the expulsion of its tuchun was effected with the tacit consent of General Wu Pei-fu.

As a matter of fact, the honour of proclaiming an open revolt against the Anfu régime belonged to General Wu Pei-fu, who appealed to the nation for co-operation and fearlessly offered the Honanese to assist them in driving out their unpopular Anfu tuchun.*

It was a very bold act on the part of a General subordinate to General Tsao Kun, of whom little was known except that he started his military career as a private, that he fought successfully against the South in 1919 and was amongst the supporters of peace between Peking and Canton. But his success was assured. His line of action and his proposal for the settlement of all Chinese problems over the head of the existing republican institutions through the convocation of a Citizens' Assembly was enthusiastically acclaimed by the Chinese public † and coincided entirely with the separatist tendencies of the provinces under the hegemony of the great war-lords. It supplied a crushing blow to the prestige of the Central Government.

The resistance of the Anfu Cabinet was very short-lived. On July 5th, 1920, President Hsu Shih-chang summarily dismissed one of the most influential leaders of the Anfu Club—Hsu Shu-tseng, "Little Hsu"—from the post of Commander of the Frontier Defence Force. The latter refused to obey the order of the President and moved his troops against Wu Pei-fu, who was cashiered, together with his chief General, Tsao-kun, at the instance of Marshal Tuan Chi-jui. ‡ He was easily defeated. Further attempts to arrest the success of Wu Pei-fu by Marshal Tuan Chi-jui were promptly

* General Wu Pei-fu's appeal to the Students' Union in Honan, June 20th, 1920.

† Kiangsu Educational Association, Shanghai City Chamber of Commerce, Chungwa Vocational Institute, World's Chinese Students' Union, Western Returned Students' Union, etc. to General Wu Pei-fu, August, 1920. —"North-China Herald," August 14th, 1920.

‡ Presidential Mandate, July 9th, 1920. This Mandate was cancelled on July 26th, 1920.—AUTHOR.

frustrated by the Chihli forces of General Tsao Kun, and on July 19th, faced with insurmountable difficulties, Marshal Tuan Chi-jui handed in his resignation.

The Anfu Club was suppressed and its leaders, with "Little Hsu" at the head, fled into the Japanese Legation, which officially took them under its protection as "political offenders."* The majority of the members of the Peking Parliament and members of the Anfu Party followed their suit and sought safety by leaving the Capital. The Parliament ceased to exist. There were no more parliamentarians left in Peking to form a quorum.

On August 4th, 1920, the Peking population witnessed the magnificent entry of the victors into the Capital. The streets were decorated with flags and lined with numerous troops. The ground from the railway station outwards to the street was strewn with yellow earth, which was done only in honour of the Great President Yuan Shih-kai and the former emperors. Thirteen motor-cars left the station in single file and passed through the throngs of cheering people. But amongst those generals in splendid uniforms who occupied the motor-cars General Wu Pei-fu was not present. It was the triumphant entry into the conquered Capital of Generals Chang Tso-lin and Tsao Kun and their large personal retinue.

The first step which these two generals undertook upon their arrival in Peking was to stop the official announcement of General Wu Pei-fu's scheme regarding an all-Chinese Citizens' Assembly, for the sake of which he had raised the revolt. †

Furthermore, the Chinese Press gave publicity to a telegram stating that President Hsu Shih-chang and the Premier ‡ had entered into an agreement with Generals Chang Tso-lin and Tsao Kun to the effect that all big problems in

* Mr. Obata, Japanese Minister at Peking, in a *communiqué* to the Press, August 8th, 1920.

† In the course of an interview granted to a party of Japanese journalists headed by Mr. Narasaki of the "Osaka Mainichi," Chang Tso-lin made some frank statements. He said that he was opposed to General Wu-Pei-fu's plan for a popular convention because he did not believe that the Chinese people were sufficiently intelligent; that Tsao Kun agreed with him, and that he had persuaded Wu Pei-fu of the futility of the scheme. He said that Wu Pei-fu did not desire the convention, but that an agitation for it was being carried on by British and Americans. Chang Tso-lin said that he had no part in international diplomacy but was personally responsible for good Sino-Japanese relations in Manchuria. He added that the British and Americans were fostering dissension between the Chinese and the Japanese, and that, while he was not a supporter of any nationality, Wu Pei-fu was a supporter of the Anglo-Saxon peoples.

‡ Chin Yun-peng, a nominee of General Chang Tso-lin.

government affairs should be subject to the consultation and approval of the two Generals; that the latter should be empowered to appoint and dismiss any official in Manchuria, Chihli, Shantung and Honan without first receiving the consent or approval of the Central Government; that they should have the right to punish any tuchun or military leader who should oppose or act contrary to their wishes and those of the Central Government.* In their turn both Generals graciously agreed to the retention of the presidential post by Hsu Shih-chang, the support of the Cabinet of Chih Yun-peng, and the pardon of Marshal Tuan Chi-jui, who was allowed to live at Peking.†

In the eyes of the Chinese public the Anfu Club represented a well-organized machinery through which the Japanese Government was able to control China, and the dislodgment of the Club meant, in their opinion, the end of this control. However, since the very inception of the so-called Chinese democracy the Japanese influence grew so deeply into the life of the Republic that Japan's entire elimination as a factor from Chinese politics could only be attained as a result of a complete change in the political structure of the country. The present change in the personnel of the Government was only a transfer of power from one party to another‡ and the assertion of the complete independence of the two biggest feudal formations in the North. It did not in the slightest degree affect the position of Japan. Her Government could view the situation with a perfect calmness, protesting vigorously against any doubt of her neutrality§ and confining herself to the personal protection of Anfuites,¶ whilst the struggle which had started in the North spread to the Southern provinces.

* "Sinwanpao," August 26th, 1920.

† Marshal Tuan Chi-jui was the only Anfu leader who refused to acknowledge his humiliation by taking refuge in one of the Legations. He continued to live in Peking under strict police supervision until February, 1922, when, disguised as a monk, he escaped secretly to Tientsin in order to reappear on the political horizon of China as Chief Executive of the Republic in 1924.

‡ Tang Shao-yi to General Tang Chi-yao, August 9th, 1920.

§ Chinese Cotton Mill-Owners' Association, Foreign Piece Goods Merchants' Association, Foreign Sundry Goods Merchants' Association, Export Merchants' Guild, Timber Merchants' Guild, Cotton Merchants' Association, Kiangsu Educational Association, Chinese Bankers' Association, etc., to the Foreign Ministers at Peking, July 10th, 1920; same to Mr. Obata, Japanese Minister at Peking, July 20th, 1920; K. Yamasaki, Japanese Consul-General at Shanghai, to the Chinese Cotton Mill-Owners' Association and others, July 22nd, 1920.

¶ One by one the members of the Anfu Club who took refuge in the Japanese Legation escaped to Tientsin, and from there to Japan. On Novem-

In fact, the split between the radical factions and the Southern tuchuns widened very considerably. The Military Government, headed by the remaining Administrative Directors, Generals Tsen Chun-hsuan and Lu Yung-ting, were strongly opposed to the position of Dr. Sun Yat-sen in the matter of the Anfu Club. They were in sympathy with General Wu Pei-fu and the Chihli party, which, after the withdrawal of Chang Tso-lin to Mukden, dominated in Peking's politics.

Their own position in Canton was far from being stable. The Cantonese troops affiliated with Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Kuo-mintang under the command of General Chen Chiung-ming in Fukien threatened the very approaches of Kwangtung, while the Szechuanese army gained a decided victory in the north and declared complete independence from Canton.

On July 31st, 1920, the telegraph brought the news that the army of General Chen Chiung-ming had defeated the troops of the Military Government and its Kwangsi Generals and that the Government was dissolved; and the ex-Directors—Tsen Chun-hsuan and Lu Yung-ting—petitioned the Peking Government to assume control of the Southern provinces.* In response to this petition the Peking Government hastily promulgated a Unification Mandate † and ordered new parliamentary elections. ‡

This act was scarcely in conformity with the general policy of the North, but the approaching Pacific Conference in Washington forced the Northern politicians again to turn their minds to the necessity of reinstating some semblance of the constitutional government claimed by China in her official relations with Foreign Powers.

The Peking Cabinet, reconstructed strictly in accordance with the ideas of both Northern lords, Generals Chang

ber 16th, 1920, the Japanese Minister at Peking informed the Chinese Government concerning the flight of General Hsu Shu-tsen, which created a scandal in the official circles of Peking. The cynicism of the Japanese diplomat was apparent, for without the direct assistance of the Legation the escape of "Little Hsu," who was very closely watched by the Chinese Police, was absolutely impossible.—Mr. Obata, Japanese Minister at Peking, to the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, November 16th, 1920; Chinese reply, November 20th, 1920.

* Statement of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, Tang Shao-yi, Dr. Wu Ting-fang, and General Tang Chi-yao to the Press, October 23rd, 1920.

† October 30th, 1920.

‡ The elections were to be held according to the Election Law of 1912, which the new Government at Peking found necessary to revive on the occasion of the unification with the South and as a definite proof of its liberal tendency.—AUTHOR.

Tso-lin and Tsoo Kun, announced a very extensive political programme. It included the complete pacification of the country, the separation of civil and military administration, the abolition of the tuchunate, the disbandment of superfluous troops, reforms of finances, education, etc.* The suspension of recognition of the Russian Minister and Consular officers, on the ground that they had long ago lost their representative character owing to the political changes in Russia, the abrogation of the extraterritorial privileges of the Russians in China,† and negotiations with the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics on the basis of "reciprocity and complete equality," gave to the policy of the new Cabinet a semblance of loyalty to the principles voiced on behalf of the Chinese public at the Versailles Conference.

The scheme announced by Peking, though inconsistent with its general policy, ‡ prevented Dr. Sun Yat-sen—who, following General Chen Chiung-ming's success, had landed at the head of a large entourage at Canton on November 30th, 1920—from taking advantage of his constitutional position and establishing his claim to the Customs revenue. The Powers refused categorically to release any accumulated or future Customs surplus "while objection is made by the Central Government, which is the only recognized Government in China." §

The scheme of a strong central government advocated by Dr. Sun Yat-sen did not appeal to the people of the South. General Chen Chiung-ming, the Southern champion of democracy ¶—responsible for the re-conquest of Canton from the Kwangsi faction and the return of Dr. Sun Yat-sen to power—expressed his entire disapproval of the creation of another "burlesque" government at Canton. He did not believe in the blessings of parliamentary government for China revived in that city, and was of the opinion that the Cantonese people desired nothing so much as Canton for the Cantonese. || He

* Premier Chin Yun-peng's programme speech to the members of the Cabinet, August 11th, 1920.

† Presidential Mandate, September 23rd, 1920.

‡ The Chinese Parliament at Canton to the Senate and the House of Representatives of the U.S., the American Minister and the Diplomatic Body at Peking.—"North-China Herald," April 29th, 1921.

§ Foreign Ministers at Peking to the Canton Government, February 15th, 1921.

¶ Statement of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, Dr. Wu Ting-fang and Tang Shao-yi to the representative of the "North-China Herald," November 24th, 1920.—"North-China Herald," January 15th, 1921.

|| Rodney Gilbert, *ibid.*, January 15th, 1921.

did not complete his idea by adding that he understood Cantonese autonomy only under the control of a strong military leader such as himself.* His view concerning the utility of parliamentarism, particularly as it was represented in China, was shared by a number of older commercial organizations, which frankly petitioned the Governments of Peking and Canton to dissolve the Old and New Parliaments, "as they had done nothing really to benefit the people."†

The indefinite scheme of a non-political and non-military Citizens' Assembly advanced by General Wu Pei-fu, which aroused enthusiasm in some quarters, was hardly capable under existing conditions of standing against the formation of feudal states in the North and the harmonious theories of a Home Rule developed in the South and Southwest.‡ The same can be said about the appeal of General Lu Yung-hsiang, Tuchun of Chekiang, who boldly advocated the voluntary abolition of the tuchunate by the tuchuns themselves and the convocation of a Citizens' Convention similar to that of Wu Pei-fu.§

The Manchu monarchical projects, rumours of which were from time to time set afloat by a group of legitimists, found even less sympathy.¶ The restoration of the Tsing Dynasty was, as could be expected, strongly opposed by all tuchuns, for whom it meant a death warrant|| and who, by consolidating their personal power, subconsciously contributed to the inevitable historical process of the disintegration of the nation.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen also admitted the necessity of introducing into China a large provincial self-government.** He proposed to convert the Government at Canton into a league of self-governing provinces, with the President of the Republic at its head. This scheme was, however, realized only so far as the election of the President of the Republic was concerned.

* Statement of Dr. Sun Yat-sen to Foreign Powers, issued through Reuter, August 17th, 1922.

† Chinese Chamber of Commerce and other commercial organizations of Shanghai to Peking and Canton Governments, August, 1921.—"North-China Herald," August 31st, 1920.

‡ Governor Tan Yen-kai of Hunan.

§ Circular Telegram of General Lu Yung-hsiang, April 23rd, 1920.

¶ Chung Foo News Agency, Peking, January 7th, 1920; "North-China Herald," February 7th, 1920; March 27th and April 2nd, 1921.

|| General Chang Tso-lin to President Hsu Shih-chang, January 8th, 1921.

** Dr. Sun Yat-sen's address on the occasion of his inauguration as President of China at Canton, May 5th, 1920.

On April 7th, 1921, an extraordinary session of the Old Parliament at Canton elected Dr. Sun Yat-sen President of the Republic of China.* This fact disconcerted very seriously the Northern Parties, and at a conference held in Tientsin it was decided to renew the warrant for the arrest of the newly-elected President issued in 1917, and to authorize the Peking Government to grant a credit to the defeated Kwangsi leaders, Lu Yung-ting and Tsen Chun-hsuan, with a view to enabling them to carry out the subjugation of Kwangtung. This decision predetermined the whole trend of following events, for the expedition against the South required money, and money could only be obtained in Japan.†

The preparations for a big offensive proceeded also in the South. The fighting, which broke out between Hupeh and Hunan, in which General Wu Pei-fu, as Inspector-General of these two provinces,‡ intervened on the side of Hupeh, offered an opportunity for the South to crush the Northern control in the Yangtze Valley.

In this project Dr. Sun Yat-sen was enthusiastically supported by the Overseas Chinese, who keenly felt the disastrous effect of China's disintegration as far as her international position was concerned. A movement was started to raise the necessary funds for the "punitive expedition,"§ but, as usual, the matter ended in a loan contracted in Japan.¶

Under these circumstances the invitation of President Harding "to participate in the discussion of the Conference on the subject of the Limitation of Armaments to be held in Washington on the 11th day of November, 1921," received by the Peking Government on August 11th, 1921, savoured rather of the ridiculous!

There was no "China" in the sense used in the document. There were certain feudal domains, ruled by Generals Chang Tso-lin, Tsao Kun, Lu Yung-hsiang, Chi Hsieh-yuan, Wu Pei-fu, Chen Chiung-ming, etc., but there was no "China" as a body. Neither the Government at Peking nor Canton had the right to represent the Chinese nation, although each of them claimed this privilege,|| and, being unable to reach an

* Out of 222 members of Parliament present, 218 gave their votes for Dr. Sun Yat-sen, three voted for General Chen Chiung-ming, and the remaining vote was ruled out for informality.—AUTHOR.

† Kirin-Haining Railway Loan (Yen 10,000,000), May 28th, 1921.

‡ Presidential Mandate, August 10th, 1921.

§ "North-China Herald," August 13th, 1921.

¶ The Japanese Pacific Co. Loan (Mex. \$12,000,000), July, 1921.

|| Ma Soo, the Representative of the Canton Government in America, to Secretary of State Hughes, September 6th, 1921.

understanding between themselves,* each denounced the other as a "usurper of the legitimate power." †

Furthermore, questions relating to Shantung, the Twenty-one Demands and the extraterritorial rights and privileges of the foreigners, which formed China's main interest, could not be brought before the Conference on account of various technicalities. ‡ But all these details and the tittle-tattle of Chinese home politicians had very little importance in the eyes of the Chinese public. Despite all difficulties, Chinese public opinion found expression at Washington through the numerous Chinese chambers of commerce, guilds, educational and professional organizations—a remote echo of the seething of countless Chinese masses.

These events are too recent to permit us to arrive at any definite conclusion regarding the political and economic factors which led to the acceptance of principles favourable to China, § the Sino-Japanese understanding in respect to Shantung, ¶ the abolition of the notorious Twenty-one Demands, || and the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, ** but it is an undoubted fact that the only power

* Exchange of telegrams between Dr. W. W. Yen, Minister of Foreign Affairs at Peking, and Dr. Wu Ting-fang, December 18th and 19th, 1921.

† This exchange of views between the two Ministers was the result of strenuous efforts on the part of Mr. Robert Lansing, former U.S. Secretary of State and Legal Advisor to the Peking Delegation at the Washington Conference, to bring about unity in China which could strengthen her cause at the Conference.—AUTHOR.

‡ Dr. Wu Ting-fang to Dr. W. W. Yen, August 17th, 1921; Dr. Sun Yat-sen to Chiang Man-lin, September 26th, 1921.—"North-China Herald," October 1st, 1921.

§ All the nations represented at the Conference, except the United States, China and the Netherlands, were bound by the Treaty of Versailles, which enabled Japan to oppose any contemplated action by any of those Powers which could be regarded as a departure from the terms of the Treaty.—AUTHOR.

¶ "As the foundation of its work in respect to China, the Conference adopted the fundamental principles, in agreeing: (1) to respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China; (2) to provide, the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government; (3) to use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China; (4) to refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States."—Willoughby: "China at the Conference," Washington, 1922.

|| Sino-Japanese Treaty, February 4th, 1922.

|| Declaration of Baron Shidehara at the Washington Conference, 1922.

** Treaty between United States, Great Britain, France and Japan, December 13th, 1921, Article IV.

behind the Chinese Delegation at Washington was Chinese public opinion. And if it is still questionable in the eyes of foreign historians, it is so in the mind of the Chinese themselves.

With the utmost vigour the Chinese public * fought against the desire of the Peking rulers to settle the problem of Sino-Japanese relations before the Conference.† But neither the success of this fight ‡ nor the result achieved at Washington inspired much public enthusiasm. The assurance of the abolition of extraterritoriality, § of the non-creation of spheres of influence¶ and Customs autonomy, || as well as the closure of foreign post-offices and the promise of the return of Wei-hai-wei, were received with the utmost distrust and suspicion.

Meanwhile, concessions regarding the settlement of the Shantung issue before the forum of the Great Powers in Washington, wrought from Peking by public opinion, resulted in friction between the Japanese and Chinese authorities in Manchuria, where the latter were more dependent upon Japanese benevolence than in any other part of China.

On December 14th, 1921, General Chang Tso-lin arrived at Peking and, after a short discussion of the situation with General Tsao Kun and the President, insisted upon the re-organization of the Cabinet and the appointment of Liang Shih-yi as Premier. The newly-appointed Premier—one of the ablest and most brilliant Chinese politicians, the leading personage of the monarchical movement under Yuan Shih-kai—was an ardent partizan of the complete co-ordination of China's policy with that of Japan.**

* Resolution of the meeting of fifty-five public organizations in Peking, September 3rd, 1921; All China People's Diplomatic Federation to the Japanese People's Association in Tokyo.—"North-China Herald," December 31st, 1921; Students' Union of Wuhan to the Cabinet, the Waichiaopu, and Ministry of Communications at Peking, September 17th, 1921, etc.

† Memorandum of Mr. Obata, Japanese Minister at Peking, to the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, September 7th and October 20th, 1921.

‡ Peking Minister of Foreign Affairs to Mr. Obata, October 5th and November 3rd, 1921.

§ Resolution concerning the establishment of a Commission to enquire into the practice of extraterritorial jurisdiction in China and her laws, the judicial system and the methods of judicial administration to be constituted within three months after the adjournment of the Conference, with a view to submitting its report and recommendations within one year after the first meeting of the Commission.

¶ Treaty of February 6th, 1922.

|| *Ibid.*

** One of the first acts of the new Cabinet was to grant pardon to all the Anfuites except General Hsu Shu-tzeng—"Little Hsu"—who, after his flight to Japan, returned to China and lived in Hangchow, enjoying the hospitality of General Lu Yung-hsiang of Chekiang.—AUTHOR.

This appointment caused an uproar of indignation amongst the anti-Japanese factions * and marked the opening of the struggle between the two greatest feudal states in China and their feudataires, known as the Chihli and Fengtien Military Parties, led by General Tsao Kun and Chang Tso-lin respectively.

General Wu Pei-fu was, by virtue of his post as Inspector-General of Hupeh and Hunan, independent from General Tsao Kun and strongly opposed to the decentralization of the government exercised by him. Nevertheless, he joined forces with him, and his firm stand against the Anfu Club and the Hupeh separatists in the past, † his valour and honesty, which made him very popular, assured to the Chihli Party general sympathy.

An ultimatum in the name of the tuchuns of six provinces—Kiangsu, Hupeh, Honan, Kiangsi, Shantung and Shensi—which joined with him, sent in by General Wu Pei-fu, ‡ compelled Premier Liang Shih-yi to retire from active participation in the government and General Chang Tso-lin to begin gradually to withdraw his troops from Peking.

President Hsu Shih-chang appealed to the country to preserve peace and ordered the acceleration of the elections to Parliament, trying in this way to deprive the movement of its growing popularity § and to prevent any armed clash between the rival parties.

But, as in the past, the cause of Japan in China, or, perhaps, the forced pro-Japanese policy of the Manchurian war-lord and his associate generals, found strong support amongst the radical factions in the South. At the end of March 1922 the Chinese press published an agreement purporting to have been entered into between General Chang Tso-lin and the Southern Government. According to the terms of this agreement, President Hsu Shih-chang and General Wu Pei-fu must be overthrown and Dr. Sun Yat-sen recognized as President of the Chinese Republic, with Marshal Tuan Chijui as Vice-President. The Old Parliament at Canton would be dissolved and a new one elected in its place according to the Constitution of 1912 in Peking. Generals Chang Tso-lin and Tsao Kun would enjoy equal power and the right of

* General Wu Pei-fu to President Hsu Shih-chang, January 13th, 1922.

† General Chang Tso-lin, Commander-in-Chief of the Self-Government Armies of Hupeh, to President Li Yuan-hung.—"North-China Herald," August 27th, 1921.

‡ January 10th, 1922.—"Shanghai Journal of Commerce," January 30th, 1922.

§ President Hsu Shih-chang's Circular Telegram, March 12th, 1922.

appointing civil governors and other officials in their provinces, which would be granted complete self-government. The Treaty would come into effect during the summer months of 1922.*

After the return of the Military Government to Canton in November, 1920, the preparations for the expedition against the North proceeded with unrelaxed force. With his characteristic expansiveness and vehemence Dr. Sun Yat-sen gave himself up to the idea of the reinstatement of the Central Government and the re-unification of the country. In spite of the fact that he found very little sympathy amongst the military leaders of the South, he insisted on increasing his army.† Three large columns were formed to advance against General Wu Pei-fu, and he announced his intention of accompanying them personally, regardless of growing opposition. ‡

In fact, the outlook for the forthcoming campaign grew less and less promising and found but scant favour even amongst his closest friends in the Parliament and in the province of Hunan, which was to be freed from the "oppression" of the North.§ The financial support of the Chinese residents in North and South America, Canada, Cuba, and the South Seas,¶ and the funds advanced by General Chang Tso-lin,|| were absolutely insufficient to finance this huge enterprise. The burden of the increased taxation, to which the Southern Government was ultimately compelled to resort, was entirely borne by the Cantonese, which contributed further to the unpopularity of the movement. For if theoretically the Southern Government claimed to represent more than 130,000,000 Chinese and to control the provinces of Yunnan, Kweichow, Kwangsi, Kwangtung and Szechuen,** its actual authority hardly extended beyond the city of Canton.†† The rest of the provinces was under the sway of various military chiefs who were, as we have stated, far from the idea

* The terms of the agreement were first reported by the "Shunpao," one of the leading Chinese periodicals in Shanghai, at the end of March 1922 and were denied by the Southern Government only so far as the election of Marshal Tuan Chi-jui as Vice-President and some minor details were concerned.—AUTHOR.

† Statement of General Chen Chiung-ming.—"North-China Herald," January 15th, 1921.

‡ Eastern News Agency, Canton, October 18th, 1921.

§ "North-China Herald," October 29th, 1921.

¶ Eastern News Agency, Canton, August 8th, 1921.

|| "Eastern Times," March 12th, 1921.

** Lord Northcliffe, "The Times," October 29th, 1921.

†† Dr. F. C. Tong's address to the Conference of Chinese Chambers of Commerce at Shanghai, October 12th, 1921.

of rendering assistance to a campaign the ultimate end of which was the reinstatement of a strong Central Government. Like their fellow-tuchuns in the North, they were all partisans of the self-determination of provinces as a means for the prolongation of their own power, and they were rather inclined to favour the Citizens' Assembly and Citizens' Convention of Generals Wu Pei-fu and Lu Yung-hsiang* than the political programme of the Kuomintang led by their President.

Finally, Dr. Sun Yat-sen could only rely on his closest friends and members of the Kuomintang, who, in spite of their numerical insignificance, formed a comparatively well-organized body and filled all important posts in the legislature and civil administration.† As far as his army was concerned, it was placed under the command of General Li Lieh-shun, Chen Chien, and Hsu Chung-chih, all ex-tuchuns of a very questionable political integrity, driven out of their own provinces. It was doubtful whether they were ever enthusiastic for his scheme or went in their aspirations beyond the mere desire to regain their lost positions. The main body of the army was composed of adventurers, fortune-hunters, and even bandits, who have infested the South since the revolution of 1912 and the political chaos after the death of Yuan Shih-kai. In this respect the Constitutionalist army was a typical modern Chinese army, very little distinct from the troops of the Northern war-lords.‡ The only exception was the division under the personal command of General Chen Chiung-ming stationed in Canton, but it was not included in the expeditionary force owing to the opposition of its commander.

The relations between Dr. Sun Yat-sen and General Chen Chiung-ming became very strained at the beginning of the Spring of 1922. The troops who had advanced against Wu Pei-fu as far as Chenchow and Yungchow in Hunan were urgently recalled, and Dr. Sun Yat-sen issued a mandate

* General Chen Chiung-ming to General Lu Yung-hsiang, August 25th, 1921.

† The results of the elections in Canton held in August 1921 for district magistrates and membership of the Parliament had indicated that wherever the Kuomintang Party had competed its candidates were mostly successful owing to the complete indifference displayed in respect to any civic duty by the mass of the population.—AUTHOR.

‡ During the winter campaign in Kwangsi, 1921-1922, the Cantonese army looted indiscriminately, ravaged the women on Kwangsi soil, and when they were compelled to retreat carried off with them all the women and girls they could take into Kwangtung.—"North-China Herald," February 18th, 1922.

relieving him of his post as Civil Governor of Kwangtung and Commander-in-Chief of the Southern army.*

The idea of conquering the North and of leading personally the Constitutionalist army to victory, in which he passionately believed, entirely absorbed Dr. Sun Yat-sen.† On June 16th, 1922, the troops formerly under the command of General Chen Chiung-ming made a sudden attack upon his troops at Canton, with the result that a greater portion of them were disarmed. A proclamation issued by the officers in command of the revolutionary troops announced that inasmuch as the Old Parliament had been restored at Peking and President Hsu Shih-chang had gone out of office, the object of constitutionalism had been accomplished. It was, therefore, natural that Dr. Sun Yat-sen should give up his scheme of an anti-Northern campaign and resign his office of President in favour of the ex-President Li Yuan-hung, who was to succeed President Hsu Shih-chang.‡

In fact, the events in the North proceeded with astounding rapidity, and by the time the anti-Northern "punitive" expedition was ready to depart General Chen Chiung-ming's officers were justified in saying that "as the Old Parliament had been restored at Peking and President Hsu Shih-chang had gone out of office" the scheme of an anti-Northern expedition should be abandoned.

On April 28th General Wu Pei-fu telegraphed to the Foreign Ministers at Peking explaining his position in connection with the Chihli-Fengtien struggle and exhorting the Ministers not to permit foreign assistance to General Chang Tso-lin, such as funds, arms and munitions, and not to allow foreign military experts to enter the Fengtien ranks. Simultaneously he gave orders to commence the attack upon the Fengtien troops stationed to the south-west of Tientsin. By May 14th it was clear that the army of Chang Tso-lin was much inferior as a fighting force to that of Wu Pei-fu, and that only a hasty retreat beyond the Great Wall would save it from a complete *débâcle*.

Yielding to the pressure of the advancing forces, President Hsu Shih-chang summarily dismissed Premier Liang

* Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Mandate, April 21st, 1922.

† It was reported that Dr. Sun Yat-sen in a fit of enthusiasm cabled to General Chen Chiung-ming offering to leave the Canton Administration in his hands while he proceeded with the anti-Northern expedition, and pledging himself never to return to Canton if he did not succeed.—Reuter, Peking, June 15th, 1922.

‡ Eastern News Agency, Canton, June 16th, 1922.

Shih-yi and two other Ministers known for their pro-Japanese sympathies * and deprived them of their ranks and decorations. General Chang Tso-lin was also cashiered and ordered to be arrested.† But all this did not avail to save the Peking Government from a new and forcible ejection.

The stand of the Chihli Party could 'be shaken neither by the intrigues in their rear ‡ nor the revived activity in Canton and the booming of the Southern expedition by the Japanese and pro-Japanese press, § nor by the menace of losing the territories of Manchuria, Outer Mongolia, Jehol, and Chahar, proclaimed as an independent state by Chang Tso-lin.¶ Hsu Shih-chang was publicly denounced as a traitor, || and on June 11th left Peking and the Government to the discretion of the Chihli Party. It appeared, however, that the latter had nothing greater to offer to the exhausted country than the worn-out constitutionalism of 1912 in the form of reinstatement in office of ex-President Li Yuan-hung, who had shamefully deserted it in 1917,** and the Old Parliament from Canton.

It was all that the victors, led by General Wu Pei-fu, with his great plans, and General Tsao Kun, were able to set against the idea of Dr. Sun Yat-sen regarding the reinstatement of the Central Government and his claim to represent "the Chief Executive of the sole *de facto* as well as *de jure* governing body in China, which was fully constituted at this moment." ††

Dr. Sun Yat-sen fought with the utmost tenacity, refusing to recognize the political change at Peking and the re-unification of the country under such circumstances. ‡‡

* Yeh Kung-chow, Minister of Communication, and Chang Hu, Minister of Finance. Both were accused of handing over large sums to General Chang Tso-lin. The Presidential Order for their arrest, dated May 6th, 1922, found them together with Liang Shih-yi *en route* to Japan.—AUTHOR.

† Presidential Mandate, May 9th, 1922.

‡ General Chao-ti, the Tuchun of Honan, declared himself against the Chihli Party; his diversion was obviously directed to relieve the latter's pressure on the Fengtien troops. The revolt was quickly suppressed by General Feng Yu-hsiang (Christian General), Tuchun of Shensi, appointed to succeed General Chao Ti.—AUTHOR.

§ "North-China Herald," May 13th, 1922.

¶ Statement of the Peking Cabinet to the Press, May 20th, 1922.

|| Circular Telegram of Members of the Old Parliament, Tientsin, June 1st, 1922.

** General Ho Feng-ling, Military Governor of Sungkiang and Shanghai, to "Great President Li, the gentleman who is temporarily carrying out the duties of President," June 3rd, 1922.

†† Dr. Sun Yat-sen, Manifesto, June 6th, 1922.

‡‡ *Ibid.*

Having retired on board a Chinese man-of-war lying in the lower reaches of the Huang-pao, while other prominent members of his faction and the Kuomintang had all disappeared into hiding, he issued order after order to the remaining loyal navy and troops, stopping not at the bombardment of Canton and the sacrifice of the Southern Capital.* He was neither influenced by the obvious hopelessness of the struggle nor the sudden death of his best personal friend and loyal supporter, Dr. Wu Ting-fang,† nor the appeal of President Li Yuan-hung who informed him of the peace between Chihli and Fengtien and urged him to come immediately to Peking,‡ his passage there being guaranteed by the Consular Body at Canton.§

Deserted by nearly all his followers,¶ he stubbornly refused to recognize his defeat or to leave the South, hoping at the last moment to rouse the mass of the Cantonese population against the military usurpers.

* U.S. Consul-General to Dr. Sun Yat-sen, June 18th, 1922.—"Hongkong Telegraph," June 20th, 1922.

† June 23rd, 1922.

‡ President Li Yuan-hung to Dr. Sun Yat-sen, June 28th, 1922.

§ Canton Foreign Consular Body's Notification to General Yeh Chu, Commander of General Chen Chiung-ming's troops, June 27th, 1922.

¶ In spite of the strenuous efforts of Dr. Sun Yat-sen to prevent the departure of the members of the Old Parliament from Canton, 150 parliamentarians left for Peking as a result of President Li Yuan-hung's invitation. With the approval of Generals Wu Pei-fu and Tsao Kun, two delegates were sent to Hongkong to meet the Canton members, with M. \$300,000 to cover their expenses and as advance on their salaries. But the most striking feature of the whole affair was, perhaps, the consent of Tang Shao-yi to become Premier of the reorganized Government at Peking (Presidential Mandate, August 6th, 1922).—AUTHOR.

CHAPTER VIII

THE PRINCIPLES OF DR. SUN YAT-SEN

HE failed. . . . The masses of Canton which, at the last moment, he hoped to raise against General Chen Chiung-ming, remained indifferent to the fate of their Generalissimo and his Government.

On August 4th, 1922, the base of operations of the Kuo-mintang and the headquarters of Dr. Sun Yat-sen were removed to Macao; five days later he himself stepped on to the deck of a British man-of-war at Canton, placed at his disposal by H.B.M.'s Consul-General, and proceeded to Hongkong. . . .*

Friends and partisans who met him at Woosung, near Shanghai, were deeply impressed by the change in his appearance which had occurred since he left Shanghai in November 1920. The strain of the past two years had told upon him. His hair had grown grey and his eyes wrinkled. †

Several hundred delegates, representing some fifty public organizations, carrying flags and banners, assembled at the Bund in Shanghai and waited patiently for many hours for his arrival, but he preferred to avoid the noisy manifestations of this popular sympathy, in which, after the defeat in Canton, he hardly believed; he motored direct from Woosung to his house in the French Concession. ‡

In fact, Dr. Sun Yat-sen's defeat in Canton was solely due to the passivity of the population, to its complete indifference to the task which he pursued. His great ideas of China's regeneration were neither understood nor appreciated. § The Chinese masses in which he, like his implacable antagonist, Yuan Shih-kai, passionately believed, were unable to fathom the depth of his revolutionary ideas; they

* Dr. Sun Yat-sen to H.B.M.'s Consul-General at Canton, Hongkong, August 11th, 1922.

† "North-China Herald," August 19th, 1922.

‡ *Ibid.*

§ Dr. Sun Yat-sen—"San Min Chu I," *op. cit.*, p. 58.

remained aloof from the struggle which was taken up by him on their behalf and for their sake, which deprived it of its sense and purpose. No revolution has been made in the interests of individuals ; all have been the result of action by the masses.*

This passiveness was the more strange and incomprehensible in that the Chinese people have always been subject to emotional movement and display an astounding susceptibility for mass action. The call of a few fanatics claiming invulnerability, an order of an unpopular government, or the propaganda of immature youth have proved sufficient to stir up a movement before the formidableness of which the most powerful and aggressive Foreign Powers have surrendered.

"When, in the last years of the Tsing Dynasty, we were forced to establish ourselves in Tokyo," said Dr. Sun Yat-sen at the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Kuomintang on March 6th, 1921, at Canton, "we determined upon the following as the fundamental principles of our party : Nationalism, Democracy and Socialism.† Words which have the same sense can be found in China : I have translated them 'Nationalism, Democracy and Socialism.'‡ A government of the people, elected by the people and for the people. . . ."

These were the three principles, the San Min Chu I, with which Dr. Sun Yat-sen thought to replace the ancient Chinese political ideology and rejuvenate the decrepit body of China, and which were neither understood nor appreciated by the mass of the Chinese people, although, perhaps, they ensured the unification of China and enabled her to assume the mission of setting free peoples suffering from unjust treatment and the foreign yoke.§

The following is a brief summary of these principles enunciated in his programme speech, which contributed so largely to the popularity of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and which it is impossible, in a work of this nature, to quote fully :—

"Chinese citizens must participate in the government of their country and exercise the privilege of election of representatives to the legislative and administrative bodies. They must enjoy the right to recall officials elected by them, and of their dismissal at their will ; the right of referendum if the legislative body passes a law contrary to their wishes ; and the

* Same—"Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary," *op. cit.*, p. 128.

† *Ibid.*, p. 226.

‡ *Ibid.*, pp. 227 and 229.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 230.

right of initiative: any citizen may propose a law, to be carried and adopted by the legislative bodies.*

"All lands, means of production and products must be proportionately distributed amongst them. Land and capital must be socialized.† The more important branches of commerce and industry, such as mining, shipping, railways, etc., must be State-owned. ‡

"The constitution of this ideal state must strictly conform to the specific Chinese system of government, which has proved in the course of thousands of years to be perfectly adapted to the peculiarities of the Chinese character. It should be 'five-fold.' It must include two additional powers or authorities—power of punishment and power of examination of officials—besides the three—legislative, judicial and administrative—found in the constitutions of Europe and America. §

"All five independent from each other, but all five mutually controlling and completing each other." ¶

No detailed examination is necessary of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's political and social theories in which he fanatically believed and which attained completeness only in 1924. They may

* *Ibid.*, p. 230.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 231 and 233.


‡ *Ibid.*, pp. 235 and 236. In respect to the methods of socialization of the means of production and capital, Dr. Sun Yat-sen did not give any definite outline in his programme speech of March 6th, 1921. He stated only "that the degree of sacrifice required for the social revolution will be higher than for the political. The Revolution of 1911 and the overthrow of the Manchus only partially realized the principle of Nationalism, while neither the theory of Democracy nor the theory of Socialism left any impression (*Ibid.*, p. 236). This blank space in his doctrine of "The Three Principles" was, as we will see later, filled in during the following years.—AUTHOR.

§ *Ibid.*, pp. 239-254.

¶ In his programme Dr. Sun Yat-sen gave a graphic representation of the "State Machine," for the sake of introduction of which he fought all his life and which we reproduce below:—

THE STATE MACHINE

People's Conference (every electoral district has one delegate).



be perfect and they may be bad, but in the history of Chinese political thought they have opened a new era, which is known in China as "Sun Yat-senism."

The Three Principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen were the first attempt to set against the subconscious historical process of the disintegration of China, and her re-unification under the power of a single man in the North, an organized political ideology and system capable to dispel the political and social disharmony caused by the Revolution. It was the result of his protracted and concentrated labours, the fruit exclusively of his work,* which he recommended to the first Senate in Nanking in 1912 and to the Parliament at Canton in 1921 without success.† Both shrank from it as a Utopia capable of ruining China.

The cause of the failure of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's political and social scheme, and the complete estrangement from him of the Chinese masses, should be sought in the psychology of the Chinese people: perhaps in the theory which has reigned over the minds of Chinese scholars and, through them, over the masses of Chinese people since the days of the Emperor Wu-Ting of the Shan Dynasty,‡ when the famous philosopher Fu Kueh first expressed it: "Knowledge is easy, but action is difficult."

This maxim, which has taken root so deeply in the minds of the Chinese people that now it is difficult to tear it out, was an enemy a thousand times more powerful than the authority of the Manchu Dynasty.§ It crushed all his schemes for the reconstruction of China. It has poisoned the minds of the four hundred millions of Chinese, making them incapable of any resolute action¶ to carry China out of the *impassé* into which she was thrown by the events of 1911-1921.||

China has never known the natural longing for liberty. Her people have never suffered from lack of personal liberty, even in the darkest times of China's monarchism, || and the watchwords of the European revolutions—Liberty, Equality and Fraternity—have no sense in China.** She has had no opportunity to develop real *nationalism*; there has never been occasion for the Chinese nation to develop the spirit of sacrifice;

* *Ibid.*, p. 239.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 252 and 254.

‡ 1720-1691 B.C.

§ *Ibid.*, pp. 7, 8, 117.

¶ *Ibid.*, pp. 15-100.

|| Dr. Sun Yat-sen: "San Min Chu I," *op. cit.*, pp. 5 and 14.

** *Ibid.*, p. 189.

the unity of the Chinese people has stopped short at the clan, and has not extended to the nation.* It was a fatal mistake that in 1911 the Chinese attempted to copy Western revolutions and to apply the highest political philosophy and the newest political theories of the West, for this caused the failure of the early efforts of the Chinese democracy.†

But all this was nothing in comparison to that formidable enemy of any progress, of any constructive idea—the all-embracing poverty in the grip of which China was suffocating—to conquer which there was only one remedy—an appeal to the Foreign Powers—even if the majority of the Chinese could not understand the benefits of international co-operation. ‡

After the declaration of the Armistice in 1918 Dr. Sun Yat-sen was deeply absorbed with the idea of industrial development in China with the assistance of foreign capital.§ According to his confession, in this idea he was prompted by the desire to contribute his humble part in the realization of world peace and the salvation of China. In his belief, China—a country possessing a territory of 4,289,000 square miles, a population of about 400 millions of people, and the richest mineral and agricultural resources in the world—was a greater bone of contention than the Balkan Peninsula. And, unless the Chinese question could be settled peacefully, another war, greater and more terrible than the one just past, would be inevitable. He suggested that the vast natural resources of China should be developed internationally, under a socialistic scheme, for the good of the world and China.¶

It was a grandiose scheme, which practically would have converted China into an unlimited market for the whole world, into a field for the application of the world's capital

* *Ibid.*, pp. 5 and 14.

† *Ibid.*, p. 284.

‡ *Ibid.*, pp. 202 and 207.

§ Dr. Sun Yat-sen: "Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary," *op. cit.*, p. 167.

¶ Same: "International Development of China," Preface.

¶ In order to give some idea of the magnitude of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's scheme of China's industrialization, it suffices to point out that it embodied the construction of 100,000 miles of railways, 1,000,000 miles of macadam roads, the improvement and construction of new canals, river conservancy, the development and construction of commercial harbours, including three large ocean ports "with a future capacity equalling New York harbour," modern cities with public utilities in all railway centres, termini and along-side harbours; waterpower development; iron and steel and cement works on the largest scale in Mongolia and Sinkiang; reforestation in Central and North China; colonization in Manchuria, Mongolia, Sinkiang, Kokonor, and Tibet, etc.—AUTHOR.

invested in warlike industries and now, after the conclusion of peace, released for peaceful purposes.* Thousands of foreign experts and engineers had to be invited, and gigantic methods had to be adopted to transform China into the source of general blessing and happiness.

The properties and values thus created would be State-owned and would be managed for the benefit of the whole nation. The construction and the operation of each of these national undertakings, until its capital and interest were fully repaid, would be managed and supervised by foreigners under Chinese employment. As one of their obligations, these foreign experts had to undertake the training of Chinese assistants to replace them in the future.†

It was the boldest scheme ever conceived and advocated by a Chinese: to surrender China with all its natural resources to international capitalists. It was a most daring idea to mortgage a nation, which could not tolerate the thought of any superior power nor allow others to correct its mistakes, and its ancient culture to modern Western Science! It was, indeed, a Utopia in which nobody seriously believed except its author, who had outgrown the prejudices of his people. Nevertheless, it left a very deep impression upon the whole policy of the Canton Government, led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, forcing it to recognize "the rights and interests legitimately secured by Foreign Powers" through treaty or agreements,‡ and to pledge itself "to open up, with the object of supplying the demands of these Powers, which have been impoverished since the Great War, the natural resources throughout the country."§

Dr. Sun Yat-sen's defeat in Canton was inevitable, for, if he succeeded in winning the sympathy of a few Chinese idealists and some foreigners,¶ he failed to reach the hearts of China's masters—the masses of destitute Chinese who imbibed with the milk of their mothers hatred against the foreigners and from their Sages the theory of the famous philosopher, Fu Kueh, that "knowledge is easy, but action is difficult."

* *Ibid.*, pp. 5-8.

† *Ibid.*, p. 11.

‡ Dr. Sun Yat-sen: Declaration, May 5th, 1921; Same to Foreign Powers (through Reuter), August 17th, 1922.

§ Dr. Sun Yat-sen: "International Development of China," *op. cit.*, p. 11.

¶ P. S. Reinsch, U.S. Minister to China, to Dr. Sun Yat-sen, March 1919; W. C. Redfield, U.S. Secretary of Commerce, to same, May 12th, 1919; General Cavaglia, Italian Minister of War, to same, May 17th, 1919.

At the time of the collapse of the Southern Government in July 1922 the most active section of the Cantonese population presented a highly organized body of labour, the power of which was capable to stop, at the order of its leaders, the overseas trade between the Orient and the Occident. It was capable of paralyzing completely the life of its major clearing-house—Hongkong, the outpost of Great Britain's might in the Far East—and to stop the enormous traffic between Hongkong and South China, French Indo-China, Siam, the Straits, the Dutch Indies, the Philippines, and Japan.

In order to appreciate the extent of the Hongkong Seamen's and General Strike, which started on January 13, 1922, and resulted in the general exodus of all Chinese workers from Hongkong, and which was settled with the greatest difficulty through the negotiations of the Hongkong Authorities and the Canton Government on March 5, it is sufficient to point out that on February 24 there were tied up in Hongkong harbour by the strike 160 vessels, representing 200,367 tons of shipping. The total amount of tonnage tied up in other Chinese and foreign ports exceeded 1,000,000 tons, belonging to fifty shipping concerns.* There was no maritime nation which did not feel the power of the awakened Chinese masses led by Canton and from Canton.† It was an elementary wave which not only affected the foreigners, but also caught and carried along with it the Canton Government.‡ Over twenty thousand people starved for two months without a murmur, fighting the hated foreigners for the

* "North-China Herald," March 4th, 1922.

† Chinese officials replying to direct questions insisted that the strike was spontaneous with the seamen and that the causes and continual inspiration of it throughout were economic. However, from the very beginning of the strike to the end it was generally known both in Hongkong and Canton that the seat of authority was Canton. Throughout all negotiations subsequent to the commencement of the strike no proposition made by the ship-owners was ever discussed until the delegates had either gone to Canton or had had time to send a message and receive a reply from Canton.—AUTHOR.

‡ On February 27th the State Council of the Canton Government decided to abrogate Art. 224 and other sub-sections in Chapter XVI of the Chinese Provisional Code, providing penalties for persons on strike. The leaders of the strike were hailed as national heroes, not only by the workers, but also by the Canton Government. On May 5th, 1922, by special order of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, Chen Ping-san, otherwise P. S. Chan, the president and one of the chief organizers of the Chinese Seamen's Union in 1921, who was sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment for the murder of his wife, was pardoned and liberated. On the date of his emerging from gaol thousands of labourers paraded through the streets of Canton enthusiastically cheering him and his generous liberator.—AUTHOR.

sake of a few bowls of rice and the right to be treated as human beings.*

In the light of subsequent events it appeared that this was all done by a small group of strangers from the land known to the common Chinese people as "the Hwa Kua land," who cast away the intricacies of constitutionalist thought and fearfully declared that neither Patriotism nor Nationalism were essential for the creation of the new China.†

The hatred of foreigners was just as useful as any other impetus to drive the foreigners into the sea and become rich. They said to the Chinese people: "You are poor; here is wealth." They pointed to the great flourishing foreign concessions, the large foreign emporiums, factories and ships, the rich residences of foreign merchants and foreign officials of the Chinese Government.

As a matter of fact, the first words which the newly-established Council of People's Commissaries of the then Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (now the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics) addressed to the Chinese People over the heads of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Governments of North and South China contained the solemn announcement that "the Soviet Government returns to the Chinese people, without demanding any kind of compensation, the Chinese Eastern Railway, as well as all the mining concessions, gold mines and all other things which were seized from them by the Governments of the Tzars, that of Kerensky and their brigand-generals."‡

It was a magnificent grant worth many hundreds of millions of taels to a destitute nation and bankrupt governments, accompanied by a promise of cancellation of the Peking Protocol, 1901, all agreements between Russia and Japan since

* H.B.M.'s Consul-General at Canton to the Hongkong Government, January 27th, 1922.

According to this despatch, the Seamen's Union's offer for the settlement of the strike was as follows:—(1) that a 40 per cent. increase should be given to all hands receiving less than M.\$15 as wages; a 30 per cent. increase to those receiving under M.\$25, and 20 per cent. increase to those whose wages were over M.\$25; (2) that an arbitration board should be established at Canton, consisting of representatives of the Canton and Hongkong Governments, H.B.M.'s Consul-General at Canton, of European and Chinese ship-owners, and of the Chinese seamen; (3) that no striker should be punished after a settlement was reached.—AURIOR.

† Declaration of the Canton Branch of Chinese Communist Party, February 27th, 1922.

‡ Declaration of the Council of the People's Commissaries of the R.S.F.S.R., July 25th, 1919.

1907, and the return of all factories and concessions owned by Russians in China.*

But the Russian manifesto went farther. It stated that "if the Chinese people, following the example of the Russian people, wish to become free and to avoid the fate reserved for them by the Allies at Versailles in their object of making China into a second Korea or another India, the Chinese people should understand that they have no other ally or brother in their struggle for liberty except the Russian peasants and workmen and their Red Army."† It was a master stroke, for it reached the very heart of the Chinese people; ‡ and, though the Peking Government refused at first to admit the emissaries of the new Russian Government into China, § and issued strict orders for the suppression of socialistic propaganda, ¶ its firmness was very soon shaken by public enthusiasm. || The diplomatic representatives of the Far Eastern Republic were admitted, and on September 10, 1920, they were received in official audience by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. A Chinese military and diplomatic mission, headed by General Chang Hsi-ling, proceeded to Moscow, where it entered into informal negotiations concerning the resumption of political and trade relations on the basis of previous declarations.**

The suspension of the recognition of the Russian Minister and Consuls by the Presidential Mandate of September 23, 1920, which was tantamount to the abolition of Russian extraterritoriality, should largely be attributed to the influence of the Soviet offers, although it was strenuously denied by the Peking Government. †† The dangers of the subversive doctrines of the new social order in Russia, which seriously disquieted the Foreign Powers, ‡‡ seemed to be too remote to

* L. Karakhan, acting for the Commission of Foreign Affairs of the R.S.F.S.R., to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Governments of North and South China, and the Chinese People, March 26th and September 27th, 1920.

† *Ibid.*

‡ The National Organizations' Union to the R.S.F.S.R., April 11th, 1920; the Shanghai Chinese Journalists' Association, April 17th, 1920.

§ Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Diplomatic Delegation of the Far Eastern Republic, Kiachta, July 1st, 1920.

¶ Joint order of the Cabinet, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Communications, and the Waichiaopu, May 6th, 1920.

|| Chinese Government *Communiqué*, September 6th, 1920.

** Memorandum of the R.S.F.S.R., October 2nd, 1920.

†† Statement of Dr. Wellington Koo, Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the U.S. Government's informal enquiry, October 3rd, 1920.

‡‡ Statement of Baron Hayashi, the Japanese Ambassador in London, "Daily Telegraph," October 16th, 1920.

stop the Peking Government from an attempt to grasp this opportunity and re-establish its lost popularity.*

Still greater was the effect upon the minds of the radical elements in the Southern Government of the primitive methods of winning the sympathy of the Chinese masses used by the Soviets. The ultra-socialistic theories, in the interpretation of Moscow, formed a logical sequel to the politico-economic ideas of the spiritual leaders of Chinese Nationalism and the programme of the Kuomintang. They formed a bridge between them and the masses, flung over the precipice of mutual incomprehension.

On January 25, 1921, the Southern Government welcomed the first diplomatic delegation of Soviet Russia at Canton, and on March 28 the Chinese press published the outline of an agreement said to have been concluded between Canton and the Soviets. According to this agreement, each Government agreed to recognize the other as a *de jure* government in their respective territories. Commercial intercourse between the two countries was resumed, and Canton undertook to permit the free propaganda of Communism in the territory under its jurisdiction and in China in general, while the Soviets pledged themselves to assist it financially whenever it desired such financial aid.†

The subsequent political events in the North, which embarrassed to a very considerable extent the relations between Peking and Moscow, did not seriously affect the intimacy of the Southern Government with Moscow. Being entirely absorbed by the acute inter-factional struggle in the South and the anti-Northern punitive expedition, the Canton Government regarded the occupation of Mongolia by the Red troops with the utmost indifference.‡

* Statement of Dr. Wellington Koo, *op. cit.*

† The conclusion of this agreement published by the Chinese press in Shanghai had strenuously been denied by the Kuomintang, particularly in respect to the clause providing the obligation on the part of the Canton Government to help in spreading communistic ideas in China, but the following political events and documents relating to 1922-1927 proved conclusively the existence of some kind of agreement concerning this point.

"The Three Principles inspired the people with a political ideal; the denunciation of unequal treaties released a latent force in the hearts of the people nurtured by the inarticulate desires of many years, and the alliance with Russia determined a method of procedure for the disentanglement of China's complex diplomatic problems," says L. T. Chen, Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Chinese biographer.—Preface to Dr. Sun Yat-sen's "San Min Chu I," *op. cit.*—AUTHOR.

‡ Joint Statement of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and A. A. Joffe, Envoy Extraordinary of the U.S.S.R., January 26th, 1923.

This strategical move on the part of the Soviets followed the complete rout of the Russian anti-communistic forces led by the notorious Baron Ungern von Sternberg, who, in his turn, in the Spring of 1921 had forced the Chinese garrisons in Urga to evacuate Mongolia.*

In spite of the assurance of the Soviets that "by taking arms against Baron Ungern the Soviet Government confirms its friendly relations with its neighbour, China," † and that "the presence of the Soviet troops in Urga was of a temporary nature," ‡ the occupation of Urga caused a great deal of anxiety in Peking, § which had no actual force to insist on the evacuation of the Red troops from Mongolia. ¶

The attitude of the Soviets appeared to be still more uncompromising in respect to the Chinese Eastern Railway and other points as soon as the Peking Government approached

* Following the Russian Revolution in 1917, the Peking Government took steps to reassert its authority over Outer Mongolia, lost in consequence of the Chinese Revolution, 1911. It cancelled the so-called Tripartite Treaty of 1915, which assured the autonomous status of the Mongols under nominal Chinese suzerainty and virtual protectorate of Russia. In October 1919 General Hsu Shu-tseng, "Little Hsu," the then Defence Commissioner of the North-Western Frontier, occupied Urga and forced the Mongols to abrogate their autonomy. In October 1920 Urga was attacked by strong forces of Baron Ungern von Sternberg, one of the leaders of the anti-communistic movement in Eastern Siberia. The attack was repulsed, but the Chinese availed themselves of it as a pretext to plunder the foreign population, mostly Russians, while the Soviet Government hastily organized a "People's Revolutionary Government of Mongolia" in Transbaikalia and ordered the despatch of Red troops. However, upon the failure of Baron Ungern's first attack, this order was rescinded. On February 3rd, 1921, Baron Ungern, after severe fighting which lasted two days, occupied Urga, completely routing the Chinese garrison. A Mongolian independence was proclaimed, and in May 1921 a triumphal coronation of the Hutuchtu, the Living Buddha, was celebrated. In June 1921 Ungern was defeated by the Soviet troops, which on July 6th occupied Urga and immediately organized the "Mongolian People's Revolutionary Government," which signed a treaty with Moscow on November 8th, 1921. According to this treaty the Soviet Government recognized the independent status of Mongolia and pledged itself to assist the newly-formed Government financially and otherwise.—AUTHOR.

† M. Chicherin, Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the R.S.F.S.R., to the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, November 11th, 1920; June 22nd, 1921.

‡ Statement of M. Paikes, R.S.F.S.R. Envoy Extraordinary to China, December 22nd, 1921.

§ Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to same, May 1st, 1922.

¶ Subsequent to the reconstruction of the Government, after the defeat of the Anfuites and dismissal of General Hsu Shu-tseng, "Little Hsu," the Peking Government entrusted the task of recovering Mongolia to General Chang Tso-lin, who in May 1921 was appointed High Commissioner for Mongolia. The latter enabled him to obtain funds and arms, which he used for consolidation of his position in Manchuria and for the campaign against Peking in 1922, whilst the proposed Mongolian expedition, which did not promise immediate advantage, was from year to year delayed until, in 1924, it was finally abandoned.—AUTHOR.

the question of realization of the original Soviet overtures.* The diplomatic friction, however, escaped the attention of the Chinese public at large, and the arrival at Peking of the newly-appointed Soviet envoy, A. A. Joffe, was hailed in some quarters as an event of paramount importance in Chinese history.†

The public speeches of the Soviet representative charmed the ears of his listeners. For the first time in the whole history of China's intercourse with Western Powers the Chinese had an opportunity of listening to a representative of a Great Power in his official capacity denouncing the policy of other Foreign Powers as imperialistic, tending to render China, without a strong army, divided, weak, entangled in internal difficulties, and thus incapable of resisting external aggression. The impression was still greater as the orations were made in the Legation compound in Peking, in the immediate neighbourhood of Foreign Ministers, representing most powerful nations, whose slightest wish the Chinese Government was accustomed to regard as almost an order. And what was by far more strange, these harangues did not arouse a single protest on the part of the Ministers whose actions were denounced in no uncertain terms. Was this the result of political and social weakness in Europe and Japan and complete indifference on the part of America to the fate of her interests in China? Was it not the direct result of the general fear of the political and social doctrines which the newly-established régime in Russia carried along with it and the spread of which the Great Powers were unable to suppress in their own territories? These questions were answered by the Chinese in the affirmative.

In effect, the period of 1921-1923 was marked by an unchecked increase of communistic propaganda in China in general, and in the South of China and the Treaty Ports in

* Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to A. A. Joffe, R.S.F.S.R. Envoy Extraordinary to China, November 11th, 1922.

† Dr. Tsai Yuan-pei, the Chancellor of the National University at Peking, at a banquet welcoming A. A. Joffe, August 1922, declared as follows: "Since the penetration of European thought into China a process of social, economic and political changes has developed in this country. The Chinese Revolution was a political one. Now it is tending towards a social revolution. Russia furnished a good example to China, which thinks it advisable to learn the lessons of the Russian Revolution, which started also as a political movement but later assumed the nature of a social revolution."

particular.* The communist ideas merged into one feeling—hatred of the foreigners—and anti-foreignism became more than ever the synonym of patriotism. “One of the greatest dangers in the past to the political independence and territorial integrity of China has been removed with the rise of Soviet Russia,” declared Dr. Sun Yat-sen.† The destructive tendencies of the political and social doctrines spread by Soviet Russia did not frighten Dr. Sun Yat-sen. They were directed against the mode of life of the Chinese people, their obsolete beliefs and customs, which were the main obstacles to his scheme of China’s restoration. He was convinced that much of the current criticism of Russian communism and the communists was unduly emotional and not a little lacking in knowledge. ‡ He would have probably gone further and recognized the necessity of a social revolution in China and the dictatorship of the Kuomintang, as he was inevitably led to do two years later, but the situation dictated a policy of extreme caution. §

At the beginning of January 1923 the negotiations between the representatives of Moscow and Peking came to an abrupt end. Both parties saw clearly the futility of further conferences, and Mr. Joffe, the Plenipotentiary Envoy of the Soviets, who had been very seriously ill since September 1922, departed for Shanghai, where he arrived on January 18 *en route* to Japan, whither he had been invited to proceed by Viscount Goto, one of the leading advocates of a Russo-Japanese *rapprochement*.

While in Shanghai Mr. Joffe, despite his sickness, conferred daily with Dr. Sun Yat-sen. The subject of these conferences remains up to the present time undisclosed. Upon Mr. Joffe’s departure for Japan a joint statement was issued, signed both by Dr. Sun Yat-sen and the Soviet Envoy, which

* Shanghai Municipal Council’s Annual Report, 1921, p. 61-A. On June 8th, 1922, the Police of the International Settlement in Shanghai succeeded in locating the headquarters of a number of societies, such as the Non-Christian Students’ League, the Marx Literature Research Society, the Young Men’s Socialist Society, etc. The rooms contained a library of 388 volumes, in Chinese, Japanese, English, French and German, of a nature in keeping with the extremism suggested by the names of the organizations to which they belonged. Handbills attacking capitalism and Christianity—its handmaid—were also found.—Police Commissioner’s Annual Report, 1922.—Shanghai Municipal Council’s Report, 1922, p. 77-A.

† Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s Statement to the Press, September 30th, 1920.—“North-China Herald,” October 7th, 1922.

‡ Same to the “North-China Daily News,” *ibid.*, November 4th, 1922.
§ *Ibid.*

said that the conferences of the two revealed the identity of their views on matters relating to Sino-Russian relations ; that the communistic order and the Soviet system could not be introduced into China because there did not exist there the conditions for the successful establishment of either communism or Sovietism, and that China's paramount and most pressing problem was to achieve national unification and full national independence, in which task China could count on the support of Russia.*

Mr. Joffe parted from Dr. Sun Yat-sen on the most cordial and friendly terms. He promised that on returning from Japan he would visit South China before finally returning to Peking. The latter was not, however, destined to happen. After unsuccessful medical treatment in Japan, and still less successful informal negotiations with the Japanese politicians, which occasioned no little uneasiness at Peking, where it was feared that he might conclude an agreement inimical to China's interests, he was recalled to Moscow just, at the moment when Dr. Sun Yat-sen's political star was once more in the ascendant.

Ever since his expulsion from Canton in August 1922 efforts were made to oust General Chen Chiung-ming and regain Kwangtung for the Kuomintang. After the collapse of the Northern expedition the troops of Dr. Sun Yat-sen were scattered throughout the Southern provinces, and in many places formed independent groups, some of which attained very considerable strength. The best-known amongst them were the group of Kwangsi troops, under the command of General Shen Hung-yin, and the Yunnanese group. Both were attached to no political party and did not recognize any political leader except their immediate commanders who provided them with means of existence by robbery, loot and extortion.

In the Autumn of 1922 these troops advanced towards the Kwangtung-Kwangsi border, where they combined together for an attack upon Canton. It was stated that in this movement they were prompted by the financial help of General Wu Pei-fu, who hoped, first, to exterminate, with the assistance of Shen Hung-yin, Dr. Sun Yat-sen's party, and later, having failed to come to an agreement with General Chen Chiung-ming, directed them against the latter as another cause of Southern autonomy. Very probably, however, the Kwangsi

* Joint Statement of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and A. A. Joffe, January 26th, 1923.

men and the Yunnanese were attracted to Canton by the opportunity of new and rich loot.

The attack of the Kwangsi and Yunnanese troops on Canton coincided with the movement of General Hsu Chung-shih, a military supporter of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who in November 1922 succeeded, with the remnants of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's anti-Northern expeditionary army, in occupying a part of the province of Fukien.*

On January 6, 1923, the forces of Kwangsi men and the Yunnanese captured Wuchow, advanced rapidly to Sanshui, and thence to Canton. On January 15 General Chen Chiung-ming left Canton for Waichow, his native place, while other high officials of his government fled to Shameen, the foreign settlement near Canton. The city was left without a responsible government in the hands of a few troops and the Southern Division of the Chinese Navy, which covered the retreat.

Chen Chiung-ming was not defeated in battle. His fall was solely due to the very simple fact that the slogan "*Canton for the Cantonese*," which he proclaimed and which seemed to be very popular with the population of Kwangtung, was not appreciated by the military commanders who surrounded him.

In driving out Dr. Sun Yat-sen from Canton these chieftains thought that they were fighting their way to promotion, to new lucrative posts and honours. But they were sorely disappointed when Chen Chiung-ming, as one of his first acts, abolished all military posts and established instead only one known as the "Tz Hui Kuan." By this arrangement all military commanders, whether old or new, high or low, were placed on an equal footing and directly subordinated to Chen Chiung-ming.

The much-coveted self-government also proved to be a failure. It was impossible to expect under prevalent circum-

* The Fukien people are the least warlike in South China and have few, if any, armed forces of their own. They offer no resistance to marauding bands of soldiers or bandits from other provinces, but provide a rich field for the armed adventurer. Several factions are always contending for the political control of the province, and in addition to these there are always forces moving about which represent no policy or faction but are looking for fields of exploitation.—China Year Book, 1924, p. 917.

In the fall of 1922 Fukien became the arena of a large conspiracy headed by the notorious Anfu General, Hsu Shu-tseng, "Little Hsu," owing to which the Tuchun of Fukien, Li Hou-chi, a former Anfuite who deserted this party and joined Wu Pei-fu, was forced to flee to Formosa. The subsequent interregnum enabled General Hsu Chung-chih and his "People's Army" to convert the province into his base against General Chen Chiung-ming.—AUTHOR.

stances of a practical military occupation and complete demoralization of the population by the ten years' civil war that the elections would be a success. Only a very insignificant part of the population attended the polls. The magistrates and other officials elected belonged to the worst elements, and their methods of "squeeze" were unrivalled. The provincial treasury was empty. The numerous soldiery, which there were no means to disband, was paid in worthless notes of the Provincial Bank.* The depreciation of these notes proceeded very rapidly. Nobody willingly accepted them, and the Government, animated by the best intentions, but without funds or active popular support, collapsed under the onslaught of hordes of mercenaries led into Kwangtung by rival political parties.†

The position of Dr. Sun Yat-sen was hardly better than that of his fallen enemy when, on February 21, he arrived in Canton, following the advice of his partizans to grasp the opportunity to establish a new Kuomintang Government. The encouraging statements issued in his name‡ could not screen the actual state of affairs, which were in a perilous predicament between three rival military forces—the Cantonese of General Hsu Tsung-chih, Kwangsi men, and Yunnanese—none of whom was inclined to recognize his authority. A number of his trusted followers appointed by him to various posts were turned out by the unruly soldiery and narrowly escaped with their lives.§ For a time he himself was virtually a refugee, being compelled to live on an island in the Pearl River, supported only by an insignificant group of General Hsu Tsung-chih's troops. The situation was further aggravated by the fact that Peking did not want to recognize the failure of its reunification plans and proceeded to appoint its own men to various posts in the South.¶

Under these circumstances it was a gigantic task to establish any semblance of authority, and, we must admit, it would have been a hopeless task had not Dr. Sun Yat-sen been

* "North-China Herald," February 10th, 1923.

† The Provincial Assembly at Canton to Tang Shao-yi and others, January 9th, 1923.

‡ Statement of Dr. Sun Yat-sen to the Press, April 1st, 1923.

§ Hu Han-min, Civil Governor of Canton and intimate friend of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, narrowly escaped execution at the hands of the Kwangsi troops. He was saved by the intervention of a Yunnanese General and fled to Shameen. Many other Kuomintang leaders, who came with him, followed him, while General Wei Pang-ping was kept for several months in prison.—AUTHOR.

¶ Presidential Mandate, March 20th, 1923.

backed by organized labour.* Since the Hongkong seamen's strike, its influence penetrated invisibly all phases of Cantonese life.

Early in the morning of April 16 the Kwangsi troops, led by General Sheng Hung-yin, appointed by the Peking Tuli of Kwangtung in defiance of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's authority, made a sudden attack on the Yunnanese forces. This attack was the continuation of General Wu Pei-fu's scheme to crush the Southern autonomy at any cost. It started with the movement of Kwangsi troops against General Chen Chiung-ming and was now turned against the Yunnanese.

The Kwangsi troops suffered a reverse; on May 17th Pai Yun Shan (White Cloud Mountain, a height commanding Canton) was captured by the Yunnanese and Dr. Sun Yat-sen's loyal troops. Of the Kwangsi men some surrendered, and others fled from Canton, pursued by the victors.

But the stability of the new régime was not based on this military success. The operations against General Chen Chiung-ming continued for many months with changing fortune. In spite of a decisive defeat at Sheklung, he still held a good portion of eastern Kwangtung,† while his new ally, Shen Hung-yin, occupied several towns in the northern part of the province. On the other hand, the Yunnanese who seemed to support Dr. Sun Yat-sen were far from being reliable. ‡ Only bodies of Hunanese troops recalled from Hunan late in the Spring of 1923 by Dr. Sun Yat-sen prevented them from an attempt to establish their own government in Canton.

The successful consolidation of the Kuomintang's power was solely due to Dr. Sun Yat-sen's personal skilful policy of playing the rival military forces against each other, his re-

* "As concerns the labour movement in China," stated Mr. Borodin, the Soviet Trade Representative at Canton, October 30th, 1923, "I believe that the most important condition for its development lies in its alliance with the national struggle for the unification, freedom and independence of China. This can be attained by the success of the national struggle led by the Kuomintang Party."—Reuter in "North-China Herald," November 17th, 1923.

† Waichow, Swatow, Chaochou, etc.

‡ After months of determined but futile attempts to take Haichow, occupied by General Chen Chiung-ming, the leaders of the Yunnanese entered into secret negotiations with him. Through the intermediation of the Kiangsu Tuchun, Chih Hsieh-yuan, they agreed to receive M. \$400,000, and retreat to Canton. It was further arranged that Chen Chiung-ming's army had to follow them up without attacking and, after they had passed Canton, seize the city and round up Dr. Sun Yat-sen and his following. Chen Chiung-ming's troops were already within sight of Canton when, owing to a misunderstanding, they attacked the rearguard of the Yunnanese and were defeated by them on November 22nd at Sheklung.—AUTHOR.

solite actions in paying off the unruly soldiery, and, as we have stated, the steady support of the labourers.

In order to obtain the funds required for the disbandment of the troops, Dr. Sun Yat-sen undertook drastic measures, the edge of which was directed against the merchant class, the class of rich landowners,* and the foreigners. In this his actions assumed automatically the character of a highly patriotic policy, enthusiastically acclaimed by the population.

In spite of the most energetic but futile protests of the foreign Inspectors and H.B.M.'s Consul-General and Doyen of the Consular Body,† the administration of the Salt Gabelle was taken over from the foreign Inspectorate and placed in the hands of Chinese officials. The Consular Body was informed that the Southern Government could not tolerate any longer that "the Customs revenues are employed by the Northern militarists to make war against the Southwest."‡ The Diplomatic Body at Peking was again requested to hand over to the Southern Government the Cantonese share of the Customs surplus, and in December 1923, when it became known that the Foreign Powers had refused to entertain the Southern plea, § Dr. Sun Yat-sen issued a statement threatening to assume the administration of the Chinese Maritime Customs in the territory under his jurisdiction.

The whole of Canton was in excitement. Mass meetings, parades and a flood of anti-foreign propaganda set the city in motion. The presence of foreign men-of-war in the harbour and the threat of the Powers that any attempt to seize the Customs-house would be resisted by force added further impetus to the general commotion.

* He ordered the seizing and selling of property of which the owners could not show a title-deed dating from the Ming Dynasty, which was tantamount to sequestration of the majority of land properties in Kwangtung. He decreed the expropriation of the properties belonging to temples and monasteries and the reinstatement of opium and gambling monopolies. The landlords in Canton were required to contribute to the war-chest an amount equivalent to a month's rent from their tenants (this happened three times during 1923). The pawnshops were ordered to subscribe to the military loan and to contribute various sums from M.\$300 to M.\$500 under the security of revenue stamps, etc.—AUTHOR.

† Sir James W. Jamieson.

‡ Chao Chu-wu, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Generalissimo's headquarters, to Sir J. W. Jamieson, H.B.M.'s Consul-General and Senior Consul of Canton, September 5th, 1923; Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Statement to the Foreign Powers, December 7th, 1923.

§ W. J. Oudendijk, Netherlands Minister and Dean of the Diplomatic Body at Peking, to Sir J. W. Jamieson, December 12th, 1923.

"My Government is being threatened with acts of war by an international force of nearly a score of cruisers and gun-boats, and armed men have already been landed at Shameen," telegraphed Dr. Sun Yat-sen to Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, M.P.* "This is the work of the Diplomatic Body in Peking, taken at the instance of the British Minister on the advice of the Senior Consul at Canton, who is His Majesty's Consul-General, and the Inspector-General of the Chinese Maritime Customs, who is a British national. . . ."

We must admit that the sentiments expressed in this statement found not only deep response amongst the Chinese masses, but also amongst the merchants, who, as a matter of fact, displayed very little enthusiasm over the proposed measure.† Preparations were started to enforce the most rigid boycott of foreign goods, but the firmness and unanimity displayed by the Foreign Powers, and lack of support of the boycott movement shown in other parts of China, particularly in the Yangtze Valley, delayed the anti-foreign movement for two years, until the memorable days of June 1925.

The wave of popular enthusiasm raised by the events connected with the dispute over the Customs enabled Dr. Sun Yat-sen to consolidate his uncertain position in Canton and to convoke a National Convention of the Kuomintang. This Convention was attended by over 200 delegates from all provinces, including representatives of Marshal Chang Tso-lin and Mr. M. Borodin, the representative of Soviet Russia. It definitely expressed itself in favour of the immediate formation of a "Consolidated Government of China" in Canton. The idea of reconvoation of the old Parliament, some two hundred of the members of which were by that time assembled at Canton, was peremptorily abandoned as having proved to be a complete failure in the past. But as far as the plan of the renewal of a triangular alliance between Canton, Mukden and Chekiang, ‡ and the immediate expedition for the subjugation of the North, were concerned, both were enthusiastically accepted. §

* December 21st, 1923.

† Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce, Chinese Bankers' Association, and Shanghai Native Bankers' Association to Sir F. Aglen, Commissioner-General of the Chinese Customs, December 29th, 1923; Chambers of Commerce of Hankow, Chinkiang, Changshu, Nantungchow, and Yangchow, to same.—"North-China Herald," January 12th, 1924.

‡ Statement of Dr. Sun Yat-sen to the "Eastern News," January 7th, 1924.

§ It will be remembered that the Province of Chekiang was the feudal domain of General Lu Yung-hsiang, an old friend of the Anfuites and Dr. Sun Yat-sen.—AUTHOR.

The wrath of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang was only indirectly turned against ex-President Li Yuan-hung, who was invited to accept the post of President *ad interim*. It was directed against the leaders of the Chihli party, Generals Tsao-kun and Wu Pei-fu, who arbitrarily appointed him President. According to his own statement, the appointment of President Li Yuan-hung was opposed by him only on the ground that the new President was "a puppet" whose incumbency would lead to "a more calamitous cycle of events than that originated by the election and international recognition of the former President, Hsu Shih-chang."* No Chinese treated in earnest the high-sounding mandates of Li Yuan-hung concerning the wholesale disbandment of troops and abolition of military tuchunates,† the promulgation of which has long ago become an infallible perquisite of every new Presidency.

The old Parliament was formally reopened in Peking on August 1, 1922, but since then not one serious piece of work, scarcely even a serious proposal, could be placed to its credit. It met at intervals, being entirely absorbed by inter-factional intrigues and competition for ministerial appointments. Neither of the new Cabinets could survive for a sufficient period of time to enable it to function successfully.‡ Each of them either became the victim of intrigues in Parliament or met the opposition of the military clique, forcing it to resign.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen's scheme for the reconstruction of the central authority, after the departure of President Hsu Shih-chang from Peking, was to reinstate the Anfu Club. He proposed to appoint Marshal Tuan Chi-jui, the former Anfu Premier, Director of Affairs in Peking, retaining the title and the post of the President for himself. This proposal was

* Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Manifesto to Foreign Powers, June 6th, 1922.

† Presidential Mandates, June 16th and 30th, 1923.

‡ Upon arriving in Peking on June 11th, 1922, President Li Yuan-hung sounded Dr. Wu Ting-fang, the veteran Foreign Minister of the Southern Government, then still alive, as to his accepting the Premiership, but without success. The plan to appoint another constitutional leader, Tang Shao-yi, also failed. Only on September 19th Dr. Wang Chung-hui, the well-known jurist, a man equally acceptable or obnoxious to all parties, as being identified with none, succeeded in forming a Cabinet, which probably was the best that the Republic has ever had. It included such gifted personages as Dr. Wellington Koo, Foreign Minister, and Lo Wen-kan, Minister of Finance. However, three months later this Cabinet was forced to resign in view of the arrest of Lo Wen-kan on a fictitious charge of speculation preferred against him by the clique of General Tsao Kun with the overthrowing of the Cabinet and putting in a new Premier favourable to Tsao Kun as President of the Republic.—AUTHOR.

communicated to General Hsu Shu-tseng, "Little Hsu," but the latter declined to take any part in the scheme.*

This failure did not discourage Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Whilst still in Shanghai he entered into new negotiations with Premier Chang Shao-tseng with a view to establishing peace between South and North. He urged President Li Yuan-hung and the Northern leaders to undertake an immediate disbandment of half of the existing troops and the formation of a labour corps from those disbanded,† and promised his entire collaboration in the reunification of the country.‡ But all his overtures were very coldly received in Peking.§

It was a very elaborate scheme to alienate President Li Yuan-hung from one of his ardent supporters, General Wu Pei-fu, in which Dr. Sun Yat-sen took part, and which aimed at the ultimate overthrow of both. The threads of this conspiracy daintily entwined with another plot which had in view to pave the road to the presidency for the Tientsin war-lord, Tsao Kun. But General Wu Pei-fu's influence and his popularity held them both for the time being in check. He insisted on the appointment of General Shen Hung-yin, the Commander of Kwangsi forces acting against General Chen Chiung-ming, Inspector-General of Kwangtung, and General Sun Chuan-fang, Tuli of Fukien, persisting that the only way to China's reunification was the continuation of an armed struggle against the Southern Separatists. His personal loyalty to President Li Yuan-hung was not shaken by the latter's pusillanimous and provocative actions,¶ and resulted in the crisis of Chang Shao-tseng's Cabinet.||

However, the power of Wu Pei-fu was insufficient to eliminate entirely the subversive intrigues of his political friends and opponents, and the Cabinet of Chang Shao-tseng emerged safely from the crisis, whereby the following of General Tsao Kun was strengthened by the appointment of one of his

* Liao Ching-hai and Wang Ching-wei to General Hsu Shu-tseng, June 2nd, 1922; General Hsu Shu-tseng to same, June 8th, 1922.—"North-China Herald," July 5th, 1922.

† According to the estimate of Dr. Shurman, U.S. Minister at Peking, the total number of Chinese troops reached 1,250,000 men, of whom only about 10 per cent. were under the control of Peking.—Dr. Shurman's statement at the meeting of the American Association at Peking, February 21st, 1923.

‡ Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Manifesto to President Li Yuan-hung, January 27th, 1923.

§ General Chang Shao-tseng to Dr. Sun Yat-sen, February 1st, 1923.

¶ Presidential Mandate, January 1st, 1923.

|| Same, March 8th, 1923.

partisans as Minister of Foreign Affairs.* The informal negotiations regarding the reunification of North and South by peaceful means were resumed, but the "actual character of this peaceful reunification" was apparently well-known to General Wu Peifu, for he immediately proceeded to assemble the rolling-stock on the northern railways, mobilizing all his divisions to meet the possible attack of the Kuomintang-Fengtien-Anfu league.

The position of President Li Yuan-hung was less, and even dangerous as far as his personal safety was concerned. The Parliament, which had long since become an obedient tool in the hands of the war-lords and an integral part of the Chinese feudal system, was busily engaged in preparing for the Presidential election campaign to unseat Li Yuan-hung and put Tsao Kun upon the Presidential chair. The supporters of the latter, led by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Wu Ching-lien, did not scruple to resort to bribing the members of Parliament.

The Government was threatened with bankruptcy. The renewed negotiations with the Four Nation Group Banks concerning a loan secured on the salt revenue proceeded very slowly. Many departments, including the metropolitan gendarmerie and the Peking garrison commanded by General Feng Yung-hsiang, were left without pay for many months, and pressed for payment. Even ministers and consuls abroad were left without funds and threatened to resign *en bloc* and return to China, leaving her unrepresented in foreign countries just at the moment when the Chinese Government was involved in an acute controversy with France over the Gold Franc issue.†

* General Huang Fu.

† As the result of China's entry into the Great War, the payment of the annual instalments of the Boxer Indemnity was suspended for five years. The French Government proposed, when payments again fell due, to utilize the amounts payable to France for the rehabilitation of the Banque Industrielle de Chine, which was declared bankrupt in 1921, and for educational and other benevolent purposes. The Chinese Government accepted this proposal, and also the obligation to remit the balance of the indemnity in gold francs. However, early in 1923 a political agitation was started against payment in gold, and the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that, according to the letter of the protocol of 1901 and the subsequent arrangement of 1905, China was not required to pay in actual gold. The controversy resulted in France having delayed the ratification of the resolutions of the Washington Conference in regard to China and the Nine Powers Treaty of 1921-1922, using this as a means to force China to assent to her proposal.—A. de Fleuriau, French Minister to China, to the Chinese Premier, July 9th, 1922; same to Waichiaopu, July 9th, 1922; Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs to same, July 27th, 1922, February 10th, 1923; Joint Notes from the Powers Signatory to the Protocol, 1901, to the Chinese Government, February 24th, November 3rd, 1923, February 11th, 1924; Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Powers, December 27th, 1923.—AUTHOR.

with Japan over the abrogation of the Treaty of 1915,* and with other Powers over the famous Lincheng incident.†

The climax, however, was reached when the Cabinet, under the pressure of Tsao Kun's party, decided to replace the Collector of the Peking Octroi, an appointee of General Wu Pei-fu, who continued to support the President's office financially, with a nominee of General Feng Yu-hsiang, the Commanding General of the troops stationed at Peking. This meant that the President was left without resources enabling him to pay even his bodyguards, and it also meant that Feng Yu-hsiang, who only a few months ago was an adherent of Wu Pei-fu and supported the President, deserted them for General Tsao Kun.

The refusal of Li Yuan-hung to countersign this mandate was made the excuse for a Cabinet resignation and for a huge demonstration by Feng Yu-hsiang's soldiers, which heralded the President's downfall. His political opponents could take no definite measure against him without the assurance that

* In March 1923 the Chinese Government handed to the Japanese Government a Note informing the latter of the cancellation of the Treaty of 1915 (The Twenty-one Demands). The Japanese Government returned the Note, refusing to entertain it in any form or shape, which aroused a storm of indignation throughout China. Attempts were made to appeal to the League of Nations and the International Court of Arbitration, but without success. The population was urged to institute a rigid boycott of Japanese goods, but in spite of the most strenuous efforts on the part of the Parliament and other public institutions the anti-Japanese movement did not attain the desired intensity as in 1919 and 1920.—*АВТОР*.

† On May 6th, 1923, the "Blue Express," bound from Pukow to Tientsin, was derailed near Lincheng, in Shantung, by a gang of armed bandits. There were thirty-five foreigners on board, one of whom, a British subject, was shot dead, while twenty-six, including women, and over 200 Chinese passengers were taken captive. The women were released within a day or two, but the men were carried off into the neighbouring hills, and the last batch of foreign captives was not released until the 12th. Under the terms accepted by the Chinese Government, the leader of the bandits, Sun Miu-yao, was given the rank of Brigadier-General, several of his subordinates were granted commissions and a number of bandits were embodied in the Chinese army. Sun Miu-yao was summarily executed for alleged insubordination in December 1923.

Only on August 10th, 1923, were the Foreign Powers able to arrive at an understanding between themselves and to present their demands for compensation of the victims, guarantees for the future, and sanctions. The Chinese Government agreed to compensate the loss suffered by the foreigners, but refused to punish the officials guilty of negligence and organize a special railway guard under foreign officers proposed by the Powers. In this it was strongly supported by the Chinese public, which interpreted the proposal as a new foreign attempt to establish a foreign control over China.—H.E. Senhor de Freitas, Dean of the Diplomatic Corps at Peking, to the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, August 10th and October 4th, 1923; Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs to H.E. Senhor de Freitas, September 24th and October 16th, 1923.—*АВТОР*.

the plans of his ousting would not be opposed by a move on the part of the Manchurian lord which would bring General Wu Pei-fu from Loyang to Peking and prevent the completion of the elaborate scheme of making Tsao Kun president. A peace conference held in Shanhaikwan on June 2, 1923, dispelled all apprehensions to that effect, for it appeared that, in spite of the warlike declarations of his Southern allies, General Chang Tso-lin was far from the idea of taking immediate revenge for his defeat in 1922.

On the night of June 6 Premier Chang Shao-tseng, realizing the danger of the situation, fled to Tientsin, where he took refuge in the foreign concession, while the remaining members of the Cabinet promptly tendered their resignations on the pretext that the President had refused to countersign mandates appointing a few local officials (amongst them Feng Yu-hsiang's nominee, Collector of the Peking Octroi), thereby interfering with the responsible Cabinet system.*

The day the Cabinet resigned the troops of General Feng Yu-hsiang and a body of the police and gendarmes held a demonstration before the Presidential Palace, demanding pay from the President and threatening him with violence. The purpose of this demonstration was apparent, but President Li Yuan-hung suddenly manifested an unusual strength of mind. He firmly announced that he had no intention of vacating the post of President until Parliament had completed and promulgated the permanent Constitution of the Republic which since 1912 it had tried unsuccessfully to complete, moving from Peking to Shanghai and thence to Canton and back.

On June 9, by order of their commanders, the metropolitan police declared a strike and organized a coolie demonstration, which surrounded the President's house, left without guards, and demanded his resignation. But neither this new demonstration nor the strike of the police, leaving him at the mercy of the noisy mob, and the refusal of the Ministry of Communications to transmit his telegrams to the Provinces, which isolated him from the outside world, could shake the firmness of Li Yuan-hung. He also refused to submit to the inevitable when on June 12 Generals Feng Yu-hsiang and Wang Huai-ching, Commander of the Metropolitan Gendarmerie, sent in their resignations, giving as their reason the non-payment of

* Circular Telegrams of the Cabinet and General Feng Yu-hsiang to the Provinces, June 7th, 1923.

their troops. Only after a message was brought to him that unless he left office troops would be moved into the city to compel him to go, did he decide to leave for his home in Tientsin.

On June 13th, early in the morning, Li Yuan-hung wrote and sealed mandates accepting the resignation of the Cabinet and others, appointing a new Premier and a new Minister of War.* A final mandate, dated the same morning, abolished the Tuchun system in China and made all the military units directly subordinate to the Minister of War.†

Shortly after one o'clock six motor-cars were observed passing, like the wind, through the broad streets of the Capital towards the Legation compound, President Li Yuan-hung sitting bolt upright in one of the middle cars. He proceeded to the station and took a special train to Tientsin.‡ Nobody attempted to stop him; but, upon his arrival in Tientsin, his car was surrounded by soldiers at the Central Station. After his departure it was found out in Peking that the Presidential seals were missing. An urgent telegram was despatched to arrest him and keep him prisoner until he would surrender the missing insignia, which were left by him in the care of one of his concubines in the French Hospital in the Legation Quarter. Late at night a special train journeyed to Peking with his private secretaries, who persuaded Madam Li to hand over the seals to the police representatives. On receipt of a telegram stating that this had been done, the President was allowed to proceed to his residence in the British Concession. A mandate issued in the evening announced his resignation§ and directed the Cabinet to carry out all Presidential duties.¶

The struggle put up by President Li Yuan-hung for the Presidential dignity and immunity and his flight to Tientsin might be considered dramatic except that such events have regularly occurred in modern Chinese history during every change of government in the North as well as in the South. The real farce, however, commenced only after his downfall.

* Li King-yuan and General Chin Yung-yen.

† Although all these mandates were technically legal, they were refused publication by the Government Printing Office, and the successors of Li Yuan-hung in the Presidential Chair ignored them as non-existent.—AUTHOR.

‡ "North-China Herald," June 16th, 1923.

§ Circular Telegram of the Cabinet to the Provinces, June 17th, 1923.

¶ On June 17th, 1923, the Parliament accepted President Li Yuan-hung's "voluntary resignation" by a "standing vote," not daring to put it to the ballot, as there was no quorum as required by the Constitution, 1912.—AUTHOR.

In spite of the fact that there was no Cabinet and no Foreign Minister, and that Parliament was rapidly drifting away, causing much confusion amongst the partizans of General Tsao Kun,* the Foreign Powers continued to accord official recognition to the non-existent government.

"The Foreign Powers, who must all along have realized the farce of their recognition, have been prompted to do so by, the notion that they must have some entity, though it be a nonentity, with which to deal," declared Dr. Sun Yat-sen with striking frankness in one of his famous manifestos to the Powers, which marked the turning-point in his relations with the foreigners in China.† "By their action, they have given Peking moral prestige and financial support in the shape of revenues under foreign control so that the Peking Government has been enabled to exist by virtue of foreign recognition, and by that alone. Unconsciously, perhaps, they have thus done something which they have professed they would not do, that is: intervened in China's internal affairs by practically imposing on the country a government repudiated by it."

It is very difficult to say whether the policy of the Powers pertained to acts which could be identified as "unconscious" or that it was just a continuation of the deliberate destruction of China as a State. Anyhow, the recognition by the Powers was one of the reasons which caused the Northern and Southern war-lords to strive for the possession of the traditional seat of the Central Government in China.

The construction of a government having any claim to legality was palpably impossible. The only outlet of the political *impasse* into which the Peking leaders were thrown by the ousting of Li Yuan-hung was again the resort to Constitutionalism and the creation of enough members of Parliament of a docile nature to elect Tsao Kun president. Some of the observers went even further and suggested to cast aside once and for ever the constitutional decorum, which could deceive nobody any more, stage a little loot by Peking troops,

* After the flight of Li Yuan-hung, Marshal Tuan Chi-jui, who since his own escape from Peking resided either in Tientsin or in Hangchow under the protection of his ally, General Lu Yuan-hsiang, of Chekiang, issued a manifesto to the members of Parliament inviting them to convene at Hangchow, where General Lu Yuan-hsiang had promised to grant them the use of the famous Lin Yin Temples as headquarters. On the other hand, ex-President Li Yuan-hung, with a party of Parliamentarians, decided to move to Shanghai and function there, in which he was supported by General Chang Tso-lin.—"Shanghai Journal of Commerce," June, 1923.

† Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Manifesto, June 29th, 1923.

compel Tsao Kun to come in, take immediate control, and then simply keep him in Peking as president.*

The choice of the new masters fell on the first method. Preparations were made for the bribery of Parliament on a huge scale and all means were put into effect to lure back to Peking the members of Parliament who had left it in disgust after the plans of the Chihli Party became known.† Every member was to receive Mex. \$5,000 for his vote and the "whips" Mex. \$10,000 each. The money was to be paid out from the personal chests of General Tsao Kun and his immediate followers.

The Southern Party, the Anfuites, and General Chang Tso-lin could, of course, by a sufficient expenditure have prevented the election of Tsao Kun, but they realized that his success could only be a very short-lived one. The alliance of such mutually antagonistic elements as himself and Generals Wu Pei-fu, Feng Yu-hsiang, and others, also feudal lords, subject likewise to the same historical process which led him to the presidency, could result only in a clash between them. General Tsao Kun was elected President of China on October 5th, 1923.‡ A large number of military guards were on duty within and without the hall of the House during the session, and neither the members of Parliament nor the audience were allowed to get out before the end of voting, when each of them was handed a cheque for the amount stipulated. Five days later the same "shameless and greedy Parliament"§ promulgated the permanent Constitution known in China as the Constitution of 1923,¶ and in another five days, when

* "North-China Herald," July 14th, 1923.

† Following the invitations of Li Yuan-hung, who, from his sanctuary in the British Concession in Tientsin, declared that he was still President of the Republic, having signed his resignation under duress, over 200 Parliamentarians registered their names with the Preparatory Office for the removal of Parliament to Shanghai. This office was subsidized by General Chang Tso-lin, who in this hoped to thwart the attempt of the Chihli Party to elect Tsao Kun. Opening of the Parliament took place on July 14th, 1923. However, the opposition on the part of local social bodies and the impossibility of forming a quorum forced it to close its doors on December 2nd of the same year.—AUTHOR.

‡ The attempted election on September 12th proved to be a complete fiasco owing to the absence of a quorum.—AUTHOR.

§ Manifesto of the Executive Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, July 20th, 1923.

¶ The Constitution of October 10th, 1923, consists of thirteen sections or chapters divided into 141 Articles. It did not present in itself anything reflecting the national character or peculiar Chinese customs and mode of life. It is a copy of any Western republican constitution and did not distinguish itself very much from the Provisional Constitution of 1912.—AUTHOR.

the whole of thinking China was roused by the cynicism of the Presidential election,* unheard of even in the annals of Chinese Republican history, the representatives of the Foreign Powers at Peking called *in corpore* on the President-elect, and, on behalf of their Sovereigns and Governments, congratulated him on the occasion of his election and assured him of their unanimous desire to collaborate for the prompt establishment of unity, peace, security, and order in China.†

* Dr. Sun Yat-sen to the Doyen of the Consular Body at Canton for transmission to the Diplomatic Body at Peking, October 10th, 1923.

† The archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Peking conceal very interesting records of the bargaining between the Chinese authorities and the representatives of the Foreign Powers at Peking concerning the acceptance of the Lincheng terms and the payment of indemnity to the victims of the outrage. The latter was made *conditio sine qua non* for the recognition of the new régime, to which the Chinese agreed.—AUTHOR.

CHAPTER IX

CANTON AND MOSCOW: THE DEATH OF DR. SUN YAT-SEN

THE direct and primitive methods of the Russian Revolution and the ingenious organization of the Russian Communist Party were just the elements needed for the success of the movement headed by Dr. Sun Yat-sen.

In spite of the conspicuous rôle played by the Kuomintang in China's politics since the proclamation of the Republic at Nanking, and the large increase of its membership during the student movement of 1919, the organization of this party was very far from being perfect. There was no discipline, no plan of action, and the mass of its members was imbued with prejudice.* Each new member was sworn in by Dr. Sun Yat-sen and attested the oath with his finger-print.† This was the usual ceremony, but there were others, without any revolutionary spirit, reminiscent rather of Chinese political sects and societies than of a modern revolutionary party.

The deficiency of the organization was acutely felt by the leaders of the Kuomintang.‡ The *débâcle* of the summer of 1922 and the necessity of gaining the active sympathy of the masses only intensified the feeling of general dissatisfaction.

The national Convention of the party in 1924 terminated without any definite steps being taken towards the inauguration of the proposed "Consolidated Government of China in Canton."§ Its attention was wholly absorbed by the problems of the immediate reorganization of the party. In this it found lively support in the newly-established Chinese Com-

* Report on the History of the Chinese Communist Party submitted to the Communist Internationale at Moscow, and found amongst the documents seized at the U.S.S.R. Embassy at Peking, April 6th, 1927. N. Mitarevsky, "World Wide Soviet Plots," page 112.

† *Ibid.*

‡ Chen Yin-shin to Huan Kai-tsiang.—Dr. Sun Yat-sen, "Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary," *op. cit.*, p. 159.

§ "North-China Herald," March 15th, 1924.

munist Party, for which the strength and success of the Kuomintang was a matter of paramount importance. The Chinese Communists and their spiritual leaders, the Russian Communists, realized full well that in spite of the striking moral success of their tactics, and the political understanding between Russia and the Southern Government, their chief task was to bring about a complete amalgamation of the two parties. They realized that the only democratic element in China which, under certain conditions, might be successful, was that of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and his followers, and that the fusion of the Communists into the Kuomintang would immensely strengthen it.

However, the first efforts in this direction proved to be abortive. Only in August 1923, after the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party at Hangchow, and the arrival of Mr. L. Karakhan, the newly-appointed Soviet Envoy, was the scheme carried out.

The details of this amalgamation were worked out by Dr. Sun Yat-sen and M. Borodin, the Soviet Representative at Canton, and were unanimously endorsed by the Kuomintang Convention.*

The constitution of the party was modified according to the construction of the Russian Communist Party, *i.e.* the party was reorganized into local units, which elected members to an annual Party Congress. This Congress elected a Central Executive Committee, which in turn selected a Central Council which formed the Government. The Communists, the members of the Association of the Socialistic Youth, an affiliation of the Chinese Communist Party, and of workmen's unions were admitted into the Kuomintang as rightful members capable to fill any official post in the party and the Government. Mr. M. Borodin was appointed High Adviser, and directed in person the session of the Convention which sanctioned the reforms.

The admission of the Communists caused widespread dissatisfaction amongst the moderate and, we permit ourselves to add, the wealthy members of the Kuomintang. Many of them thought fit to sever their connection with the Canton Government altogether. Dr. C. C. Wu, the son of the famous Dr. Wu Ting-fang, was the only well-known person who, after

* Minutes of the Meeting of the Chinese Communist Party, October 1924.—Mitarevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

the termination of the Convention, remained in high office, being Secretary of Foreign Affairs.*

The Kuomintang was flooded with newcomers, with no relations amongst the Cantonese gentry, which since the formation of the party had filled its ranks. It was, in fact, a complete democratization or even proletarianization of the Kuomintang, which shocked the old and respectable members of the party.

The admission of the new element was, in the eyes of the majority, a *force majeure*. The Communists had to accept the Kuomintang principles, and were only admitted so long as their actions were not "treacherous to China and the Kuomintang." †

This was the official version of the "express condition" on which the Communists were admitted into the Kuomintang, but we doubt it. The name of the Communists was not so invidious to Dr. Sun Yat-sen as to the majority of his followers. He was, as he himself stated, convinced that much of the current criticism of Russian Communism and the Communists was unduly emotional and not a little lacking in knowledge. ‡ Moreover, the Kuomintang were too weak to dictate their terms to a party which, in reality, represented the powerful Soviets, on whose support in dealing with the organized masses and on whose credits the Southern Government depended in not a little degree.

It is a very difficult task to disclose the true nature of the relationship of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and his intimate followers to the Soviet Government. Both interested parties have taken all possible means to conceal the actual facts and documents. But, in our opinion, the key to the position should not be sought as much in the official records or facts as in the very psychology of Dr. Sun Yat-sen himself.

Neither the considerations of material or moral support § which the affiliation with the Communists and Russia offered could induce him to surrender to strangers his unlimited authority in the Kuomintang. Only a deep psychological process, which he had no mental force to withstand, might have

* "North-China Herald," March 15th, 1924.

† Wu Ching-han's Document to the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, April 2nd, 1927.

‡ Dr. Sun Yat-sen: Statement to the "North-China Daily News," November 4th, 1922.

§ Dr. C. C. Wu, "The China Courier" September 30th, 1926; Chang Wei-chin, *Ibid.*, February 10th, 1926; Mr. G. E. Sokolsky, "China Year Book," 1928.

caused him to commit this highest act of self-negation, which, in course of time, turned out to be the greatest act of political wisdom and patriotism.

It is very hard to follow step by step the evolution of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's mentality which led him to the acceptance of Communist political methods. The original notes and manuscripts representing his mental labour of years and containing the complete treatise on the reconstruction of China were destroyed by fire during the bloody events of June, 1922, at Canton.* However, even the incomplete material, in the form of sixteen lectures which he delivered in 1924,† discloses the immense mental metamorphosis which he had undergone since 1921.

He became entirely absorbed by the idea of the triumph of Communism in Russia, under the influence of which "she has changed her old policy of force to a new policy of peace."‡ His idea became fixed at the fact of the oppression and exploitation of his country by the Foreign Powers, which, in his opinion, transformed it into a "hypo-colony."§ He breathed with admiration for Russia and hatred against other Powers. It appeared to him that the Communist political and social creed did not conflict with his own principles,¶ and that both were fully justified in Chinese history and religion. ||

As a matter of fact, the restless spirit of seeking God's truth on earth, which has for centuries hovered over the Russian plains, and gave the world Bakunin, Kropotkin, Dostoevsky, Tolstoi, and others, and the most fantastic religious sects, culminating in the modern Russian Communism, has also hovered over the land of Han.

Emperor Wang Mang (王莽), B.C. 38-A.D.23, made an attempt to nationalize land, and, by "Five Equalizations and Six Controls," to introduce State Socialism.** Wang An-shih (王安石), A.D. 1055-1085, the Prime Minister of Emperor Shen-tsung, introduced the State monopoly of commerce,

* Dr. Sun Yat-sen, "San Min Chu I," *op. cit.*, p. xi.

† There is a short outline of the Kuomintang programme published by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, on April 12th, 1924, under the title of "The Main Outline for the Reconstruction of the National Government." It sums up the principles contained in the sixteen lectures, forming the "San Min Chu I" referred to above.—AUTHOR.

‡ Dr. Sun Yat-sen, "San Min Chu I," *op. cit.*, p. 17.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 27, 32, 33, 38, 53, 110, etc.

¶ *Ibid.*, pp. 148, 416, 423, 424, 428, 429, 434.

|| *Ibid.*, pp. 97, 169.

** Han Shu, B.99b, of Bk. 24a: Chinese Readers Manual, p. 241.

equality of taxation, militia instead of a standing army, and the conscripted labour for the State.* Their names were cursed by their contemporaries; they were forgotten by their descendants; but the golden dream of the "Great Principle" was still alive amongst the millions of adepts of the Great Sages.

"When the Great Principle of the Great Similarity prevails," said Confucius, "the whole world becomes a republic; they elect men of talents, virtue and ability; they talk about sincere agreement, and cultivate universal peace. Thus men do not regard their parents only as their parents, nor treat their children only as their own children. A competent provision is secured for the aged till their death; employment for the middle-aged; and the means of growing up to the young. The widowers, widows, orphans, childless men, and those who are disabled by disease are all sufficiently maintained. Each man has his rights and each woman her individuality safeguarded. They produce wealth, disliking that it should be thrown away upon the ground, but not wishing to keep it for their own gratification. Disliking idleness, they labour, but not alone with a view to their own advantage. In this way selfish schemings are repressed and find no way to arise. Robbers, filchers and rebellious traitors do not exist. Hence the outer doors remain open, and are not shut. This is the stage of what I call the 'Great Similarity.'" †

But the fullest justification of the Communistic doctrines was in the very fact of their existence as a State system in one of the greatest countries of the world, in the loyalty and the courage of their followers, and the international recognition of their representatives as the *de jure* government of all Russia. The reluctance displayed in this respect by the Chinese Central Government was due to the absence of political foresightedness and inertia, for the Chinese people, irrespective of political creeds, have long demanded the resumption of normal relations with Russia. ‡

The preliminary agreement was signed on March 14, 1924. Since then no progress had been made. The Chinese Government had from day to day delayed to confirm it. The

* John C. Ferguson, Ph.D., "Journal of the China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society," 1903-1904.

† Li Ki, Bk. VII, pp. 365-7.

‡ Appeal of the Professors of the Peking University to the Government, —"North-China Herald," February 23rd, 1921.

final signing of the treaty took place on May 31, 1924, after the Soviet representatives had sent in an ultimatum that "unless the treaty was signed within three days, Russia would not consider herself bound by the conditions of the preliminary agreement." * At the same time the Soviet Mission at Peking released the text of the agreement for publication, † and the Chinese public at large became aware that, in spite of the incompleteness of its provisions regarding Mongolia and the Chinese Eastern Railway, ‡ the Peking Government had delayed the confirmation of a treaty which would have opened a new era in Chinese international relations. Russia voluntarily renounced her extraterritorial privileges and returned to China her concessions. § She continued the occupation of Mongolia, and retained joint management with the Chinese of the Chinese Eastern Railway, but she manifested "her goodwill and respect for China" by treating China as a great and independent Power. ¶

As for the rest, in ceding to China Russian privileges and concessions the Soviets might also have been moved by considerations which had nothing to do with the manifestation of Russia's goodwill and respect for China; the terms of the agreement and declarations signed by Dr. Wellington Koo, on behalf of China, and L. M. Karakhan, on behalf of U.S.S.R., corresponded strictly to the national interests of new Russia. These interests required "the formulation of a common policy" with China which alone could free both "from the political and economical servitudes imposed under an international system resting on force and working through the methods of economic imperialism." ||

China's recognition of the Soviets as the *de jure* government of Russia was to a great extent due to the pressure brought to bear upon the Peking Government by the Chinese public. Meanwhile, the Three Eastern Provinces and Canton refused to recognize this act as binding upon them. The protest of the latter was of a purely formal nature. The Kuomintang Government, in the person of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, expressed its entire satisfaction with the terms of the treaty.

* L. Karakhan to Dr. C. T. Wang, March 16th, 1924.

† "Rosta News Agency," March 16th, 1924.

‡ Circular telegram of the Peking Cabinet, March 23rd, 1924.

§ Chinese Government's Official Communique, May 31st, 1924.

¶ L. Karakhan's Address at the Peking National University, June 7th, 1924.—"Rosta News Agency," June 9th, 1924.

|| Dr. Sun Yat-sen to L. Karakhan—*Ibid.*, September 8th, 1923.

It refused to recognize it, as it has refused to recognize any act of the Peking Government, including the Sino-German Trade Agreement of 1921. The Soviet Consul-General appointed to Canton was accorded recognition and was enthusiastically received by the Kuomintang.* The Manchurian protest was of a more serious nature.

The independent domains of Marshal Chang Tso-lin refused to admit the right of Peking to settle matters affecting their interests.† The attitude of Marshal Chang Tso-lin was uncompromising. He demanded that all questions relating to the status of the Chinese Eastern Railway¹ should be negotiated directly with him, and his claim was supported by Dr. Sun Yat-sen.‡ The latter maintained that "in settling the issue of the Chinese Eastern Railway General Chang Tso-lin should be consulted on the point."§ The question was solved on September 20, 1924, by the Soviet Government recognizing the autonomous status of Manchuria and her claims, which caused great indignation in Peking.¶

We will not go into the minor issues of the recognition of the Soviet Government by China. Neither the question of the handing over to the Soviet Ambassador of the premises of the former Russian Imperial Legation nor the problem of the Deanship of the Diplomatic Corps, which arose automatically with the appointment of the first Ambassador to China, and which caused a sensation in Peking diplomatic circles, are of any historical importance. China was swiftly drifting to radicalism. This was the most important issue of the day which occupied universal attention.

In fact, the result of the admission of the Communists into the Kuomintang surpassed the boldest expectations. Within less than three months the Canton Government found itself at the head of a mass movement capable of mustering at any time a parade of 170,000 labourers and farmers representing 160 trade unions. || The total number of organized labourers

* Resolution of the Generalissimo's Headquarters, August 7th, 1924.

† Circular Telegram of the Provincial Assembly of the Three Eastern Provinces, June 18th, 1924.

‡ Statement of Yang Ta-shin, Marshal Chang Tso-lin's Special Delegate to Kwantung, July 1924.—"North-China Herald," August 2nd, 1924.

§ Joint Statement of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and A. Joffe, January 26th, 1923, *op. cit.*

¶ Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs to M. Karakhan, September 25th and October 11th, 1924.

|| "North-China Herald," May 3rd, 1924.

pledged to the cause of the Kuomintang exceeded, according to the estimate of the Soviet agents, 350,000.*

With the growth of its strength and the support of the masses the political programme of the Kuomintang gradually lost its original theoretical character. In the treatise entitled "Main Outline for the Reconstruction of the National Government," Dr. Sun Yat-sen gives us some practical ideas regarding this programme.† He stipulates three periods in its development: (a) the period of military government; (b) the period of educational government; and (c) the period of constitutional government. In the first two periods he recognizes the dictatorship of the Kuomintang. It was the duty of the party, as the only section of Chinese people professing real constitutionalism, to bring up the rest of the nation in this idea.

Since the fusion of the Communists into the Kuomintang the dictatorship of the party had already begun. It was one of those political methods which, according to the doctrines of Communism, was *conditio sine qua non* of the political education of the masses. It was the dictatorship of the proletariat, which in China assumed the form of the dictatorship of the Kuomintang. The democratic principles of political and religious tolerance were discarded as a prejudice of the bourgeoisie. The members and non-members of the party were subject to the most rigid discipline. No criticism of party or government was permitted. The press was restricted by a severe censorship. The secrets of private correspondence were rescinded, etc.

The easiness with which the new order was established was striking. It indicated that the course taken by Dr. Sun Yat-sen was correct. In introducing the practical methods of Russian Communism he followed the natural process of evolution of Chinese revolutionary thought, which, sooner or later, had to bring the Kuomintang to the realization of the necessity of discarding the principles of Democratism.

The increasing influence of the Communists in all branches of public life alarmed the Cantonese. They loudly protested against the fiscal measures taken by the Government,‡ and, in the meantime, prepared themselves for self-defence. Interest in the Merchants' Self-Protection Corps, an organization established by the Kwangtung gentry since the eventful days

* Mitarevsky's collection of documents seized at the U.S.S.R. Embassy in Peking, April 6th, 1927, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

† This treatise is dated April 12th, 1924.

‡ "North-China Herald," April 5th, 1924.

of 1912, greatly increased. Over one thousand men joined the corps during the first months of 1924; and it was rightly believed that if only more arms and ammunition could be obtained, its strength could easily be increased by three or four thousand men.*

The growth of the opposition in Kwangtung improved the chances of General Chen Chiung-ming. However, the first clashes of his troops with the new Kuomintang army proved to be fatal for them.

It appeared that within a few months the Whampoa Military Academy, founded by Dr. Sun Yat-sen on the advice of the Soviet military experts and run by the latter, was able to supply the Southern army with a sufficient contingent of military and politically trained officers† to entirely change its character. It was no more a Chinese mercenary army able to loot but not to fight. An element of idealism and enthusiasm was inculcated into its midst. For the first time in the whole history of republican China, the Chinese soldiers and officers knew the cause for which they fought; this time it was near to the Chinese heart. Over the entrance of the new military *alma mater* there was a motto in great gilt characters: "He who seeks power or riches need not enter here."‡

The recruiting of the officers from amongst the poor and exalted Chinese student class, the education of the army along Communist and ultra-nationalist lines, which embraced an extensive anti-foreign propaganda, alarmed the representatives of the Foreign Powers. The Consular Body at Canton strongly protested against the increased activity of the agitators "plotting against the foreign governments,"§ but its protest could not stop the birth of a new Chinese army.

If the Cantonese bourgeoisie has up to the present succeeded in checking, to a certain extent, the radical activity of the Kuomintang,¶ this has been solely due to the existence of the Volunteer Corps. With the consent of the Government, the

* *Ibid.*, March 1st, 1924.

† According to the documents seized by the Chinese Authorities in the U.S.S.R. Embassy at Peking, April 6th, 1927, the Whampoa Academy was largely subsidized by the Soviets. In October 1924 the school had about 1,000 students.—Mitarevsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 39 and 40.

‡ John McCook Roots, "Asia," 1926.

§ M. Eizi Amau, Consul-General for Japan and Senior Consul at Canton, to Liao Chung-kai, Civil Governor of Kwangtung, June 26th, 1924.

¶ There were over 150 merchant strikes for the first half of 1924 as a protest against the actions of the Government. Some of them were followed by meetings and armed parades of the Volunteers.—"North-China Herald," June 7th, 1924.

merchants secured a large consignment of war materials from Germany, but as soon as the ship carrying the precious cargo dropped anchor in the Whampoa, Dr. Sun Yat-sen suddenly withdrew the permit, and the supply was not released. On August 11, 1924, the Volunteers proclaimed martial law in Canton, and declared that unless the Government released the arms a general strike of all merchants would be enforced throughout the whole province.

At this critical moment the Kuomintang, with the assistance of the Communists, resorted to the formation of a Labour Corps, known later as the "Red Army." The first battalion was formally organized on August 26, 1924, and it was further announced that the party was also forming a Peasants' Corps consisting of twenty battalions of farmers.

The situation was relieved by the moderates of the Kuomintang, who insisted on the release of the arms, to be handed over to the Volunteers on the understanding that the merchant strike should be cancelled, the commander of the corps should resign his command,* and the Volunteers should pay to the Canton Government Mex.\$500,000. However, the Government failed to fulfil its promise. The main forces of the Corps were concentrated in Canton, in the district called Saikuan, ready for action, and Dr. Sun Yat-sen threatened to bombard the city should they not disperse. The Consular Body filed an energetic protest.† The senior British naval officer informed Dr. Sun Yat-sen that he was instructed by his commander in Hongkong to take "immediate action with all available naval forces stationed in the Whampoa" in the event of the Chinese Authorities firing upon the defenceless city. ‡

This timely, or untimely, foreign intervention, dictated by considerations of humanity and the desire to assist the Cantonese merchants, whose interests were closely interwoven with those of the foreign firms in Canton and Hongkong, made impossible any compromise between the parties. §

* The Commander of the Corps, Chan Lin-pak, one of the richest merchants at Canton and Compradore of the Hongkong-Shanghai Banking Corporation (British), was accused by Dr. Sun Yat-sen of plotting against the Kuomintang Government and of being in league with Marshal Wu Pei-fu.—AUTHOR.

† B. Giles, H.B.M.'s Consul-General, to the Canton Authorities, August 29th, 1924.

‡ Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Manifesto, September 1st, 1924.

§ Same to the President of the League of Nations at Geneva, September 25th, 1924; Chiung Shing, Speaker of Kwantung Provincial Assembly, to the Dean of the Diplomatic Body at Peking, September 2nd, 1924; to the President of the League of Nations at Geneva, September 26th, 1924.

On October 15 the guns began to speak. Up to the last moment the Volunteers believed that the British Government would fulfil its threat, but they were deeply disappointed. The men-of-war of His Britannic Majesty in the Whampoa preserved perfect neutrality. Canton city was being destroyed, not by the shells of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's 'gunboats and the artillery of the Red Army, but by forty squads of unemployed coolies formed to commit incendiarism.

After one day's fighting the defeated Volunteers fled to Macao and Hongkong. The destruction of Canton and the massacres of its citizens by the Red Army, as far as figures went, gathered from various sources, were responsible for deaths amongst aged persons, women, and children, numbering 4,800 to 6,000; 1,600 to 2,000 shops and offices were wholly or partially ruined; while the damage to business and property amounted to no less than Mex. \$25,000,000. The number of streets destroyed in the most prosperous section of the city was twenty-three. Indeed, it was a radical remedy administered against the opposition according to the methods applied in Russia by the Communist Government. The victory was full.* The cry of indignation raised by the powerful Cantonese communities throughout the country and abroad † had no practical effect. The advance of General Chen Chiung-ming and the occupation of Nanyang by the troops of Marshal Wu Pei-fu, and the guerilla warfare in the province, which at first alarmed the Kuomintang, ‡ were also of no particular consequence. The opposition of the Kwantung bourgeoisie was crushed for ever.

In the meantime the situation in the North had gone from bad to worse. The recognition of the Government of Tsao Kun by the Foreign Powers added very little to its prestige and stability. The international act which helped the *régimes* of Li Yuan-hung and Hsu Shih-chang § had long ago lost its

* British Communist Party to Dr. Sun Yat-sen, "Reuter's Pacific Service," October 20th, 1924.

† Kwantung Residents' Mercantile Association, Canton and Shaoking Association, Chaochow Guild, Shaoking Association, Tapu Association, Nanhai Guild, Panyu Guild, Shunteh Guild, Hsiangshou Association at Shanghai to the General Chamber of Commerce, the Headquarters of the Merchants' Volunteer Corps, the Nine Benevolent Institutions at Canton, and all Kwantung Guilds and Cantonese Organizations throughout China, Australia, America, Straits Settlements, Saigon, Siam, Dutch India, India and other foreign countries and ports, October 22nd, 1924.

‡ "North-China Herald," October 11th, 1924.

§ Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Manifesto, June 20th, 1923, *op. cit.*

effectiveness. It brought to the meagre exchequer of President Tsao-Kun only a new burden,* and ruined its last credit.† There was also no hope for the increase of the two and a half per cent. in the Customs duties provided for in the Washington Nine-Power Treaty. The Gold Franc issue remained unsettled, and the French Government refused to take any action in this respect. All other projects advanced by Chinese politicians and patriots had no practical value whatsoever. ‡

The presidency of Tsao Kun was just another unfortunate attempt to bring about a Constitutional order in China, and as such its failure was inevitable. President Tsao Kun was deserted by all. His orders were disobeyed; his mandates had hardly more weight than those of his unfortunate predecessor, although some of them evidenced a sincere desire to improve the conditions in China.§ Only with the greatest difficulty did he succeed in the formation of a Cabinet, which, under the premiership of Sun Pao-chi, lasted only five and a half months, having been constantly torn by inter-Cabinet feuds.¶ His successors were not more fortunate.|| Even the successful conclusion of the Sino-Russian negotiations and the settlement of the outstanding

* Cf. Chap VIII.

† The Foreign Ministers at Peking handed to the Chinese Government a Memorandum in which they stated that the Customs surplus revenues could not be used as security for domestic loans, as had been the case in the past. "The Chinese Government engaged itself in the event of default or of the specific security pledged becoming ineffective to provide from other sources the sums necessary for the due payment of principal and interest on foreign loans secured on Customs revenues."

‡ In connection with these noble endeavours it is interesting to mention the scheme of a "Round Table Conference" of Sir Robert Hotung, a British subject of Chinese nationality and a prominent figure in the Chinese mercantile community at Hongkong. His appeal to the leaders of the rival parties and the Diplomatic Corps at Peking was received very favourably. Amongst persons who approved his idea of settling all dissensions through a Round Table Conference were ex-President Li Yuan-hung, Marshal Chang Tso-lin, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, Marshal Wu Pei-fu, Marshal Lu Yung-hsiang, etc., but the events of 1923 and 1924 proved the impossibility of diverting the course of China's history into a new channel.—AUTHOR.

§ Presidential Mandate, dated February 9th, 1924, concerning development of industry, high cost of living, banditry, stock-raising possibilities of Mongolia, etc.

¶ In the last of his numerous letters of resignation, dated July 1st, 1924, Sun Pao-chi characterized the situation as follows: "I hoped to effect the unification of the nation, but chaos seems to have been aggravated. I hoped to give relief to the people, but I now see sufferings on all sides. Each political party gives such a different view on current politics that one is at a loss to follow the right advice."—AUTHOR.

|| Dr. Wellington Koo and Dr. W. W. Yen.

affairs with Germany* were not placed to the credit of the Government, whilst an attempt to settle the Gold Franc issue, which might have considerably brightened the outlook for the future, was stamped as a venality. It was the same Parliament of 1912, which, since the days of Yuan Shih-kai, had passed through all phases of moral corruption, and which now claimed the right to exercise the supreme power. Many of its members, reduced to poverty by lack of salary, and not daring to show themselves in their native provinces for fear of their grateful electors, claimed that the House had a right to a share in the Government patronage, even in regard to minor clerkships. They meddled in the administration and embarrassed the functions of the Cabinet. The new elections fixed for May 14, 1924, according to the new permanent Constitution, failed.† In many provinces the Tuchuns simply prohibited the publication of the Presidential Mandate.

It was clear that President Tsao Kun was not the man to put China's house in order. He was too weak and lacking in individuality. The country looked to General Wu Pei-fu, who had silently permitted this generous and courteous gentleman to be put into the Presidential chair and who now silently supported his Government.

Since the flight of Li Yuan-hung, General Wu Pei-fu, now "Marshal," like all super war-lords, kept himself aloof from the political medley of the Capital. With his rambling ideas of a Citizens' Assembly, to which the tired country had to be led by a strong man of irreproachable integrity, he, unlike his colleague, the Christian General, ‡ firmly refused to take any part in the government.§ His close relations with Marshal Chi Hsieh-yuan, Tuchun of Nanking and Inspector-General of Kiangsu, Anhwei and Kiangsi, an irreconcilable anti-Anfuite, ensured him a wide influence over a number of

* June 7th, 1924. According to this settlement, Germany agreed to pay in settlement of all claims a war indemnity of Mex. \$34,839,977, including Mex. \$4,000,000 paid in 1921 in China Railway bonds. The Chinese Government returned to Germany all private properties seized during the war, and agreed to the opening of the Deutsche-Asiatische Bank.—AUTHOR.

† Presidential Mandate, January 1st, 1924.

‡ Memorial of Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang to President Tsao Kun, October 25th, 1923.

§ Foreseeing the inevitable active participation in the struggle of Marshal Tuan Chi-jui, Marshal Wu Pei-fu insisted that the Peking Government should offer him a monthly pension of Mex \$15,000 on the condition that he should stay away from politics, and give to the Chihli party a clear course to carry out their plans for peace and reunion of the country.—AUTHOR.

the Yangtze provinces. In addition to this, he bought over the entire fleet of Dr. Sun Yat-sen in Kwangtung waters.

In May, 1924, upon his recommendation, the Government appointed General Yang Sen Director-General (Tuli) and General Liu Hsiang Tupan (Director) of the Szechuan-Shensi border, which closed the war which for years had ravaged these provinces, and placed them under his direct control.

The state of war between Marshal Wu Pei-fu and the Triangular Alliance never ceased to exist. The actual fighting was only from time to time interrupted in order to give recess to the armies. In the summer of 1923 the renewal of warfare was prevented by the joint pressure brought to bear upon the Tuchuns of Kiangsu and Chekiang by the united bodies of merchants of Shanghai, Nanking, and Hangchow and the Shanghai Consular Body.* In 1924 the position was different. With the subjugation of Szechuan, Marshal Wu Pei-fu made a very considerable advance towards the realization of his scheme regarding the reunification of the country. The conquest of Chekiang would enable him to make an onslaught on Dr. Sun Yat-sen, and, by driving him out from Canton, complete his coveted scheme. An important item in the struggle against Chekiang was the possession of Shanghai, with its large arsenal in Kiangnan, geographically belonging to Kiangsu, but since the days of Yuan Shih-kai actually controlled by Chekiang.

The Triangular Alliance was also prepared for the fight. The temporary inability of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang to participate actively in the struggle was a matter of no importance for his allies. The armies of Marshal Chang Tso-lin and General Lu Yung-hsiang, backed by all Anfuities, were amply supplied with funds, arms and ammunition, and numbered: the Fengtien Army 130,000 and the Chekiang Army 35,000. The Chihli party had at its disposal about 395,000 troops, but only some 150,000 could be advanced against the allies.

President Tsao Kun took energetic steps to prevent the outbreak of hostilities. The Diplomatic Corps at Peking also made an attempt to bring pressure to bear upon the parties by warning the Government that it would be held responsible for any loss incurred to their nationals through fighting.†

On August 28 Marshal Chi Hsieh-yuan, and on September 2 General Sun Chuan-fang, Tuli of Fukien and an

* Treaty of Peace between Marshal Chi Hsieh-yuan, of Kiangsu, and General Lu Yung-hsiang, of Chekiang, August 19th, 1923.

† Joint Note of British, French, and Japanese Ministers to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 29th, 1924.

ally and subordinate of Marshal Wu Pei-fu, declared war on Chekiang.

The war was declared under the flimsy pretext that Chekiang had broken the Peace Treaty between Kiangsu and Chekiang of August 19, 1923. Marshal Chi Hsieh-yuan reported to President Tsao Kun that General Lu Yung-hsiang, the Chekiang war-lord, had enlisted in his army a contingent of Fukien troops "lest the people became afraid and suspicious." In his opinion, this was contrary to Article 3 of the aforesaid treaty.* A punitive mandate was immediately issued against General Lu Yung-hsiang and his sworn brother, General Ho Feng-ling, the Defence Commissioner of Shanghai,† and the Second Fengtien-Chihli war was opened.‡

Within fourteen days the resistance of General Lu Yung-hsiang was broken. The army assigned to guard the provincial capital of Chekiang revolted, and General Lu Yung-hsiang removed his headquarters to Shanghai. General Sun Chuan-fang was appointed Tuli of Chekiang.§ A new treachery reduced the forces of General Lu. His navy surrendered to the Kiangsu fleet, and the Commander of the 4th Chekiang Division refused to fight. On October 13 General Lu Yung-hsiang and Ho Feng-ling, in plain clothing, left Shanghai, bound for Japan. An attempt to reorganize their troops by the Anfu General, Hsu Shu-tseng, "Little Hsu," who suddenly appeared on the scene, was frustrated by the Municipal Council of the International Settlement of Shanghai and the Shanghai Consular Body. He was arrested and deported, as having entered the Foreign Settlement contrary to the order of expulsion which had been pending against him since 1921.¶ The troops were disarmed and repatriated.||

The success of the Chihli party was, however, very short-lived. The fate which befell the Chekiang Generals was the fate which was prepared for the party in the North, where the general fighting started only at the end of September.

With his usual energy and restlessness, Marshal Wu Pei-fu threw himself into preparations for war. He mobilized every

* Art. 3 of this Agreement said as follows: "The authorities of the two provinces agree to refrain from transporting troops lest the people become afraid and suspicious," etc.—AUTHOR.

† Presidential Mandate, September 7th, 1926.

‡ Marshal Chang Tso-lin's Circular Telegram, September 7th, 1926.

§ Presidential Mandate, September 20th, 1924.

¶ Kotenev, "Shanghai: Its Mixed Court and Council," *op. cit.*, p. 29.

|| Shanghai Municipal Council's Report, 1924, p. 54.

available corps, hoping to bring the strength of his forces at the front up to 200,000.* He drained the Peking treasury of every available cash, and succeeded in getting further funds from the Customs.†

On September 18 he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of all troops acting against Marshal Chang Tso-lin, "the disturber of the national peace whom the Government was obliged to suppress by force."‡ This made him *de facto* dictator in Peking, while his sworn brother, General Feng Yu-hsiang, "the Christian General," was allotted the very important post of Commander of the army which had to cover the Capital from the North and menace the rear of Marshal Chang Tso-lin.

The easiness with which this General had in the past changed his political allegiance, and the uncertainty of his attitude at that time, compelled Marshal Wu Pei-fu to delay his departure for the front, which proved to be fatal for his cause. The Fengtien troops forced the Great Wall near Shan-haikwan, and defeated his vanguards.

Large reinforcements were rushed to the menaced point, while hasty preparations were made to effect a landing somewhere in the rear of Marshal Chang Tso-lin. Marshal Wu Pei-fu personally directed these operations from Chinwangtao, and there was ample ground to believe that the tide of the fighting might soon turn in his favour. His army was well provisioned, well armed, and in the best fighting spirit.

On the night of October 22 the Peking population slept peacefully, not suspecting the *coup d'état* which was carried out during the night secretly, quietly and with dramatic suddenness.

A group of Generals, headed by the Christian General, and a group of prominent young Chinese, including the former Chinese delegate at Versailles and Director of Sino-Russian negotiations, Dr. C. T. Wang, and Minister of Education, Huang Fu, decided to overthrow the hegemony of the Chihli party. The Presidential Palace was surrounded, the bodyguard of the President disarmed, and the President himself taken into

* Marshal Wu Pei-fu's Statement to the Press, September 26th, 1924.

† Mex. \$4,200,000. The loan was contracted from the Customs on the security of a new issue of Treasury Notes, and on the understanding that the funds would be used for administrative expenses and maintenance of peace in the Capital during the crisis.—Agreement of October 3rd, 1924.

‡ Punitive Mandate against Marshal Chang Tso-lin, dated September 18th, 1924; Presidential Mandate, September 24th, 1924, cancelling Marshal Chang Tso-lin's titles, orders and decorations.

custody. Under threat of bodily harm he was forced to issue a mandate ordering the immediate cessation of hostilities and dismissing Marshal Wu Pei-fu from all his present posts and appointing him "Tupan of Land Development at Kokonor."*

There was something new in the whole affair, something which distinguished this sudden *coup d'état* from the traditional procedure of unseating Chinese presidents. The action of General Feng Yu-hsiang and his associates could not be even warranted by the desire "to stop the senseless war and to organize a new People's Army devoted to the welfare of the nation."† It was an act which even the ethics of the Chinese militarists condemned as meanness.

A further mandate was extorted from Tsao Kun‡ announcing the formation of a new Government by Dr. C. T. Wang and General Huang Fu under the authority of General Feng Yu-hsiang.

Armed with a secret order of President Tsao Kun to act at his discretion, which the latter succeeded in conveying to him,§ Marshal Wu Pei-fu, with 800 men, rushed to Tientsin to check the disastrous effect of the *coup d'état*. The task was hopeless. His attempt to negotiate peace on the basis of a return to the *status quo ante bellum* failed. General Feng's reply was an offer of Mex. \$100,000 for Marshal Wu, dead or alive.

On November 3 Marshal Wu Pei-fu left Tientsin, and in Tongku boarded one of his military transports. For more than ten days his whereabouts were unknown. Only on November 13 the telegraph brought news that his transport had been sighted at the mouth of the Yangtze. On the 14th she cast anchor at Nanking, where Marshal Chi Hsieh-yuan proclaimed independence from the Central Government.¶

The first act of the new Cabinet, which, on November 3, assumed "in the absence of the President" the functions of the President, was an order cancelling the Abdication Acts of the late Dynasty. The ex-Emperor was deprived of his

* Presidential Mandate, October 24th, 1924.

† General Feng Yu-hsiang's Circular Telegram, October 23rd, 1924.

‡ Presidential Mandate, October 31st, 1924.

§ Marshal Wu Pei-fu to the Doyen of the Diplomatic Body at Peking, October 24th, 1924.

¶ Proclamation of Marshal Chi Hsieh-yuan, of Kiangsu, Kiangsi and Anhui; General Sun Chuan-fang, of Chekiang and Fukien; Admiral Tu Shih-kuei, Commander of the Yangtze Fleet, and others, October 28th, 1924.

traditional title, this being exchanged for the name of Mr. Pu-yi. His Manchu Court was abolished. His Imperial allowance was reduced,* and he himself, with his family, evicted from the Forbidden City. Under a strong guard furnished by General Feng Yu-hsiang's new "People's Army," the Kuo-minchun, he was removed to the house of his late father, where he was virtually kept a prisoner. An urgently formed Liquidation Commission immediately set to work to liquidate the relics of China's ruling houses kept in his former palaces.

The Tsing Dynasty had been dormant since the days of the unfortunate attempt by General Chang Hsun to restore it to political power. Probably it would have been entirely forgotten had not rumours of monarchical plots circulated from time to time. Nobody knew the origin of these rumours, and everybody denied them.† Their appearance pertained to the mysterious facts which are found in the history of every nation, and which have never been explained. They originated somewhere very deep in the mind of the people as a sub-conscious protest against the dark actuality: as anything that was associated in the people's mind with the conception of order and peace.

The arbitrary cancellation of the Abdication Acts by the Government caused widespread consternation. The impression of it was even greater than that of the stabbing in the back of Marshal Wu Pei-fu. The Ministers of Great Britain, Netherlands and Japan made personal inquiries at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where they were assured that no violence would be committed against the person of the ex-Emperor. Only a few approved the action of the Government—the Chinese politicians who were in lively communication with the Soviet Embassy, and Dr. Sun Yat-sen. In his opinion, the continued existence of the privileged position of the ex-Emperor and his Manchu Court was a direct challenge to the Republic and constituted a constant menace. ‡

The position of the new Government in connection with the affair of the House of Tsings was far from being enviable. Neither Marshal Chang Tso-lin nor his allies wanted to see

* Revised Favourable Treatment Agreement, November 5th, 1924.

† Chung Foo News Agency, January 7th, 1920; Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 5th, 1921; Marshal Chang Tso-lin, April 2nd, 1921; R. F. Johnston, the English Tutor of the ex-Emperor, to the Editor of the "North-China Daily News," March 3rd, 1921.

‡ Dr. Sun Yat-sen to Dr. George Hsu Chien, his representative at Peking, November 7th, 1921. Same's Circular, January 15th, 1925.

the Central authority remaining in its hands. The post of the new head of the Government was allotted to Marshal Tuan Chi-jui, who, on September 15, 1924, suddenly came into the open, denouncing President Tsao Kun and supporting Chekiang in its war against Marshal Chi Hsieh-yuan.* His military and political authority and seniority, coupled with the credit which he enjoyed in Tokyo, temporarily placed him beyond any competition. His attitude in regard to the reprisals against the ex-Emperor was also uncompromising †: in spite of all the overtures of General Feng Yu-hsiang and his Ministers, he ‡ refused to have anything to do with them. It was beyond his dignity to have anything in common with people who committed such acts as the treachery against Marshal Wu Pei-fu and the gross violation of the terms of the Abdication Agreement. Still less was it possible for him to receive the Presidency from their hands.

The problem of the Government was decided by a Conference summoned by Marshal Chang Tso-lin and Marshal Tuan Chi-jui upon the former's arrival in Tientsin. General Feng Yu-hsiang and some of his senior Generals were invited to participate in this conference as leaders of Chinese armies only. Marshal Tuan Chi-jui was unanimously appointed Provisional Chief Executive of the Republic.§ His appointment was, as it was anticipated, accepted by all military leaders throughout the country, including the Yangtze Provinces and Marshal Wu Pei-fu.¶ The latter had just completed the formation of a Military Government "in defence of the Constitution."||

In fact, the unfortunate instrument of China's chaos was in danger. According to the declaration of Marshal Tuan Chi-jui, he assumed the office of the Chief Executive only temporarily, pending the convention of two Conferences: first, the Reorganization Conference, which had to decide

* Marshal Tuan Chi-jui's Circular Telegram, September 15th, 1924.

† Same to Generals Feng Yu-hsiang, Sun Yueh, and Hu Ching-yi, November 5th and 6th, 1924.

‡ Cabinet's Mandate, November 6th, 1924, granting full pardon to Anfuites; Bulletin of the Peiyang Headquarters of the Kuominchun Army, November 7th, 1924, appointing him Generalissimo of the new Kuominchun Army, etc.—AUTHOR.

§ Circular Telegram of Marshal Chang Tso-lin, Generals Feng Yu-hsiang, Hu Ching-yi and Sun Yueh, November 15th, 1924.

¶ Marshal Wu Pei-fu to Marshal Tuan Chi-jui, November 27th, 1924. As a consequence of this declaration the advance of the troops of General Hu Ching-yi against Marshal Wu Pei-fu was stopped.—AUTHOR.

|| Marshal Wu Pei-fu's Declaration, Wuchang, November 17th, 1924.

immediate military and financial questions, and to discuss the best means for the convention of the second, a People's Conference, which had to dispose of the problem of the future constitution of the Government.*

Whether this programme was a sincere expression of ideas animating Marshal Tuan Chi-jui and his present supporters, Marshal Chang Tso-lin and General Feng Yu-hsiang, or just another political manoeuvre to get a recess before the final struggle for the supreme power, it is difficult to say. But even if Marshal Tuan Chi-jui was animated by the most sincere desire to set up a workable government system in China, the forces which were moving China forward set all his democratic schemes at naught.

On November 22, 1924, Marshal Tuan Chi-jui, followed by General Feng Yu-hsiang, arrived at Peking and took up his residence in his old house. The official ceremony of his inauguration took place two days later in the presence of Marshal Chang Tso-lin and General Feng Yu-hsiang,† the latter having sent in his resignation on the very day of his arrival in the Capital. His political and military schemes did not receive any encouragement. The new Cabinet was composed of members of the old Anfu Club and one representative of the Fengtien party and two members of the Kuomintang. The original list of the Ministers also contained the name of the veteran statesman, Tang Shao-yi, but the latter declined the honour.

The new Government immediately removed all the restrictions over the ex-Emperor, which enabled him to shift, for the sake of better safety, to the Japanese Legation, and thence to proceed to Tientsin, where he established his permanent residence in the Japanese Concession.

As one of the leaders of the anti-Chihli movement and an old ally of the two Marshals, Dr. Sun Yat-sen was invited to attend the Conference at Tientsin. The acute crisis in Canton, which prevented him from taking active part in the fight against the Chihli party and leading personally the Anti-Northern Expedition,‡ also prevented him from reaching Tientsin in time. This could hardly have any importance, for his revolutionary ideas had

* Marshal Tuan Chi-jui's Declaration, November 21st, 1924; Chief Executive's Mandates, November 24th, 1924.

† On December 9th, 1924, the new régime was granted *de facto* recognition by the Foreign Powers signatories to the Peking Protocol, 1901.—AUTHOR.

‡ Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Manifesto, September 13th, 1924.

nothing in common with the schemes of the Northern Marshals and the pacification of the country. He strove for the revolutionizing of China, but not for her pacification; for the immediate abrogation of all "unequal" treaties with Foreign Powers, but not for international co-operation on the basis of existing relations.*

On November 13, before leaving Canton, he issued a Manifesto in which he expressed his views on the situation and advocated the convocation of a People's Convention composed of representatives of all provincial parties, with full powers to amend the Constitution of the country. He wanted to create a body, full of revolutionary pathos, which would be able to carry out his schemes for China's liberation.

The deportation of General Hsu Shu-tseung, "Little Hsu," from Shanghai, during the Kiangsu-Chekiang war, and the campaign started against him in the foreign Press of Shanghai,† filled Dr. Sun Yat-sen with keen hatred against the foreigners, which he did not try to conceal.‡

There were also undoubtedly some other reasons which caused his further delay in proceeding northward, and which warranted his sudden decision to visit Japan before going to Tientsin. He explained this unusual move by the desire to meet his Japanese friends, whom he had had no opportunity of seeing for many years. Steady rumours, however, connected his journey with a very important political scheme which necessitated the consent of the Japanese Government. He himself denied any ambitious plans.§

It would serve no useful purpose to guess at the motives for Dr. Sun Yat-sen's journey to Japan. They will always constitute a puzzle for the student of China's politics, but it is a fact that during the Anti-Chihli movement Japan displayed the keenest interest in the proceedings and did not remain neutral, as she has asserted.¶ Under the excuse of defending her special interests in Manchuria,|| she refused to give

* Statement of Same to the Press (through Eastern News Agency), November 14th, 1924.

† "North-China Daily News," November 7th, 1924.

‡ Mr. Ma Soo, Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Secretary, to the "North-China Daily News," October 22nd, 1924.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Statement to the Press.—"North-China Herald," November 22nd, 1924.

§ Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Statement to the Eastern News Agency.—*Ibid.*, November 29th, 1924.

¶ Statement of Baron Shidehara, Japanese Foreign Minister, October 2nd, 1924.

|| Japanese Memorandum to the Chinese Government, October 15th, 1924.

permission to Marshal Wu Pei-fu to use the South Manchurian Railway for the transportation of his troops, yet this same railway was freely used by Marshal Chang Tso-lin.* Many of the Fengtien regiments and the entire artillery were commanded by Japanese officers. They also directed the operations of the Fengtien General Staff. Finally, a party of Japanese troops was landed in Chinwangtao, occupied by Marshal Wu Pei-fu. They were not landed there to fight, but to become embroiled with the Chinese soldiery, and, in case of necessity, to furnish an excuse for further intervention.† They were landed under the pretext of manœuvring, which, according to the Peking Protocol of 1901, the Foreign Powers had the right to hold in the railway zone between Tientsin and Shanhaikuan.

The result of this breach of neutrality was that the power passed from the hands of irreconcilably anti-Japanese Chihli-ites and alleged sympathizers of Great Britain and America ‡ into the hands of a political combination, the leaders of which were identified with the pro-Japanese policy:

It is also a fact that on the eve of his departure from Japan Dr. Sun Yat-sen made a public statement to the representatives of the "Japan Chronicle," in which he defined his attitude *vis-à-vis* Japan. He stated that he was willing to leave the question of Japan's possession of territories in Manchuria to rest for the present. In his campaign for the restoration of China's independence he was confining himself in the immediate present to two things—the abolition of foreigners' extraterritoriality privileges and the restoration of Customs autonomy to China. He stated that he was convinced that Japan would give the lead to the other Powers in relinquishing her privileges, and that the Japanese people were with him to a man. He was not opposed to China honouring her debts to Japan contracted by the former Anfu Government if Japan could be induced to support China in her demand for independence. China was willing to sacrifice a little for the sake of restoring the life of the nation. But, he added, if the Foreign Powers would not follow the lead of Russia in restoring China's sovereignty, China might unite with her and India against them. "We can stir up our animal spirits if we want to," concluded this statement, which created a wide sensation in the Far East.§

* China Year Book, 1924-1925, p. 836.

† "North-China Herald," December 6th, 1924.

‡ Cf. Chap. VII.

§ "North-China Herald," December 13th, 1924.

No Chinese politician could say more in order to win the official and unofficial sympathy of Japan. It was just such a man who, if he wished, was fit to become President of the Republic of China and to free her from the foreigners, which Japan herself had been unable to do.

An unequalled welcome awaited Dr. Sun Yat-sen upon his arrival in Tientsin on December 4, 1924. The streets were a blaze of banners and flags bearing the inscription "San Min Chu I." On the previous night lecturers on platforms addressed crowds of people, outlining his life and principles. The schools declared a holiday. Thousands of common people, agitated and jubilant, lined the streets through which he drove to his residence in the Japanese Concession.

But Dr. Sun Yat-sen arrived sick, unable to take part in the popular feasts arranged in his honour. He had immediately to take to his bed and thus interrupt his journey to Peking, which, at that very moment, also presented a scene of unusual movement. Echelons of Fengtien troops, which had arrived with Marshal Chang Tso-lin, were hurriedly evacuating the Capital, whilst strong detachments of General Feng Yu-hsiang's Kuominchun Army were steadily pouring through the city gates from Peiyang. Machine-guns were placed in position just outside Chin Men, the gate nearest to the Legation compound. The walls in various sections of the Capital were plastered with inflammatory posters directed against the foreigners and calling the people to abrogate all treaties which impaired China's sovereignty.

It was rumoured that Marshal Chang Tso-lin, followed by his suite and generals, had secretly left Peking before midnight on December 4, fearing lest he be entrapped by General Feng Yu-hsiang. It was further told that General Feng Yu-hsiang and his followers, in co-operation with the Soviet Embassy, had engineered a new plot, this time aimed at the elimination of Marshal Tuan Chi-jui and Marshal Chang Tso-lin, and the immediate abrogation of all "unequal treaties."* In fact, the conduct of General Feng Yu-hsiang aroused the gravest suspicion. In spite of his repeated requests for resignation, and solemn declarations that he was retiring into private life, he actually continued to direct the affairs of the Kuominchun, and took all measures to increase its strength.†

* "North-China Herald," December 13th, 1924.

† Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang to the Chief Executive, October 22nd, November 30th, December 3rd and 10th, 1924.

The seriousness of the situation was realized by the Diplomatic Body. On December 9 it formally drew the attention of the Chinese Government to "the necessity for China observing her Treaty obligations," promising to assist her "according to the terms of the Washington Treaty."*

It is very doubtful if this Note and the promise contained therein had any effect upon General Feng Yu-hsiang and his associates. But the sudden illness of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, which compelled him to interrupt his journey to Peking, and the concentration of the Fengtien Army around Tientsin and in Shantung † set their plans in confusion.

The nature of these plans became known only on December 26, 1924. On this date the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang at Canton passed a resolution strongly opposing the Government's scheme of the Reorganization Conference and endorsing Dr. Sun Yat-sen's plan for the People's Convention. It declared as a *conditio sine qua non* (1) the abolition of all treaties granting to foreigners extra-territorial privileges, control over Customs, and foreign management of Chinese schools; (2) full liberty of speech, press and assembly; (3) abolition of the Tuchun system, and confiscation of all properties of the militarists; and (4) establishment of a Government by the National Convention.

General Feng Yu-hsiang had to satisfy himself for the time being with the Tupanship of the Northwest Frontier, with residence in Kalgan, which was offered to him following the general movement for the abolition of Tuchunates. ‡ Marshal Chang Tso-lin also resigned his Inspector-Generalship of the Three Eastern Provinces and became Tupan of Frontier Defence of the Northeast. §

On December 31 Dr. Sun Yat-sen started for Peking. His state of health was still very bad. Upon his arrival in the Capital he was so weak that he was unable to address the throng of high officials and representatives of hundreds of various societies and schools assembled to welcome him at the

* Diplomatic Body's Note, December 9th, 1924.

† The Military Conference held in Tientsin on December 7th, 1924, allotted the Shantung Province to General Chang Chun-chang, a trusted lieutenant of Marshal Chang Tso-lin, and the Chihli province to General Li Ching-lin, also a general of the Fengtien Army. This allotment of territories was approved by Marshal Tuan Chi-jui, who issued mandates appointing the above-named officers Tupans of the respective provinces.—АУТРОН.

‡ Chief Executive's Mandate January 4th, 1925.

§ *Ibid.* January 7th, 1925.

station. He was deadly pale, exhausted, and could not move without help. A large retinue of Russians surrounded him. It was almost impossible to detect a Chinese amongst them.* Printed pamphlets bearing his signature were distributed, and were eagerly seized by the crowd, which was, however, deeply disappointed after reading them. A few scornful phrases by a man sick unto death concerning China's position as a "semi-colony" amongst the nations, and this was all.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen was sick to death. He was suffering from cancer on the liver. It was too late to realize any of his ambitious plans. However, in spite of his hopeless condition, Dr. Sun Yat-sen still remained an important factor in current Chinese politics. One of his first acts upon his arrival in Peking was to confirm his approval of the summary abrogation of the Abdication Acts and the expulsion of the ex-Emperor Hsuan Tung from the Forbidden City. He also issued a declaration directed against the Constitution of the Reorganization Conference promulgated on December 24, 1924. He refused to attend it on the ground that it differed from his programme announced in Canton on November 13.†

Marshal Tuan Chi-jui was forced to make concessions and announce the formation of a special advisory committee of representatives from provincial organizations,‡ but Dr. Sun Yat-sen was in too critical a condition to consider it. The Political Council of the Kuomintang, which came with him to Peking, rejected it on his behalf on the ground that it did not meet his wishes: the delegates of the provincial organizations were not to be permitted to have seats in the Conference itself.§

Dr. Sun Yat-sen's hopeless physical condition became known to the public at large after an exploratory operation conducted by foreign doctors on January 26, 1925. On March 12, at 9.30 a.m., he passed away peacefully, being conscious to the last.¶ During his last hours he was surrounded by members of his family, his personal followers, and Mr. Borodin and his wife. One member of the Government, a Kuomintang, Yeh Kung-cho, also was present.

* "North-China Herald," January 10th, 1925.

† Dr. Sun Yat-sen to Marshal Tuan Chi-jui, January 17th, 1925.

‡ Marshal Tuan Chi-jui to Dr. Sun Yat-sen, January 29th, 1925.

§ Resolution of the Political Committee of the Kuomintang, Peking, January 31st, 1925.

¶ Dr. Krieg's Bulletin, March 12th, 1925.

On the previous day, in the afternoon, he issued final instructions respecting several matters, and informed his wife that he wished to be embalmed and placed in a casket similar to his friend Lenin, and be buried at the Tiger Hill at Nanking,* the Ming Capital, which in 1912 saw his triumph.

On learning the news of his death all the Cabinet Ministers, except Marshal Tuan Chi-jui, who sent his son, hurried to his bedside to pay their last-respects.

A mandate was immediately issued eulogizing his services to the nation and announcing that the Ministry of Interior had been ordered "to suggest on the most liberal scale the posthumous honours to be conferred on him, so as to show the Government's appreciation of his meritorious services." † All flags throughout the country were lowered. The flags of the foreign Legations and Consulates were half-masted. In token of respect, the ships in the Treaty Ports sounded their sirens.

The mandate of the Chief Executive, extolling the virtue and wisdom of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, and complaining that "Heaven was so unmerciful as to deprive the country of the services of such a man," which overcame him with sorrow and grief, ‡ was an example of the specific Chinese official lie. Marshal Tuan Chi-jui, as an old member of the Northern Military party, the Peiyang party, who signed the famous memorial to the Throne urging the Emperor to abdicate, and one of the lieutenants of Yuan Shih-kai, knew very well the history of the Chinese revolution. The hecatombs of October 15, 1924, in Nanking should have also been fresh in his memory. The fate which had then befallen thousands of innocent aged women and children might have also been his and that of his Government had not Heaven been so merciful as to deprive them of such a man as Dr. Sun Yat-sen!

The expression of condolence and posthumous honours to the late Chinese revolutionist by the foreign diplomatic representatives and the foreign communities in China was even more startling. If the attitude in respect to the foreigners of the deceased could still rouse any doubt, if his anti-foreign harangues could be attributed to evil influence from outside, the foreigners in China now had in their hands a document in the form of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's last will, which stated as follows:

"For forty years I devoted my life to a revolutionary cause in an attempt to elevate China to a state of freedom

* *Ibid.*

† Chief Executive's Mandate, March 12th, 1925.

‡ *Ibid.*

and independence. My experience of these eventful years has absolutely convinced me that to attain this cherished goal we must enlist the support of the great mass of people at home and work in co-operation with those nations which treat us on the basis of equality.

"The revolutionary movement has not as yet succeeded, and it is therefore imperative that all my fellow-workers should do their utmost in order to realize my 'Reconstruction Plan,' 'Outlines of Reconstruction Policies,' 'The Three Principles of the People,' and the policies enunciated in the manifesto of the Kuomintang at the first national convention.

"Fight on, my fellow-workers, with renewed vigour to bring about a People's Convention for the solution of our national problems and to abolish the unequal treaties with foreign nations. These things must be done in the shortest time possible."*

The sorrow and grief of the Chinese masses, the countless destitute Chinese, who had heard the passionate appeal of Dr. Sun Yat-sen was deep and sincere. He was the man who in times of general demoralization and fear had the courage to say loudly what was dear to the heart of every true Chinese: what was once said by a loyal servant of China's Sovereign, executed to satisfy the bloodthirsty "fan kwai,"† and which was not still forgotten: "Remember that it is your duty to do everything in your power for your country; at all costs, these foreigners must not be allowed to possess themselves of the glorious Empire won for us by our ancestors."‡

This was deeply realized by the immediate followers and political partisans of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. They vigorously protested against anything which could directly or indirectly affect the memory of "the formidable leader of a movement that was destined to restore to China her strength and her independence."§ They protested against any Christian funeral service to be held over his body, but his family, who were Christians, found themselves bound by the words stated by him during his last hours that he was dying calmly as a Christian should.¶

* "Nationalist China," published by the Secretariat, the Kuomintang of China, the Central Political Council, the Canton Branch, Canton, China, 1927.

† Cf. Chap. I.

‡ Cf. Chap. III.

§ Mr. Eugene Chen, Member of Political Council of the Kuomintang, (through "Reuter's Pacific Service,") March 20th, 1925.

¶ Mr. T. V. Soong, on behalf of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's family (through "Reuter's Pacific Service"), March 27th, 1925.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen was given Christian obsequies. His body was placed in a casket similar to his friend Lenin, and was not buried at Tiger Hill at Nanking. The bronze coffin sent from Moscow proved to be of such poor workmanship and material that it was impossible to use it. The inter-factional struggle of the Kuomintang after his death and the civil war prevented the removal of his body to Nanking.

The political testament of Dr. Sun Yat-sen laid a very strong restraint on the liberty of action of the Kuomintang, which identified itself with the person of its late founder and leader. It confined the policy of the Kuomintang to a strictly definite political maxim and limited its international relations to an alliance with Russia, for Russia was the only foreign Power which treated China on an equal basis. It was a yoke not easily to be borne: a course of policy not always possible to follow. The party soon saw itself forced to reconsider its relation to this document. Its genuineness was placed under doubt.

It appeared that the draft of the will was not prepared by Dr. Sun Yat-sen himself, but by a member of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, Wu Chi-hui, who passed it to Yu Yu-jen, Li Shi-tseng, Eugene Chen, Li Ta-cha, and Wang Ching-wei, also members of the same Committee, for revision and approval. It was then handed to Mme. Sun to present to her husband. On account of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's grave condition she retained it for several days before she gave it to him.*

It appeared, further, that of the Committee which edited the will only Wang Ching-wei, an ardent supporter of the Sino-Russian alliance, ever saw Dr. Sun Yat-sen in the Union Medical College Hospital at Peking, where he passed his last days, and that Mr. and Mrs. Borodin were constantly at his bedside. Thus, of the Committee which prepared the final draft of the document who might have been present at the actual act of its signing to bear witness to the condition of mind of the testator, all were ardent partisans of Sino-Russian co-operation. As far as Mme. Sun was concerned, her subsequent conduct proved that in her person the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics and the Communists had one of the most loyal friends. The document itself was not signed by any witnesses whatsoever, and, therefore, from a legal point of view, is of doubtful value.

* Statement of Yu Yu-jen at the Memorial Exercises to Dr. Sun Yat-sen at Nanking, March 12th, 1928.

Under these circumstances, the attitude of some of the Kuomintang was in many respects justified. The moment was very serious. Messrs. Wang Ching-wei and M. Borodin and Mme. Sun might easily have exercised an undue influence over the dying leader in order to obtain a document which ensured the triumph of their political views in the future. Or they might easily have selected a moment for its signature when Dr. Sun Yat-sen was incapable of knowing and understanding its contents.

But, even so, if Dr. Sun Yat-sen signed his political testament without understanding its contents, or under the moral pressure of his wife, M. Borodin, and Wang Ching-wei, acting in their own interests, a great service was rendered to the dying man. In a few lines they have expressed the substance of his theories : they have made it to appear that after a lifetime of wandering in the labyrinth of foreign ideas, at the last he found his soul, his true Chinese soul ; they have reconciled him with his people !

CHAPTER X

THE EURASIAN DOCTRINE

IN the opinion of Dr. Sun Yat-sen the revolution in Russia was a national revolution : fascinated by the general destruction of Russia, and the creation of a new State on her ruins, perfect in principle, he failed to see the rôle of the Communist Internationale in this revolution. He did not imagine China in alliance with the Soviets. He ordained to China an alliance with the Russian people, who proclaimed liberty to all oppressed, and who voluntarily renounced their privileges in China and treated her as an equal.

He saw in the tragedy of the Russian nation the tragedy of his own people. The fate of Russia, her struggle for freedom and her triumph became transmuted in his mind into the fate of China fighting for her independence and freedom from foreign oppression. He imagined an alliance with Russia as an intimate bond, as a close co-operation of the two countries. He refused to see any aggression on the part of Russia in regard to China.* Russia revolutionized was a new Russia, which had nothing in common with her imperialistic past and the aggression of Western Powers ; she had reverted to her true nature and returned into the family of the Oriental races.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen did not define this attitude. He stated : "The one hundred and fifty million Russians, when their revolution succeeded, broke with the other white races, and condemned the white man's imperialistic behaviour ; now they are thinking of throwing in their lot with the weaker, smaller peoples of Asia in a struggle against the tyrannical races." †

The definition of Russia's attitude and the attitude of Russians was made by the Russians themselves : they were

* Joint Statement of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and A. Joffe, January 26th, 1923, *op. cit.*

† Dr. Sun Yat-sen, "San Min Chu I," *op. cit.*, p. 87.

Eurasian. Russia as a conglomerate of peoples of various races, the Russians, pure Arians and of mixed Arian and Turanian blood, were neither Asiatics nor Europeans: they were Eurasians. They represented a special group of peoples and a culture which formed a bridge between the peoples and cultures of Western Europe and Asia.

The true nature of Russia was hidden under a stratum of outward Europeanization, foreign to her semi-Asiatic nature, and, since the days of Peter the Great, forcibly introduced into Russia by all Imperial Governments. This stratum could not withstand the inward contradictions of the European civilization caused by the Great War. It was too thin: it broke, and Russia ceased to be a great European Power. She became a union of Eurasian and Asiatic peoples and countries with immense natural resources and broken political and economic powers; she became automatically a new and immense country for the future colonization of Europe and America. And as such she was inevitably led into the family of her Asiatic relations. She assumed the leadership of her Asiatic sisters in their struggle against the Western nations, for the victory of Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, India, China and other semi-colonial countries of the Orient meant her own victory, her own independence and freedom.

The triumph of the Bolsheviki in Russia in 1917-1919 was due to the fact that in carrying out the destruction of capitalism and imperialism in Russia, these two basic elements and products of modern Western civilization, they had automatically fallen into the rhythm of an historical process, this being the self-determination of Russia as an Eurasian country.

The further forcible reconstruction of Russia according to the latest theories of Western socialism and the principles of self-determination of the nations only helped her to assume her natural aspect. The numerous Turanian peoples, the Tartars, Kirgeese, Bashkirs, Chuvashes, Yakuts, Mongols, etc., became rightful members of the group of nations forming present Russia. Their languages became recognized as official in their respective territories, and their representatives were invited to take equal part with the Russians in the organization of new Russia. Moreover, it appeared that the stability of the new order was to a great extent dependent on special troops recruited from amongst the Asiatics. And if the Cantonese army was reorganized and

led by Russian military experts, the Chinese units in the Russian Red Army played a very considerable rôle in the victory of the Russian proletariat.

The success of the struggle of the Soviet Government against the world capitalism depended entirely on the success of its policy in the Orient. The way to the heart of imperialistic Europe lay through China and India and Persia and Afghanistan. And to strike at the Imperialism of Europe was to strike there.

A strong Asia was no less essential for the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics than for Russia. The inflexible law of history forced the Soviets to carry on the Russian national policy in Asia, in spite of the fact that they were responsible for the disappearance of Russia's name from the maps of the world.*

This may sound as a paradox; but paradoxical though it may be, the purely Russian national policy in assisting China to free herself from foreign invasion was destined to be carried out by two men, neither of whom was a Russian, both being ardent Communists and Internationalists, longing to convert China to Communism. These were Michael Borodin and Leon Karakhan.

The past of Michael *alias* Jacob Borodin, *alias* George Brown, High Adviser to the Kuomintang, whose real name is Grusenberg, is hidden in the unpublished annals of the

* These views are professed by a modern Russian politico-philosophical school known as "Eurasian." It should be admitted they are perfectly logical and historically correct. The school is represented by well-known Russian scientists and authors, P. Savitazky, G. Vernatsky, P. Suvchinsky, G. V. Florovsky, Prince N. S. Trubetzkoi, P. M. Bizilly, and others. Their views are not new in the Russian political philosophy. They were shared by many Russian authors at the end of the nineteenth century. In his "The Diary of a Writer," Dostoevsky writes as follows:—"Russia is not only in Europe, she is also in Asia; and a Russian is not only a European, but also an Asiatic. Moreover, there is more hope for Russia in Asia than in Europe. Moreover, perhaps Asia is the best outlet for us in the future. I foresee the indignation which will seize some of the readers of this retrograde assumption of mine (but it is an axiom for me). Indeed, if there is anything to be corrected in our views, it is our view regarding Asia. It is imperative to wipe out our fears, a fear of a lackey, that we will be called Asiatic barbarians by Europe. The disgrace that Europe will see in us rather Asiatics than Europeans pursues us for almost two centuries. It has particularly increased during the present nineteenth century. It has attained the extent of a panic. This erroneous shame of ours, this erroneous view that we are only Europeans, but not also Asiatics (whom we have never ceased to be), has cost us a great deal during these two centuries. We paid for it with our unfortunate European policy, and, finally, with money, money and money. . . . God only knows how much was spent in order to prove to Europe that we are Europeans and not Asiatics."—AUTHOR.

world revolutionary movement of the last century. The name indicates that he is a Jew by birth. It is a very common Jewish name in Russia, Poland, Austria and Germany. He was first heard of in connection with Communist activities in 1919, when he was sent to Spain for propaganda by the Communist Internationale. In 1920 he was in Mexico, where he acquired a national passport which he used to enter the United States, where he became known to the State Department as a prominent agitator. In 1922 he landed illegally in England with a mission from the same Internationale. He was arrested and sentenced in Glasgow on August 29, 1922, in the name of George Brown, to six months' imprisonment and recommended for deportation. The Procurator-Fiscal told the Court that Brown, whose *alias* was given as Borodin, was regarded by the Intelligence Department as a most dangerous person. He was one of the "underground" agents of the Communist Internationale, and was sent to foster sedition. The accused claimed at the time to be a Yugoslav, then changed to Mexican and Austrian nationality. Eventually, at the request of the Soviet Representatives, he was deported straight to Petrograd.*

This sounds rather queer for a biography of the man who was, in many respects, responsible for the success of the modern Chinese patriotic movement, and whose name will be undoubtedly placed at the fore of those many Chinese national leaders as soon as the Chinese historians regain the impartiality which they lost on the establishment of the Republic and the abolition of the old Hanlin Academy.†

After the death of Dr. Sun Yat-sen the work of M. Borodin as a High Adviser to the Kuomintang was not an easy one. He was amongst the very few, if not alone, who had a clear idea about the function of the new machinery of the party, which, as we have seen, has already caused a deep split amongst the Kuomintang.

During the illness of Dr. Sun Yat-sen this split deepened very considerably. Immediately after his demise a strong group of moderate members connected with the

* "The Times," August 30th, 1923.

† According to the ancient traditions, the Chinese Imperial historiographers enjoyed exceptional privileges, which placed them outside of any undue official influence and ensured the impartiality of their records. It is told that their manuscripts were kept in sealed iron chests, to which even the emperor himself had no access. These chests were opened and the records published only at the change of each dynasty, when the first emperor of the new dynasty caused an edict to be issued to that effect.—AUTHOR.

Shanghai branch of the Kuomintang organized a conference in the Western Hills at Peking and formed a Club which was bitterly opposed to the presence of the Communists in the party and the Government. The problem of the succession to the leadership of the party furnished a new impetus to the acute struggle amongst the Kuomintang.

As soon as the reports of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's hopeless condition reached Canton the party became divided into many factions, which contested for the leadership. The two principal of them were the faction called "Elder Statesmen," headed by Wang Ching-wei, Hu Han-min and Liao Chung-kai, all radical and partisans of the closest friendship with Russia, and the "Prince Faction," led by a former Mayor of Canton and son of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, Sun-fo. In October 1924 he was forced to leave Canton as an irreconcilable anti-Communist. Finally, a mixed commission under the chairmanship of Hu Han-min was organized to control the current affairs of the Government in Canton. Such a solution of the predicament assured the unity of the party, which was in serious danger of losing entirely its prestige as a governing body.

On March 18, 1925, General Tang Chi-yao announced that he had assumed the office of Vice-Generalissimo of the Southern Government. General Tang Chi-yao, Military Governor of Yunnan, one of the earliest adherents and loyal friends of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, based his claim on the fact that this office had been offered to him by Dr. Sun Yat-sen during his lifetime. He was a typical Chinese feudal lord, and, in spite of his loyalty to Dr. Sun Yat-sen, an ardent partisan of a federal system for China.* His claim was readily upheld by the Yunnanese commanders in Canton, whose troops still formed a very considerable part of the Southern army. The position was critical. The Chief Executive Committee of the party resolved to defend its rights to the last.† This immediately put to the fore the newly-organized Red Army as the only troops which the party could trust, and simultaneously stabilized the position of the extreme left. Over 124 members connected with the Western Hills Conference at Peking were expelled from the Party.

* Memorandum of Generals Tang Chi-yao and Chao Heng-te to Marshal Tuan Chi-jui on the Reorganization Conference, March 22nd, 1925.

† Chief Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, Circular Telegram, March 25th, 1925.

This accidental success could not, of course, satisfy the group of the closest followers of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. The domination of the Left Wing of the Kuomintang in the Southern Government and the party, and the execution of the radical programme of the First Kuomintang Congress of 1924, were far from being assured. The outcome of any inter-factional struggle could not have any particular importance for the ultimate result of the movement. It depended entirely on the attitude of the mass of the population. The bond between them and the Kuomintang should become indissoluble: the commandments of Dr. Sun Yat-sen should become sacred, his person divine. The necessity of this had been foreseen by Dr. Sun Yat-sen during his lifetime. He said to M. Borodin that his followers should cling to him with the same loyalty as that with which the followers of Confucius followed their master.*

There was nothing exceptional in the deification of political and military leaders in China. The majority of the so-called titular deities in China were historical personages, ministers, soldiers, officials, etc., elevated to the rank of deities by the Chinese Government not only for religious or moral purposes, but also for purely political ends.† In this respect the partisans of Dr. Sun Yat-sen followed a procedure which formed part of the Chinese religious and political system and which was assured of a popular reception.

In a few months the ritual of the worship of the new saint was ready. Three bows before his image, then the reading of his last will, and a three-minute silence for self-examination and revelation.

Meanwhile M. Borodin was working to bring about an understanding between the Kuomintang and Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang and to co-ordinate his actions in the North with those of the Southern Government. His work in this direction synchronized with the negotiations of M. Karakhan with Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang concerning general politics in China. They succeeded in obtaining a number of obligations on the part of Feng Yu-hsiang towards the Kuomintang in exchange for arms to be supplied for the Kuominchun. ‡

* M. Borodin's Report to Soviet Government, found amongst the papers seized in the U.S.S.R. Embassy at Peking, April 6th, 1927.

† J. J. M. de Groot, "Annales du Musée Guimet," Vol. XI, pp. 46, 120, 171, 174, etc.

‡ Jen Chan, Chief of the Kalgan Group of Soviet Military Instructors, to Comrade Frunze, President of the Military Council of the U.S.S.R., May 22nd, 1925.—Mitarevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

Upon the return to Canton of M. Borodin and the group of the Kuomintang which had accompanied Dr. Sun Yat-sen on his last journey to Peking the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang issued a declaration denouncing Marshal Tuan Chi-jui and his régime, and proclaiming a national struggle for the convocation of the National People's Convention and the abrogation of all "unequal treaties."

"As to the nations which treat us on a footing of equality," stated the declaration,* "only Soviet Russia deserves the name of an equal partner. The Kuomintang should, therefore, continue hand-in-hand with the Soviet Republic in the struggle against imperialism."

This very important declaration, which virtually consolidated the relations between the Kuomintang and Russia as laid down in Dr. Sun Yat-sen's last statements to his followers, was preceded by an analogous declaration of the Second National Conference of Chinese Labour. Over 250 labour delegates of the Southern trade unions voted for the complete affiliation with the all-Russian Federation of Workers.† The delegates of other provinces hesitated to endorse such a radical action, which made Chinese labour dependent on a foreign body and which, in face of the general anti-foreign tendency, appeared to be repugnant to their Chinese feelings. ‡

We do not attach much importance to the so-called May 30th incident in Shanghai, which followed chronologically these two events and received unusually large publicity in contemporaneous political literature. The incident in itself was of a very trivial nature, like others since the student movement of 1919, § and was practically inevitable. It was the result of the anti-foreign movement in general, ¶ and the anti-Japanese agitation and boycott in particular. || By taking timely precautions the International Settlement police might have prevented the necessity of firing upon the students ** when they tried to force entrance to the police station with the

* Declaration of the Chief Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, May 23rd, 1925.

† Declaration of May 1st, 1925.

‡ "North-China Herald," May 16th, 1925.

§ Shanghai Municipal Council's Annual Report, 1919, pp. 64A-66-A.

¶ "North-China Herald," September 20th, 1924.

|| M. Yashida, Japanese *Chargé d'Affaires*, to Shen Jui-lin, Chinese Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, May 9th, 1923; Resolution of Joint Conference of the Japanese Chambers of Commerce in China, Shanghai, June 15th, 1923.

** Judge Finlay Johnson, Judicial Inquiry Report on May 30th, 1925; China Year Book, 1926.

intention to free some of their comrades arrested for delivering anti-foreign speeches in the streets.*

The reason that the brunt of the hatred aroused by the whole affair was exclusively directed against the British was due to two facts: that the administration of the Foreign Settlement in Shanghai was virtually in the hands of the British, and the leadership of the movement fell at once into the hands of the Kuomintang and Communists. Their leaders realized at once that in attacking Great Britain they attacked the most formidable enemy of Chinese economical emancipation, and that, in spite of Great Britain's seeming might, she was practically powerless in the face of Chinese nationalism. A blow rightly aimed at the economic might of Britain in China would not only be fatal to her interests, but would also mean the destruction of the whole Western prestige in the Orient.†

The Soviets firmly refused to support the bellicose tendencies of the Chinese towards Japan, maintaining that the latter should be excluded from the anti-foreign policy of the Chinese revolutionary parties.‡ And whilst the general strike and boycott against Great Britain paralysed the entire British trade in the Far East, and the British diplomats tried in vain to devise means to appease the Chinese wrath, § Mr. Yada, the Japanese Consul-General, Hsu Yuan, the Chinese Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, and General Shing Shi-lien, the Commanding General at Shanghai, met together to draw up an *aide memoire* for the settlement of the anti-Japanese strike and boycott.¶

General Feng Yu-hsiang, who embarked upon most lively anti-foreign propaganda and proclaimed war on Britain, || in the course of an interview with Japanese journalists stated as follows: "We Chinese and Japanese are descendants of the same ancestors, and so we should unite and co-operate for mutual help and benefit." **

* Shanghai Municipal Council's Annual Report, 1925, pp. 62, 63.

† Resolution of the Extended Plenary Session of the Chief Executive Committee of the Communist Internationale, found amongst the documents of the U.S.S.R. at Peking, April 6th, 1927.—"The Soviet in China Unmasked," ed. "North-China Herald," Shanghai, 1927, p. 9.

‡ Mitarevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 155.

§ Diplomatic Body's Note, June 6th, 1928.

¶ August 11th, 1925.—A. M. Kotenev, "Shanghai: Its Council and the Chinese," pp. 146, 147.

|| General Feng Yu-hsiang to Christians of the World.—"Shun Pao," July 8th, 1925; Same to Marshal Tuan Chi-jui, June 9th, 1925; Same, Circular Telegram, June 30th, 1925.

** "North-China Herald," July 25th, 1925.

Large funds poured from all sides into the chests of the strikers. The movement assumed such dimensions and popularity that even the Peking Government and the Northern feudal lords felt themselves bound to contribute sums to keep the boycott and strike going. The Soviet Government ordered collections for the assistance of the Chinese strikers and their families,* and despatched a delegation of All-Russian Professional Unions to China.†

We said that the leadership of the movement fell at once into the hands of the Kuomintang and the Communists. There is no definite proof that either of these organizations or the Russian agents had taken any direct part in the engineering of the May 30th incident in Shanghai. But it is firmly established that the powerful impetus to the movement given by the attack on Shameen, the foreign Settlement of Canton, was organized by the Chinese Communists under immediate instructions of the Soviet representatives.

Following the mass meeting held under the auspices of the Kuomintang on June 19, 1925, circulars were distributed ordering the boycott of foreign goods, refusal to sell goods to foreigners, refusal to use foreign bank-notes, refusal to work for foreigners, etc.

On June 23 thousands of workmen, students, soldiers and citizens paraded along the Bund around Shameen. When the demonstration arrived opposite the British Concession several shots were fired at the British and French marines stationed around Shameen. The latter replied with machine-guns. The firing lasted about twenty minutes, Chinese soldiers answering from the West Bund.‡

It was a signal for the repetition of the Hongkong Seamen's strike of 1921, but only on a more grandiose scale. It lasted over one year and brought Hongkong to the verge of

* According to the Soviet News Agency, "Rosta," the contribution from the General Council of the Russian Trade Unions amounted to G. R. 100,000, while various individual unions subscribed from G. R. 5,000 to 20,000 each.—"Rosta," June 14th, 1925.

† The delegation, consisting of Comrade Lempse, Chairman of the Union of Metal Workers, and Comrades Smorgius, Vaskoff and Briskin, all prominent Communists, arrived in Shanghai on August 1st, 1925.—АУТНОР.

‡ H.B.M.'s Minister at Peking to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 1st and 15th, 1925. This Note in its assertions is based on the report of Sir James Jamieson, H.B.M.'s Consul-General at Canton, which contained a statement of four foreigners having personally witnessed that the firing was commenced by armed Chinese forces participating in the procession.—АУТНОР.

ruin, the British Government being helpless to check the activity of thousands of armed pickets which enforced the strict boycott rules.* These armed pickets, composed of workers full of revolutionary enthusiasm and fanatical loyalty to the principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, and Communism, strengthened immensely the Southern army and the position of the Communists in the Kuomintang.

M. Borodin made every endeavour to impress upon the Kuomintang Government that all interests should be sacrificed to one single point—the increase of the fighting capacity of the army.† And, it should be admitted, the Government blindly followed his advice, reverting to military purposes all available funds. ‡

The Cantonese army was richly provided with arms, funds, and military instructors. The operative department of the General Staff and the educational work of the army was entirely in the hands of Russian officers headed by General Galen. In the fight for the leadership between the old Kuomintang and the Yunnanese General, Tang Chi-yao, the Whampoa cadets, led by their commander, General Chiang Kai-shek, again played a very prominent part, and proved to be of the greatest use to the Kuomintang. The actual fighting broke out on June 5, and lasted a little over a week, when the Kuomintang achieved a decisive victory over their enemy.

But the Soviet emissaries in Canton insisted on the realization of their original idea in full. "What has been done, since the Kuomintang Government came into existence, that the peasants should receive your troops in a friendly manner?" asked M. Borodin at the meeting of the Kuomintang at Canton on November 13, 1924. "Fifty per cent of Kwangtung peasants are cultivating some paltry 20 mow under conditions unheard of. For this miserable bit of land they are compelled to pay a high rent to the landlords, whose handsome sons and daughters play so brilliantly at basket-ball on huge courts specially prepared for this purpose, the using of which for the training of the Kuomintang army you find inadmissible because the Americans

* Telegram of Mass Meeting of the Hongkong and British Traders to H.B.M.'s Prime Minister, August 25th, 1925.

† Minutes of the Meeting of the Military Council at Canton, July 1st, 1925.—"The Soviet in China Unmasked," *op. cit.*, p. 11.

‡ Manifesto of 3,000 Students and 38 Professors of Kwang Tai University (Kwangtung).—"North-China Herald," December 19th, 1925.

and others have told you that basket-ball is civilization. . . . I propose to the party and the Government to issue immediately an order which would give the land to peasants." *

The mass of the rural population of Kwangtung was set in motion. The agrarian reform advocated by M. Borodin was strictly in accordance with the views on the subject of the Communist Internationale, which published a definite outline of the reform to be introduced into China. It admitted the difficulty of nationalization of land as a fundamental solution of the agrarian problem in China. It recommended that the Kuomintang should immediately carry out the following measures to win the interest of the peasantry to the revolution: (a) a maximum reduction of rents; (b) the introduction of a single rural economic progressive tax; (c) the confiscation of lands belonging to monasteries, churches, reactionary militarists, and those compradores of foreign firms, landlords, and nobles who carry on civil war with the Kuomintang Government; (d) the securing for tenants of the right to perpetual leasehold of the lands they cultivate and regulation of their rents; (e) the granting of full support to the interests of the peasantry by the Government; (f) the disarmament of the Merchant Volunteers and all other organizations of landowners; (g) the arming of the poor and middle-class peasants submitting all such armed forces to the Government; (h) organization and protection of peasants' unions.†

We have set out the details of the agrarian reform advanced by M. Borodin in order to show once more the exact position of Moscow in regard to the Kuomintang. It is evident that even a part realization of the reform proposed by M. Borodin might have immensely strengthened the bonds which connected the party with the actual masses of the Chinese population. But it did not receive the approval of the Government. The Kuomintang did not venture to go farther than the recognition of peasants' unions and the formation of some armed peasant units. They left the completion of the scheme either to the future legislative organs or to the local municipal‡ and military authorities, § and, in rural districts, to the farmers themselves, which inevitably led to all kinds of excesses.

* Mitarevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

† Resolution of the Seventh Plenary Session of the Executive Council of the Communist Internationale, Moscow, *op. cit.*

‡ Municipal Taxation of Ancestral Graves in Canton, April 1925.

§ Proclamation of the Military Command in Kweilin, Pinglo, Linchow, and Kingyuan (Kwangsi), January 6th, 1926.

The actual power in the Southern Government was concentrated in the hands of a triumvirate which consisted of Wang Ching-wei, Hu Han-min, and Liao Chun-kai, all belonging to the extreme left of the Kuomintang. Such an usurpation of the political power by a few members and their outspoken sympathy to the communistic doctrines and Russia, caused a new outburst of indignation amongst the moderate Kuomintang.* Mr. Sun-fo, Minister of Communications and ex-Mayor of Canton, was for the second time forced to leave Canton for Shanghai.†

On August 19 one of the members of the triumvirate, Liao Chun-kai, who, as Minister of Finance, was in control of the Kuomintang funds, and an ardent supporter of the Communists, was assassinated. The murderers were not disclosed, but in extremist circles it was believed that the crime was perpetrated by the conservatives, particularly as the assassination synchronized with the assassination of Chen Chui-lin, the editor of a radical paper, which bore a decidedly political character. It was stated that the conservatives had resolved to resort to terrorism in order to check the growing Russian influence. It was also alleged that Hu Han-min, in complicity with General Chen Chiung-ming, who was again menacing Canton, had attempted to get rid of his colleagues in order to proclaim himself Generalissimo.

On the night of August 24, by order of General Chiang Kai-shek, the principal of the Whampoa Academy, the cadets searched the offices and homes of all Government officials, including those of Hu Han-min. Over one hundred officials of various ranks were arrested. Hu Han-min was taken under guard on a man-of-war to Whampoa. Four days later General Chiang Kai-shek, now Commander-in-Chief of the garrisons in Canton, was in full control of the city.

"The existence or death of both the people of Kwangtung and the party itself depends on this strike," cried the Kuomintang in Peking and Shanghai, ‡ but the domination of the left wing of the Kuomintang, now headed by General Chiang Kai-shek, was firmly established, and Hu Han-min was forced to accept an honorary appointment as diplomatic

* Declaration of Western Hills Conference Group (the Chungkuo Kuomintang Club), July 7th, 1929.

† "North-China Herald," July 25th, 1925.

‡ Manifesto of the Western Hills Group of the Kuomintang, September 1st, 1925.

envoy of the Canton Government, and to sail for Europe and the United States "to inspect general conditions."

During November the forces of Chen Chiung-ming were driven out of Kwantung towards Fukien, and in December the opposition was crushed in Pakhoi and Hainan. The Cantonese army was officially under the command of General Hsu Chung-tze, and General Chiang Kai-shek was his subordinate. But as the Central Executive Committee, presided over by Wang Ching-wei, gave to General Chiang Kai-shek full initiative and independence as far as the army was concerned, General Hsu Chung-tze had soon to follow the example of the moderate members of the Central Executive Committee and leave Canton.

Once more the right section of the Kuomintang at Peking and Shanghai issued violent manifestoes denouncing the Canton Government and demanding the ousting of M. Borodin and all Communists.* The Second Convention of the Kuomintang from all parts of China in session in Canton solemnly confirmed the inviolability of the alliance with Russia,† refused to accept the resignation of M. Borodin, and presented him with a silver tripod with the inscription: "Co-operative struggle."‡

On February 4, 1926, following the resolution of the Convention that "all encouragement should be given to Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang and the Kuomintang in their struggle against the Northern imperialists and militarists," M. Borodin left Canton for the North. His ship was bound direct for Tientsin, and missed Hongkong, which was still suffocating in the iron grip of the boycott.§

The sudden departure of M. Borodin just at the moment when it seemed that he had reached the highest power in Canton, and as the *de facto* dictator in the South responsible for the rise of General Chiang Kai-shek, was interpreted by the public as an indication of a split between him and the Canton Government. It was stated that owing to the contemptuous treatment of General Chiang Kai-shek and his officers on the part of the Russian military advisers, a very serious split had occurred between M. Borodin and the Chinese.

* *Ibid.*, November 25th, 1925.

Resolution of the Shanghai Branch of the Kuomintang, December 1st, 1925.

† Resolution of the Second Convention of the Kuomintang, Canton, January 4th, 1926.

‡ Same, January 6th, 1926.

§ Hongkong Government Official Communiqué, January 21st, 1926.

He went to the North in order to prepare a new base for the Communists, whose influence in the South was on the wane.

No opportunity of disclosing any document or sufficiently authoritative statement to prove these allegations has been vouchsafed. No evidence has been found to show that the rise of General Chiang Kai-shek was due to the influence of M. Borodin. It is probable that Hu Han-min's arrest and departure formed part of a scheme to make way for General Chiang Kai-shek, very skilfully engineered with the consent, if not the actual participation, of M. Borodin.

A native of Chekiang and a son of a merchant, the future Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Army, General Chiang Kai-shek, was an early member of the Kuomintang. He joined the party in 1906 and participated actively in the revolution of 1911. But, in spite of his intimate acquaintance with Dr. Sun Yat-sen, he never played a conspicuous rôle in Chinese politics. He studied military science in Japan, and became in 1923 his chief-of-staff. He was sent by Dr. Sun Yat-sen to Russia to study the organization of the Russian Red Army, and won some prominence there. Upon his return to China he was appointed principal of the Whampoa Military Academy.

According to the vivid characterization of M. Stepanoff, his chief Russian military adviser, he was a brilliant figure, with clearly expressed features, ambitious and resolute. He longed to become a hero in the eyes of all China. He called himself revolutionary not only in the national sense, but a revolutionary as regards the whole world. He wanted power and money. But he wanted this not for self-enrichment, as most of his Chinese colleagues: he was too lavish as regards rewards and pecuniary recompense. He longed to effect some grand liberal gesture. He understood pretty well political questions not only of a local Chinese but of a world-wide nature. But in this he was egoistic and conformed to circumstances about him. Without relying on the masses, he wanted their support, and hardly understood how to use them in order to reach the aims of this ambition. It may be that he availed himself also of the national revolutionary movement merely in order to become a national hero.*

On the other hand, the mass of documents seized at the Soviet Embassy on April 6, 1927, some of which we

* Report of Comrade Stepanoff, Chief Adviser to General Chiang Kai-shek's Division, found amongst the papers seized at the U.S.S.R. Embassy at Peking April 6th, 1927.—Mitarevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

have already cited, gives quite a different aspect to the sudden departure of M. Borodin from Canton. He was needed in the North to complete the unification of all forces of the Chinese militant nationalism. The progress of Moscow's policy in respect to China could not be stopped by any inter-factional dissension or collision of personal ambitions.

The sincerity of Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang, now also full General, in regard to the Kuomintang inspired serious suspicion on the part of M. Karakhan, the doyen of the Diplomatic Body * and the Soviet Ambassador at Peking, and the man who, as already stated, was also destined to carry on the Russian national policy in China.†

A Karaim Jew by nationality, a Communist by political convictions and prominent revolutionary in his past, M. Karakhan was one of the ablest Soviet diplomats. The failure of the Reorganization Conference opened solemnly by Marshal Tuan Chi-jui in the Hall of the Grand Ceremonies of the Presidency on February 1, 1925, and the reparcelling of the country by the Fengtien generals and those who threw in their lot with Marshal Chang Tso-lin, and the May 30th incident presented a good opportunity for the boldest and most surprising political moves.

The victor in the Kiangsu-Chekiang war, Marshal Chih Hsieh-yuan, had hardly settled himself down in the newly-acquired territory when a new war broke out, and he had to follow the example of his predecessors, General Lu Yung-hsiang and Ho Feng-lin, and undertake a trip to Japan.

On January 29, 1925, a Fengtien armoured train of General Chang Chung-chang, manned by a detachment of ex-Russian soldiers and political emigrants, steamed slowly into the North Station in Shanghai, bringing back General Lu Yung-hsiang as Pacification Commissioner of Kiangsu and Anhwei. ‡

General Sun Chuan-fang escaped the fate of Marshal Chih. The conflict between him and the Fengtien troops was averted through a compromise with the Fengtien party, and he was recognized as Tupan of Chekiang and Fukien.

* After lengthy discussions, the Foreign Ministers at Peking decided on April 21st, 1925, to invite L. Karakhan, as holding the rank of an Ambassador, to become the doyen of the Diplomatic Corps, under the same conditions as prevail in most other countries, which meant that he was to preside as doyen on official occasions.—AUTHOR.

† Mitarevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

‡ Chief-Executive's Mandate, December 11th, 1924.

The occupation of Kiangsu by the Fengtien troops made Marshal Chang Tso-lin master of all Central and North China's outlets to the open sea, a position enjoyed hitherto by no feudal lord in China.

The power of the Chief Executive, Marshal Tuan Chi-jui, was an illusion. He was even denied the pleasure of denouncing the Tuchuns.* The financial operations of his Government, which enabled him to meet the expenses of the first four months of its existence, soon came to an end.† The only resource which was left at the disposal of the Government was the settlement of the Gold Franc issue, which proved to be fatal for Tsao Kun.

Great efforts were made to disarm public opposition to the contemplated step. On April 12, 1925, the Minister of Foreign Affairs signed the last document settling the dispute and releasing the French portion of the Boxer indemnity. Two days later the Government issued a mandate announcing the inauguration of a Provisional Senate to gild the pill which China had to swallow, for the settlement of the Gold Franc issue was effected on conditions demanded by the French Government. ‡

Meanwhile the propaganda of extremist ideas made rapid progress in the North. The centre of this propaganda was the Soviet Embassy, but the Government made only feeble attempts to check it, § fearing lest any resolute action in regard to the anti-foreign and anti-Japanese agitation ¶ would result in the revival of the accusation against the Government of pro-Japanese tendencies. The tension was, however, so great that it had to prohibit the students from holding any procession on May 7, the anniversary of the acceptance of the Twenty-one Demands. This order enraged the students to such an extent that they attacked the house of the Minister of Education. || Police were called in, and had to resort to arms, and it was alleged that during the fracas three students were killed.

On May 9, 1925, twenty to thirty thousand students paraded through the streets of Peking and made an attempt

* Marshal Tuan Chi-jui to Marshal Lu Yung-hsiang, March 26th, 1925.

† Loan of the 14th year of the Republic; Loan for Dyke Work on the Yangting River, 1925.

‡ Cf. Chap. VII.

§ Regulations of the Ministry of Justice concerning the Suppression of Communism, February 24th, 1925.

¶ Note of the Japanese Government, April 29th, 1925.

|| Mr. Chang Chih-chao.

to break into the house of the Chief Executive. It was a reiteration of the events of 1919, when the students attacked with impunity the Chinese Minister to Japan and severely injured him. This time, however, the Government found enough moral force to assume a firm stand and suppress further violence on the part of the students. But it was too weak to preserve this attitude for any considerable time. Its firmness was swept aside by the wave of hatred against the foreigners which seized the country as the result of the May 30th incident in Shanghai.* The Chinese delegation sent to investigate the incident on the spot, and report on their finding jointly with a delegation dispatched by the Diplomatic Body,† handed to the latter the terms of a settlement of the incident. They were identical to the thirteen demands presented to the Shanghai Municipal Council by the Union of Commerce, Labour and Education at Shanghai, an organization controlled by the Kuomintang and the Communists.

These terms did not contain anything extravagant or extreme, but nevertheless their contents were very characteristic. It was stated that the cause of the deplorable incident was "much deeper than the foreigners think,"‡ and was followed by a Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which announced not only the "readiness of the Chinese Government to discuss both organizations of International Settlement in Shanghai and the administration of justice therein," but also the necessity of "the readjustment of China's treaty relations on an equitable basis in satisfaction of the legitimate national aspiration of the Chinese people."§ It was an official endorsement of the movement, an endorsement of the programme of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang.

The magnitude of the anti-foreign movement forced the Powers to take some steps to appease the general excitement. The Nine-Power Washington Treaty was ratified,¶ and the Powers expressed their readiness to "consider the proposal for the modification of the Treaties in measure as the Chinese demonstrate their willingness and ability to fulfill their obligations and assume the protection of foreign rights and

* Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Diplomatic Body at Peking, June 3rd, 1925.

† Diplomatic Body's Notes, June 6th and 12th, 1925.

‡ Official Statement of the Delegates of the Diplomatic Body, June 18th, 1925.

§ Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Diplomatic Body, June 24th, 1925.

¶ August 5th, 1925.

interests." They also stated their willingness to discuss the revision of the Customs tariff and appoint a commission to investigate the judicial conditions of China and the operation of foreign extraterritoriality provided for by the Washington Conference.* December 18, 1925, was fixed as the date for the opening of the conference on extraterritoriality.†

On the other hand, some of the numerous missionary societies and foreign communities in China, distrusting the ability of Official Diplomacy to solve the crisis, and having before them examples of this diplomacy, ‡ resolved to meet the Chinese wishes and to bring pressure to bear on their Home Governments. §

The readiness on the part of the Treaty Powers and foreign communities to arrive at a compromise with the Chinese and to cede some of their privileges did not correspond with the ends of new Russia and the revolutionary plans of the Soviets. As a responsible leader of the Soviet policy in the Far East, and a diplomat with two international treaties to his credit, ¶ M. Karakhan realized that this line of policy of the Powers, if sincerely carried out, would immensely strengthen their position in China and weaken the chances of the Chinese national revolution. He also realized that any advantage derived from the compromise with the Powers would fall into the hands of the Peking Government and the political combination which controlled the situation in the North, i.e. Marshal Chang Tso-lin.

On September 21, 1925, the telegraph brought a message from Tokyo that the Japanese Cabinet had discussed the

* Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Treaty Powers, August 18th, 1925. Foreign Reply, September 4th, 1925.

† Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Treaty Powers, September 25th, 1925.

‡ The Diplomatic Investigation of July 1925, which failed owing to the divergence of opinion of the representatives of the Powers, and the International Judicial Inquiry, opened on October 7th, 1925. Owing to the refusal of the Chinese to take any part in this inquiry the whole proceedings were transformed into a private discussion of the conduct of the Shanghai Municipal Administration during the May 30th incident, and did not go beyond this.—**AUTHOR.**

§ Resolution of Methodist Episcopal Missionaries of Kiangsi, Anhwei, and Kiangsu, August 23rd, 1925.

¶ Same of the Mission Boards and Societies of the U.S. and Canada working in China, New York, October 2nd and 3rd, 1925.

Resolution of the British Chamber of Commerce and the Shanghai Branch of the China Association, August 31st, 1925.

¶ The Sino-Russian Agreement of May 31st, 1924, and Russo-Japanese Convention negotiated and signed by L. Karakhan, on behalf of the U. S. S. R., and by K. Yoshisawa, on behalf of Japan, January 20th, 1925.—**AUTHOR.**

situation in China in connection with confidential reports that a civil war between Marshal Chang Tso-lin and Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang was imminent, and voted unanimously in favour of Japanese neutrality if hostilities should break out.* It seemed, however, that the preparations for the offensive of Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang were not complete. He publicly repudiated any warlike intentions and addressed Marshal Tuan Chi-jui and Marshal Chang Tso-lin, assuring them of his loyalty.† But his assurances could deceive nobody: it was known that General Sung Ping, the Chief of General Staff of his army, hurriedly completed negotiations with the Soviet Government in Moscow concerning the providing of the Kuominchun army with arms and ammunition. ‡

The signal for the opening of the attack on Marshal Chang Tso-lin, which was intended to create a general confusion in China and prevent any compromise between her and the Treaty Powers, was not given in the North, as it was expected, but in the province of Kiangsu. On October 19, 1924, General Sun Chuan-fang, of Chekiang, suddenly attacked the Fengtien troops § and drove them from Shanghai and Nanking along the Tientsin-Pukow line far into the Shantung Province.

An alliance was formed between Kiangsu, Kiangsi, Chekiang, Fukien and Anhui, controlled by ex-Chihli leaders. Marshal Wu Pei-fu was invited to join the alliance and become provisional Generalissimo of a government which it was intended to establish either in Hangchow or Nanking.

On October 19 Marshal Wu Pei-fu arrived at Hankow. He did not move from Yochow, his headquarters and the anchorage of his transports, after he left the Temple of Wu Wang in Aocheng, where he had stayed since his *débâcle* in November 1924, until he had received the invitation from the whole military command of Hupeh to enter that province. ¶

These actions of the war-lords of the Yangtze Valley were closely connected with the finest political intrigue ever conceived in republican China, the strings of which were in the hands of M. Karakhan and Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang. It was a

* "North-China Herald," September 26th, 1925.

† Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang to Marshal Tuan Chi-jui, September 30th, 1925; Same to Marshal Chang Tso-lin, September 28th, 1925.

‡ "Reuter," Moscow, September 28th, 1925.

§ General Sun Chuan-fang's Declaration, October 19th, 1925.

¶ Marshal Hsiao Yao-nan's Declaration, October 19th, 1925.

plan to provoke a general movement against Marshal Chang Tso-lin, which, however, failed owing to the premature attack of General Sun Chuan-fang.*

The army of Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang was concentrated near Peking and Dolonor. The Chief Executive, Marshal Tuan Chi-jui, was virtually a prisoner. He was even deprived of liberty to send a circular telegram which he intended to issue announcing his resolution to resign should the hostilities between the Kuominchun and Fengtien break out.† Every-thing was ready for the attack,‡ but Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang delayed the last move,§ his foe slowly moving his troops inside the Great Wall at Shanhaikuan.

The situation remained unchanged until November 25. On that date General Kuo Sung-lin, one of the ablest Fengtien Generals, revolted, with his troops, against Marshal Chang Tso-lin. At the head of four divisions he rapidly advanced towards Mukden. On November 28 he entered Shanhaikuan, forcing the remaining Fengtien troops to retreat in disorder. He boldly addressed Marshal Chang Tso-lin, asking him in strong terms promptly to go into retirement, and threatening him with reprisals should he not follow his demand.¶ Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang also issued a circular telegram couched in identical terms,|| and moved his troops towards Tientsin.

All masks were thrown away. The Anfu members of the Government and officials were in a panic. Many of them were immediately arrested. It seemed that the last hours of the greatest of China's feudal potentates, who embodied the entire process of China's return to the traditional forms of government, had come, and, with his end, the end of Marshal Tuan's régime.

In spite of the fact that his army was badly suffering from cold, General Kuo Sung-lin inflicted a crushing blow on the troops of General Chang Hsueh-liang, Marshal Chang Tso-lin's eldest son, who made an attempt to arrest his progress. The road to Mukden was open. The word belonged to Tokyo : in the eyes of some of the Chinese public Marshal Chang Tso-

* Canton Government to Marshal Wu Pei-fu, Hsiao Yao-nan, General Sun Chuan-fang, *et. al.*, November 6th, 1925. "Reuter's Pacific Service," Hankow, November 2nd, 1925; Mitarevsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 31, 32.

† "North-China Herald," November 14th, 1925.

‡ "Reuter's Pacific Service," Peking, November 24th, 1925.

§ Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang to Marshal Tuan Chi-jui, November 12th, 1925. Same to the Doyen of the Diplomatic Body, same date.

¶ General Kuo Sung-lin to Marshal Chang Tso-lin. This telegram was received at the latter's headquarters on November 26th, 1925.

|| Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang's Circular Telegram, November 28th, 1925.

lin was still its protégé—a chieftain of a gang of bandits, a Hunghutse, who fought on the side of Japan during the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905, and who was pardoned with his comrades and made General by the great Empress Dowager owing to the entreaties of the Japanese Government.

The decision of the Tokyo Cabinet was against dispatching any reinforcements to Manchuria. In the official opinion of the Japanese Government, the warfare between the opposing forces under the command of Marshal Chang Tso-lin and General Kuo Sung-lin was a strife between individuals, and, therefore, the outcome of this individual fighting had nothing to do with Japan, which was bound to maintain strict neutrality. Even if General Kuo Sung-lin's troops acted in co-operation with Soviets, as stated by Marshal Chang Tso-lin,* and Manchuria should fall under the sway of Communism, nothing could be done under the circumstances so long as there was no encroachment upon Japan's rights and interests. Only in this event would the Japanese Government take whatever steps were necessary in self-defence.†

We have many reasons for believing that the Japanese Cabinet was sincere in its desire to maintain strict neutrality. Perhaps it wished even a change in the Manchurian high command, which had not always complied with its designs, as generally believed in China. Anyhow, the official Japanese News Agencies exerted themselves in advertising the victories of Kuo Sung-lin and in describing the hopeless position and the imminent fall of Chang Tso-lin. But the General Staff in Tokyo thought otherwise.

The Japanese War Office gave out the text of two communications which the Commander of the Japanese Troops stationed in Kwantung sent to the rival parties. It was a warning to both sides that military operations in the zone of the South Manchurian Railway were strictly prohibited.‡ General Kuo Sung-lin's troops were refused entry into the city of Newchwang.§ The Japanese garrisons in some important strategical points of South Manchuria were increased by troops brought over from Korea.¶

* Official Statement of Marshal Chang Tso-lin's Headquarters, Mukden, November 23rd, 1925.

† Statement of Viscount Kato, Japanese Premier, to the Seiyukai Party, Tokyo, December 10th, 1925.

‡ "North-China Herald," December 12th, 1925.

§ General Kuo Sung-lin to K. Yoshizawa, Japanese Minister at Peking, December 17th, 1925.

¶ "North China Herald," December 26th, 1925.

On the morning of December 24 General Kuo Sung-lin started a general attack against the last Fengtien forces hurriedly despatched to the front to stop the general retreat of Marshal Chang Tso-lin's army, and suddenly suffered a reverse. Late in the afternoon of the same day a group of his officers called on the Japanese Consul-General at Tsiminfu, and requested him to mediate between General Kuo Sung-lin and Marshal Chang Tso-lin. Still a few hours later, when, after defeating the troops of the Tupan of Chihli Province, Li Ching-lin, the Kuominchun entered Tientsin victoriously, the dead bodies of General Kuo Sung-lin and his wife were brought to Mukden as a trophy and laid before Marshal Chang Tso-lin.* On December 24, 1925, General Kuo Sung-lin, accompanied by his wife, was captured by the Fengtien cavalry while fleeing in the disguise of a coolie from Tsiminfu to Liaoyang and was executed.†

The suddenness of the collapse of the revolt was startling. The Chinese Press cried in one voice that it was solely due to Japanese interference. It was stated that on the eve of Kuo Sung-lin's last attack Marshal Chang Tso-lin went in person to the Japanese Consulate and on his knees implored them to save him, offering large concessions to Japan.‡ The assistance was rendered. Some few thousand Japanese soldiers, dressed in Chinese uniform, were hurried to the front, which proved to be fatal for the half-frozen troops of General Kuo Sung-lin, denied warm quarters in Newchwang and Tsiminfu.

Whilst the Chinese public passionately discussed the incident, the Kuominchun in Peking hastened to wind up its affairs. The organization of a new Provisional Government, which was proposed to be introduced by the Kuominchun at the beginning of the offensive, was suspended.§ The return of M. Karakhan, who was on a short visit to Moscow in connection with the appropriation of funds for the campaign,¶ could not change the situation. On January 4, 1926, Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang announced that he was giving up public life, and, waiting for the reply to his letter of resignation,

* "Eastern News Agency," December 24th, 1925.

† "Reuter-Kokusai," December 25th, 1925.

‡ Shanghai Chinese Labour and Commercial Organization to Mr. Chang Yu-ting (courtesy name of Marshal Chang Tso-lin).—"North-China Herald," February 6th, 1926.

§ Marshal Tuan Chi-jui's Mandate, December 28th, 1925.

¶ Official Statement of Marshal Chang Tso-lin's Headquarters, *op. cit.*

left for Russia *via* Mongolia.* The Cabinet, which was still in the hands of his partisans, appointed him "Special Commissioner for Study of Industries in Foreign Countries." The mandate was signed by Marshal Tuan Chi-jui,† who also caused a circular telegram to be published announcing his own intention to resign. ‡ The Minister of Finance fled: the amorphous Government's credit was nil. §

The resignation of Feng Yu-hsiang did not mean, however, that the leaders of the Kuominchun army laid down their arms. They kept Peking, Tientsin and Shanhaikuan, and prepared themselves for the continuation of the struggle.¶ M. Karakhan took heroic measures to strengthen their armaments || and to arrest the progress of the Fengtien army. Under the pretext of non-payment of passage-money for the transport of Marshal Chang Tso-lin's troops the Russian Administration of the Chinese Eastern Railway suspended the traffic on that railway, thereby causing complete confusion in the rear of the Fengtien army. But the position was now different. By order of Marshal Chang Tso-lin, M. Ivanoff, the Russian Director-General of the Railway, was promptly arrested, and, in spite of a threatening attitude, the Soviet Government ** had finally to give in and renew the transportation of Fengtien reinforcements.

The majority of the Chinese feudal lords, like many politicians in China, †† had their own reasons for keeping the spoils of any compromise with the Foreign Powers from falling into the hands of the Peking Government or Marshal Chang Tso-lin. †‡ However, the activity of the Soviet Government and the support of the radical factions by Soviet Russia alarmed them. It was no longer a farcical expedition of Dr. Sun Yat-sen which could be ridiculed: it was a real war which was backed by a Great Power and which was directed not only against Marshal Chang Tso-lin, but also against all of them, including those who joined Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang.

* Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang's Circular Telegram, January 4th, 1926.

† Chief-Executive's Mandate, January 8th, 1926.

‡ "North-China Herald," January 16th, 1926.

§ Mr. Chen Chin-tao.

¶ Marshal Wu Pei-fu's Circular Telegram, Hankow, February 6th, 1926.

|| Mitarevsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 52-55.

** M. Chicherin, People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., to L. Karakhan, January 23rd, 1925; L. Karakhan to the Chief Executive, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Marshal Chang Tso-lin, January 23rd, 1925.

†† Statement of Tang Shao-yi, October 5th, 1925.

‡‡ Marshal Wu Pei-fu to the Diplomatic Body at Peking, October 26th, 1925.

Marshal Wu Pei-fu was the first to reconsider his position. Whilst General Sun Chuan-fang suspended war operations in Shantung, he entered into an agreement with Marshal Chang Tso-lin concerning joint action against the Kuominchun* and moved his troops into Honan. On March 3, 1926, the combined Chihli and Shantung forces, associated with the Fengtien party, started an offensive against the Kuominchun near Tientsin. A few days later Marshal Chang Tso-lin crossed the Great Wall. The communications with Peking were interrupted. The Taku channel was mined. The Foreign Powers strongly protested against this violation of the Protocol of 1901.† Their naval authorities at Tientsin presented an ultimatum to the Kuominchun command at Tientsin, demanding an immediate removal of mines which had been placed in the Taku Channel, and closed Tientsin for navigation. ‡

The incident might easily have been closed by an expression of regret on the part of the Peking Government, § for both parties were accustomed to mutual protests of no practical consequence, but the Chinese Youth, led by the extremists, thought otherwise. Several thousand students, enraged by the foreign ultimatum, marched to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and after parading past the Legation quarters, proceeded to the house of the Chief Executive. Not finding him there, they marched to the Ministry of the Navy, where the Marshal was reported to be, and where the demonstrators met a large posse of the Marshal's personal bodyguard. The soldiers fired a volley. Over one hundred students were killed and wounded. The crowd retreated pell-mell into the streets, scattering in all directions.

The Fengtien cavalry was thirty miles from the Capital. Tientsin was evacuated. The Kuominchun hastily retreated to the Nankow Pass leading to Kalgan. The Tupan of Shansi, General Yen Hsi-shan, called the "Model Governor," who for the last five years had remained aloof from inter-factional strife, and who recently threw in his lot with the Kuominchun, suddenly turned against them and dealt them a severe blow

* "Shanghai Journal of Commerce," February, 1926.

† Diplomatic Body to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 10th and 13th, 1926.

‡ Naval Representatives of the Protocol Powers to Commander-in-Chief of the Yellow Sea Squadron, March 16th, 1926.

§ Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Diplomatic Body, March 18th, 1926.

along the Suiyuan Railway. According to reports, Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang was *en route* to Urga.

On April 3 thousands of people in Peking watched, for the first time in the history of the Chinese Capital, a squadron of manoeuvring Fengtien aeroplanes. Bombs were dropped, aimed at the Kuominchun barracks and headquarters. One fell near the French Mission, causing the Diplomatic Body to burst into anger and to file a new protest against the violation of the Peking Protocol.* But there was nobody left at Peking to draft a reply to this protest. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. C. T. Wang, an intimate friend of Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang, was in flight. The Chief Executive was in hiding. Other Ministers and high officials took refuge in the Legation compound and did not attend at their offices.

Being hard pressed from all sides, the Kuominchun made a desperate bid for the support of Marshal Wu Pei-fu, inviting him to come to Peking, and engineered a *coup d'état* in his favour. The scheme failed. Marshal Wu Pei-fu refused to entertain the invitation, and there was practically no authority left in Peking against whom the *coup d'état* could be directed. Order in the city was maintained by a self-appointed Committee of Safety under General Wang Shih-chu, composed in the main of ex-Premiers, who invited Sir Francis Aglen, Inspector-General of Chinese Maritime Customs, to act as advisory member. This Committee immediately released President Tsao Kun and rescinded the mandate of October 7, 1925, ordering the arrest of the members of the Chihli party.

On April 19 the Allied troops entered Peking.† On the following day Marshal Tuan Chi-jui left for Tientsin, giving room to a new Government, but neither Marshal Chang Tso-lin nor Marshal Wu Pei-fu hastened to make their appearance in the Capital or announce the organization of a Government. An attempt to pave the way for the return to Constitutionalism was made by ex-President Tsao Kun, who, after his release, proclaimed the restoration of the Constitution of 1923, but nobody took it seriously.‡ The

* Diplomatic Body to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 6th, 1926.

† Before evacuating Peking the Kuominchun Commanders exterminated Marshal Tuan Chi-jui's loyal bodyguards who saved him from the wrath of the students on March 17. They were taken first to the Yellow Temple, thence ordered to the front, but they were ambushed *en route* under machine-gun emplacements and shot down. Out of 400 odd, only five escaped.—
АУТНОН.

‡ Marshal Tsao Kun's Circular Telegram, May 1st, 1926.

authority in the Capital remained in the hands of the Committee of Safety, which was enforced by the co-opting of some members of the Fengtien and Chihli factions* until May 16, when it was replaced by the so-called Regency Cabinet.

Marshal Chang Tso-lin arrived in Peking only on June 26, followed two days later by Marshal Wu Pei-fu. The historic interview of the two greatest representatives of Chinese feudalism lasted only a few minutes, Marshal Wu Pei-fu returning to his troops in Honan. Neither the Kuominchun, which retreated to the Nankow' Pass,† nor the Kuomintang and the Soviets were crushed.‡ The formidable struggle, which, in the ultimate result, has brought the reunification of the country and the capitulation of the Occident in China, had only just started. The failure of M. Karakhan's attempt to win back for the cause of the two Kuomin Marshal Wu Pei-fu as a "valiant and great Chinese patriot" by personally addressing him,§ had hardly any practical effect. The "red menace," which caused Wu Pei-fu to refuse with indignation the proposition of the Soviet Ambassador,¶ was stronger than ever.||

In fact, besides the creation of political combinations which paralysed all efforts of the Foreign Powers to reach an understanding with China and to arrest the progress of Chinese nationalism, the Soviets made all endeavours to rouse the enthusiasm of the rank and file of the Nationalist armies and to ensure them the support of the masses. The ideas of Russian Communism were implanted so as to suit the requirements of Chinese nationalism and to prevent the appearance of new war-lords in the midst of the revolutionary army.** It is very doubtful whether the Chinese leaders realized the depth of this policy and its final results for China; but all, irrespective of political creed and affiliation, felt instinctively the personal danger which this policy carried along with it.

The acute hatred against the Soviets and their agents in the North, which moved Marshal Chang Tso-lin and Wu

* Generals Li Ching-lin and Wang Huai-ching.

† Marshal Wu Pei-fu's Circular Telegram, February 5th, 1926; Marshal Chang Tso-lin's Statement, April 13th, 1926.

‡ Paul Pao, Representative of the Kuominchun and Commissioner for Foreign Affairs at Kalgan, to the Diplomatic Body at Peking, July 11th, 1926.

§ M. Karakhan to Marshal Wu Pei-fu, March 29th, 1926.

¶ Marshal Wu Pei-fu to M. Karakhan, March 31st, 1926.

|| Appeal by Mr. Ma Soo, Dr. Sun Yat-sen's ex-Representative at Washington, to the country, February 6th, 1926.

** Mitarevsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 24, 25.

Pei-fu to demand the recall of M. Karakhan* and deny him the protection due to him as a foreign Ambassador according to International law, had its counterpart in the South.

The strife between the partisans and non-partisans of the Communists and Russians in the Kuomintang was embittered by the high-handed actions of the strike pickets, resulting in the temporary closure of the port of Canton.† On March 20, 1926, this strife came to a head when General Chiang Kai-shek suddenly commenced drastic action against the Communists. Without orders from the Kuomintang Central Executive, he disarmed part of the pickets of the Canton Strike Committee, after surrounding and searching the Strike Committee headquarters for several hours. He also ordered the disarming of some of the Communist army units and the arrest and deportation of some of the Russian military instructors. The leading member of the Executive Committee, Wang Ching-wei, was forced to flee from Canton. In his actions General Chiang Kai-shek was supported by Dr. C. C. Wu, Generals Tan Yen-kai, Chu Pei-teh, Li Shi-shen, Sun-fo, and the Chief of the Canton Police, General Wu Teh-chen.

The impression of this anti-Communist movement was tremendous. Hundreds of moderate members of the Kuomintang who were in exile hurried to return to Canton. A telegram was immediately sent to Moscow recalling Hu Han-min to Canton. Hongkong was jubilant. On April 8 the Hongkong Authorities held an informal conversation with Dr. C. C. Wu, preliminary to a formal conference which had in view the ending of the boycott.‡

The *débâcle* of the Communists, however, was far from being complete. The reprisals undertaken by General Chiang Kai-shek touched chiefly the Left Wing of the Kuomintang,

* Marshal Chang Tso-lin's Declaration, January 28th, 1926; M. Podolsky, Consul-General *ad interim* of the U.S.S.R. at Mukden, to Kao Ching-lo, Chief of the Central Diplomatic Administration of the Three Eastern Provinces, April 9th, 1926; Kao Ching-lo to M. Podolsky, April 12th, 1926; "North-China Herald," May 22nd, 1926.

† The incident was closed by the surrender of the goods seized and removed without proper examination and assessment from the Customs. The Cantonese Government caused the Strike Committee to issue a proclamation that henceforth all formalities would be complied with and the Commissioner of Customs at Canton agreed to withdraw his order of February 22nd, 1926, closing the port.—"North-China Herald," February 27th, 1926.

‡ Official Communiqué of the Hongkong Government, handed to Reuter, April 13th, 1926.

and were rather of a personal character than of a political nature. An official banquet was given in honour of the Russian instructors ordered to leave Canton. This banquet was attended by General Tan Yen-kai, the Minister of War. The compound machinery of the party organization, the work of the Russians, was left intact. This was clearly understood by the responsible agents of Soviet Russia in China, who, independently of the question of how far Chiang Kai-shek was a revolutionary or counter-revolutionary, "were of the opinion that they should continue the work with him" in carrying out the struggle for the national revolution.*

On April 29 M. Borodin returned to Canton. To the general surprise he was accompanied by Hu Han-min. To the still greater surprise of the public, a mandate of the Central Executive Committee, dated May 5, appointed him Adviser to the Political Committee of the Canton Government. Rumours were afloat that he would shortly be promoted to be Supreme Adviser of the Canton Government. The Chief of Canton Police, General Wu Teh-chen, who carried out the arrests of the left Kuomintang and Russians, was imprisoned. Dr. C. C. Wu was advised to leave Canton. Mr. Sun-fo, the leader of the right wing, was dismissed from the Government and offered the post of Canton representative in Moscow, or, if he preferred to stay in Canton, his old post of Mayor of Canton. Finally, Hu Han-min hurriedly departed for Shanghai.

As far as the Communists were concerned, nothing was known until May 15, when, at the first meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, General Chiang Kai-shek, now Chairman of the Military Council, opened the meeting by denouncing some of the outrages attributed to the Communists in South China. He suggested that henceforth no Communists within the Kuomintang might hold a leading post in the party or in the Government. A resolution was passed to the effect that the relations between the Kuomintang and the Communist party should be rearranged, but the radical suggestion of General Chiang Kai-shek regarding the expulsion of Communists was over-ruled. It was decided to restrict the number of Communists who might fill places within the Kuomintang organization. The Communist Party

* Report of Comrade Stepanoff, Chief Adviser to General Chiang Kai-shek, at a meeting of the nucleus of the Russian Communist Party at Canton re the incident of March 20th, 1926.—Mitarevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

was bound to instruct its members not to oppose the three fundamental principles of the Kuomintang and to deposit a list of its members with the Central Executive Committee. These resolutions were fully endorsed by M. Borodin.

The inconsistency of the Kuomintang and the endorsement of the resolutions by M. Borodin give every reason to believe that the entire proceedings were arranged beforehand by the leaders of both parties, including General Chiang Kai-shek. The necessity of preserving unity was obvious. The anti-Northern expedition was no longer a dream of a few enthusiasts. It was a hard reality. The vanguards of the enemy were close at the gates of Kwangtung. General Tang Sheng-chi, an ally of the Kuomintang, had been driven from Changsha and retreated to Chuchow. Changsha was occupied by General Yeh Kai-shin, one of Marshal Wu Pei-fu's commanders.

On June 11 Mr. Eugene Chen, the newly-appointed Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs and an intimate friend of M. Borodin, informed the Hongkong Government of the readiness of his Government to negotiate with regard to the settlement of the boycott. The negotiations, however, proved to be abortive: the Hongkong Government found it impolitic to make a loan to Canton, which was one of the terms of the proposed settlement by the Kuomintang. This loan could be used for military purposes against the North. The necessary credits were opened by Russia.*

On July 10 the Canton Bureau of Information announced the appointment of General Chiang Kai-shek as Commander-in-Chief of the Canton National Revolutionary Army. The war was declared. It was a war against "Imperialism and for the re-unification of China." †

It is for the future historians of China to complete the record of this period, which Posterity will call the birth of Chinese nationalism, and which is connected with the Eurasian movement; but, in concluding this Chapter a glimpse may be given of the life which has been going on in a small residence in the Japanese Concession at Tientsin occupied by Mr. Pu Yi and his wife since their flight from Peking in February 1925. ‡

* Mitarevsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 56-58.

† General Chiang Kai-shek's Declaration, July 10th, 1926.

‡ Official Statement of the Japanese Legation, February 24th, 1925.

Mr. Pu Yi still clings to the traditions of his House. He has observed the festivals of the ancient calendar. He has even held State functions, to which his European friends were invited. He has decked his Imperial robes with imitation jewels made by a Tientsin jeweller to replace treasures stolen by the Republican liquidators. He has mounted a throne, an imitation of that throne which was used by his illustrious ancestors, and has received the homage of his loyal courtiers. There were only fifty, including servants, left of a retinue of some ten thousand who formed the suite of his grandmother.

The other evening Mr. Henry Pu Yi put on a tail-coat and a smart white tie, and attended a dinner-party given in his honour at the Astor House Hotel at Tientsin. After dinner, which was in the ordinary European style, he strolled into the public lounge, where a lively orchestra played the latest jazz airs, and he danced like the other guests.

He danced quite well. The Chinese servants hovering at the door watched Mr. Pu as they might watch the Herald of the Day of Judgment.* It was the Chinese Emperor, the Son of Heaven, the heir of the Great Empress Dowager, who danced a fox-trot just at the time when his Country, the Great Inheritance, made her last endeavour to regain her unity and freedom.

For fifteen years he has had a foreign tutor, Mr. R. F. C. Johnston, and under the latter's care has acquired a fair knowledge of European affairs.†

* Sir Percival Phillips in the "Daily Mail," 1925.

† *Ibid.*

CHAPTER XI

JAPAN'S SPECIAL INTERESTS: THE ANTI-NORTHERN EXPEDITION

THE progress of the Anti-Northern expedition could easily be checked at the outset by Japan. Pulling the strings behind the Chinese political stage since the very birth of Chinese republicanism, she has had ample means to destroy the plans of the Kuomintang Government and to force it to abandon the idea of conquering the North by force. She could easily bring pressure to bear upon the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic, forcing it to abide strictly by the letter of the Convention of 1919 prohibiting the import of arms into China, although it was not a signatory to this Convention. The Korean Straits, through which the Russian supplies went from Vladivostok, formed a part of the Japanese Inland Sea since the Treaty of Portsmouth, 1906. She herself could have stopped the supply of arms and munitions to the Nationalist army, as she had signed this Convention.

But as the Soviet intrigue against Marshal Chang Tso-lin in the North coincided with the immediate interests of Japan, as far as preventing any understanding between China and the Treaty Powers was concerned, the anti-Northern expedition of the Southern Government, organized with the help of Soviet Russia, tended to further the plans of Japan in regard to China.

As a matter of fact, the Tariff Conference, which opened shortly before General Kuo Sung-lin's revolt, proved to be a success for China, the Powers agreeing to recognize China's tariff autonomy with effect from January 1, 1929,* but aroused grave apprehension in Japan. It was the end of progress of her import trade to China; it was the end, in fact, of the greater portion of her foreign trade. No Japanese Government could agree to it, even if it inspired the fullest willingness

* Resolution of the Tariff Autonomy and Likin Abolition Sub-Committee, November 17th, 1925.

to meet "the legitimate aspirations of awakening China."* The maximum concession which it could make in the matter of China's tariff autonomy was to agree upon the introduction of a graduated tariff based on the principle of the lowest rates for Japanese imports and the highest rates on goods imported by Occidentals. But this scheme could hardly be expected to find favour with the other Powers.†

The outbreak of hostilities between the Kuominchun and Marshal Chang Tso-lin, and the political turmoil which ensued, solved the predicament. The Chinese delegates' deserted the Conference, and it had to suspend proceedings pending the stabilization of the Government.‡

The Extraterritoriality Commission, which proceeded smoothly in spite of all political uncertainties, was a different matter. It was, in appearance, a *beau geste* on the part of the Powers signatories to the Washington Treaty, but in fact a concession to appease the indignation of the Chinese after the events of May and June, 1925. This was interpreted by the Chinese as a new and a most elaborate insult to China, which served the purpose of fostering anti-foreign propaganda.§ Its scope was confined to the investigation of the Chinese judicial system and a report on the findings to the Powers concerned, who were not bound to accept any suggestion contained in it. Such a procedure was welcomed by the Japanese.

The anti-foreign movement and anti-foreign boycotts affected Japan very little. They proved to be effective and lasting only against the Western Powers, and particularly against Great Britain. As far as Japan was concerned, their results were abortive. In the six years which followed the boycott of 1919, Japanese trade with China reached the sum of Tls. 486,092,648 in 1925, showing an increase of Tls. 94,809,412 over the value of direct trade following the boycott of 1922.¶ The Japanese cotton mills in China, in

* Statement of Baron Shidehara, Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the Japanese Diet, January 21st, 1926.

† Statement of Mr. S. Saburi, Director of the Commercial Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Japanese Delegate to the Tariff Conference, February 5th, 1926.

‡ Statements of Sir Ronald Macleay, H.B.M.'s Minister, and Mr. K. Yoshisawa, Japanese Minister, at the meeting of the Tariff Conference at Peking, July 3rd, 1926.

§ Southern Government to Dr. Wang Chung-hui, President of the Extraterritoriality Commission.—"North-China Herald," April 24th, 1926.

¶ Chinese Maritime Customs Revenue and Trade Reports for 1922 and 1925.

respect to their production, held the first place after the Chinese-owned mills. In spite of incessant strikes since 1923, their number reached 45 in 1926, with 1,347,947 spindles and 8,338 looms respectively.*

The bulk of the ships plying in Chinese waters also belonged to Japan, while the amount of Japan's investments in various industrial enterprises in China probably ran into hundreds of millions. Japan was approaching the moment which she had unsuccessfully tried to precipitate in 1915 by presenting to Yuan Shih-kai her notorious Twenty-one Demands. Her Occidental competitors were losing ground in China,† notwithstanding their efforts to regain the goodwill of the Chinese people. Thus the intensification of the anti-foreign propaganda connected with the anti-Northern expedition did not present any menace to Japanese interests in China. On the contrary, it afforded Japan a new opportunity of extending her trade at the expense of her Occidental rivals. Still less was there any reason for Japan to be afraid of the victory of the Chinese radical elements and the growing influence of Soviet Russia and the Communists. In the person of the Southern Government she had rather a friend than an enemy. Her participation in the Chinese revolution on the side of the Republicans ensured her this friendship.

In the eyes of Dr. Sun Yat-sen Japan has been responsible for the rise of the standing of all Asiatic peoples amongst the nations and the fact that the white races had not dared to disparage them. ‡ Moreover, she was able to harmonize the most modern Occidental views and practice with the ancient wisdom of Japan, and to create a new form of civilization,

* Report of Messrs. Spunt & Co. on the Chinese cotton season 1926-1927.

† The following tables compiled from the Maritime Customs Revenue and Trade Reports for the respective years show the decline of the British trade and the increase of the Japanese trade in China for the period under review :

General Trade Years	Great Britain	Japan
1921	Hk. Tls. 180,840,571	Hk. Tls. 382,460,065
1922	183,800,424	391,183,236
1923	163,004,359	409,541,643
1924	176,261,876	435,937,789
1925	140,780,962	486,092,648
1926	172,105,202	548,650,330
1927	130,063,563	502,632,570

The decrease of the Japanese trade in 1927 should be attributed to the fact that in 1927 the greater portion of China was closed to foreign trade owing to the Civil War.—AUTHOR.

‡ Dr. Sun Yat-sen, "San Min Chu I," *op. cit.*, p. 15.

which China had to learn.* Dr. Sun Yat-sen keenly realized the need of mutual economic co-operation between Japan and China, their mutual dependence,† and the necessity for all the Asiatic races to unite together.‡ The Sino-Japanese rancour was due to a misunderstanding for which both nations were equally responsible. Quarrels between brothers require less ground than quarrels between strangers.§

The wisdom of Japan which enabled her to resist successfully all foreign aggression and to preserve the independence of her civilization was the true and pure Chinese civilization inherited by Japan from China.¶ The Japanese of to-day were the real Chinese, the Chinese of the Tang dynasty, the period in which Chinese civilization first blossomed.|| The delicacy, refinement and principles of loyalty and gallantry of that period were preserved in Japan from the destructive influence of the Mongols and Manchus which Mongolized the Chinese, debasing them with the untidiness, slovenliness and personal uncleanness of the Mongols.**

We do not go so far as the famous Chinese thinker, Ku Hung-ming, whom we have just cited, and who has been admired by the *élite* of Japanese Science and Literature, and ridiculed by the modern Chinese, but we think that the present antagonism between China and Japan is largely due to the erroneous interpretation of Japan's position *vis-à-vis* China since the war of 1894-95.

Neither the notorious Twenty-one Demands nor the subsequent policy of Japan in Shantung and Manchuria, even if it had the appearance of an intervention in China's domestic affairs, can give grounds to conclude that the Japanese intrusion into Chinese politics was or is threatening China's territorial integrity or her sovereign rights. The huge investments made

* *Ibid.*, p. 16.

† Statement of Viscount Shibusawa to General Chiang Kai-shek, *op. cit.*

‡ Dr. Sun Yat-sen in the course of a public address in Kobe, November 28th, 1924.—"North-China Herald," December 6th, 1924.

§ General Chiang Kai-shek, speaking in Miyanosita, October 1927.—"China Press," October 19th, 1927.

¶ In 202 A.D. the Japanese fleet, led personally by Jingu Kogō, the famous widow of the fourteenth Mikado, Chuai Jenno, appeared on the Korean coast. The conquest of a part of Korea was an event of incalculable importance for the development of Japan. Korea became the connecting bridge over which the whole civilization and culture of China made its way into Japan, with Buddhism and the philosophy of Confucius as their vehicles.—Prof. J. J. Rein, "Japan: Travels and Researches," pp. 217, 218.

|| Ku Hung-ming, "The Future of Japan."—"North-China Herald," May 8th, 1920.

** *Ibid.*

in China by Japan subsequently to the successful elimination of the Tsings and Yuan Shih-kai do not represent any danger to China. Those investments may roughly be valued at Gold Yen 1,900,000,000, a larger amount than that of any other nation. The "special interest of Japan" in Manchuria, as far as her investment in railways, mining, manufacturing industries, banking, commerce, etc., is concerned amounts alone to Gold Yen 1,329,000,000. In addition to this Japan has loaned to the Peking Government and the various provincial governments a total of about Gold Yen 700,000,000. If the latter, in its greater part, has been squandered by unscrupulous politicians and consumed by civil wars, the capital invested in various commercial and industrial enterprises remains. It has fertilized the barren soil of Manchuria and revived the stagnant Chinese commerce, giving earnings to millions of Chinese artisans, workmen and peasants.

There was, perhaps, a moment when the Japanese Government, and particularly the Japanese military party, intoxicated with the victories of 1894-95 and 1904-5, dreamt of grandiose conquests on the continent, but this time has irrevocably passed. The experience of twenty years has clearly shown that Japan's territorial expansion lies not in the direction of the continent, and that the surplus of her population* cannot be cleared by mass emigration into countries which do not present the same natural facilities as Japan. There was and is no room for a mass emigration of Japanese into China proper. She is too over-populated to give place to a new population running into millions. Neither is there room for the Japanese colonization of Manchuria. Tens of thousands of Chinese yearly forsake their old homes and move thither.† The economic pressure of these amorphous, impermeable masses is irresistible. It was due to this fact that the emperors of the late Manchu dynasty, awake to the obliterating and engulfing propensities, or rather abilities, of the prolific Chinese, forbade them to migrate into Manchuria in order to save the country of their ancestors from becoming Chinese.

* According to Mr. Shimojo, the Director of the Bureau of Statistics at Tokyo, the population of Japan has increased by two million persons during 1926, while the crop of rice for the same period dropped off 6.9 per cent., giving a shortage of over 4,000,000 koku to be made good with imported rice.—AUTHOR.

† Statement of Mr. A. Matsuoka, Vice-President of the South-Manchuria Railway Co.—"North-China Herald," October 1st, 1927.

Up to the Boxer rebellion Manchuria was mainly waste land, but as soon as this restriction was rescinded her Chinese population increased with enormous rapidity until at the beginning of 1926 it reached 20,000,000. The Tsing dynasty faded out of the picture; the Manchus disappeared, absorbed by the Chinese, but the average Japanese emigrant is not desirous of going to Manchuria, while those who did go failed to make their home in that land.* They were like the Manchus, unable to withstand the pressure of the patient, plodding, insinuating, hard-working Chinese, who, sooner or later, gradually became the sole proprietors of the soil.

The Far Eastern dominions of Russia present still less facilities for the Japanese expansion. The Siberian expedition of 1918-1922 proved positively that all dreams to establish there a territory for Japanese colonization are chimerical. Besides severe climatic conditions, which the average Japanese cannot endure, and the natural inaccessibility of the country, to conquer Siberia means to exterminate her entire population. For in every Russian the Japanese will find an irreconcilable enemy who will never endure the appearance of Japanese colonists on Russian soil. Russia is not a second Korea, inhabited by a destitute and disarmed population, easily suppressed. The policy of harsh measures applied there is out of place in Siberia. It has led only to bloody excesses,† to the events of Nicholaevsk on the Amur, where the Soviet irregulars massacred the entire Japanese colony, including women and children, together with the Japanese garrison and the personnel of the Japanese Consulate. ‡

The possession of fisheries on the Amur coast and Kamchatka, and of the oil-fields of Saghalien, without the express sanction of the Russian Government, might easily result in the necessity of maintaining a large army, the cost of which will offset the advantages of such a possession. This was at once realized by the sober-minded section of Japanese politicians § and commercial bodies, ¶ which preferred to see normal relations with Russia restored rather than to follow the chauvinistic outcries of the die-hards.

* Mr. Eiji Amoh, Japanese Consul-General in Harbin.—*Ibid.*

† "The Japanese Operation in the Amur Provinces," collection of official documents relating to the International Intervention in the Amur Provinces, published by "Svobodnaya Rossia," Vladivostok, 1921.

‡ Declaration of the Japanese Government, July 3rd, 1920.

§ Mr. Seigo Nakano in the House of Representatives in support of the motion regarding the unconditional recognition of the U.S.S.R.—March 20th, 1923.

¶ Resolution of the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce, May 7th, 1923.

In effect, the outlet for Japan's emigration and territorial expansion scarcely lies in the Asiatic continent. If Japan is ever forced to seek "a place in the sun" for the surplus of her population, the natural direction is towards the south. Being barred from the continent by its natural conditions and the density of its native population, and being excluded from America and Australia as undesirable, the Japanese emigrant will be forced to move to the thousands of Southern islands which form a chain along the eastern and southern coasts of Asia.* He will remain there, in the land of rice, without which no Japanese mass emigration is possible. He will meet there a population economically and socially weak to resist the victorious march of Japanese Culture. The possession of these dominions will ensure to Japan the permanent leadership and domination of all peoples of yellow race, and solve, once and for ever, all her economic problems. Any step in this direction will open a new era in the Pacific: an era of a formidable and lasting struggle, the outcome of which will depend upon the moral and material preparedness of the combatants to endure the enormous losses connected with it.

We are not concerned with the moral side of the issue, for if such a struggle ever takes place (and we believe it will) it will undoubtedly bear the character of a deep national movement in Japan. We are interested in the material side of the problem, and we venture to state that in our short historical analysis we have met Japan in the process of systematically preparing herself for the coming struggle.

The great earthquake of 1923 has delayed, and, at the same time, brought nearer, the final event. It has delayed it, for it dealt a severe blow to the national economy of Japan, causing a loss amounting to Yen 5,506,386,034,† not including the value of works of art, objects of historical interest, libraries, etc., which were destroyed by fire. It brought it nearer, for the earthquake of 1923, with its 1,513 shocks and the subsequent 27,000 earthquakes,‡ indicated that the secular elevation of

* General N. Golovin and Admiral A. Bubnoff, "The Problem of the Pacific in the Twentieth Century," Charles Scribner, New York City, 1922.

† Bureau of Social Affairs of the Home Office, Tokyo: "The Great Earthquake of 1923 in Japan," 1926, p. 464.

‡ Seismological Department of the Tokyo Central Meteorological Observatory, September 1st, 1928. Out of the total 27,000 earthquakes, 9,500 were felt by the human body; the rest were recorded only by instruments.

the coasts of the main Japanese islands, recorded in the annals of Japanese history from the eighth century B.C., has assumed a catastrophic form.*

The destruction which this geological process brought along with it could be endured in the past by Japan when she was a purely agricultural country. But it cannot be endured by Japan as a modern State, with a highly-developed industry, with its huge buildings, precious machinery, railways, dockyards, etc.

It is asserted in certain quarters that people may become inured to earth tremors, that familiarity with earthquakes is breeding a species of contempt for them, and that the rattlings of the earth's crust are even despised in Japan as too trivial a matter to interfere with life. But it cannot be denied that the seismic disturbances in Japan were and are fatal for her normal development as a Great Power; that the only means to check their terrible consequences is the expansion of her territory and the redistribution of her population and vital industries and means of national defence in such a manner as to guarantee them against any such catastrophe as a severe earthquake.

China and Russia form the Japanese rear-line. It is to the advantage of Japan to see these countries industrially developed and self-supporting, free from any foreign influence and capable to resist any foreign aggression. It is to her advantage to see them strong and willing to supply her with all that she needs in her struggle for her national progress.

The dispute with Russia has been settled. The national insult which was received in Nicholaevsk-on-Anur, and which served as an excuse for the occupation of the northern part of Saghalien Islands, has been forgotten. On January 20, 1925, His Excellency K. Yoshisawa, the Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of his Majesty the Emperor of Japan at Peking, and Comrade L. Karakhan, the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for China, signed a convention whereby Japan received exclusive oil concessions in Northern Saghalien,† and was assured that all questions connected with the right of Japan to exploit forests and

Among the prominent earthquakes which did considerable damage were those in Sagami district, January 16th, 1924; Northern Tajima, May 23rd, 1925; Karenko, Taiwan, June 14th, 1925; Northern Tajima, March 7th, 1927; Tamsuikai, Taiwan, August 25th, 1927; and Sekigahara, Niigata prefecture, October 27th, 1927.—АУТНОН.

* Prof. J. J. Rein, *op. cit.*, pp. 52, 56.

† Russo-Japanese Convention, 1925, Protocol B.

fisheries on the Russian Pacific coast would be solved according to her desires.* The terms of the Portsmouth Treaty, whereby the rights of Japan in South Manchuria were established, were reconfirmed.† The Japanese troops evacuated Saghalien, and the Japanese Government pledged itself to "respect scrupulously Russia's territorial integrity" and the rights of the U.S.S.R. to order its own life within its own jurisdiction in its own way, and to refrain from any act, overt or covert, liable in any way to endanger its order or security. The Soviets bound themselves to refrain from any political or social propaganda endangering the existing order in Japan.

It was not a "Gentlemen's agreement," but it was surely an agreement based on the realization of mutual advantage: it ensured to the Communist Internationale safety and a free hand in spreading its doctrines in China as long as they did not jeopardize "Japanese legitimate interests," and to Japan the destruction of political prestige and economic power of her Western rivals in China.

These limitations were tacitly accepted by the Soviets, which, as we stated, excluded Japan from amongst the "Foreign Powers" against whom they agitated in China, and which insisted upon the Kuomintang accepting this principle. Indeed, it should be admitted that, if the Soviet Government has constantly violated the non-propaganda provision of its treaties with other Powers, it has kept its word loyally in respect to Japan. Japan's social and financial crises, unemployment, and agricultural unrest are due to specifically Japanese reasons and the mediaeval system of land tenure which is still in force in Japan, but are not due to the Communist propaganda of the Soviets.

But whilst Soviet Russia has been willing, or forced by circumstances and the firm policy of Japan, to co-ordinate her policy in the Far East with that of Japan, the methods of political and diplomatic pressure brought to bear on China by her proved to be a complete failure. None of the Chinese political parties or groups recognized as an absolute fact that China's fate is indissolubly bound with that of Japan: that there was and is no room for China's independent politics as

* The Russo-Japanese Lumber Concession Agreement was signed in Moscow on January 10th, 1927.

† Chinese Government Note to the U.S.S.R., February 11th, 1925; same to Japan, January 17th and February 11th, 1925; M. Karakhan to the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, February 26th, 1925.

long as they did not correspond with the Japanese conception regarding the future of the Far East.

In the long chain of Japan's relations with China her non-interference with the progress of the anti-Northern expedition forms an event of particular importance for the destinies of the whole of Asia. The Chinese revolution reached in its progress the stage when it became essential to extend the territory of its immediate effect. The Kuomintang had to be given a chance to build up a new China on the principles expressed by their late leader. They had to be given an opportunity of realizing the hopes which were placed upon them by Japan when she afforded asylum to the Chinese revolutionaries seeking safety in flight, and, later on, helped Dr. Sun Yat-sen to establish a republic in China. For if Japan had ever to come to a complete understanding with China, she had to do it not with the China of Yuan Shih-kai or the Anfuites or Marshal Chang Tso-lin, but with the China of those who led and represented the Chinese masses.*

The outcome of the anti-Northern expedition depended on whether the China of the Kuomintang and the Communist was able to realize her actual position *vis-à-vis* Japan or not. Should it do so, her peace and order, her political and economic independence and territorial integrity were assured. Should it not—politics in the Orient have no limit in time—Japan had to wait for another chance.

Sweeping success accompanied the anti-Northern Expedition from the very start. With striking swiftness the Southern armies forced their way to the North, capturing small cities and pushing into Hunan province, the domain of Marshal Wu Pei-fu. In three weeks after the appointment of General Chiang Kai-shek, Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist armies, and the declaration of war, they reached Changsha, the capital of Hunan, where they joined the forces of General Tang Sheng-chi, an old ally of Canton. One month later their vanguards reached the outskirts of Wuchang. They

* In this connection it is interesting to point out that amongst the documents found in the U.S.S.R. Embassy at Peking during the police raid on April 6th, 1927, there is a copy and translation of a letter sent by Dr. Sun Yat-sen to a certain Japanese Minister whose name in Chinese is Mu-Tang. M. Borodin, who forwarded this copy, did not disclose his real name. In this letter Dr. Sun Yat-sen states, *inter alia*, that Japan must prepare herself for the inevitable war against Western Powers and that, "properly speaking," the victory of the Chinese revolution is in the interests of Japan, because without fostering the Chinese revolution Japan will never obtain China's friendship and will not have the possibility of greater economic development of its country."—Mitarevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 155, 156.

crossed the Yangtze west of Nanyang, and on September 6 occupied this city with its famous arsenal. Two days later they were in Hankow. Wuchang, on the other side of the river, held out stubbornly, defended by a Honanese garrison, until October 11, when, just as an agreement for the capitulation of the city was arranged, its gallant defenders to be afforded all military honours and receive a free pass, the Southern army entered the city by means of a ruse.

Marshal Wu Pei-fu's forces retreated northward, leaving the whole upper part of the Yangtze Valley in the hands of the victors. His troops proved to be incapable to withstand either the enthusiasm of the Southerners or the demoralizing effect of the Communist propaganda. Many units which had professed allegiance to him went over to the enemy or refused to fight. Nanyang, with its huge arsenal and supplies, was surrendered owing to treachery. The same occurred in Wuchang.* Marshal Wu Pei-fu himself with his best troops remained in Changhsintien, awaiting the result of the operations against the Kuominchun at the Nankow pass, taking no personal part in the war, and blindly trusting his commanders, who one after another betrayed him.

It was not only his army in which treachery assumed such proportions. The same happened in the Fukien Province, South Honan, and, later on, in Kiangsi, Chekiang, Shantung, and Shensi. The Northern commanders competed between themselves in the swiftness of their surrender to the Southerners, which brought them rich rewards and high appointments in the Nationalist army.

However, should we make an attempt to analyze the disgraceful conduct of these Generals in respect to their leaders, to whom they owed their allegiance, we would arrive at the conclusion that they had no other alternative except to do as they did. They were themselves surrounded with treachery. Their troops refused to fight against the Nationalists. They were surrounded by a hostile population, which acclaimed the advance of the Southerners.

The Communist and Kuomintang agents swamped the country long before the arrival of the Nationalist troops, causing demoralization in the ranks of the Northern party and strikes and peasant-uprisings in the rear of its armies. Their resistance was already broken during the first period of the campaign, due to the tempting slogans of Communism,

* Declaration of Marshal Wu Pei-fu, September 12th, 1926.

which the Kuomintang held, for the time being, inadvisable to introduce into China, but the force of which they realized full well.* It was a terrible weapon, a terrible means of victory, which the Northern allies had no remedy to counteract. They had nothing to offer to the masses. They could not resort to anti-foreign and anti-Christian agitation. They had no funds, no trained men to establish an effective system of corruption, espionage and propaganda, which produce the five forms of demoralization known to Chinese classical military art: the demoralization of cities and villages; the demoralization of armies; the dissension between the highest and the lowest; the demoralization of life and the demoralization of death.†

Still less could the Northern leaders resort to means of terrorism. They could not depart from Chinese traditions, which were the only weapons left in their hands to resist the destructive methods of the Southern tactics. These traditions forbade the use of terror against a peaceful population, and the putting to death of officers and soldiers loyal to their chiefs, as was done by the Nationalists.‡ They were insufficiently modernized to despise the traditional Chinese generosity and to cast away the custom, strictly adhered to since the Revolution of 1911, whereby the personal property of defeated political opponents was not liable to confiscation by their victorious rivals.§

On December 1, 1926, the Political Council of the Kuomintang decided to remove the Southern Government to Wuchang. This decision was taken with the approval of General Chiang Kai-shek, who thus expressed a feeling of complete security in the Southern control of the Yangtze territory.

* Declaration of the Canton Government, Canton, June 5th, 1925.

† Rules of Military Art (兵法), Art. 13. These rules are attributed to the genius of the Chinese General Sun-tse, who lived in the sixth century B.C.—АУТНОР.

‡ On the day of the trial of General Liu Yu-chun, the gallant Commander of the Wuchang Garrison, and General Chen Chia-mo, the Tsuchun of Hupeh, the Nationalist Government promulgated a new Penal Code governing counter-revolutionary offences. According to Art. I. of this Code, both generals, as "holders of important offices," and "having committed acts frustrating the policies of the Nationalist Revolution," were liable to the death penalty.—"Hankow Herald," February 28th, 1927.

§ According to Mr. Rodney Gilbert, the Southern Government netted between ten and fifteen millions in cash or negotiable real estate by way of confiscations during the first three months of Hankow's occupation. Amongst the victims there were ex-President Li Yuan-hung, and his nephew, Wu Wen-fu, Marshal Wu Pei-fu's brother, and many others who had nothing to do with the present struggle, but who were known to be non-sympathizers with the Kuomintang.—"North-China Herald," December 11th, 1926.

On December 10 fourteen leading members of the Southern Government, now styled the Nationalist Government of China, including the entire family of the late Dr. Sun Yat-sen and M. Borodin, arrived at Hankow.

The largest concourse in the history of Hankow and its native city, Wuchang, estimated at 300,000, attended a mass meeting on the following day. The newly-arrived addressed the people, urging them to rise in support of the Nationalist cause and "help to bring about the abolition of the charter of China's poverty, the unequal treaties."*

Since the early days of May, 1926, Hankow had been the scene of acute labour unrest, which was deliberately intensified by the most elaborate anti-foreign and anti-Christian propaganda. Practically all foreign-owned factories and banks suspended operations. The strike wave extended to the Chinese-owned enterprises, while shipping had been crippled since the Wanhsien incident of August 29, 1926, and the increase of sniping at vessels by both Nationalist and Northern soldiers since the ultimatum to the foreign naval authorities of General Chiang Kai-shek.†

The Wanhsien incident, which stirred the whole of China, was grossly exaggerated by both Chinese and foreigners. Both sides tried to get the best of the issue, which represented a very trivial matter in a civil war. The detention of two ships and their crews belonging to a British firm ‡ by General Yang-sen, a semi-independent subordinate General of Marshal Wu Pei-fu, and the subsequent forcible release of the crew by British gunboats, resulting in an exchange of fire wherein a number of shots were fired at the city of Wanhsien, was raised to the magnitude of the deliberate destruction of a peaceful population by the British naval authorities. The Chinese claimed a loss of nearly one thousand killed and wounded. §

The Ultimatum of General Chiang Kai-shek, restraining the liberty of navigation for foreign warships in the zone of operations, was even of less importance. The foreign warships have always maintained a perfect neutrality as far as Chinese

* M. Borodin, addressing the meeting.—Reuter's Pacific Service, Hankow, December 12th, 1926.

† The Commissioner for Foreign Affairs of the Southern Army to the Consular Body at Hankow, September 17th, 1926.

‡ S.S. *Wantung* and *Wanhsien*, of Messrs. Butterfield & Swire, Shanghai.

§ British Memorandum to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 20th, 1926; Chinese Notes to the British Legation, August 10th and 14th, and November 2nd, 1926.

mutual destruction has been concerned. But, as stated, the anti-foreign feeling ran high, and thousands of workers were put out of work and, half-starving, filled the streets of Hankow. With the arrival of the Nationalists, the control of the strike movement went over to the Communists, who saw to it that no settlement of strikes could be effected.

The situation eased somewhat during the stay in Hankow of the newly-appointed British Minister, Sir Miles Lampson, who came to establish a direct contact with the Nationalist Government, the cause of which found a number of sympathizers in Great Britain.* But the effect of his interview with Mr. Eugene Chen, the Nationalist Foreign Minister, could not be lasting. The end of the anti-British boycott in Canton and the cancellation of the Hongkong strike did not mean the cessation of the anti-foreign and anti-British movement.† The Southern Government was moved to relax its attitude *vis-à-vis* Great Britain by the necessity of strengthening the war-chest of the Kuomintang, but not by considerations of inadvisability of its unfriendly policy in respect to Great Britain. It ordered the removal of the strike pickets, substituting the boycott by the levy of a 2½ per cent. surtax on all foreign imports and exports, which, since the beginning of its collection from January 1, 1927,‡ has netted several millions for the Kuomintang.

The generous grant by the British Government of £350,000, representing the percentage of the available funds of Great Britain's share of the Boxer indemnity, for educational and other public purposes in China, announced in London, § scarcely affected the anti-British attitude of the Nationalists, whilst the liberal proposals of the British Government submitted to the Diplomatic Body at Peking on December 17, 1926, ¶ regarding the immediate enforcement of the Washington surtaxes and partial cancellation of some of the extra-territorial privileges only increased the general enmity. ||

* Mr. Lloyd George's speech at Bradford, December 6th, 1926.

† Declaration of the Canton Strike Committee, October 10th, 1926.—
"North-China Herald," October 16th, 1926.

‡ Mr. Eugene Chen, Canton Minister of Foreign Affairs, to H.B.M.'s Consul-General, September 18th, 1926. Same to the Consular Body, October 6th, and December 30th, 1926.

§ Dr. F. B. A. Da Horta, Consul-General for Portugal and Senior Consul, to the Canton Government (by mail), November 5th, 1926.

¶ Report of China Indemnity Advisory Committee, London, November, 1926.

|| "North-China Herald," December 24th, 1926.

|| Mr. Eugene Chen, Nationalist Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Mr. F. B. Kellogg, U.S. Secretary of State, December 31st, 1926.

The British Concession in Hankow presented a fortified camp. All entrances to the Concession roads were barricaded and guarded by British police and volunteers and a landing party from British gunboats, which, with the greatest difficulty, succeeded in holding back an angry mob attempting to force an entrance to the Concession. Matters came to a head on January 3, 1927, when a large demonstration assembled on the boundary of the Concession and the Nationalist Government presented an ultimatum, containing the resolution of the joint meeting of the representatives of labour, agriculture, commerce, education and the army, demanding the withdrawal of the British forces and the disarmament of the volunteers.*

The position of the defenders was hopeless: thirty-five marines and some two hundred volunteers and Indian police against a crowd of many thousands, backed by the Nationalist Government.† In view of the fact "that any further use of force would lead to much useless bloodshed," ‡ it was arranged that the British troops and the volunteers would be removed, on the understanding that the Chinese authorities would undertake to guard the boundary of the Concession. However, on the morning of January 4 and on the following day a riotous mob broke through all the defences and flooded the roads of the Concession, taking possession of all official buildings.

On January 7 the Nationalist Government issued a proclamation taking over the administration of the Concession and undertaking to protect the lives and property of the foreign residents. This proclamation, in the form of a *communiqué* signed by the Nationalist Minister of Foreign Affairs, was posted within the British Concession and in the Chinese city. But there was nobody to read it. On the same day, early in the morning, the Concession was evacuated by all foreigners, except a few tens who took refuge in the buildings belonging to the Asiatic Petroleum Co., guarded by British marines.

Similar riots occurred in Kiukiang and other places on the upper Yangtze, where the majority of the foreigners,

* Resolution of the meeting of 3,500 delegates of civil and military associations, Hankow, December 20th, 1926.

Dr. H. T. C. Tu, Political Department of Headquarters of National Revolutionary Army, "The China Press," January 11th, 1927.

† Sir Austen Chamberlain in the House of Commons, February 10th, 1927.

‡ *Ibid.*

except the Japanese and the French, had to close their business and flee or were evacuated by order of their Governments. "The dykes have been cut and the water has begun to rush through," declared M. Borodin, the Soviet High Adviser to the Kuomintang.*

We must admit that not only the foreign colony in China, but also the Nationalist Government itself, were struck with amazement by the swiftness of events. The Nationalists felt that they had gone a little too far in following the tactics of the Communists. It was inconceivable that the greatest and proudest country in the world would endure silently the humiliation imposed upon her by a party of Chinese modernized politicians, degrading her prestige amongst the millions of Asiatic peoples whom it ruled.

The Nationalist Government expressed its entire willingness to compensate any loss sustained by the foreigners in general, and the British in particular, as the result of mob actions.† It tried to shift the responsibility for the incident to a set of circumstances which forced it to take control of the British Concessions.‡ It disavowed any aggression in respect to foreigners: the Nationalist Government was only anti-imperialistic, but not anti-foreign.§

The Nationalist Government pledged itself to afford every protection to the foreigners, urged them to resume their business and vowed not to capture by force Shanghai, the only Treaty port in the Yangtze Valley which the foreigner still held, but to enter it "as administrators and conservers of work done there by foreign nationals."¶ It was in the grip of fear of reprisals on the part of Great Britain, and appealed to the Public Opinion of the world, which since 1918 has never failed to lend an ear to Chinese grievances. It seemed to be confused, and its Minister of Foreign Affairs exerted himself in hiding the real facts behind a flood of noisy phrases. But the unsophisticated military leaders of the Nationalist forces were more outspoken and frank. They pointed to the inevitableness of a war between Great Britain and Japan, which "would give to China a chance to

* Statement of M. Borodin to the Representative of Reuter's Agency, January 19th, 1927.—"The China Press," January 27th, 1927.

† Mr. Eugene Chen to "The Daily Mail," January 10th, 1927.—Reuter, London, January 12th, 1927.

‡ *Ibid.*

§ Same to "The New York Herald," January 17th, 1927.—"The China Courier," January 20th, 1927.

¶ *Ibid.*

settle her own affairs unmolested by interference of these Powers." * They declared that China must unite with all the peoples weak and oppressed to fight for her independence and freedom, and must rely upon herself for the restoration of foreign Concessions, abolition of extraterritoriality and unequal treaties. † Only the Communists kept silence.

But all apprehension was superfluous. The world was decidedly in favour of the Chinese Nationalist movement. It failed to see behind it either the red face of Moscow or the Rising Sun of the Yamato people. ‡ It accepted it as an elementary movement of the Chinese awakening masses hardly to be controlled by anybody, even the Kuomintang, which, "if not promptly dealt with upon a basis of justice and equality, will endanger the peace of the world." § Under the pressure of public opinion the Government of the world's greatest democracy, America, declared itself in favour of meeting half-way the Chinese national aspirations, ¶ and, simultaneously with this announcement the British Government sent its representatives to negotiate the rendition of the British Concessions in Hankow and Kiukiang. || Moreover, it communicated to China a memorandum expressing its readiness to recognize modern China's law courts and apply her law in its own courts in China; to make British subjects liable to payment of regular legal taxation; to prohibit British missionaries to purchase land in the interior; the Chinese converts should look to the Chinese law and not to the treaties for protection; and the missionary educational and medical institutions should conform to Chinese laws and regulations.**

* Statement of General Chiang Kai-shek at the Dr. Sun Yat-sen Memorial Service at Nanchang, January 3rd, 1927.—"The China Courier," January 17th, 1927.

† Same, addressing the mass meeting upon his arrival in Hankow, January 12th, 1927.—"The Hankow Herald", January 13th, 1927.

‡ Mr. Lloyd George, *op. cit.*; Mr. Black in the U.S. House of Representatives, December 11th, 1926; Senator W. Borah, Chairman of the U.S. Foreign Relations Committee, to the Press, Washington, January 1st, 1927; Mr. Porter, Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, in the U.S. House of Representatives, January 4th, 1927.

§ Resolution regarding China's affairs, U. S. House of Representatives, January 4th, 1927.

¶ Declaration of Mr. F. B. Kellogg, U.S. Secretary of State, January 27th, 1927.

|| Messrs. Owen O'Malley, Councillor of H.B.M.'s Legation at Peking, and Eric Teichman, Chinese Secretary to the same Legation.

** Memorandum of the British Government handed by Mr. O'Malley to Mr. Eugene Chen on January 28th, and by Sir Miles Lampson to Mr. Wellington Koo on January 27th, 1927.

It was not much, but it was much more than appeared at the first glance. It proved that the Soviet methods of disposing of international issues were correct, and that the tactics adopted by the Nationalist Government in respect to the Foreign Powers was sound.

"New China is strong and is conscious of its power and its ability by economic means to enforce its will on Chinese soil against any Power. The question is not what Great Britain and the other Powers may wish to grant China to meet the legitimate aspirations of the Chinese nation, but what Nationalist China may justly grant Great Britain and the other Powers, whose *régime* of international control is now definitely sharing the fate of all historical systems of political subjections," declared Mr. Eugene Chen, the Nationalist Minister of Foreign Affairs,* and, as soon as the British Government announced its decision to despatch troops for the protection of her nationals in Shanghai,† he promptly broke off his negotiations with the British representatives at Hankow. ‡

This despatch was the only possible means to save the greatest foreign colony in China from being disgracefully turned out from China. The scheme to neutralize Shanghai, revived by a section of Chinese politicians and public organizations § and the United States Government, ¶ was indignantly refused by the Nationalists and the Northern Party alike. There was no other alternative left for Great Britain except to resort to armed force in order not to be placed in the position where she had either to accept the humiliating terms of the Nationalists, as in Hankow and Kiukiang, or declare war on Nationalist China. ||

In fact, whilst the settlement of the Hankow issue was allowed to drag on,** the situation in Shanghai had reached a critical stage. Marshal Sung Chuan-fang, the over-lord of five provinces—Kiangsu, Kiangsi, Chekiang, Fukien and Anhwei, who also controlled the Shanghai

* Declaration on Nationalist Foreign Policy, Hankow, January 22nd, 1927.

† Declaration of British Government, January 24th, 1927.

‡ Mr. Eugene Chen's Statement, January 30th, 1927.

§ Mr. George Sokolsky, China Year Book, 1928, p. 1355.

¶ U.S. Minister's communication at Peking to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Peking, February 5th, 1927; U.S. Consul-General at Hankow to Mr. Eugene Chen, February 6th, 1927.

|| The agreement concerning the transfer of the British Concession in Kiukiang was formally concluded by notes exchanged between Mr. O'Malley and Mr. E. Chen on March 2nd, 1927.

** Mr. Eugene Chen's Declaration, February 19th, 1927.

area, shared the fate of Marshal Wu Pei-fu. During the first period of the campaign in Hunan and Hupeh he tried to maintain neutrality in the hope that the Southerners would confine themselves to those provinces, but as soon as the Nationalist army occupied Hankow they invaded the province of Kiangsi, disregarding his ultimatum.* Twelve days later Nanchang, the capital of Kiangsi, and on November 5, Kiukiang, fell into the hands of General Chiang Kai-shek, who personally led the Nationalist army. During the latter part of November he advanced into Fukien and occupied a part of Anhwei, threatening Hangchow, the capital of Chekiang. An attempt to arrive at a compromise with him failed, while the difficulties owing to the revolt of entire units, labour strikes and peasant uprising increased with every moment. Marshal Sun Chuan-fang appealed for help to Marshal Chang Tso-lin, offering to forego all his rights except the control of Chekiang and Kiangsu.†

A combined force of Shantung-Chihli troops was at once moved to his assistance. Some of these troops were advanced through Anhwei towards Kiukiang; some occupied Nanking, where the Shantung forces under Marshal Chang Chung-chang, the Tupan of this province, had established headquarters. However, the efforts to save the situation failed. On February 18, 1927, the Nationalist army entered Hangchow. The Chekiang capital rendered no resistance to the Nationalists. The unoccupied part of Anhwei declared neutrality, which, being translated into common language, meant that it declared allegiance to the Nationalist cause. The fall of Shanghai and Nanking was imminent.

On February 25 the Diplomatic Body at Peking announced that it would take the necessary steps to ensure the safety of the International Settlement in Shanghai and to protect its nationals. About seven thousand British troops, over one thousand American marines, six hundred Japanese sailors, and landing parties from men-of-war of other nations and volunteers manned the barricades hastily erected around the International Settlement. The French Concession was guarded by a detachment of French troops.

Shanghai hoisted the Nationalist flags on March 21. Its fall was due to treachery, as in the case of Wuchang,

* Marshal Sun Chuan-fang's Ultimatum to the Nationalist Government, September 7th, 1927.

† "Toho News Agency," Tientsin, November 20th, 1927.

Nanyang, Nanchang, Kiukiang, and Hangchow. A joint committee of the Kuomintang and Communists, having their seat in the French Concession, directed the activity of the local labour organizations and plain-clothed soldiers of the Southern army smuggled into Shanghai, receiving instructions by wireless from Hankow. A general uprising of armed labourers was planned to effect the seizure of the foreign Settlement, but this was frustrated by the resolute actions of the British authorities, which forced the troops of other nationalities, including the Japanese, to participate half-heartedly in the defence.

The vanguards of the regular Nationalist army arrived only on March 22, when the Northerners were already in full retreat, and the native city and suburbs were controlled by armed Labour organizations, Marshal Sun Chuan-fang withdrawing his troops north of the Yangtze.

On March 23, Marshal Chang Chung-chang evacuated Nanking, and the Southern troops, advancing from Wuhu, poured into this city, meeting no resistance whatsoever.

This brief account of the principal events of the Nationalist campaign in the Yangtze Valley will show to the reader the striking results of Communist strategy applied in the great Russian Civil War of 1918-1920. But it was not this that struck most the mind of the average Chinese, and probably the mind of the average Japanese. It was the helplessness and disunity among the Foreign Powers displayed in the face of the common enemy. The British were driven out from Hankow because none of the other Powers which had men-of-war in Hankow wished to help the small British landing-party to resist the attack of thousands of Chinese coolies. The same happened in Kiukiang.

The Chinese-controlled areas in the vicinity of the International Settlement and French Concession of Shanghai fell into the hands of the Nationalists. The French authorities, aware of the existence of the Kuomintang and Communist centres of propaganda in the territory of their Concession, were helpless to stop their activity.

The Japanese declared that they saw no reason to change their policy of non-interference, for "the events in China did not affect their interests," and "that the co-operation among the Powers in China was spiritual rather than material."*

* Statements of Baron Shidehara, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the Japanese Diet, January 18th and 24th, 1927.

As for the rest, the position of Japan hardly surprised anyone, but the lack of unity amongst the British themselves, *vis-à-vis* the anti-British movement in China, was astounding, and probably satisfied the Nationalist Government much more than all the statements on China ever made by Sir Austen Chamberlain.* The most democratic elements of Great Britain expressed themselves definitely opposed to the despatch of troops for the protection of her interests in China † and exchanged encouraging telegrams with the Nationalist Government just at the moment when the entire prestige of Britain in the Orient was at stake. ‡

In the light of these events it was quite natural that every Chinese should ask whether it was not the proper moment for China to free herself from foreign oppression; whether it was not better to let the Communists do their work and not to oppose the excesses of the labour and peasant movements. Treachery, corruption, cruelty became deprived of the element of public shame, for the breach of discipline in the ranks of Northern armies assumed the aspect of highly-patriotic acts, while the opposition to the Southern invasion was identified with national treason. M. Borodin, the Russian High Adviser to the Nationalist Government, became dictator, whose instructions were beyond criticism!

The position of Marshal Chang Tso-lin was extremely difficult. He was helpless to do anything: his faithful lieutenants, his army, the Three Eastern Provinces, his loyal supporters, and even his sons, were all of one mind as far as the foreigners in China were concerned. § They were true Chinese, and could not feel or think otherwise than as Chinese. ¶

Marshal Chang Tso-lin had to co-ordinate his actions with those of the Nationalists in order not to impede their actions, aimed at the driving out of the "foreign devils." He had to linger where he had to strike. He had to follow scrupulously

* Mr. Eugene Chen's Declaration, February 19th, 1927.

† Declaration of the National Joint Council of the British Labour Movement, January 26th, 1927; Labour Amendment to the King's Address in the House of Commons, February 10th, 1927.

‡ National Joint Council of the British Labour Movement to Mr. Eugene Chen, February 6th, 1927.

§ Statements of General Chang Hsueh-liang, Marshal Chang Tso-lin's son, January 12th, 1927.—"The China Courier," January 20th, 1927; Wu Ching, Chief of the Diplomatic Bureau of the Ankuochun Headquarters, January 7th, 1927.—*Ibid.*

¶ Liang Chi-chao, "To Our British Friends," February 1st, 1927; Statement of Chu Chao-hsin, Chinese Delegate to the League of Nations, Geneva, February 13th, 1927.

the political moves of his enemies and to imitate them in order not to be accused of treason against his own country by his own party. This lessened the prestige of the Peking Government, which he backed.

An immediate collection of the two and a half per cent. Washington surtax was ordered, although it was obvious that this measure could not be enforced without the consent of the Powers concerned.* A protest against the dispatch of British troops to Shanghai was lodged not because it was really against the interests of the Peking Government or its conception of China's welfare and sovereignty, but just because it was regarded as such by the Nationalists.† The Peking Government demanded an immediate treaty revision, and, as soon as the British Concessions in Hankow and Kiukiang were surrendered to the Nationalist Government, the return of all Foreign Concessions at Tientsin.‡ It promulgated a set of rules for the registration and control of foreign educational institutions immediately after such a control was arbitrarily taken over by the Nationalists, who denied the right of free tuition to foreign missionary and educational institutions.§

In the meantime Marshal Chang Tso-lin swiftly approached the status when he could rightly consider himself to be the lord of the whole of Central and Northern China. Marshal Wu Pei-fu, one of his dangerous rivals, was out of the way. He stubbornly refused to accept the armed aid offered to him after the fall of Wuchang by Marshal Chang Tso-lin, fearing lest this help would be fatal to him not less than the Southern armies. He preferred to fight alone, and, as we know, was hopelessly defeated.

The authority of Marshal Sun Chuan-fang was reduced to that of a mere subordinate general of Marshal Chang Tso-lin. The Kuominchun army, although not defeated, retreated from the positions at Hankow Pass and Yuchan towards Shensi, and, on July 10, 1926, the Fengtien troops occupied these important strategical points. Three divisions of the Kuominchun and two brigades laid down their arms and were taken over by General Yen Hsi-shan, the Tupan of Shansi and ally of Marshal Chang Tso-lin. They suffered badly from lack of ammunition, and, after the return of Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang

* Peking Government Mandate, January 12th, 1927.

† Chinese Government Note to H.B.M.'s Minister at Peking, January 31st, 1927.

‡ Statement of Dr. Wellington Koo, Acting Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs.—"Reuter's Pacific Service," Peking, March 14th, 1927.

§ Declaration of the Ministry of Education at Peking, March 19th, 1927.

from Russia in October 1926, were further withdrawn to Northern Shensi and Kansu.

For several months nothing was heard of them, in spite of the fact that, since his arrival, Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang had accepted the command, and declared his resolution "to fight the foreigners and militarists to the end."* Whilst living in Moscow he officially joined the Kuomintang party, together with his officers and men, and was appointed a member of the Nationalist Government.†

At the beginning of December, 1926, the Kuominchun vanguards advanced to the Tungwan Pass, on the Shensi-Shansi-Honan border, but this movement did not constitute any direct menace to the Northern Allies.

On December 2, 1926, a joint Manifesto of Marshals Chang Tso-lin, Sun Chuan-fang, Chang Chung-chang, and General Yen Hsi-shan announced the formation of the so-called Ankuochun, or Tranquility Restoration Army. Marshal Chang Tso-lin assumed office as Commander-in-Chief of his newly-formed army, while both Marshals and General Yen Hsi-shan were appointed Vice-Commanders. Marshal Wu Pei-fu did not receive any appointment. He was out of the game, notwithstanding his stubborn endeavours to hold the North-eastern part of Honan.

The Regency Cabinet, which replaced the Committee of Safety in May 1926, was swiftly giving way, and the consolidation of the entire State power in the hands of Marshal Chang Tso-lin was only a question of time. The plan to revive the post of Chief Executive held by Marshal Tuan Chi-jui was definitely dropped after the refusal of the eldest statesmen and men of unquestionable reputation and popularity to assume the post,‡ which could be only a mere fiction in face of Marshal Chang Tso-lin's power.

Marshal Chang Tso-lin, however, delayed the final step which would have officially made him the head of the Chinese Government. The psychological moment was not opportune. There was nothing which could warrant his claim to the supreme power of China without exposing him to the accusation of

* Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang's Manifesto, September 16th, 1926.—"North-China Herald," October 30th, 1926.

† Canton Information Bureau, August 27th, 1926.

‡ Marshal Wang Shih-chen, the Chairman of the Committee of Safety, ex-Premier and Minister of War, and Chao Erh-hsun, the ex-Viceroy of the Three Eastern Provinces under the Empress Dowager, Director of Tsing History Compilation Bureau, Chairman of the Reorganization Conference, 1926.—
AUTHOR.

imperialism and selfish ends, fatal for the whole cause for which he had fought since the death of Yuan Shih-kai. There was no popular movement which could raise him on its crest to this power, for it was clear that he could occupy any post except that of China's constitutional President.

The panic which seized the Chinese bourgeoisie as the result of the mass movement stirred up by the Communists afforded the first opportunity when the problem of central authority in the North approached a solution. The split in the Kuomintang, the general indignation and fear of reprisals on the part of the Foreign Powers, caused by the Nanking outrages,* and the subsequent disclosures made during the Police raid on the premises of the Soviet Embassy at Peking were the concluding phases of the process which finally brought Marshal Chang Tso-lin into the supreme power in China. On June 16, 1927, Marshal Chang Tso-lin was proclaimed Generalissimo of the Chinese Army and Navy,† and on June 18 he proclaimed himself Dictator of the Republic of China, with the title of Tayuanshuai.‡ The Regency Cabinet resigned, and a new Cabinet was formed under Premier Pan-fu, a Chujen of Imperial examinations and a leading industrialist and ex-Minister of Finance. The motto of the new régime was suppression of Communism, revision of treaties and protection of the lives and property of the foreigners.§

* Shanghai District Chamber of Commerce and 51 other commercial and industrial bodies to Sir Austen Chamberlain, Messrs. Lloyd George and Ramsay MacDonald, the "Manchester Guardian," and the Chinese Legation, London, March 30th, 1927.

† Circular Telegram of Marshals Sun Chuan-fang and Chang Chung-chang, General Wu Chun-sheng and other Ankuochun leaders, June 16th, 1927.

‡ Marshal Chang Tso-lin's Mandate, June 18th, 1927.

§ Statement of same to the Diplomatic Body, Peking, of same date. Premier Pan-fu to the Press (through "Reuter"), Peking, June 24th, 1927.

CHAPTER XII

THE ANTI-NORTHERN EXPEDITION : THE RUPTURE WITH MOSCOW

The intoxication of the Chinese middle class with the success of the foreign and domestic policies of the Nationalists was very shortlived. The loss which they suffered as the result of the heavy and systemless taxation,* stoppage of business, and new labour legislation, which practically placed them at the mercy of their employees and workers,† and the peasants' uprisings, were too heavy a strain for their enthusiasm to endure.

The exodus of wealthy Chinese from the territories occupied by the Nationalist armies soon assumed a very alarming proportion. The ebb of specie in the banks caused an acute crisis on the money market, which could not be remedied by the levy of an embargo on silver to which the Nationalist Government was forced to resort. This was one of the most disastrous fiscal measures ever undertaken by the Nationalist Government at Hankow, which ruined entirely its financial prestige and inspired the greatest fear in the hearts of the numerous Chinese petty bourgeoisie for the safety of their savings.

Conditions in the newly acquired provinces were extremely tense. The population in the cities experienced a shortage of coal and rice, for the transport along the river was crippled, and the farmers refused to sell goods for the depreciated notes of the Government bank. The stocks in hand were all commandeered and rationed. The Government collected all available silver and a rigorous house-to-house search was conducted by the labour pickets brought from Canton and the police. Pedestrians on the roads were stopped and subjected to search.

* The Strike Settlement Law, Canton, December 27th, 1928.

† Associated Chambers of Commerce Convention, December 20th, 1927.

Under these circumstances it was hopeless to look forward to the resumption of normal business, and all the efforts of the Nationalist Government to induce the foreign firms to resume their operations were without result.

The agreements concerning the rendition of the British Concessions in Kiukiang and Hankow were signed by Mr. O'Malley, the British Representative, and Mr. Eugene Chen, on behalf of the Nationalist Government, on February 19th, and 20th, 1927, respectively. The virtual handing over of the Hankow concession took place on March 15th, 1927, when the Nationalist Municipal Regulations came into force.

It was a capitulation, at least in the eyes of the Chinese, and of the British in China, a new proof of Great Britain's weakness,* which did not inspire much confidence as far as the further safety of the British in Hankow was concerned.† Subsequent events proved that these apprehensions were not only correct as far as Hankow was concerned ‡ but also in respect to other places under the jurisdiction of the Nationalist Government. The Nanking Incident on March 23rd, 1927, was a glaring instance of this insecurity.

The small foreign colony of Nanking was subjected to a systematic destruction by the Nationalist troops. Consulates, firms, private residences and missionary institutions were looted; foreigners were murdered and wounded, foreign women were subjected to the grossest indignities and outraged.

It was a deliberate attack and cold-blooded murder of individual foreigners by the Nationalist soldiers of General Chen Chien, who entered the city after its evacuation by the Shantung-Chihli forces. Only the resolute action of the commanders of the British gunboats and two American destroyers saved the foreign colony in Nanking from complete extermination. Under the cover of a barrage of shrapnel from these war-ships, they were able to escape and reach the bank of the river where they were placed on board the ships. §

* Memorandum endorsed by the Annual Meeting of the British Chamber of Commerce, Shanghai, March 15th, 1927.

† *Ibid.*

‡ The position became at one time so unbearable that the British Government seriously considered the re-occupation of the Hankow concession, and was finally forced to withdraw its diplomatic representative accredited to the National Government.—Sir Austen Chamberlain, in the House of Commons, May 9th, 1927.

Mr. Basil Newton, the British Diplomatic Representative at Hankow, to Mr. Eugene Chen, May 17th, 1927.

§ Official Report of H. B. M's Vice-Consul at Nanking: Affidavit of Mrs. M. B. Giles; American Missionaries Statement; Statement of a Group of Nanking missionaries.—China Year Book, 1928, pp. 723-729.

The Nanking outrage was an event, unusual even under conditions of present Chinese civil war, where the murder of individual foreigners is a matter of frequent occurrence.

Only the destroyer *Hinoki*, the Japanese guardship at Nanking, did not take any part in this salvation of the international community. She kept silence, although amongst the victims of the Nationalists there were Japanese of official standing,* and the insult to the Imperial Japanese Navy was so gross, that it drove one of the Japanese officers to commit suicide.†

Justice requires, however, to mention that the Japanese were treated a little differently from the other nationals. The Nationalist Command and the Kuomintang did their best to stop the attack on the premises of the Japanese Consulate-General. ‡

General Chiang Kai-shek hastened to tender his apology to the Japanese Consul-General at Wuhu, asking him to communicate also with the British and American authorities and assure them "that the Southerners have no enmity against Great Britain and America, and that General Chiang Kai-shek would proceed to Nanking in person to settle the incident." § Some days later, his Chief-of-staff visited the Japanese Consul-General at Shanghai and repeated the apology for the incident. ¶

The fear of immediate reprisals caused the Hankow Government to issue a statement to the effect that the disorders at Nanking were due to the remnants of the defeated Northerners and White Russian mercenaries in Marshal Chang Chung-chang's army, "who instigated the attack on foreign consulates in order to involve the Nationalist forces with the Powers." ||

The number of Chinese killed and wounded by the fire of the British and American men-of-war was given as 2,000.**

On March 26th, General Chiang Kai-shek arrived on board of a Chinese gunboat at Shanghai, and events in Nanking assumed a new aspect, no less sudden and unexpected

* Official Japanese Report, Nanking, March 25th, 1927.—"North-China Herald," April 2nd, 1927.

† Lieutenant K. Araki of the H.I.J.M.S. *Hinoki*, March 29th, 1927.

‡ Official Japanese Report, Nanking, March 25th, 1927, *op. cit.*,

§ Statement of Mr. Liu Shih-min, on behalf of General Chiang Kai-shek, to the Japanese Consul-General at Wuhu, March 24th, 1927.

¶ Mr. K. Yoshizawa to the Press, Peking, April 1st, 1927.—"Toho News Agency," Peking, April 1st, 1927.

|| "Nationalist News Agency," Hankow, March 30th, 1927.

** Official Report of the Nationalist Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 30th, 1927.

than the arrival of the Nationalist Commander-in-Chief at Shanghai itself.

It appeared that Nanking had been deliberately despoiled for the purpose of preventing the triumphant entrance of General Chiang Kai-shek into the ancient capital, and of entangling him in difficulties with the foreigners. A particular point was made of attacking the Japanese because they were supposed to be friendly to him.

According to this version it was a masterly-organized intrigue, the execution of which was entrusted to General Chen Chien, an opportunist who made his career as organizer of the Red Peasant Corps and who was one of the greatest antagonists of General Chiang Kai-shek.

This explanation was accepted in all Chinese circles as valid, and has never been since questioned. There is, however, a point which casts a shadow on the whole matter: General Chen Chien, responsible for the outrages, retained command of his forces, and even received promotion!*

The split amongst the leaders of the Nationalist Government, and the Nationalist high command and the Communists reached its climax. The repeated attempts to screen the actual situation failed. The public at large became aware that, acting under the pressure of the Communist members, the Chief Executive Committee of the Kuomintang suddenly abolished the positions of the Chairman of the Political Council, the Standing Committee of the same Council, and the Military Council, instituting instead a Board of Chairmen. This move stripped General Chiang Kai-shek of all his political power as he was the chairman of all these three most important Government committees.

The communistic element in the Kuomintang gained the upper hand and his position was reduced to that of the head of the expeditionary forces. He was accused of Napoleonic designs, of attempting to usurp the whole Government authority and to establish a new one in Nanchang, his headquarters. Moreover, the Nationalist Government, now commonly known as the Wuhan Government, from its seat in the dual cities of Wuchang and Hankow, consolidated into a greater city—named Wuhan,† accused him of being pro-Japanese, secretly trying to come to terms with the Northerners and turn with them against the Communists. ‡

* The China Year Book, 1928, p. 736.

† Nationalist Government Mandate, January 1st, 1927.

‡ Dr. Chen Tu-hsiu, *op. cit.*, "The Guide Weekly," March 18th, 1927.

It is difficult to decipher all the recriminations heaped against each other by both parties.* But one is beyond any doubt, that General Chiang Kai-shek appeared to be irreconcilably anti-communistic. In his opinion, "they had reached the zenith of power as well as arrogance in the Kuo-mintang and if their activities were not curbed, both the Kuo-mintang and the Nationalist Government would fall".†

It is also beyond any doubt that in the brilliant personality of Chiang Kai-shek the leaders of the Wuhan Government had a very dangerous political rival who could easily cause a great deal of trouble in the future.

These leaders stubbornly ignored the fact that the Communist principles at the foundation of their practices alienated from the Nationalist cause the entire Chinese bourgeoisie. They saw in Communism only the driving force of the revolution, and failed to see its destructive nature, which left the victorious Southern armies to occupy cities and villages full of angry and hungry mobs and deserted by the rich : to occupy cities with the business life brought to a standstill, with heavy taxation and no taxpayers.

The army was underfed, ill-clothed, unpaid : millions and millions were required to bring the struggle against the North to a close. These millions had to be provided by the Chinese bourgeoisie. The Soviets could not finance the Anti-Northern expedition *ad infinitum*.

The cause of General Chiang Kai-shek was won at the moment when he took up the glove thrown down by the Wuhan Government and the Communists. The sympathy of the Chinese middle class was on his side. He was full-heartedly supported by all Chinese intellectuals who viewed with anxiety the passing of the influence over the masses to the Communists led by a foreign Power, and the triumph of an alien doctrine. He was assured of the support of all merchants who finally, were the main sufferers in the social revolution carried out by the Communists. In addition to this, in Shanghai, where he arrived, he was surrounded by his fellow provincials, which in Chinese relations was a very important matter.

On April 14th, when the Wuhan Government forwarded its caustic replies to the identical Notes of Great Britain, America, Japan, France and Italy demanding punishment of commanders responsible for the Nanking outrage and a com-

* Statement of General Chiang Kai-shek, Nanchang, March 14th, 1927, "The China Press," March 20th, 1927.

† *Ibid.*

plete reparation for personal injuries and material damage done to their nationals,* its authority was reduced to that of a local government at Wuhan.

On April 18th, the plenary session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang established a new Nationalist Government for all China at Nanking. The Wuhan Government was denounced as having deviated from the basic principles of the late leader, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, which the Nanking Government had to restore in their original purity.† A purification from the party of all extremist elements was declared.‡

With his usual swiftness and energy, General Chiang Kai-shek descended upon the Communists in Shanghai, Nanking and Canton. In a few days with the support of the majority of the Nationalist commanders to whom the foreign tutelage of the army and Communist activity had long since become nauseating, he succeeded in making impossible any serious opposition on the part of the Communists. The labour unions were forcibly closed, the armed labour and peasant units disarmed and disbanded.

Hundreds and thousands of Communists perished in the native city of Shanghai, in Nanking, Wusih, Soochow, Changchow, Hangchow and Canton. The firing squads raged particularly in the suburbs of Shanghai City, controlled by the labour organizations after the fall of Shanghai.

Still more people perished, when special Committees for cleaning-up Communists and Reactionaries started to function. They were organized according to the principles of similar institutions in Soviet Russia,§ and the effectiveness of their operation was no less. There was no further need for the Powers to insist on the punishment of those responsible for the Nanking outrage¶ which caused a divergence of opinion amongst the Powers.||

The foreign policy of the new Government, as announced by Dr. C. C. Wu, the newly-appointed Minister of Foreign

* Notes of Five Powers, addressed to Mr. Eugene Chen and General Chiang Kai-shek, April 11th, 1927.

† Declaration of the Political Council of the Kuomintang at Nanking, April 18th, 1927.

‡ *Ibid.*

§ Statement of General Chiang Kai-shek, May 14th, 1927.

¶ Detailed Regulations and Rules governing the Committee of cleaning up of Communists and Reactionaries in the Special District of Shanghai, by Messrs. Chen Dah-chung and Lee Tse-tong, published by the Special Shanghai District Committee, 1927.

¶ Sir Austen Chamberlain, in the House of Commons, May 9th, 1927.

|| "Toho News Agency," May 5th, 1927.

Affairs,* was in accordance with the declarations of General Chiang Kai-shek made upon his arrival at Shanghai: † it was abrogation of all unequal treaties by strictly peaceful and legitimate means, and protection of foreign lives and property. In this the Nanking Government varied very little from the political programme of the Peking Government, except in the matter of the policy *vis-à-vis* the Soviets.

Marshal Chang Tso-lin insisted on the recall of M. Karachan ‡ and M. Borodin, § ignoring the Soviet threat "to cancel recognition of the Chinese Government at Peking and wait for the establishment of a Central Government to deal with M. Karachan." He refused to be satisfied with the official Soviet repudiation of having anything to do with M. Borodin "whom the Chinese Government should arrest in accordance with its sovereign rights." ¶ Finally, M. Karachan was compelled to leave Peking and China altogether, having been replaced by M. Linde, U.S.S.R. Consul-General at Shanghai, as Chargé d'Affaires. The situation did not permit him to proceed either to Canton or Hankow, although the question of recognition of the Southern Government was very seriously discussed in Moscow.

Reprisals were also taken against individual Soviet citizens and diplomatic officials and ships which were suspected of being connected with communistic activities and carrying supplies to the Southern armies. On February 28th, 1927, the Shantung Military authorities seized at Nanking the Soviet steamer *Pamiat Lenina*. They arrested three diplomatic couriers and, to their surprise, discovered amongst the passengers Mrs. M. Borodin, the wife of M. Borodin. During the evacuation of Nanking by the allied Shantung-Chihli forces, the steamer was sunk. The couriers and Mrs. Borodin were brought to Peking for trial, || notwithstanding the repeated protests of the Soviet authorities.** As for the rest, they were all released by the Chinese judge on the ground that the charges

* Statement of Dr. C. C. Wu to the Press, May 14th, 1927.

† Same of General Chiang Kai-shek, March 31st, 1927.

‡ Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs at Peking to Comrade Chicherin, People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the U. S. S. R., August 3rd, 1926.

§ *Ibid.*

¶ Comrade Chicherin to the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, August 5th, 1927.

|| Statement of the Ankuochun Headquarters, March 17th, 1927.

** Soviet Consul-General at Shanghai to Marshal Chang Chung-chang, March 11th, 1927. The U. S. S. R. Embassy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 5th, 10th, and 11th, 1927.

against them were not grave enough to exclude them from the benefits of Marshal Chang Tso-lin's amnesty, promulgated on the occasion of his assuming the post of Generalissimo. They immediately disappeared from Peking, together with the judge who released them,* much to the indignation of the military authorities who issued a new warrant for their arrest.

But the most resolute step in regard to the Soviet representatives in China and their activity, which led to the complete severance of diplomatic relations between China and the Soviet,† was taken by Marshal Chang Tso-lin on April 6th, 1927, when the Metropolitan Police suddenly raided the premises of the Dalbank at Peking and extended the search to the offices of the Military Attaché of the Soviet Embassy. This search was made with the express consent of the Ministers of the Powers signatories to the Peking Protocol, which agreed to "this brutal violation of *franchise de l'hôtel d'ambassade*"‡ and the terms of the protocol prohibiting the Chinese armed force to enter the sacred precincts of the Peking Legation quarter, on the ground that "inasmuch as Russia was no longer a signatory Power to the Boxer Protocol the Diplomatic Corps was unable to keep the Chinese police from searching an organ established in the Legation quarter."§

The foreign Ministers at Peking were no less anxious than the Chinese to secure documentary proofs that the "so-called Chinese nationalist movement" was in reality a plot to oust the foreigners from China engineered by the Soviets. The foreign military attachés took the liveliest part in the examination of the documents found, and the protest of Ministers against "the extension of the search to the part of the Embassy occupied by the Soviet Military Attaché and not included in the original search warrant counter-signed by the Senior Minister," sounded very unconvincing.

Thirty persons, including the well-known Chinese communist, Li Ta-cha, were found seeking refuge on the premises of the Embassy. Nineteen of them, and Li Ta-cha, were convicted of sedition by summary Court Martial, and executed

* Judge Ho-chun of the Peking High Court.

† Acting U. S. S. R. People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. Cheng Yen-hsi, Chinese Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow, April 22nd, 1927.

‡ Prof. M. J. Pergament, "The Diplomatic Quarter in Peking: Its Juristic Nature," China Booksellers, Ltd., Peking, 1927.

§ Statement of Mr. W. J. Oudendijk, Netherlands' Minister and Doyen of the Diplomatic Corps, April 6th, 1927.—"Toho News Agency," Peking, April 7th, 1927.

by strangulation. The rest and several Russians were held for formal trial by an ordinary Court.

The mass of documents found in the office of the Soviet Military Attaché was startling. They proved conclusively the enormous sums spent by the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics on the organization of the Nationalist movement and the equipment of the Nationalist armies. Amongst the heap of half burnt documents, which the Soviet employees had no time to destroy, there was a number of detailed lists of arms and munitions supplied to various Nationalist units and two certified copies of special receipts by Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang issued by him during his stay in Moscow for the total amount of Gold Roubles 10,897,641.*

The disclosures made by the raid of the Soviet Embassy at Peking had hardly any effect upon Nanking. The archives of the Kuomintang kept more illuminating records in respect to Russian assistance of the Chinese national movement.

The attitude of the National Government *vis-à-vis* Russia remained the same.† Russia and China were in a similar position among the family of nations, both being under oppression of Western imperialism, and the anti-Communist movement was in no way anti-Russian. ‡

The Nanking Government had also no intention to apply force against Wuhan. It was the Government of the late leader's family whose name still controlled the sympathy of the masses, and was still surrounded with the aureole of sweeping diplomatic and military victories.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen's family was virtually in control of all important branches of the Wuhan Government.§ Mme. Sun Yat-sen, his former secretary, whom Dr. Sun Yat-sen later married after separating from his first spouse in Canton, and whom we have already met at his bedside at Peking, headed this family rule.

* Mitarevsky, *op. cit.*, p.p. 42-50; China Year Book, 1928, pp. 817, 818.

† Statement of General Chiang Kai-shek, May 14th, 1927.

‡ Same of Dr. C. C. Wu, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nanking, July 1st, 1927.—"Kuo Min News Agency," July 5th, 1927.

§ Mr. Sun-fo, son of Dr. Sun Yat-sen was Minister of Communications, and Commissioner of Reconstruction. Mr. T. V. Soong, Mme. Sun's brother, Minister of Finance. Dr. Kung Hsing-hsi, Dr. Sun Yat-sen's brother-in-law, married to Mme. Sun's sister, Deputy Commissioner of Finance. Mr. Lee Lueh-chin, Dr. Sun's adopted son, Commissioner of Industry, Dr. Tai En-sai, his son-in-law, General Director of River Conservancy Board. Other relations of Dr. Sun and his family occupied more or less unimportant positions in addition to the members of the late Mr. Liao Chung-kai's family prominently identified in the persons of Mrs. Liao and Kam Nei-kuang, her son-in-law.—AUTHOR.

Most of the members of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's family were persons of excellent education, real patriotism and administrative ability. Mme. Sun, besides her charming personality as a woman, possessed a rare energy and was one of the most influential members of the Executive Committee of the Kuo-mintang. But as having been intimately connected with the late leader and full of his ideas regarding the co-operation with the Communists and Soviet Russia, they all were true guardians of his covenants and executors of his political testament.

Realizing the indisputable authority which it held among the masses through its connection with the late leader's family, the Wuhan Government was not inclined to view the situation as peacefully as the Nanking Government. General Chiang Kai-shek was dismissed from all his posts and expelled from the party as national traitor. General Tang Sheng-chi was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the National Army.

It was alleged, in circles close to the Nanking Government, that Mme. Sun refused to sign this order and that the document was issued without her signature.* This version, if true, minimized the effect of the Central Executive Committee's mandate whereby General Chiang Kai-shek "was found guilty of massacre of people" and of "reactionary acts."† But it hardly had any bearing on the results of the suppression of the labour and peasants' organizations and the purging of the army from the Communists‡ for the further progress of the anti-Northern expedition.

The financial help, which the Nanking Government received from the Shanghai bankers in exchange for this suppression, was a very important matter,§ yet it did not constitute a decisive factor of the victory. It still remained dependent on the attitude of the masses, and the masses showed signs of falling off.

On April 13th, 1927, Marshal Sun Chuan-fang re-occupied Pukow and his artillery bombarded the new capital. The

* Statement of General Chang Tin-fan, Chief-of-Staff of the Nationalist Army at Shanghai.—"The China Press," April 25th, 1927.

† Mandate of April 15th, 1927.

‡ Nanking Government's Circular Telegram, May 5th, 1927.

§ The bankers group which came forward with the financial assistance to the Nanking régime was represented by Mr. K. P. Chen, of the Shanghai Commercial and Savings Bank, who eventually headed the Financial Commission of the Nanking Government. Owing to his efforts the Nanking Government was able to float within the first three months loans to the amount of over M.\$30,000,000 which consolidated its position and placed it in far more favourable financial condition than that of the Wuhan Government.—AUTHOR.

position of the Nanking Government was critical. Its army was no more the army which conquered the Yangtze Valley. Only the rapid advance of Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang from the Tungkwan Pass, which forced the northern armies to retreat, saved the situation. On May 30th, Marshal Chang Chung-chang evacuated Hsuehowfu and the allied Shantung-Chihli and Marshal Sun Chuan-fang's forces retreated deep into Shantung, while the Fengtien army operating in Honan withdrew north of the Yellow River.*

At this juncture it became known that Loyang, the last *point d'appui* of Marshal Wu Pei-fu, where he retired after his *débâcle* in Hunan and Hupeh, had also been taken by the Kuominchun, and that he himself had fled with but a few of his loyal troops into Szechuen.

The occupation of Hsuehowfu enabled General Chiang Kai-shek to get into direct touch with Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang, but in spite of this strategical advantage his position was still far from being stable. The campaign had to be stopped.† The Wuhan armies constituted a serious menace to his rear, while the forward motion of his troops weakened with every moment.

A personal interview between Chiang and Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang at Hsuehowfu on June 20th, disclosed the uniformity of their views in regard to the Communists,‡ and, after lengthy consultations, Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang sent an ultimatum to the Wuhan Government demanding the immediate expulsion of M. Borodin and the irreconcilably pro-Communists who had to go abroad "for the sake of their health."§ He proposed further a conference between the rival factions in Kaifeng, to end the dissension amongst the Kuomintang.

But the Wuhan Government flatly refused to have any pourparlers with General Chiang Kai-shek "as a counter revolutionary," demanding his complete submission to the mandates of the Wuhan Government.¶ The sudden *volte-face* of Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang could not inspire much confidence.

* The issue in the Fengtien expedition into Honan was decided by treachery. It was the treachery of General Tien Wei-chiu, who allowed the Kuominchun to occupy Yushih, and thus create a menace to the right flank of the Fengtien forces.—AUTHOR.

† Proclamation of General Chiang Kai-shek, June 24th, 1927.

‡ Joint Telegram of General Chiang Kai-shek, and Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang, June 23rd, 1927. "North-China Herald," July 2nd, 1927.

§ Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang to the Wuhan Government, June 22nd, 1927.

¶ Joint Statement of General Tang Sheng-chi and Mr. Sun-fo to the Press, "Reuter," Hankow, July 22nd, 1927.

Some weeks previous to the conference at Hsuehowfu the representatives of the Wuhan Government had an interview with him in Chengchow, which led them to believe that he was entirely on their side against Nanking.

A number of Nanking troops were withdrawn to Nanking and the combined Shantung-Chihli forces resumed the offensive. Early in August the armies of General Chiang Kai-shek were in full retreat, hotly pursued by the Northerners. Feeble attempts to create a diversion by an advance into Honan by the Kuominchun were easily repulsed. Hsuehowfu was re-occupied by Marshal Chang Chun-chang, while Marshal Sun Chuan-fang continued his drive along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway and, on August 17th, recaptured Pukow.

"I would be in Peking now if Japan had not sat astride the Shantung railroad,"—declared General Chiang Kai-shek, explaining the failure of the Anti-Northern campaign of 1927.*

This sudden and seemingly inconsistent declaration of General Chiang Kai-shek contained in reality a very deep and correct diagnosis of the political moment. Since the split in the Kuomintang and the suppression of the Chinese labour and agrarian movement, the attitude of Japan underwent a very considerable change. It was no longer an attitude of benevolent neutrality † and, not less, benevolent tolerance which silenced the Japanese guns in Nanking on March 23rd, 1927. The Nationalist movement lost its interest in the eyes of Japan: it was no more the movement which was destined to unite China and lead the masses with which Japan sought to effect the convention enabling her to solve her national problems. There was no ground to treat the new Nanking Government or its enemy, the Wuhan Government, on a different footing to any other Chinese Governments. ‡ There was no reason to sacrifice further lives and property of Japanese residents in China for the sake of any of these governments, which were unable or unwilling to oust the foreigners and give room to the Japanese.

* General Chiang Kai-shek's Statement to Mr. H. V. Kaltenborn, Associate Editor of the "Brooklyn Daily Eagle," August 1927.—"The China Press," September 21st, 1927.

† Baron Shidehara, in the House of Peers, Tokyo, March 22nd, 1927.

‡ At the moment referred to in the narrative China was divided politically, as follows: (1) The Peking Government; (2) The Nanking Government; (3) The Wuhan Government; (4) The Canton Government; (5) The Shansi Provincial Government; (6) The independent areas under Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang; (7) The feudal areas of Szechuen; (8) Yunnan; (9) Mohammedan States in the Northwest, and (10) The Mongolian Republic.

The attempt to seize the Japanese Concession in Hankow on April 4th, 1927, by means of mob action, as in the case of the British concession, was at once stopped by machine-gun fire.

The Japanese men-of-war which did not fire a single shot when their compatriots were murdered and the honour of the Imperial Japanese Navy was insulted at Nanking, trained their big guns on the points of Nationalist army concentration, and the Wuhan Government had to yield.*

The garrison in South Manchuria was strengthened by one division and a fleet of thirty-five war-ships cast anchor at the port of Tsingtao.

In response to the demand of the Japanese public,† which suddenly broke its silence, the new Cabinet of Baron Tanaka announced that "in the matter of Communist activities in China, Japan can hardly remain indifferent, as she is vitally concerned with the preservation of peace in the Orient."‡

Coming from the lips of such a man as the new Japanese Premier whom the Chinese public associated with the restoration attempted by General Chang Hsun in 1918, the Japanese expedition into Siberia, and the suppression of General Kuo Sung-lin's revolt,§ these words meant the end of benevolent neutrality and tolerance.

The advance of the Nationalist army into Shantung and the occupation of Hsuehowfu in May was the first occasion when this attitude was fully demonstrated. Under the excuse of preventing "the recurrence of the Nanking and Hankow incidents and protection of Japanese residents"¶ Japanese troops were landed in Tsingtao and dispatched to Tsinanfu, the provincial capital of Shantung. Japanese garrisons were also stationed along the railway connecting this place with Tsingtao.

The number of troops landed was comparatively insignificant. According to the official Japanese reports it did not

* Mr. Eugene Chen to Mr. Takao, Japanese Consul-General at Hankow, April 8th, 1927.—"Reuter," Hankow, April 9th, 1927.

† Viscount Shibusawa and Messrs. Kodama and Yasukawa, of the Sino-Japanese Businessmen's Association, to Baron Tanaka.—"Toho News Agency," May 11th, 1927.

‡ Statement of Baron Tanaka, April 22nd, 1927.

§ Mr. Yu Loo-tong, in the "China Courier," June 28th, 1927.

¶ Japanese Government Declaration, May 28th, 1928.

Japanese Memorandum addressed to Dr. Wellington Koo, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Peking, June 9th, 1927.

exceed two thousand,* but, in reality, it was swiftly increased by some thousand, sufficient to command all, more or less, important strategical points in Shantung.

This action of Japan was absolutely unwarranted as there was nothing which could inspire the slightest apprehension for the safety of Japanese nationals in either of these places. The landing of foreign troops in Shanghai could hardly serve as a precedent for the despatch of troops into Shantung, for the actions of the foreign troops in Shanghai were strictly confined to the territory of the foreign concessions, whilst neither at Tsingtao nor Tsinanfu was there a foreign settlement or Japanese concession.†

But there was the rear of the combined Shantung-Chihli and Marshal Sun Chuan-fang's troops which had to be guaranteed from any recurrence of the tragedies of the recent past. The Japanese Government did not intend to repeat in Shantung the "Newchwang Expedition of December, 1925," which brought about the defeat of General Kuo Sung-lin and checked the spread of the Nationalist influence over Manchuria.‡ Its actions, as far as the immediate military operations between the Southerners and Northerners were concerned, were absolutely correct. The Japanese troops did not assist or embarrass the actions of either side, which was perfectly known to the Nanking High Command which refused to send observers into Shantung, although invited by the Japanese Government to do so.§ Their presence ensured only peace and order in Shantung and. . . this was enough to paralyze the Nationalist advance, for "peace and order" excluded the possibility of guerilla tactics and corruption in the rear of the enemy.¶

All the endeavours to force Japan to abandon her new attitude remained without result. The boycott was no longer an effective weapon. The direct participation in this boycott

* Statement of Baron Tanaka, "Toho News Agency," Tokyo, June 12th, 1927.

† Protest of the Wuhan Government addressed to the Japanese Consul-General at Hankow, June 1st, 1927.

‡ Shanghai Kuomintang Headquarters to General Yamanashi, the Commander of Japanese forces in China, June 27th, 1927.—"The China Courier," June 28th, 1927.

§ Dr. C. C. Wu's Statement to the Press, July 17th, 1927.—"Reuter's Pacific Service," Nanking, July 17th, 1927.

¶ Early in July, General Chen Ye-yen, a subordinate General of Marshal Sun Chuan-fang, revolted at Kaomi and tried to seize Tsingtao. He failed owing to the Japanese garrisons on the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Railway having prevented him from using the line on the ground that it would endanger peace and order in the zone of the railway and the port of Tsingtao.—AUTHOR.

of the Nanking Government and the Canton Administration* could not supply it with the essential efficacy, which it had possessed when it was under the direct control of the Communist Party. The Chinese merchants violated the boycott rules constantly, and only penalties such as imprisonment in wooden cages in the public streets, forced them to stop, temporarily, business relations with the Japanese.†

Meanwhile, it was clear that the Japanese Government had not only in view a check to the advance of the Nationalist armies, but went further in its designs. It tried to bring pressure to bear upon the Nanking Government to come to a compromise with Marshal Chang Tso-lin. The withdrawal of the Japanese troops from Shantung was made optional, dependent on the re-establishment of peace and order and a compromise between Nanking and Peking.‡

Negotiations regarding the division of the spheres of jurisdiction between Nanking and Peking were pending for some time. However, compromise between the parties was hardly possible.§ The negotiations bore the character of a personal interchange of views by the two leaders of the anti-Communist movement, General Chiang Kai-shek and Marshal Chang Tso-lin. Meanwhile there were other military leaders whose opinions could not be ignored. Under the pressure of Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang, General Yen Hsi-shan, the Tupan of Shansi and former ally of Chang Tso-lin, declared his allegiance to the Kuomintang, and demanded that Marshal Chang Tso-lin should adopt the Three Principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, recognize his forces as a Revolutionary army, hoist the Kuomintang flag and co-operate with him in the anti-Communist campaign.¶ Hostilities between him and the Ankuochun were temporarily averted, and efforts were made to induce him to withdraw his troops from the Chihli province where they had been advanced to block a new attempt of the Fengtien offensive.

Whilst these negotiations were in progress the situation in the Yangtze Valley underwent a very important change. On July 17th, General Ho Chien, Commander of the 35th

* Resolution of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce at Shanghai, July 18th, 1927, forwarded to Baron Tanaka.—"Toho News Agency," Shanghai, July 19th, 1927.

† *Ibid.*

‡ "Toho News Agency," Tokyo, July 19th, 1927.

§ Declaration of the Generalissimo's Headquarters, Peking, July 18th, 1927.

¶ General Yen Hsi-shan's Proclamation, June 5th, 1927.

Nationalist Army, effected a peaceful *coup d'état* at Hankow as a part of an alleged anti-Red movement but, in reality, a move aimed to make Hunan and Hupeh independent under General Tang Sheng-chi, the Commander-in-Chief of the Wuhan Armies. Moreover, on July 27th, M. Borodin left Hankow for Russia.

His departure was preceded by the departure of Mme. Sun Yat-sen, who went to Shanghai and thence, also, to Russia. The block of the left wing of the Kuomintang and the Communists fell to pieces. The reconciliation between the inimical groups of the Kuomintang was only a matter of time.

The three months of inactivity proved to be fatal for the Wuhan Government. As soon as it was confined to one place its administrative machinery, dynamic in its nature as that of any revolutionary party, and effective only in forward motion, fell swiftly into decay.

The leaders of the Wuhan Government lost time in issuing pathetic proclamations, enumerating the offences committed by General Chiang Kai-shek and his associates against the Party discipline. Had they struck, and struck hard, the results would have been very different. The newly-established Nanking Government would never have been able to withstand the weapon which was still in the hands of the Wuhan Government: the popular enthusiasm caused by its victories. But at the end of June, when Feng Yu-hsiang wired his ultimatum, the control of the movement of the Chinese masses was no more in the hands of Wuhan. It went its own way, uninfluenced either by the programmes or schemes of the Kuomintang or the Communist Party: it went into the deep channels of the specific Chinese social movement, radical in its doctrines and conservative in its form strange to the theories and forms of Russian Communism and the principles of the Kuomintang. The feeble attempts of M. Borodin to regain control of this movement and turn it again into the channels of orthodox Communism were frustrated by the irresoluteness of the Wuhan group of the Kuomintang. The provinces were plunged into anarchy. In Wuhan, the labour unions dictated their will to the Government, which, even in its most liberal measures, was far behind the demands of the masses. Under these circumstances, it was obvious that the social movement headed by the Wuhan Government and the Chinese Communist Party was doomed unless extraordinary measures were devised to save the situation. Such measures necessitated

that the entire political power should be at once taken out of the feeble hands of the Wuhan Kuomintang and placed with the Communists, the Kuomintang organization being reconstructed along more radical lines so as to comply with the aspirations of the masses and, in due course, give place to the Communists as the more active element. The arbitrary confiscation of land by the peasants must be legalized, and its further execution entrusted to the Chinese Communist Party. A special Court must be established to suppress the opposition of the military men to the revolutionary activities of the Communists, and, finally, a new army must be organized consisting of Communists, labourers and peasants of the Hunan and Hupeh provinces.

This programme was the only one, which might avert anarchy, and enable the Government to regain control over the movement and to head it. It was the only one which could satisfy the "millions of organized peasants, who in accordance with the Kuomintang's teachings, had joined in the struggle for the realization of the slogan "Land to the Peasants."*

But this programme would have been the death warrant of the Kuomintang, and, as soon as it became known that it had been sanctioned by the Communist International at Moscow and was to be put into effect, the indignation of the entire Kuomintang Party was raised to the highest pitch.†

On July 13th, a meeting of members of the Executive Committee under the Chairmanship of Wang Ching-wei, decided to break with the Communists. A new meeting determined that M. Borodin and all the Russian military experts should leave China, all radical movements should be forbidden, and a delegate should be dispatched to Moscow to explain the motives of these measures.‡

Two days later General Ho-chien took control of Nanyang, and on July 17th of Hankow including the railway line and other strategic points. It was a *coup d'état* effected with the tacit consent of the Kuomintang with the exception of Mme. Sun Yat-sen who, in disgust, left Hankow declaring that "the party is no longer a revolutionary party, but merely a tool in the hands of this or that militarist."§

* Statement of Mme. Sun Yat-sen, September 6th, 1927.—"Nationalist News Agency," Moscow, September 6th, 1927.

† Mr. George E. Sokolaky in the "North-China Herald," July 30th, 1927.

‡ *Ibid.*

§ Statement of Mme. Sun Yat-sen, July 14th, 1927.—"Reuter," Hankow, July 17th, 1927.

Her resignation and departure were followed by a number of resignations of prominent men of the left wing of the Kuomintang, amongst whom there were Mr. Eugene Chen, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Mr. George Hsu-chien, Minister of Communications, who went to Moscow. A warrant for their arrest, issued by the Nanking Government, has been pending against them and M. Borodin since July 7th, 1927.

M. Borodin left Hankow only on the 27th of July. Owing to this warrant he was compelled to return to Russia by land *via* Chengchow and Shensi, controlled by Marshal Feng Yuhsiang. A special train, plentifully provisioned, and motor cars, were put at his and his large retinue's disposal. Members of Government and the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, headed by Wang Ching-wei, gathered at the station to bid him farewell.*

In spite of all that had happened during the last three weeks and the resolution of the Executive Committee regarding the return of all Russians to Moscow, M. Borodin's retirement did not bear the character of a forced departure. It seemed rather that, being a man of the world, he knew when the end of the rope of his usefulness had been reached, and therefore, voluntarily, swung out from the sphere of his activity in China amidst the hearty greetings of his former colleagues and disciples assembled at the station at Hankow.

The last obstacle in the way of the reconciliation of the Wuhan and Nanking factions of the Kuomintang was removed with the resignation of General Chiang Kai-shek. This resignation came as a surprise to the public, but, in reality, it was inevitable after the severance of connections of the party with the Communists. The reaction of the moderate elements of the Kuomintang against the increasing domination of the working classes and peasants in government politics, was identified in the mind of the majority of the Kuomintang with the personal enmity of M. Borodin and General Chiang Kai-shek. The historical process of Chinese bourgeois reaction against the social revolution led by the Communists was impersonified and assumed the form of a personal split between the two leaders, which resulted in many personal ambitions being involved in it.

In the eyes of a great number of members of the Kuomintang General Chiang Kai-shek was guilty of a breach of party discipline and of arbitrary action in establishing a new

* "Toho News Agency," Hankow, July 27th, 1927.

Government without the sanction of the party, thereby endangering the entire cause of the national Revolution. As a person guilty of such grave offences he had to share the fate of the main delinquent, M. Borodin, and leave.

From the purely military point of view his further retention of the post of the Commander-in-Chief of the Nanking revolutionary armies was even less justified. His name was associated with the failure of the Northern expedition and the compromising negotiations with the Northern Generals.

On August 12th, the Military Council at Nanking discussed the problem of the reconciliation with Wuhan which appeared to be the only possible means to save the Nationalist cause from a complete failure. In course of this discussion, General Chiang Kai-shek suddenly rose to his feet and handed in his resignation. Without giving any explanation as to the motives of his action, he left the room and took a special train to Shanghai.

Nobody made any attempt to stop him. General Li Tsung-jen, Commander of the 7th army, was appointed to take his place as acting Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist armies.

A number of resignations followed the resignation of General Chiang Kai-shek, amongst which, that of Hu Han-min was the most important. These resignations paved the way for the reconciliation between the individual members of the Kuomintang, and on August 24th, 1927, a series of conferences were opened in Kiukiang. The Wuhan group was represented by Messrs. Wang Ching-wei and Sun-fo and General Tan Yen-kai, and the Nanking group by Dr. C. C. Wu. Early in September these negotiations were transferred to Shanghai, where a number of prominent leaders of both sides were gathered.

As a result of many informal discussions, it was decided to have a joint conference of the Central Executive Committee and Central Supervisory Committee at Nanking on September 15th, 1927. The attempt of Marshal Sun Chuan-fang to cross the Yangtze and take the Nationalist Capital had failed. He was severely defeated, and again had to evacuate Pukow, withdrawing his forces along the Tientsin-Pukow line.

The preliminary meeting of the conference held in the Central Party Headquarters and presided over by General Tan Yen-kai sanctioned the outlawry of Communism and the expulsion of the Communists from the party on the ground that

they tried "to monopolize the so-called mass movement, and in the company of the worst social elements, thieves and riff-raff, created disturbances in all quarters freshly conquered by the Nationalist army."*

In taking such a step the conference, was moved by the last political programme of the Communists in Hankow, which aimed at the destruction of the Kuomintang and which convinced the responsible members of the party at Wuhan of the necessity of departing from the late leader's original policy toward the Communists. According to the statement of General Tan Yen-kai, who presided at the conference, the Communists were admitted into the party "only in view of the danger that must entail to a wholesale importation of the totally alien theory and ill suited policy of Marx and Lenin."†

It was to prevent such possibility of an erroneous diagnosis, that Dr. Sun Yat-sen decided to open Kuomintang membership to followers of Communism that "they may yet have opportunity to realize the comparative feasibility of the Three People's Principles to the class struggle of Marx and the dictatorship of the proletariat, or, even the latter day new economic policy of Lenin, and become, thus, loyal and useful members of the Kuomintang."‡

Since the sole issue of disagreement between all factions was removed and the Kuomintang were unanimous in their anti-Communist attitude, the Conference sanctioned the formation of the Central Special Committee, which embraced all members of the three Kuomintang headquarters, Nanking, Wuhan and Shanghai, and which had to reorganize the Nationalist Government according to the requirements of the new political situation. It also had to arrange the third convention of the Kuomintang National Congress in January, 1928.

On September 19th, the second meeting of the newly-organized Central Special Committee passed three resolutions creating the Political Council, the Military Council, four Ministries and the University Council, of the Nationalist Government, and abolishing the same bodies of the former Nanking and Wuhan Government, which had functioned separately since the split in April 1927.§

* Report of the Official Nationalist News Agency, Nanking, September 16th, 1927.

† *Ibid.*

‡ *Ibid.*

§ Circular Telegram of the Secretariat of the Central Special Committee of the Kuomintang, September 19th, 1927.

The list of members of the reorganized Government contained amongst other names, the names of Mme. Sun Yat-sen, General Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei, who did not take any part in the proceedings and did not affix their signatures to the resolution of the joint conference.

The absence of the first two need not be explained. They retired previous to the announcement of the convocation of the Conference. But the sudden resignation of the latter, and, no less, his sudden disappearance from Shanghai on the eve of the Conference, was a matter of serious conjecture. It looked as if Wang Ching-wei had intentionally evaded the Conference and to vote for a resolution which had nothing in common with the views of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. He rather preferred "to punish himself for having been too tardy in guarding against and suppressing the Communists,"* than to be bound by a document which, he knew, was nothing more than an example of official propaganda calculated to produce certain effects upon the public.

Followed by Mr. T. V. Soong he proceeded to Canton, where his movements were surrounded with profound mystery until November 1st, when it was reported that a meeting of members of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee present at Canton, including Wang Ching-wei and General Li Shi-shen, the Commanding General and *de facto* dictator at Canton since the inauguration of the Nanking Government, decided that the Nationalist Government should be re-established at Canton.† Even then the matter seemed to be very obscure, for General Li Shi-shen was believed to be absolutely loyal to General Chiang Kai-shek and the Nanking Kuomintang, and both, following the repeated entreaties of the Nanking Government, proceeded on November 15th, to attend the session of the Central Executive Committee at Nanking.

But the entire issue assumed a different aspect when it became known that, shortly after their departure, the troops of General Huang Chi-hsiang at the instance of General Chang Fa-kwei, both belonging to the extreme left, having returned to Canton from Wuhan overland, attacked and disarmed General Li Shi-shen's troops and took control of Canton. A

* Mr. Wang Ching-wei to Fellow Members of the Kuomintang, September 13th, 1927.

† Same to the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang of same date.

† "Reuter," Nanking, November 1st, 1927.

punitive mandate was at once issued against them but Wang Ching-wei threw in all his weight in order to prevent its execution, and the latter was stopped.*

As a matter of fact, a new split threatened to shake the very foundation of the Kuomintang and its controlling bodies. The agitation against the latter assumed a very considerable proportion, particularly in connection with the shooting affair of November 21st, when a mass meeting, held to celebrate the victory over General Tang Sheng-chi at Nanking, resulted in a *fracas* with the troops, which fired on the crowd, inflicting a number of casualties. The unfortunate incident was placed at the doors of the new governing authority of the Kuomintang, the Central Special Committee, the abolishment of which was sought by Wang Ching-wei and his friends of the left Kuomintang.

The situation approached a new crisis. Outwardly the unity of the Kuomintang had very considerably strengthened since the victory over General Tang Sheng-chi, the ex-Commander-in-Chief of the Wuhan Nationalist armies, who, after the anti-red *coup d'état* at Hankow in July, was virtual master at Wuhan and tried to win for himself the provinces of Hupeh and Hunan. The undercurrents were still strong and a collapse of the proud edifice of the Kuomintang unity was not impossible.

It was at this juncture that General Chiang Kai-shek emerged from his retirement, and, strengthened now by his relationship with the family of Dr. Sun Yat-sen,† once more threw in his lot with the Nanking Government. He received the offer to resume office as Generalissimo, while Wang Ching-wei agreed to go into retirement.‡ But the turn of events at Canton put an end to the party squabble.

On December 11th, late at night, General Huang Chi-hsiang's troops attacked one of the regiments of the newly-organized Division of General Mo Hsiung. It was a signal for a general uprising of armed peasants and workmen at Canton. The combined forces, with the "Labour Red Corps" at the head, numbering five thousand, and a party of regular soldiers defeated the troops of General Chang Fa-kwei, disarm-

* Punitive Mandate of the Nanking Government, December 2nd, 1927.

† During the interval of retirement, General Chiang Kai-shek married Miss Soong May-ling, the sister of Mrs. Sun Yat-sen, T. V. Soong, the present Minister of Finance of the National Government, and Mrs. H. H. Kung, the wife of the former Nationalist Minister of Interior.—AUTHOR.

‡ "Nationalist News Agency," Nanking, December 9th, 1927.

ed the police and took complete control of the city. Generals Chang Fa-kwei and Huang Chi-hsiang barely escaped with their lives and took refuge on a man-of-war.

Following this a Soviet Government was immediately established under the title "The Revolutionary Soviet of Kwantung" and the chairmanship of Soo Chao-tseng, formerly Minister of Labour in the Wuhan Government.*

Fire broke out in a dozen places in the city, and the mob, assisted by the red troops, looted banks, gold and silver shops, provision stores, dry goods stores and jewellers' shops. The Government Bank was burned. The prisons were captured and prisoners released. Thousands of refugees and homeless thronged at the jetties endeavouring to secure a passage to Macao and Hongkong.

The rule of the conquerors was shortlived. In the afternoon of the 12th, the anti-red troops of General Li Fu-lin and General Chu Huai-jih assisted by the river gunboats, launched a big offensive from Honam, a suburb of Canton, and gained a decisive victory. The Communists were forced to evacuate Canton and, after a fierce battle, to retire to the country.

Canton was a city of the dead. The streets were littered with the corpses of the killed. The Communists were ruthlessly pursued, caught and shot on the spot. Amongst those massacred were many Russians arrested, as alleged, with arms in their hands leading the reds.

The Soviet Consulate-General was subjected to vigorous search and looting. Russians and Chinese, men and women, everyone found in the premises, from the Vice-Consul down to the clerks, were arrested and carried to the Bureau of Public Safety, where after short examination, they were ordered to be shot.

The Russians were paraded round the town, carrying placards on their shoulders with details of their alleged crimes. The public was invited to do with them as it pleased, with the consequence that many helpless prisoners were slashed with penknives and spat upon as they tramped their sorrowful way to the execution ground.†

Amongst those executed was M. Hassis, the Soviet Vice-Consul, one of the responsible workers of the Russian Communist Party in China. The Soviet Consul-General and his wife were put into custody and deported.

* Same, December 13th, 1927.

† "Reuter," Hongkong, December 16th, 1927.

According to the official version the Communist revolt at Canton was not an accident. It was a deeply conceived plan to overthrow the Kuomintang rule in Kwantung and to establish a Communist régime in its place. This plan was executed under the immediate direction of Russian Soviet agents, while the Consulate-General and various trade organizations of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics were used as bases by the revolutionaries.*

It was further alleged that the red revolt was closely connected with the *coup d'état* of Generals Huang Chi-hsiang and Chang Fa-kwei against General Li Shi-shen and the Nanking Government, and the mysterious movements of Wang Ching-wei and his radical friends.†

A Government Committee was appointed to investigate these movements and, pending the completion of this investigation, they all were placed under strict police surveillance. ‡

However, for some reason, this measure was not enforced against Wang Ching-wei. He was allowed to leave Shanghai and sail for France.

On December 14th, at the proposal of General Chiang Kai-shek, who assumed the command of the troops along the Nanking-Shanghai and Shanghai-Hangchow railways, the Government issued a mandate severing diplomatic relations with the Soviets and ordering the closing down of all Soviet Consulates and Commercial Agencies in its territory, and the departure of their staff within one week.

This order was partially rescinded in regard to the Soviet Commercial Agencies, some of which were permitted to continue their operations under Nationalist Government control. But as far as the Soviet Consulates were concerned, they were all closed, and by the end of 1927 there was officially no Soviet agent left in the territory of the National Government.

* "National News Agency," Canton, December 13th, 1927; Statement of Dr. C. C. Wu, Nationalist Minister of Foreign Affairs, "North-China Herald," December 24th, 1927.

† Nanking Nationalist Government Mandate, December 16th, 1927.

‡ *Ibid.*

CHAPTER XIII

THE GREAT CHRISTIAN CHURCH OF CHINA

The blow struck at the Communists and Communism in China by the Nationalist Government was crushing. The Soviet Diplomatic Representatives were deported * and the direct link between the Chinese Communist Party and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Third Internationale was irreparably broken. The Communist venture was deprived of its directors and the aureole of affiliation with one of the greatest Western Powers, which constituted in itself a peculiar charm in the eyes of the Chinese masses.

The prestige of Soviet Russia suffered a terrible loss, the moral effect of which upon the Chinese was not lessened by the preservation of a few consulates in the North or by the bombastic notes of the Soviet Government stating that the disgraceful expulsion of its agents "can only mean that the Generals who have seized the power in Nanking, acting under the pressure of the imperialists, have thought it advisable in the territory under their domination." †

The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. repudiated most energetically all the allegations of the Nationalist Government. According to his version, it was simply an old trick on the part of the Imperialists to attribute the revolutionary movement in China to "a consequence of intrigues of exterior forces." ‡

We must admit that in its statements the Soviet Government was perfectly consistent. The evidence produced by the Nationalist Government against the Soviets was very vague and diffused. §

* Nationalist Government Order, December 15th, 1927.

† Comrade M. B. Kozlovsky, U.S.S.R. Consul-General at Shanghai, to the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs at Shanghai, December 17th, 1927.

‡ *Ibid.*

§ Nationalist Government Note, December 15th, 1927.

The reference to a partly-burnt document numbered 12-857 and found in the U.S.S.R. Consulate at Canton made by the Nationalist Minister for Foreign Affairs in his public statement, did not disclose anything.* It was an identical document, containing the Communist programme of the agrarian revolution in China, which had been seized eight months before in Peking.

The whole controversy pertained to a more or less theoretical speculation, for both parties knew very well the real motives underlying their actions. The only important point in the whole matter was that by officially severing its diplomatic relations with the Soviets, the new Nationalist Government publicly broke away from the course of the international policy defined for China by the late founder of the Kuomintang, † and that the U.S.S.R. and the Chinese Communists had proved to be unable to raise sufficient enthusiasm amongst the workers and farmers to overcome its forces. Communist relations in respect to the Nanking Government were not even upheld by the selected minority of the Kuomintang who might be said to be bound to do this by the very fact of their relationship to their late leader. ‡

Russian Communism and the Russian Communists were themselves directly responsible for the weakness of the Chinese Communists and the collapse of the stately edifice of the Sino-Soviet Conception. The burden of their tenets was too heavy to be endured not only by Chinese bourgeoisie but also by the Kuomintang.

The interest of Nationalist Russia in the Chinese mass movement was strictly confined to the creation of a China politically and socially strong enough to counterbalance the pressure brought to bear upon Russia from the West. She was wholly indifferent to the form of this movement as long as it served this end. But the matter was quite differently viewed by her governing body. It was of paramount importance for the Russian Communist Party and the Communist Internationale to see the process of the Chinese national awakening moulded into the form of orthodox Communism. This idea prevailed over all considerations of political reasonableness and expediency.

* Dr. C. C. Wu to the Press, December 22nd, 1927.—"Kuo Min News Agency," Nanking, December 22nd, 1927.

† Mme. Sun Yat-sen to General Chiang Kai-shek, Moscow, December 18th, 1927.—*ibid.*, December 18th, 1927.

‡ General Chiang Kai-shek to same, Shanghai, the same date.

China was invited to adopt Communism in the form which it has assumed in Russia and which has been adopted by Russia. She was deprived of the possibility of working out her own theories and methods suitable to her national character and the peculiar conditions of China.

It was the greatest mistake and the gravest blunder ever committed by Soviet Russia. However willing the Kuomintang or any other political party in China it was beyond their power. The idea of Communism did not plough deeply into China's virgin soil as it had that of Russia, nor did it bring to China any richness or any freedom; its effects were evanescent.

The efforts to free China from foreign oppression by means of Communism brought, in the end, a new stream of foreigners into China—Russians and persons of suspicious nationality who invaded her and assumed the leading posts in all branches of her public life.

The ideas of Socialism and Communism, which had shaken the very foundation of Western civilization, proved to be powerless in China, and collapsed at the first clash with Chinese actuality. They shared the fate of other Western ideas, which were found unable to adapt orthodoxy to practicability. They shared the fate of their anti-pode—the Christian idea, which had always remained in China as a foreign body, and failed to resist the wave of the anti-Christian movement which accompanied the anti-Northern expedition.

In effect, the shock experienced by the Christian Church in China in 1927 can hardly be attributed alone to the anti-Christian propaganda and movement organized by the allied forces of the Kuomintang and the Communists. The Nationalists were responsible for the material damage done to the Christian church and for the closure of missionary institutions, religious, educational and philanthropic, and the persecution of the personnel of some of the missions. But the very fact that the Christian communities collapsed, deserted by their members and left by their pastors, at the approach of the anti-Christian forces, proved the weakness of Chinese Christianity as led by foreign missionaries.

We are far from accusing all Chinese Christians and foreign missionaries of lack of devotion to their faith or of personal courage. We know very well that many of them paid with their lives for loyalty to their principles, and left their posts only under the orders of their governments,* but we

* "North-China Herald," October 15th, 1927.

must also admit that in the course of the whole eventful year, 1927, there was no instance in which the force of the anti-Christian movement was broken by the moral force of Christianity or was defeated by any organized resistance of the Christian congregations. In spite of all the endeavours to bring the Christian Church nearer to Chinese life and the realization of the necessity of an indigenous church, Christianity in China continued to remain a body not less foreign than Communism. The analogy between them, as far as their methods are concerned, is striking. If Russian orthodox Communism came into China with a fixed ideology and forms into which it tried to squeeze the Chinese social movement, the Christian Church did the same in respect to the religious life of the country.

It brought into China a fixed idea of the perfection of its theology, ethics and rites, and their superiority over any Oriental religious system. The Chinese heathen religions and ethics appeared to be "so hopelessly vile and corrupt that Christianity, in whatever shape or form, had to be brought in to replace them."* It was decided beforehand that the Christian dogmas as divine revelations would be beneficial to China as they had been beneficial to the Western world, and would be finally accepted as a constituent element of Chinese national life. No Christian worker thought for a moment that the Gospel would meet in China a scepticism more refined than that in the West, and that the fundamental tenets of Christianity, its cosmogony, demonology, liturgy, and even its ethics would be ridiculed by the Chinese armed with the newest and best results of Western Science, which they themselves brought into China.

The Christian doctrine met in the educated class of Chinese an irreconcilable enemy. The efforts of the Christian educational workers "to stir up the stagnant pool that surrounded them," † the establishment of schools and colleges, the translation into Chinese of books on religious, ethical and scientific subjects, the dissemination of the knowledge of foreign languages, supplied the educated Chinese with a weapon and bitterness against Christianity. The Christian workers in China were accused not only of antagonizing the people and disparaging Confucianism and other Chinese recognized religions and disseminating rebellious teachings against the

* Lin Shao-yang, "A Chinese Appeal to Christendom," p. 37.

† Dr. F. L. H. Pott, "The Outbreak in China," p. 95.

State, but also of wilfully deceiving the Chinese people by teaching a religious system which was "morally defective, intellectually absurd and historically untrue, and which has been discarded by all capable theologians as well as by nearly all educated laymen in Western lands."*

The Christian Church in China found in the Chinese modern students even a more irreconcilable enemy than in the Chinese *literati*. According to the candid confession of one of the leading missionaries, Chinese students do not take the institutional type of religion as represented by the Christian Church for granted and must be led by interpretation as well as otherwise into an appreciation of its values and importance.† The dogmas of Christianity, the rites and ceremonies of the Church were meaningless to nine out of ten Chinese students, which, coupled with the fact that the Church still remained largely a missionary and, therefore, a foreign institution, and the conservatism and prejudice of family and social groups,‡ deterred the Chinese youth from becoming Christian.

The Eleventh Conference of the World's Students' Christian Federation, held in April, 1922, at Peking, caused an outburst of indignation. A federation of National Non-Christian Students was organized to combat Christianity. The campaign started and spread with extraordinary rapidity, gaining ground throughout the country and involving all the leading educational institutions.§

In numerous manifestoes issued by this Federation the students strongly repudiated the idea that the movement was inspired by anti-foreign feeling or Bolshevism.¶ It was the product of cold analysis of facts which led the initiators of the movement, all belonging to the educated class, to come to the conclusion that "at a time like the present, when Science has reached its full development and man just completed his emancipation from intellectual slavery, it is a great disgrace to mankind that these pernicious and heathen teachings should be allowed to hold their sway."|| It was a purely anti-religious

* Lin Shao-yang, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

† Rev. Eugene E. Barnett, "Chinese Student and the Christian Church," "China Mission Year Book," 1923, p. 83.

‡ *Ibid.*

§ Peking National University, Chao Yang University, Communication University, Nankai University, Tung Tsai Commercial College, Peking Higher Normal College, Peking Normal School, Southeastern University, Peking Government Technical College, etc.

¶ "North-China Herald," April 15, 1922.

|| Declaration of the Chihli First Normal School.—*ibid.*

movement, embittered by the recollections that the early missionaries were not only messengers of God's Word but also "forerunners of foreign imperialism and foreign exploitation."*

Foreign education in China was also subject to a very severe attack. In 1924 the National Association for the Advancement of Education held a Conference at Nanking and demanded that education in China be nationalized under the Ministry of Education. The Peking Ministry of Education promulgated a set of rules requiring that private schools in China should be registered with the Ministry, and that their curriculum should conform to the Ministry's standard curriculum, while Religion was made an optional subject.† These regulations largely figured during the negotiations for the revision of the treaties in 1926 and 1927. A great number of missionaries refused categorically to comply with them, being bound by the conditions of monetary contributions from Home. They were especially collected and sent for the fostering of Christian education in China but not for the needs of Chinese national and non-religious education.

In the territory under the jurisdiction of the Kuomintang the anti-Christian movement had the Kwangtung University as its centre. On December 16th, 1925, a demonstration took place, which was led by nearly 1,000 students, workers, soldiers and marines claiming to represent some two hundred organizations of Kwangtung, including the Trade Unions.‡ The participation of the latter, closely associated with the Communists, resulted in the extending of the specifically anti-Christian crusade to an anti-religious movement in general. In this the Kuomintang doctrine regarding the separation of politics from religious matters or, rather, the complete neglect of any matters connected with Religion, afforded the best opportunity for destroying the last foundations of the Chinese national religio-ethical system, leaving unfilled the blank space in the Chinese national ideology caused by the revolution of 1911.

As a matter of fact, it was hardly possible for the primitive religious ideas of ancient China and the cults of ancestors and Confucius to retain their place in the new order created by this revolution. There was no connection between them and the modern Chinese actuality, just as there was no con-

* Non-Christian Chinese Federations Manifesto, cited by Mr. G. Sokolsky in the "China Year Book," 1928, p. 1334.

† Regulations of the Ministry of Education, Peking, December 7th, 1925.

‡ "North-China Herald," January 2nd, 1926.

nection between the doctrine of the Five Relationships and Eight Cardinal Virtues of Confucius and any of the three Chinese Republican Constitutions. The doctrine of the Great Tranquility or Similarity could not serve as a national justification of the theories of Western political economy introduced into China, as was maintained by Dr. Sun Yat-sen and some of the Chinese modern thinkers.*

The Confucian conception of the State based on the Five Relationships, and Eight Cardinal Virtues embracing the whole relationship between the sovereign and his subject, father and son, elder and younger brother, husband and wife, friend and friend, was hopelessly compromised. The Republic was able neither to reinstate its former place in the national life nor to create a new politico-ethical system in its stead. This task was not only beyond the power of Yuan Shih-kai and the Bureau of Rites and Ceremonies instituted by him, subsequently to his decrees concerning the restoration of the official worship of Confucius and the cult of Heaven in 1915, but also beyond the power of all the subsequent legislative attempts of the Republican Government. Its solution required a radical change in the whole of China's conception of the world.

The modern order of China was the product of the imported ideas and technical progress of Western civilization based on the monotheistic conception of Christianity, incompatible with the animistic ideas of Confucianism and Ancestorship, and the polytheistic doctrines of the two other great religions of China—Buddhism and Taoism. Thus, if all the works of the Bureau of Rites and Ceremonies, the Li Shih Kuan (禮制館) of Yuan Shih-kai, to reinstate harmony between the modern politico-social order in China and the national conception of the State and its relationship to the individual and his family, had been carried to their logical end, the new system of Chinese rites and ceremonies would have borne definite traces of Christianity. The *li* (禮) deals chiefly with rites and ceremonies but its real meaning goes far deeper.

The *li*, as understood in Chinese, is an ethical system embracing the whole life and providing a code of personal conduct for any individual member of human society. It defines his rights and his obligations to his sovereign, his country, and his fellow men, ultimately securing harmonious

* Dr. Chen Huan-chang, "The Economic Principles of Confucius and his School," Columbia University, 1911.

social relations among the people. In its wider application, the *li* is capable of maintaining harmonious relations with foreign nations.

No efficient government is possible without the existence of *li*, and the success of any State system, depends upon its operation. The *li* forms the backbone of the political and social structure of any country, and assures its national progress.

The Chinese emperors, in conducting the government, laid much emphasis on the *li*. With every change of a dynasty, which formed a new phase in China's historical development, a new system of *li* characterizing this dynasty and the political and social relations brought by it into existence, was promulgated. One of the first legislative measures undertaken by Yuan Shih-kai was the institution of Li Shih Kuan. It failed, costing him his very life. Marshal Chang Tso-lin repeated his attempt.

As soon as he assumed the post of *Tayuanshuai* or Generalissimo he issued a mandate establishing the Li Shih Kuan or Bureau of Rites and Ceremonies, with a department of classical music. It was formed to work out a new ethical system that "a salutary change in the manners and customs of the people would be brought about and all the causes that make for the present social and political disturbances would disappear."*

The brief enumeration of the subjects to be dealt with, comprising sacrificial rites, funeral rites, social etiquette, wedding and other ceremonies, military ceremonies and ritual music, shows their complete inconsistency with the principles of the individual liberty of a modern democratic State such as China has become in principle.

This attempt also failed, and, as we shall see later on, its failure was also followed by the tragic end of its initiator.

The religio-ethical system of the ancient Sages, from which it was sought to derive the necessary spiritual elements, proved to be bankrupt. Since the unfortunate efforts to make Confucianism China's State religion, which ended in the meaningless compromise of the freedom to honour Confucius and to profess any religion,† it lost its hold on the people. The temples and halls of Confucius were deserted. The official

* Marshal Chang Tso-lin's Mandate, cited by Mr. Lo Kwan in the "North-China Herald," November 5th, 1927.

† Constitution of the Republic of China, 1923, Art. 12.

ceremonies of honouring his spirit became a matter of mere routine, while the observation of the same ceremonies in the schools was only performed on the anniversary of his birth in view of the special regulations of the Ministry of Education to that effect. The abolition of the study of the classics in the schools and the competitive examinations, which were the main road leading to a political career, proved to be fatal to him and his teachings. The future belonged to the man armed with the knowledge of Western science and technical knowledge, but not to the classical *literati*.

The future belonged to the Society and the State, the *li* of which was in conformity with the principles which gave birth to this science and knowledge—the principles of Christianity.

In the year 1813, at a small village in the Hwa district, some little distance from Canton, there was born a man by the name of Hung Sui-tshuen.* His family, or rather, clan, was one of the most ancient in China. So far back as the Sung Dynasty, A.D. 1000, many of the Hungs were prominent *literati*, occupying the posts of Ministers of State. During the reign of the Ming Dynasty they became allied to the Imperial family by marriage; and it was one of the Hungs who, as generalissimo of the Chinese forces, fought the last battle in defence of Nanking and the last Ming prince. The prince was treacherously killed by some of his own followers, while the General perished with the main body of his army, being defeated by the Manchus. His few descendants who succeeded in escaping the vengeance of the victors, emigrated into the southern part of Kwangtung, where, impoverished, they continued their life as common farmers forming in the course of time a clan known amongst the aborigines as Hakkas or "immigrants."

From his early age Hung Sui-tshuen distinguished himself as a very diligent and capable student of Chinese classics, and at the age of eighteen he was appointed schoolmaster in his native village by the unanimous wish of his clansmen. But as far as his further literary attainments were concerned he was less fortunate: he failed to attain his degree at the public examinations.

During one of his visits to Canton, about the year 1836; when he again tried his luck, he met in the street a man dressed

* Rev. Theodor Hamberg, "The Visions of Hung Sui-tshuen, and Origin of the Kwangsi Insurrection," Hongkong, 1854.

in ancient robes. This man was unacquainted with the local dialect and employed a native as interpreter. Numbers of people kept gathering round the stranger, who would tell them of the fulfilment of their wishes without waiting for any question from them. "You will attain the highest rank, but do not be grieved, for grief will make you sick. I congratulate your virtuous father," * said the stranger to the young Hung Sui-tshuen, when he approached him.

On the following day Hung Sui-tshuen again met two strangers in the street. One of them had in his possession a parcel of books consisting of a complete set of a work entitled, "Keuenshi-leang-yen" or "Good Works for Exhorting the Age." He gave them to Hung Sui-tshuen who, on his return from examination, brought them home, and after a superficial glance at their contents, placed them in his bookcase, without considering them to be of any interest.

In the next year, 1837, Hung Sui-tshuen again went to Canton to sit at the examination, but bad luck pursued him. This time his failure, which meant the end of all his hopes to win literary distinction and the honour and fame which accompanied it in China, filled him with mortification and bitterness. He fell seriously ill. Struggling between death and life, he was visited by a series of marvellous visions and dreams.

He saw a great number of people bidding him welcome to their number. He saw the apocalyptic beasts of Chinese mythology, the dragon, the tiger and the cock, entering his room. He was conveyed in a beautiful sedan-chair to the accompaniment of heavenly music to a beautiful and luminous place where a multitude of fine men and women saluted him with expressions of joy. Amongst these men he saw many ancient Chinese sages including Confucius.†

As he left the sedan-chair he was taken to a river where he was bidden to wash himself. After this washing was performed his body was opened with a knife, his heart and other parts were taken out and replaced by new organs of a red colour. After this he was led into a large building, the beauty and splendour of which was beyond description, where he found himself in the presence of a man, venerable in years, with a golden beard, dressed in a black robe, sitting in an imposing attitude upon the highest place in the hall. As soon as this

* *Ibid.*

† *Ibid.*

venerable man observed Hung Sui-tshuen he began to shed tears and said : " All human beings in the whole world are produced and sustained by me, they eat my food and wear my clothing, but not a single one among them has a heart to remember and venerate me ; what is, however, still worse than that, they take my gifts and therewith worship demons; they purposely rebel against me, and arouse my anger. Do thou not imitate them." Thereupon he gave him a sword, commanding him to exterminate the demons, but to spare his brothers and sisters ; a seal by which he would overcome the evil spirits ; and also a yellow fruit, which Hung Sui-tshuen found sweet to the taste.*

The sickness of Hung Sui-tshuen lasted about forty days, during which these visions appeared regularly. Armed with ensigns of royalty which he received from the old man, he wandered in his dreams to the uttermost regions in search of evil spirits whom he exterminated as had been commanded by the old man. In these wanderings he was accompanied by a man of middle age, whom he called his elder brother and who instructed him how to fight the evil spirits, and assisted him in his work of exterminating them.

Six years passed after the illness of Hung Sui-tshuen and his wonderful visions. He recovered and continued his humble profession of a village schoolmaster. Once a cousin of his, Lee, happened to come across the small volumes, " Good Works for Exhorting the Age." Lee inquired into their contents but Hung Sui-tshuen did not know them. Lee read the books and found them to be extraordinary and very different from Chinese books. They appeared to contain a number of whole chapters of the Bible translated into Chinese by Dr. Robert Morrison, a Protestant missionary to China, many essays upon important subjects from single texts, and sundry miscellaneous statements founded on Scripture.†

Hung Sui-tshuen then took the books, and was struck with what he read there. It was a key to his remarkable visions. He now understood that the venerable old man who sat upon the highest place and whom all men ought to worship, was God, the Heavenly Father ; and the man of middle age, who had instructed him in his crusade against the demons, and whom he called the elder brother, to be Jesus Christ.

* T. T. Meadows, " The Chinese and Their Rebellion," 1856, pp. 76-78 ; Rev. Th. Hamberg, *op. cit.*

† *Ibid.*

The demons were the idols, his brothers and sisters were the men in the world.*

The discovery caused a complete revolution in his mind. Learning from the books regarding the mystic force of the sacrament of baptism, he and his cousin, Lee, poured water upon their heads saying: "Purification from all former sins, putting off the old, and regeneration." They thereupon destroyed their idols, removed the tablet of Confucius, and, full of exaltation, started to preach the new faith, which was revealed to them in such a miraculous manner.

The news about the appearance of a self-formed congregation of Shangti-Hwei or the Association for the Worship of God, soon reached Canton, and Hung Sui-tshuen and his cousin were invited to come and see the foreign missionaries preaching the Gospel in the city. Hung Sui-tshuen came to Canton. He expressed his readiness to accept the fundamental principles of their teachings and become baptised. But he was refused. His primitive Christianity refracted in his specifically Chinese mind, and his exaltation failed to appeal to the Rev. Isacchar J. Roberts, an American missionary, whom he happened to meet. The latter refused to class his visions in the same rank of phenomena which forms the fundament of the Old and New Testaments, and which Modern Science would undoubtedly have done. The claim of a humble Chinese village teacher to a divine mission and immediate communion with the Almighty appeared in the eyes of the orthodox Protestant to be a gross blasphemy and nothing more. This occurred in 1847.

Four years later, in 1851, a manifesto issued in imperial style announced the inauguration of a new Chinese dynasty in China. The dominions of this dynasty embraced in 1853 six of the richest provinces, including the greater part of the Yangtze Valley, with the ancient capital of the Mings, Nanking, as the capital and with a population of about 25,000,000.†

This manifesto was signed by the humble village teacher Hung Sui-tshuen, who, in the name of "Our Heavenly Father, the Great God and Supreme Lord," ‡ proclaimed a new empire of "Extreme Peace"—*Tai-Ping*, assuming for himself the title and the position of Tien-Teh-Tai-Ping-Wang, "Heavenly-Virtue-Peace King."

* Lin-le, "Ti-Ping-Tien-Kwoh," London, 1866, Vol. I., p. 40.

† Lin-le, *op. cit.*, Vol. I p. 217.

‡ Proclamation of Tien Wang, translated by Dr. Medhurst and cited by Lin-le, *op. cit.*, Vol. I. p. 84.

The messianic idea of the Old Testament, with its dream of the liberation of God's people from the yoke of foreign oppression, and the creation of a world theocracy, and the Christian idea of individual assertion and liberation in God and through God, being cast into the Chinese masses produced a religio-political movement of an unsurpassable magnitude. It set in motion millions of people, creating a profound revolution in their minds and liberating them from the fetters of animism and the power of the dead over the living which, in the form of Ancestor worship, had stifled creative thought in China. This blasphemy (in the eyes of the orthodox Christian missionaries) proved to be not only the stimulus of a religious revolution but also that of a movement for the liberation of China from the Manchu régime. The interests of British and French politics in China, however, demanded the maintenance of the old order, and the opinion of the missionaries triumphed.*

The empire of Extreme Peace was sacrificed for these interests and the great Taiping movement passed into history as a shocking grotesque of Christianity and as a rebellion of the Chinese rabble against their legitimate sovereign.

The warning of a few broad minded men that the result of the suppression of the movement would be disastrous to the Western Powers in the Far East remained unheeded.† The advantages of the Treaties of Tientsin, the legalization of the opium trade and the war indemnities, ‡ which the Imperial Government at Peking was able to pay only on condition of the immediate suppression of the Taipings, prevailed over any consideration of humanity, justice and the future position of the Western Powers in the Far East. Great Britain and France intervened. It became necessary to add new hecatombs of human lives to those already sacrificed during the Taiping revolution to free Chinese thought from the chains of Chinese antiquity.

In the present short historical analysis we cannot deal with the mass of political events which accompanied the rapid progress of the religious and moral doctrines of Hung Sui-

* In connection with this we cannot pass silently by the name of Rev. J. L. Holmes, of the American Baptist Mission, whose negative opinion regarding the nature of the Taiping movement is referred to as an authority by Sir Frederick Bruce, H. B. M's Minister in China, in his official dispatch to Sir John Russel, dated Shanghai, September 4th, 1860.—AUTHOR.

† The Bishop of Victoria to the Archbishop of Canterbury, Hongkong, May 23rd, 1853, cited by Lin-le, Vol. I. p. 365.

‡ British Treaty, Tientsin, June 26th, 1858; French Treaty, Tientsin, June 27th, 1858. Both were ratified in October, 1860.

tshuen and his associates, and the battles which they fought, won and lost. Nor do we wish to deal with the details of the British and French policies of that period in China, and the secret intrigues of the French Jesuits, who alone, perhaps, realized the magnitude of the movement and its fatality to the work of Western Christian missionaries in China.

The actions of the British and French diplomats, the exploits of Ward and Gordon and the "Ever-Victorious army," the unspeakable atrocities of Marquis Tseng Kyo-fang and Li Hung-chang against the Taipings, and the mercilessness of the latter in their holy war against idolatry and the Manchus form a subject which has been exhaustively explored by a number of Western and Chinese contemporaries and historians. Therefore, we concentrate our attention exclusively upon the process of the evolution of the religious and moral tenets of Christianity as professed and preached by the Taipings. This evolution was subject to the same laws of historical expediency which led to the formation of the Roman Catholic Church in Rome, the Greek Orthodox Church in Constantinople and Eastern Europe, and the Protestant Church in countries of Anglo-Saxon and German cultures. The principles of Christianity having been passed through the prism of Chinese religio-ethical and politico-social ideas, assumed a form peculiar in itself and specifically Chinese.

At the moment of the proclamation of the Empire of Extreme Peace, the religion of the Taipings was nearing its completion. From the fragments of Biblical ideas, which reached him through different channels, Hung Sui-tshuen, now the Celestial King or Tien Wang, built up an harmonious system which reflected the idiosyncrasy of his people and country. This system was not overburdened by the complex theology of Western Christianity inherited by it from the Gnostics and the esoteric sects of Asia Minor and Egypt. It was a Christianity near to its original primitive form, which appealed to the unsophisticated minds of the fishermen of Galilee, and, later on, to the masses of the destitute and slaves of the ancient world.

The religion of the Taipings was also the religion of destitute coolies and poor farmers, oppressed by the corrupt officials of a foreign dynasty. The person of God had for them a very real meaning. He was their Loving Father,*

* Rev. Edkins, John, Macgowan and Hall.—"Missionary Magazine," Shanghai, July 16th, 1860.

just as Christ, His Son, was the real Saviour, the Messiah, who came to the earth to save them from their misery. They were not abstract persons of the Trinity, one of which left His heavenly abode, went to the earth, died there, and then, having returned to His heavenly palace, has sat at the right hand of His Father and looked indifferently upon their continued sufferings.

Hung Sui-tshuen was one of those who suffered himself: one of the millions of those destitute Chinese whom he wanted to save, and to whom he appealed. He said: "Our Heavenly Father, the Great God and Supreme Lord, is one true Spirit (God), besides our Heavenly Father, the Great God and Supreme Lord, there is no Spirit (God); the Great God, our Heavenly Father and Supreme Lord, is omniscient, omnipotent and omnipresent—the supreme over all. There is no individual who is not produced and nourished by Him. He is Shang (Supreme), He is Te (Ruler). Besides The Great God, our Heavenly Father and Supreme Lord, there is no one who can be called Shang, and no one who can be called Te."*

This designation of God the Father defines the position of Christ. He was His beloved Elder Son, and, as with the son in a Chinese patriarchal family, occupies a subordinate position in regard to His Father.† He was sent into the world by Him to redeem men from sin by the endurance of extreme misery. He suffered death upon the cross. In three days after His death, He rose from the dead, and then, during forty days He discoursed on heavenly things. When He was about to ascend to His Father, He commended His disciples to communicate His gospel. Those who believe will be saved and ascend to Heaven, but those who do not believe will be the first to be condemned.‡

But if there were a father and a son, there should be a mother. The Celestial Mother had no particular functions besides those assigned to a mother, wife and woman in a good Chinese family. She was kind and exceedingly gracious, beautiful and noble in extreme, far beyond all compare. The Heavenly Son had also a wife as it behoved every Chinese, anxious to have his household in good order and to continue his family. She was very virtuous and very considerate, constantly exhorting her husband to do things deliberately. §

* Proclamation of Tien Wang, *op. cit.*

† Rev. Dr. Bridgeman cited by Lin-le, *op. cit.*, Vol. I. p. 213; "Trimerical Classic," *ibid.*, Vol. II. p. 827.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 828.

§ *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, p. 830.

If Hung Sui-tshuen had stopped at this phase of his primitive theology he could hardly have gone beyond becoming a sentimental Chinese moralist and not the prophet of a new religion in China. The Chinese had sufficient moralists amongst their ancient sages. They longed for a Messiah who would save them from real misery, from the yoke of a foreign Dynasty. As a Chinese, Hung Sui-tshuen had thought and felt the same. The Elder Brother, the Heavenly Son, could not accomplish this mission: his mission had already been completed; besides, he was not a soldier who could perform the task of liberating China from the Manchus. Someone else was needed for this purpose, and if the Heavenly Father really loved his children, the Chinese, and if there was no deity in the heavenly Pantheon ready to perform this exploit, he had to secure it for their sakes. He had to adopt it, as it was customary in China to adopt children. This adopted deity was Hung Sui-tshuen himself. He was the adopted son of the Heavenly Father. He was the Younger Brother of Jesus Christ, the Elder Brother. In the Ting-yen year (1837), he was received up into Heaven, where heavenly affairs were clearly pointed out to him. The Great God personally instructed him, gave him odes and documents, and communicated to him the true doctrine. God also gave him a seal, and conferred upon him a sword connected with authority and majesty irresistible. He bade him together with the Elder Brother drive away impish fiends, the Manchus, with the co-operation of angels.*

It was not easy to press into the Christian theology this specifically Chinese idea of the Messianic doctrine without destroying its integrity. In the first acts of the Tien Wang † we see clearly traces of hesitation to dot the *i* and to assume the exalted position of one of the Trinity. His title of *Tien Wang*, the Younger Brother, sounded like any other extravagant designation of the Chinese Emperor-Celestial Ruler, Monarch of the Universe, Brother of the Son, etc., the Dalai Llama of Tibet, or any other Asiatic ruler; like the usual Oriental metaphorical style of naming their princes, and setting forth their dignity and position. But this was only at the beginning of the vertiginous success of the Taiping insurrection. With every new victory of the Taipings over the Imperialists the heavenly mission of their leader became more and more

* *Ibid.*, p. 829.

† Tien Wang's Proclamation, *op. cit.*

apparent. He was sent by the Great God to the earth to be the Ruler of the Central Kingdom, he was the Heavenly King ; * he was God, the Younger Brother of Jesus, the Saviour. †

It was a natural process which has happened many times in the history of mankind before the enthronement of the Tien Wang, and which was the inevitable result of the political element contained in any religious system of the Orient. The Tien Wang, the Younger Brother, assumed automatically the place of the third person of the Trinity. The Holy Spirit was degraded, and became a mere attribute of the omniscient Deity as a supreme intelligence descended upon the Tien Wang and his subordinate Wangs. ‡

The literary talent, the moral greatness, the administrative ability, the mental energy, the commanding superiority of the Tien Wang inspired such a general admiration amongst his followers that the dogma of his divine mission and origin was accepted without hesitation. His presence at the head of a civil insurrection transformed it into a religious movement. He did not transmute a Christian fraternity into a political rebellion, § but he supplied it with an idea which led the discontented Chinese masses far beyond the simple inauguration of a new Chinese dynasty in China. The doctrines professed and preached by the Tien Wang, however imperfect from an orthodox Christian point of view, caused a complete revolution in the mind of the masses which followed him.

We pass over the problems of cosmogony and demonology of the Taiping religion which were solved by the Tien Wang in the spirit of orthodox Christianity. ¶ “The Book of Religious Precepts of the Taiping Dynasty,” with the Ten Commandments, their interpretation and the doctrines of human depravity, redemption by the Blood of Jesus, and the renewal of the heart by the influence of the Holy Spirit ; “The

* Le, the Loyal Prince of Heavenly Dynasty, to the Honourable Consuls of Great Britain, United States, Portugal, etc., 12th day of the 7th moon, of the 10th year of the Heavenly Kingdom of Extreme Peace (August 21st, 1860).—Lin-le, *op. cit.*, p. 281 ; Fang, Commander-in-Chief of the Heavenly Dynasty, to F. Harvey, H. B. M's Consul, *et al.*, 22nd day of the 10th moon of the 11th year of the Heavenly Kingdom of Extreme Peace (December 2nd, 1861).—*ibid.*, p. 2112.

† Meadows, *op. cit.*, pp. 257, 258.

‡ Lin-le, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

§ Bishop of Victoria, *op. cit.*

¶ Prince of the East, Yang, to Sir George Bonham, 26th day of the 3rd moon of the Kweihaou year of the Heavenly Dynasty of the Extreme Peace (May 1st, 1853), cited by Lin-le, Vol. I. p. 90 ; “Trimetrical Classic,” *op. cit.*, pp. 827, 828.

Ode of Youth " another work of the Tien Wang setting out in detail the duties which are required of us as parents and children, brothers and sisters, husbands and wives, relations and friends, contained the highest Christian ethics " to which no Christian missionary could take exception and which he might not adopt, and circulate as a tract for the benefit of the Chinese." *

The ethics of the ancient sages were shaken. Confucius, the spiritual master of China, had to give place to the new prophet. He had omitted to expound the new doctrine clearly in his books. †

In effect, the rationalist forms of the Confucian ethical system did not leave room for Love, Compassion and Hope. Together with the fatalism of philosophical Buddhism it could not resist the attack of the all-loving and all-superintending Providence in which the Taipings believed, ‡ and which was so miraculously displayed in their own case. §

Believing in the truth of the divine revelations of their Celestial King, the Taipings waged a merciless war against the most dearly cherished sensual habits of their countrymen, which, in their philosophical quietude and tolerance, the Chinese sages passed over unnoticed as anything inseparably pertaining to humanity. The ten moral rules of the Decalogue were enforced with the utmost vigour. Amorous glances, libidinous songs, and all the common incentives to profligacy, were prohibited and abandoned. The drinking of wine, the smoking of tobacco, gambling, lying, swearing and, above all, indulgence in the fumes of opium, were denounced and abolished with a moral determination which permitted no half measures. ¶

It must be admitted there were no half measures taken in regard to the violators of these rules: the transgression of the moral code of the Celestial Kingdom was a transgression of God's commandments, the highest law, and as such it was punishable by death. || There was no place for compassion and those guilty of smoking opium, adultery, prostitution ** as well as sorcery, treason, cowardice and desertion of the ranks

* Rev. Dr. Medhurst, cited by Lin-le, *op. cit.*, Vol. I.

† The Visions of Hung Sui-tshuen.—Hamburg, *op. cit.*

‡ La Thai-kang, Commander of Taiping Forces at Chekiang, cited by Lin-le, Vol. I. p. 144.

§ Captain Fishbourn, "Impressions on China," cited by Lin-le, *ibid.*, p. 146.

¶ Bishop of Victoria, *op. cit.*

|| Rev. Dr. Medhurst, *op. cit.*

** Lin-le., *op. cit.*, Vol. I. pp. 301, 302.

in battle, marauding * etc., were all liable to the death penalty. There was no classification of offences and no corrective measures: the infected limb was simply cut off. The Taiping movement was not only an insurrection against the Manchus, but also an heroic attempt to construct a new China which was to be set against the demoralized and corrupt régime of the Tsings.

It seemed that under these circumstances life in Taipingdom should have been entirely stifled and that the Empire of Extreme Peace should have been at the mercy of Terrorism, exposed to the most cruel practices of the Heavenly officials and the Holy Inquisition of the Tien Wang.

Carefully scrutinizing the documents in our possession, we cannot, however, discover any authority confirming such a supposition, except some of the official reports of the British and French authorities. But even these reports admit that cruelty and barbarity were perpetrated by the Taipings only against the Imperialists and in self-defence.† We find a number of statements which bear witness that the life in the territories occupied by the Taipings showed in comparison with that under the jurisdiction of the Imperialists signs of general animation;‡ that trade in all forms flourished in Nanking and along the Yangtze.§

The subjects of the Celestial King did not present the sad picture of being oppressed and terrorized by their government. Slavery was abolished.¶ Footbinding was prohibited. || Special institutions were founded for women and female children where they enjoyed the protection of the State against any attempt of exploitation.** Women were admitted into the army where they formed special detachments which rivalled in bravery the men.†† Concubinage, however, was preserved, and polygamy amongst the rich became very customary owing to the surplus of women in consequence of

* "The Book of Celestial Decrees."—Blue Book—Taiping Rebellion, Papers respecting the Civil War in China, 1863, pp. 41-44.

† T. T. Meadows to Lord John Russel, Shanghai, February 19th, 1861.—*Ibid.*

‡ Rev. Edkins, John, Macgowan and Hall, *op. cit.*, Rev. Griffiths John to Rev. Dr. Tidman, August 16th, 1860.—Lin-le *op. cit.*, Vol. I. p. 292.

§ "The Friend of China," Shanghai, January 13th, 1865. General Stavenley to Sir C. Lewis, H. B. M's Secretary of State for War, July 3rd, 1862.—Further Papers relating to the Rebellion in China, 1863, p. 43; Inclosure in No. 27.

¶ Lin-le, *op. cit.*, Vol. I. p. 303.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 301.

** Rev. Dr. Bridgeman, *op. cit.*

†† Lin-le, *op. cit.*, Vol. I. p. 301.

the war, and to the extreme importance in the eyes of the Chinese of the raising of off-spring to perpetuate the ancestral *sacra*.

Loyalty to their Tien Wang and the principles announced by him, personal honesty,* and complete toleration of foreigners and foreign cults † were the features which finally made the Taipings distinct from the subjects of the Tsings. It appeared that the Taipings knew not only how to punish the guilty but also how to foster civic virtues, the absence of which in modern China was deplored by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. ‡

These truly miraculous results achieved by the Taipings within less than twenty years should be attributed to the cult and ritual of their religion. This cult and ritual, primitive as the Taiping faith itself, were not crowned by the cross. The cruel sign of ignominy and torture transformed into the symbol of the regeneration of humanity by Western Christians remained the symbol of ignominy and suffering to the Taipings. The Imperialists used it as a tool of torture against the unfortunate Taipings who fell into their hands. They were attached to it and slowly sliced to pieces amid the cheering of the rabble. § But as far as the principal sacraments of the Christian religion were concerned, they were observed. Holy Communion consisted of placing three cups of tea upon the altar as an offering to the Deity; it was only after 1859, when Hung-jen, the Kan Wang, a former Chinese Christian catechizer, joined the Taipings that they were tasted.

Baptism was the most important sacrament. ¶ None but grown-up persons were admitted into the Taiping fraternity and only after an examination of their readiness to accept their doctrine. Later on, with the appointment of the same Hung-jen as Kan Wang, whom the Tien Wang entrusted with the religious reform of his Kingdom, children were also admitted. ||

Various forms of prayer and ceremonies were used on all felicitous and adverse occasions: at births, marriages, burials, building of houses, commencement of expeditions, previous to

* Chung Wang, "The Autobiographic Deposition of Chung Wang, the Faithful King."—"North-China Herald," October 22nd, 1864.

† Le, the Loyal King of the Heavenly Dynasty, etc., to the Foreign Ministers, August 18th, 1860.—Lin-le, *op. cit.*, Vol. I. p. 273.

‡ Dr. Sun Yat-sen, "San Min Chu I," *op. cit.*, pp. 5, 14, 133.

§ "The Daily News," London, August 8th, 1865.

¶ Lin-le, *op. cit.*, Vol. I. p. 315.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 318.

battles, after victory and after defeat : for all sick and wounded persons, for rulers and princes, for blessings and successes vouchsafed, all of which were attributed to the Almighty.*

For the first time in China's history the entire community, without distinction as far as the sex or social position of its members were concerned, was called to take an active part in the public cult, and it readily responded to this call. In all the official buildings and palaces of the Wangs or princes there were constructed for the purpose of Divine worship special Heavenly Halls, which were crowded with people, poor and rich, high and low, on the prescribed and strictly observed days. The services were conducted by presbyters, who, before their ordination, passed a special examination at the Ecclesiastical Court presided over by the Tien Wang himself.

As a matter of fact, each Wang or chief of high or low rank, was a priest as well as the Tien Wang, the Heavenly King, who was the *pontifex maximus* of his Heavenly Empire which formed an ideal theocracy ruled by God, through His son and the four Wangs in charge of the Eastern, Western, Northern and Southern regions. † China was the new Israel, the land of spirits, and gods. ‡

The belief in this exclusive position of China amongst the nations of the world, however, did not fill them with arrogance. In the course of their entire history the Taipings proved to be absolutely devoid of the specifically Chinese xenophobia and arrogance in their intercourse with the foreigners. § China's isolation ceased as far as the Taiping Kingdom was concerned. She was a member of the family of nations to which, the Taipings professed, she belonged in the early and golden ages of her history. ¶ It was a constant cry for co-operation, for religious instruction and political help addressed to the Foreign Powers by the Taipings, which shook the air. ||

They prayed, they longed passionately to associate themselves with the spiritual and material culture of their foreign

* *Ibid.*

† Proclamation of Tien Wang, *op. cit.*

‡ Same of Yang, the Eastern Wang, cited by Lin-le, *op. cit.*, Vol. I. p. 89.

§ Revs. Edkins, John, Macgowan and Hall.—"Missionary Magazine," Shanghai, July 16th, 1860; "The New Conformist," Nov. 14th, 1860.

¶ "The Trimetrical Classic," *op. cit.*

|| Hung Sen-tzung (Hung Sui-tshuen), the Tien Wang, to H. B. M's Minister in China, October 30th, 1856.—Blue Book, The Canton Campaign, pp. 50, 51.

and elder Christian brethren.* They realized how far they were in reality from Christianity,† but they failed to understand that their religious movement and their rebellion against the Manchus was just an episode in the international relations of the Western Powers and China. They did not see that there was no room for any spiritual or material co-operation between them and the Powers, and that the few enthusiastic missionaries who called the Christian world to come to their assistance and wished to correct their errors, were powerless to do anything, not only because they were prevented from doing this by their Governments,‡ but also because to correct their errors meant to destroy their faith. For the errors and heresies of the Taipings, from an orthodox Christian point of view, were the specifically Chinese elements which were introduced into the Christianity of the Taipings and which appealed to the Chinese mind and made it acceptable to the Chinese masses.

On July 19th, 1864, Nanking was captured. The noble Chung Wang, the Faithful Prince, its last defender, was executed. He left behind him his autobiography, a strikingly pathetic document, exposing the deep metamorphosis which Taiping Christianity had been able to produce in the midst of the morally and mentally degenerate Chinese society of the first half of the Nineteenth century.§

The Tien Wang committed suicide. His corpse was exhumed by the Imperialists, beheaded, cut into pieces, and burnt. Over one hundred thousand of the Taipings were caught and executed on the spot.¶ The Taiping movement was crushed.

The destruction of the political power of the Tien Wang proved to be fatal for the whole religious movement. Being deprived of its political element, it ceased to exist as an in-

* Proclamation of Yang, the Eastern Wang, Principal Minister of State, etc., May 1st, 1853.—Lin-le, *op. cit.*, Vol. I. pp. 143, 144. "The Overland Register," September 11th, 1860.

† Rev. Griffith John, cited by Lin-le, *op. cit.*, Vol. I. p. 243. Le, the Loyal Prince of the Heavenly Dynasty, to the foreign consuls of Shanghai, August 21st, 1860.—*Ibid.*, p. 381.

‡ Mr. Harvey, H. B. M's Consul at Ningpo, to Sir Frederic Bruce, December 31st, 1861.

§ Captain Corbett, R.N., to Admiral Hope, December 20th, 1861.—Lin-le, *op. cit.*, Vol. I. p. 311.

¶ Deposition of Chung Wang, the Loyal Prince, containing 55,000 characters written by him in confinement before execution and translated by Mr. W. T. Lay. "North-China Herald," October 22nd, 1864.

¶ Joint Memorial of Marquis Tseng Kwo-fang and his Generals, to the Throne, Tung-chin 3rd year, 6th moon, 23rd day (July 26th, 1864.)

stitution. The destruction was completed by the thousands of missionaries who invaded China after the Boxer rebellion, and who tried to create loyal Catholics, Anglicans, Lutherans, Baptists, Methodists, and followers of every other creed except Chinese Christian, which finally caused the very name of Christian in China to become the synonym for a non-patriot and anti-nationalist.

A great number of Western authors attributed the downfall of the Taipings to the fact that they were unable to organize any form of civil administration ; * that in his political aspirations the Tien Wang entertained no new principle of government, for he knew nothing of other lands, their jurisprudence or their policy.† Moreover, their religious tenets and ethical rules in their strict theory were based on the principles of Christianity, but they were so overlaid with anthropo-morphism as to exclude any possibility of recognition as a Christian faith capable to regenerate China. Their prophet and founder, the Tien Wang, was, in the eyes of the foreigners, just "an ignorant fanatic, if not an impostor" ‡

Secluded in his palace he lived the life of a typical Oriental potentate sharing his time between mystical practices and his eighty-eight consecrated wives and his unnumbered concubines.§ The religious movement which he headed was a religion of the rabble, which was despised by the educated Chinese, and which justified the nickname, The Coolie King, given to him by the foreigners.

We do not share these views. In our opinion it was impossible to develop any form of civil administration or a new principle of government, presumably Western, in the conditions of the raging civil war. We believe that the inauguration of a new system of government had no particular importance for China at this phase of her political development. The process of the assimilation of Christianity by the Chinese masses in itself which resulted in the cessation of the mental isolation of China, was already an attainment which covered all the deficiencies of the movement. For, if the Chinese had ever to become Christians, if Christian ethical and religious tenets had ever to become the Li Shih Kuan of

* H. B. Morse, "The International Relations of the Chinese Empire," 1834-1860, *op. cit.*, p. 452.

† Williams, "The Middle Kingdom," Vol. 11, p. 622.

‡ Sir Frederic Bruce to Lord J. Russel, September 4th, 1860, cited by Lin-le, Vol. I., p. 284.

§ Morse, *op. cit.*, p. 444.

modern China, it would be exactly in the same manner as the Taipings became Christians *viz.*, by their own interpretation of the Scriptures and the introduction into Christianity of elements specifically Chinese.

The first peremptory steps towards the westernization of China caused the Chinese Christians to raise the problem of the independence of the Chinese Christian Church. It was clear that if the Chinese Church did not free itself from foreign tutelage "the coming of the Kingdom of Heaven" in China would be "a mere fantastic dream."*

The Chinese delegates who had come to attend the National Christian Conference in May, 1922, were filled with visions of a Chinese Church. Their ideal appeared to be far beyond the material independence of their Church. They longed to see it triumphantly Chinese in every respect, and while the foreign missionary body were thinking of adding Chinese Christianity to the Roman, English, and other churches already in existence, they themselves thought of its complete nationalization. The compromise that Christianity is rather international by virtue of its universal elements than a national religion did not appeal to them. They asked for freedom to express the Christian life in Chinese thought, form and symbols.

The National Christian Council, which was formed as a result of this Conference could not satisfy them.† The subsequent events of the revolution and the process of the Nationalist movement in the South increased the determination of Chinese Christianity to liberate itself from Western influence. The idea of the creation of an indigenous church by gradually taking out the foreign element and organizing it according to the ceremonies, habits, historical elements, and religious sentiments inherent in the nature of the people ‡ gained more ground until Chinese Christianity demanded the freedom of restatement and religious experience.§ There was only one step left to make the Christian movement in China specifically

* Prof. Chen King-yang, "China Mission Year Book," 1914, p. 255.

† The National Christian Council of the Protestant Churches in China was formed with the object (1) to acquire and disseminate information; (2) to promote sympathy and understanding between all the units of the Christian Movement in China, however they may differ ecclesiastically or theologically, and (3) to promote co-operation between the various churches and missions.— "China Mission Year Book," 1923, pp. 61, 62.

‡ T. C. Bau, "The Place of the Christian Church in the Life of China."— "China Mission Year Book," 1923, p. 67.

§ Timothy T. Lew, "Young China and the Christian Church."—"North-China Herald," August 2nd, 1924.

Chinese ; it was to introduce into it the political element, without which no religion exists in the Orient.

On July 16th, 1925, the Executive Council of the National Christian Council, composed of one hundred members of Chinese, British, American, German and Scandinavian nationalities claiming to represent officially the Protestant Christian forces in China, issued a message to the Christians in China.* In this message it demanded for the Chinese equal rights in the foreign self-governing communities in China and enumerated the causes of mutual misunderstanding between the foreigners and the Chinese which led to the unfortunate events of May and June, 1925, in Shanghai and other Treaty ports. It attributed them to the unsettled conditions in the country, militarism and civil war, general poverty, the curse of opium and foreign aggression, coupled with the lack of understanding by the foreigners of the Chinese temperament and legitimate aspirations. It frankly admitted the existence of jealousy, strife and ill-feeling between the one hundred churches and missions existing in China and the excessiveness of ecclesiastical baggage brought into China from the West. It pointed to the necessity to incorporate into the life of the Christian Church in China the most helpful and inspiring elements of Chinese civilization.

On October 13th, 1926, one year later, the National Christian Council watched with intensive attention Dr. David Z. T. Yui addressing one of its yearly meetings.† In terms which left no doubt as to their sincerity he invited the Christian workers to accept the challenge of the hour, march forward, and fearlessly join the national movement to abrogate the "unequal treaties," and free China from foreign oppression. He appealed to them to accept the principle of nationalism in Church life, for Chinese Christianity, like any other institution or movement, must rise or fall in accordance with whether it has the approval or disapproval of the national spirit.

The sweeping success of the anti-Northern expedition and the departure of the foreign missionaries resulted in the growth of a nationalist tendency amongst the Chinese communities. The Continuation Committee at Wuhan, a body allied to the National Christian Council, issued a manifesto in which it recognized the immense moral force of the Kuomintang, which stands for the salvation of the country and the people, and

* "North-China Herald," July 25th, 1925.

† *Ibid.*, October 16th, and 23rd, 1926.

announced its readiness to join it.* They pledged their support to the Nationalist Government and the National Revolutionary Army, and expressed their deepest belief that the "Three People's Principles," the "Outline for the Development of China," and the internal and foreign policy and programme of the Kuomintang presented the only scheme for the emancipation of China and the salvation of the Chinese nation. They volunteered to participate in the People's Revolutionary Movement, for which they were ready to work, externally to overthrow foreign imperialism in order to build up an equal and independent nation on the earth; internally to overthrow militarism, to better the living conditions of farmers and labourers and to construct a just and progressive social order in which every individual may enjoy a living with plenty to eat and enough to wear; and, for the final goal of world-wide revolution, the equality of all human beings. For Christ was originally a great revolutionist, and his revolutionary spirit was still alive in Christianity: "He overthrew the forces of sin, Pharisaism, traditional ethics, the nobility who oppressed the common people, and, finally, gave up his life on the Cross." †

It was a conception of Christ and his work far removed from that which has been professed by the West and preached for over a hundred years by the foreign missionaries in China, a conception very near to that of the two Heavenly Brothers and the earthly mission of the Taipings.

Chinese Christianity was freeing itself from the fetters of the West. . . .

* *Ibid.*, January 22nd, 1927.

† *Ibid.*

CHAPTER XIV

THE FALL OF PEKING: THE ASSASSINATION OF MARSHAL CHANG TSO-LIN

The necessity of a national standard of ideals to set against the modern ideas of the Nationalist South influenced Marshal Chang Tso-lin to a greater extent than the mere revival of the Li Shih-kuan of Yuan Shih-kai. Close contact with the doctrines of Sung Ching and Tung Shung-su, the two ancient ideologists of the *li*,* amid the general seeking after a new religious and social system in China,† left a deep impression upon his entire state policy. It was ultra-nationalist and specifically Chinese, rectilinear in its practical application. The elasticity and shrewdness, which delighted Dr. Sun Yat-sen and which led him to find in Marshal Chang Tso-lin the right man to administer the tangled affairs of the Three Eastern Provinces, ‡ disappeared. There was no room for that gentle condescension, by which all his actions were veiled, and which induced the opprobrium of his countrymen who accused him of being the instrument of Japanese imperialism in China. It was replaced by firmness and tenacity in all questions directly or indirectly affecting Chinese national interests.

The ambitious plans for the construction of a series of railways in Manchuria and the industrialization and electrization of the country served by the South Manchurian Railway, met in the person of the Tayuanshuai and his administration in Peking and the Three Eastern Provinces irreconcilable enemies. The concessions wrung from him during the revolt of General Kuo Sung-lin, if true, § were thrown into the melting pot.

* Sung Ching (宋璟); Tung Shung-su (董仲舒)

† "North-China Herald," July 2nd, 1921; January 12th, 1924, etc.

‡ Joint Statement of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and A. A. Joffe, January 26th, 1923, *op. cit.*

§ Shanghai Chinese Labour and Commercial Organizations to Marshal Chang Tso-lin,—"North-China Herald," February 6th, 1926.

The solemn recognition by the Peking Government and Marshal Chang Tso-lin of the Japanese "special and overwhelming interests" in the Three Eastern Provinces was forgotten.* The preliminary agreement of September 28th, 1918 † and the secret arrangement between the Japanese and Chinese Imperial Governments of 1905, which served as guiding principles for the Chinese authorities in dealing with the Japanese railway interests in Manchuria, were completely ignored. ‡

The seemingly innocent plan of General Wu Chun-sheng, the Tupan of Heilungkiang, an immensely rich man and trusted friend of Marshal Chang Tso-lin, for the construction of the Mukden-Heilungkiang-Kirin Railway, which would occasionally run parallel to the Japanese-owned South Manchurian Railway, § grew into the bold scheme of constructing a number of lines. These railways ¶ with the Port of Newchwang as their outlet to the sea, if completed, would not only compete successfully with the South Manchurian Railway in contravention of the provisions of the treaties of 1905 and 1918, || but, what was far more important, would render the Chinese administration in Manchuria and Northern China, independent of the Japanese, who held in their hands the vital nerve of the North—the South Manchurian Railway.

Moreover, efforts were made to put the gold Japanese yen out of circulation in Manchuria and to regain for the Chinese national currency its original dominant position on the market.

"High-handed actions," cried the Japanese mercantile community in the Three Eastern Provinces in their petition

* Japanese Memorandum to the Chinese (Peking) Government, October 15th, 1924; Chinese (Peking) Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Japanese Minister at Peking, October 20th, 1924; Marshal Chang Tso-lin's Reply to the above Memorandum, October 21st, 1925.

† The stipulation of this agreement that the principal agreement should be signed within four months after the signing of the preliminary one, was never fulfilled. It was, therefore, an open question whether this agreement was valid or not. The Japanese insisted that it was, while the Chinese declared it null and void.—AUTHOR.

‡ Secret Treaty 1905, Art. 3. stated as follows:—"The Chinese Government engage, for the purpose of protecting the interests of the South Manchurian Railway, not to construct, prior to the recovery by them of said railway, any main line in the neighbourhood of and parallel to that railway or any branch line which might be prejudicial to the mentioned railway."

§ Japanese Consuls' General at Mukden and Kirin Protests, November, 1926.—"North-China Herald," November 27th, 1926.

¶ Sze-ping-kai-Taonan, Taonan-Angangki-Taitsihar, Tahushan-Paiyintala and Mukden-Heilungkiang railway lines.

|| Statement of Mr. Matsuoka, Vice President of the South Manchurian Railway.—*ibid.*, October 1st, 1927.

to their Home Government, "which are aimed at the deliberate prevention of foreign traders from pursuing their legitimate activities."*

In 1915 an analogous petition accusing President Yuan Shih-kai of all sorts of malicious intentions against the foreigners, opened a series of protests on the part of the Japanese Government, which culminated in the presentation of the well-known Twenty-One Demands and the support of the revolutionary movement of General Tsai Ao against Yuan Shih-kai.

This time the Generalissimo was personally warned against any further encroachment on "the Japanese special interests in Manchuria." He was called upon to take immediate steps to arrest the spread of Anti-Japanese agitation, in the opinion of the Japanese Government artificially stimulated by the Fengtien authorities,† and threatened with grave consequences for him and his government should they not change their attitude *vis-à-vis* Japan.

In fact, the new régime of the Government of Tayuanshuai approached more and more the character of the specifically Chinese national régime of the late Yuan Shih-kai. It threatened very seriously the unlimited development of the huge Japanese investments and their political plans in China in general and in Manchuria in particular.

The Japanese Imperial Government keenly realized that Marshal Chang Tso-lin, as Generalissimo, was confined in his international policy by the traditional Chinese political views and the trend of events, which he was impotent to overcome. His victory over the Nationalists could not bring him one step nearer to the solution of the vital problem which faced Japan in her relation to China. His victory would mean his enthronement and the restoration of the monarchy in China, but not an *entente* between the two great nations.

The Tayuanshuai as China's sovereign would be forced to continue the policy of the Chinese monarchs, and would never under any conditions, sacrifice the independence of China's international policy for the sake of the Japanese nation, even if China obtained as a reward for this sacrifice internal peace, national prosperity and external security.

* The Union of the Japanese Chambers of Commerce in Manchuria to the Japanese Government, January 9th, 1927.—"North-China Herald," January 22nd, 1927.

† Mr. K. Yoshisawa's interview with Marshal Chang Tso-lin, August 24th, 1927; General Yang Yu-ting's Statement to the Press, August 31st, 1927.—"Reuter," Peking, same date.

The irreconcilability of the present Peking Government was clearly demonstrated in the matter of the revision of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1896, which expired on October 20th, 1926, and which the Japanese Government agreed to revise, condescending to the requests of the Chinese Government. *

Subsequent to the opening of negotiations on January 21st, 1927, nineteen meetings were held, but all terminated with but little result. The six months' period for the conclusion of a new Sino-Japanese Commercial Treaty provided by the old treaty † expired on April 20th, 1927. By mutual consent, the period was extended twice; nevertheless, no progress was made. ‡

The Government of the Tayuanshuai demanded not only tariff autonomy, retrocession of concessions and abolition of the extraterritorial rights of the Japanese residing in China, but also included in the scope of the treaty negotiations the delicate points concerning the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula and the status of the South Manchurian Railway. § The anxiety expressed by the Nationalist Government ¶ was groundless. The attitude of the Peking Government *vis-à-vis* Japan was that of any national Government inspired by the most patriotic feelings and was beyond any reproach from a Chinese point of view. And if in 1927 the Japanese political leaders lost interest in the anti-Northern expedition and arrested its progress by intervening in Shantung, they now clearly saw that any further support of the Northern party would be detrimental to Japanese interests.

The danger of the situation was fully realized in Peking. General Yang Yu-ting, Chief-of-Staff and Adviser to Marshal Chang Tso-lin, was ordered to proceed to Mukden to deal with "the Japanese question" and the paramount issue of railway construction. A project was hastily advanced to substitute the military régime of the Tayuanshuai by a civil administration and proclaim Marshal Chang Tso-lin President. In this way it was thought to allay all suspicions regarding the nature

* Chinese Government Note to the Japanese Minister at Peking, October 20th, 1926; The Japanese Memorandum to the Chinese Government, November 10th, 1926.

† Sino-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, July 21st, 1896. Art. XXVI.

‡ Chinese Government Note to the Japanese Minister at Peking, April 20th, 1927.

§ "Reuter," Peking, February 4th and 6th, 1927.

¶ Dr. C. C. Wu, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Nationalist Government, to K. Yoshizawa, Japanese Minister at Peking, October 1st, 1927.

of Marshal Chang Tso-lin's dictatorship, but it proved to be a failure.

On September 4th, 1927, the whole of the Japanese troops stationed in Tsinanfu and along the Kiaochow-Tsinan Railway received orders to start evacuation, which was completed four days later, not a single Japanese soldier remaining in Shantung.

The friction between Marshal Chang Tso-lin and the Japanese was anxiously watched, not only in the Nationalists' camp but also in the North. It was a general belief in China, after Kuo Sung-lin's revolt and the intervention in Shantung, that the success of Marshal Chang Tso-lin's political career was solely due to Japanese support, the withdrawal of which would mean his immediate downfall. Some of the Northern leaders opposed to the Ankuochun régime hesitated to throw in their lot with his opponents only on the ground that they were convinced that any movement against him would finally be crushed by the Japanese coming to his rescue.

The sudden evacuation of Shantung proved the folly of all these beliefs and fears. It was a strong indication that the support was withdrawn, and that a new era in the relations of Marshal Chang Tso-lin with Japan had started. Hostilities between the Ankuochun and General Yen Hsi-shan, the Tupan of Shansi, temporarily averted in the summer of 1927, became inevitable.

On September 20th, Peking was startled by the news that General Yu-Chen who had been sent to Kalgan to inspect and reorganize the Ankuochun troops stationed there, had been seized with a handful of soldiers by the troops of the Shansi tupan, while strong contingents of the same troops made their appearance on the border of Chahar and attacked Kalgan.*

It was a very severe blow to the Northern party. Up to the last moment it was seriously believed that General Yen Hsi-shan would never take arms against his former powerful ally. The proclamation announcing his joining up with the Kuomintang † was regarded as a mere tactical manoeuvre, and not as a demonstration of real sympathy with the Nationalists' cause. It was the result of pressure brought to bear upon him by his subordinate generals, either converted to the Kuomintang by skilful propaganda or bought over by Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang. ‡

* Marshal Chang Tso-lin's Circular Telegram, October 3rd, 1927.

† General Yen Hsi-shan's Proclamation, June 5th, 1927.

‡ "North-China Herald," January 28th, 1927.

The hostilities were soon brought close to the gates of Peking. The Shansi forces succeeded in occupying Chochow, some thirty miles from Peking, and in the vicinity of Mentowkow. The gunfire was distinctly heard in the capital. We must admit it did not serve to inspire much confidence in the stability of the Ankuochun.

The reforms undertaken by Marshal Chang Tso-lin were very far from being completed. The reorganization of the military administration and fiscal systems, after the unsuccessful campaign of 1926 and the spring of 1927, had only just been outlined. The provinces continued to be ruled according to the old methods, which proved to be absolutely useless in a time of national crisis. They continued to form separate domains of various military lords, with this difference, that most of them recognized fully the authority of the Tayuanshuai and were dependent upon him in their appointments. They were ruined by the continuous civil war, and by the most elaborate system of extortion to which they were exposed by their military lords.

The conditions were particularly distressful in the Provinces of Shantung and Chihli, which, in addition to the horrors of the civil war, were stricken by a famine. Thousands of people abandoned their homes and sought safety in flight. In some districts sixty per cent of those remaining were sick.* Emigration to Manchuria went on unceasingly, and thither the Government of Tayuanshuai looked for army and financial reinforcements.

The forces of both General Chu Yu-pu and Marshal Chang Chun-chang, the Tupans of Chihli and Shantung, were entirely disorganized and demoralized. The soldiers looted and robbed the places which they garrisoned, being in their turn robbed by their officers and generals.† Drastic steps were undertaken to improve the situation. The armies were reduced and reorganized, but, in spite of all these efforts, they presented a very poor fighting force hardly capable of taking the field against any enemy. The only unit of the Northern armies in the field against the Nationalists, which still preserved the semblance of an army, was that of Marshal Sun Chuan-fang. The fortunes of war reduced his forces to slender proportions, but he still had a strong hold on his men, and had every chance

* International Famine Commission's Report, January 30th, 1928.

† Marshal Chang Chun-chang's Statement, January 19th, 1928.—
"North-China Herald," February 25th, 1928.

to recover from the débâcle. But the war-chest of the Government was depleted. Means were devised to raise the necessary funds, but it was hardly possible to squeeze anything out of the provinces affected by the civil war, famine and, in many cases, the lust for self-enrichment of the various military administrators. The only resources which were not exhausted were those of the Three Eastern Provinces, and thither, as we have stated, the Government looked for reinforcements, both in funds and soldiers.

The Fengtien, Kirin and Heilungkiang troops were the forces upon which Peking could rely in its war against the Nationalists and their allies. They formed the strategical reserve of the Ankuochun armies, and every step was taken to save them from the destiny of the Chihli-Shantung armies.

Since the short and indecisive campaign against Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang in Honan in the spring of 1927, when they were withdrawn to the northern bank of the Yellow River, they had taken no active part in the struggle. They were well-disciplined, richly provided with arms and munitions, inspired by the best fighting spirit and ably led by Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, the eldest son of the Generalissimo, General Han Liu-chun and the tupans of Kirin and Heilungkiang. The latter commanded the troops of their respective provinces.

The loyalty of these forces was beyond any question, but their concentration inside the Great Wall, far from their original base, presented a very difficult problem: they had to be supplied with everything by their provinces, which, in spite of their riches, had to make great efforts to meet the burden of all the administrative and military expenditures of the Government of the Tayuanshuai. The land and miscellaneous taxes were greatly increased, and, as every silver dollar raised in Manchuria went to Peking, it caused an enormous slump of the local paper currency, the Fengpiao. The stern measures adopted by the provincial authorities to prop up the purchasing power of this currency, the wholesale arrest of traders and exchange brokers accused of speculation, even their execution,* had only the effect of upsetting further the financial conditions of the Three Eastern Provinces. The attempt to drive the Japanese yen out of circulation, as we have already stated, proved to be unsuccessful. It caused only further discontent on the part of the traders and peasantry

* "Router," Mukden, February 9th, 1927; "The China Courier," March 1st, 1927.

who were the main sufferers in the crisis, and who, despite all threats and arrests, continued to carry on their business operations on the basis of the Japanese yen.

Meanwhile the movement of the Chinese masses stirred up by the Communists who, since the Nationalists lost control, had gone their own way, reached a state when it became a noticeable political factor in the North. Already, in 1926, the activity of the so-called "Red Spears" was the cause of the severe reverses suffered by the Fengtien troops at the hands of the Kuominchun.*

It was a specific Chinese organization composed of villagers and town people and purporting to be established by them for self-defence. In Honan alone it numbered tens of thousands † and, as far as its political and religious creeds were concerned, was closely related to the famous Chinese secret societies ‡ and the movements of the Triads and the Boxers. It also claimed to possess all kinds of supernatural powers, including the invulnerability of its members. These superstitions were mixed with the fragments of some of the latest theories of Communism and Socialism concerning the equal distribution of wealth and land amongst the toiling classes, creating the most fantastic movement which ever existed and which was directed against whatever authority and army might seek to impose itself upon it.

Bloodthirsty, with a charm round their necks, blood smeared all over their faces and armed with spears, these avengers of social injustice and seekers of truth on the earth spread terror everywhere they appeared. They literally annihilated entire detachments of regular troops which had the misfortune to advance deeply into the country where they held sway. In many battles they played a decisive part by siding with one of the contending parties and throwing the enemy into a wild state of panic by appearing suddenly in his rear. §

The acute dissatisfaction of the masses, caused by the economic crisis, famine and maladministration, increased the activity of such organizations. The "Big Swords" movement in Manchuria required the despatch of a considerable number

* Mitarevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

† According to the estimate given in one of the reports of the U. S. S. R. Military Attaché at Peking, over 150,000.—*ibid.*, pp. 92-95.

‡ The "An Ching" or "We Friends" founded at the end of the Ming and in the beginning of the Tsing dynasty. In 1792, Emperor Kien Lung leaned heavily on its members for protection.—Аутнов.

§ Mitarevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

of troops for its suppression, which, however, in many cases ended in the defeat of the Government forces.* In Honan the activities of the "Red Spears," and in Shansi, the "Heavenly Gate Society," constituted a serious menace to the movements of the armies, the commanders of which were frequently forced to buy them off to ensure their benevolence.†

The war situation, which, since the retreat of Marshal Sun Chuan-fang from Nanking in September, 1927, had remained static on the main Shantung-Honan front, also showed signs of revival. In October, 1927, Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang attacked the combined Shantung-Chihli forces along the Lung-hai Railway and drove them back in the direction of Tsinanfu. However, the general offensive of the Nationalists against the Northerners did not begin until January 4th, 1928, when "in face of persistent demands from various party organs and the army," General Chiang Kai-shek reassumed the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Army and declared the resumption of the anti-Northern expedition. ‡

The reorganization of the Nanking Government, after the crisis of December, 1927, was completed. The group closely associated with the family of the late Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the Soong party, regained fully its former domination in the Government and the Presidium of the Kuomintang. The Fourth Plenary Session of the Party, opened on February 3rd, 1928, at Nanking, fully endorsed the action of its new Commander-in-Chief and virtual head. It proclaimed the vital importance to the party of gaining Peking at any cost, and the necessity of a further purification of the party from the Communists. §

The Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee decreed the organization of a Central Political Council, which elected General Chiang Kai-shek President. ¶

The last touch to the reformation of the Government was added. The organization of the government and the High Command of the Nationalist Army were supplied with the

* "Reuter," Mukden, January 11th, 13th, February 27th and March 9th and 15th, 1928.

† "North-China Herald," January 21st, 1928; "Reuter," Peking, April 4th, 1928.

‡ General Chiang Kai-shek's Circular Telegram, January 9th, 1928.

§ Manifesto of the Fourth Plenary Session of the Kuomintang.—"Kuo-Min News Agency," Nanking, February 6th, 1928.

¶ Resolution of the 130th Meeting of the Standing Committee,—*ibid.*, March 2nd and 8th, 1928.

flexibility and independence essential to the success of the forthcoming attack against the North. This attack appeared to be imminent even in the face of the coming revision of the unequal treaties, the corner-stone of the new Nanking Government's policy * which required the co-operation of all political factions in China. A party of Kuomintang officials and leaders including Hu Han-min, Dr. C. C. Wu and Sun-fo, proceeded on an extensive tour around the world to prepare the way for an early revision of the treaties.† Yet a compromise with the North, in which some of the Northern leaders believed, ‡ was out of the question. In the matter of the Anti-Northern Expedition there was no difference of opinion within the Kuomintang in Nanking, Canton and Wuhan or amongst their allies. §

This unanimity was important, for it would be entirely false to suggest that so huge an organization as the Kuomintang controlling so vast a territory, formed a homogeneous body. The Kuomintang was divided into four distinct groups, sometimes very antagonistic to each other, viz: the Right Wing, to which most of the deported leaders belonged; the Centre, headed by General Chiang Kai-shek; the group of Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang and General Yen Hsi-shan and other Northern Generals who joined the Kuomintang during the campaign of 1926-1927, and the group of former partisans of Soviet Russia and the Communists, who succeeded in retaining their position in the party owing to their timely denunciation of Communism.

The conflicting interests of various provinces under the control of the Nanking Government were also factors which affected the unity of the Party.

Kwangtung and Kwangsi provinces, from the time of the Communist uprising in December, 1927, entirely dominated by the Kwangsi military party led by General Li Shi-shen and Chen Ming-chun, only nominally recognized the authority of

* Manifesto of Fourth Plenary Session of the Kuomintang, *op. cit.*, Statement of General Huang Fu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Nanking Government, to the Press, February 21st, 1928.

† Circular Telegram of the above-named, dated January 25th, 1928. The disposition of the travelling members of Kuomintang for propaganda purposes was as follows: Dr. C. C. Wu, Washington; Dr. Wang Chung-hui, London and Geneva; Messrs. Hu Han-min and Li Shi-tseng, Paris, and Mr. Sun, Berlin and The Hague.

‡ Statement of General Huang Fu, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Press, February 21st, 1928.—"Kuo Min News Agency," Nanking, February 22nd, 1928.

§ General Chiang Kai-shek's Statement, March 4th, 1928.—"North-China Herald," March 10th, 1928.

Nanking. The financial and military affairs of these two provinces hardly permitted them to take any part in the anti-Northern expedition, except by morally supporting it.* The same might be said of Wuhan, which, in spite of its conciliatory attitude towards Nanking, still preserved its independence and was only induced to join the expedition on the very eve of Peking's collapse.

The Communist Party also formed a strong body. The Nanking Government was forced to continue drastic measures to check its activity†, but all legislative and administrative efforts seemed to have but little effect.‡ As in the North, the Communist movement degenerated into a specific Chinese movement of masses incapable of adopting the doctrines of Communism in their entirety. Indescribable cruelties were perpetrated in the districts which fell into the hands of organizations similar to the "Red Spears" and "Big Swords." The peaceful population were massacred in thousands.§ Reports described disembowelled corpses left lying for days in the streets, none being allowed to remove them, until they were torn to pieces and eaten by dogs; women whose babies were killed before their eyes, before they themselves passed under the executioner's knife; women approaching childbirth, done to death in ways too horrible to describe in print; men who had their ears and strips of their flesh cut off, fried and eaten before their eyes, before they were killed.¶

It was an orgy of senseless massacres committed by hordes of peasants and ex-soldiers described as Communists, and perhaps, sincerely believing themselves to be disciples of Communism, but who, in reality, had very little in common with the latter. It was a wild orgy of massacres and incendi- arism, committed by one section of the population against another, in which the movement of the Chinese masses, stirred up by the ideas of Socialism and driven to despair by hunger and destitution, found its final outlet.

* General Li Shi-shen's Statement.—"North-China Herald," April 21st, 1928.

† Provisional Regulations Governing the Prosecution and Punishment of Counter-Revolutionaries.—Nanking, March 5th, 1928.

‡ General Chiang Kai-shek's Statement, February 2nd, 1928.—"Kuo Min News Agency," Nanking, same date.

§ Haifung and Laifung Districts, December, 1927 and January, 1928; Leiyang, South Honan, February, 1928; Kading and Nanzing, Kiangsu, March, 1928, etc.

¶ "North-China Herald," January 14th and February 18th, 1928; "Reuter," Hankow, March 2nd and 3rd, 1928. "Kuo Min News Agency" Kading, April 10th, 1928.

Only by the utmost effort was the provincial and central Kuomintang government able to keep the party and the territory under its control and from entire disintegration, and to manoeuvre safely amongst the contradictions caused by the imperfections and methods of the Party. It was undoubtedly a proof of the latter's vitality, which gave hope "that sooner or later it would overcome the immense difficulties confronting it."*

In spite of the very severe criticism to which the administrative methods of the Nanking Government were subjected by the Chinese public,† it did not lose entirely the support of the Chinese bourgeoisie. The bonds of its treasury were readily underwritten by the banks and commercial organizations,‡ which placed it in a far more favourable position than that enjoyed by the Government of Tayuanshuai at Peking.

On the other hand, the Nationalist Government displayed a surprising pliability in questions in which it might rightly be expected to be irreconcilable. On March 16th, 1928, the Government Council at Nanking issued two mandates, one ordering the arrest of the culprits responsible for the Nanking incident in March, 1927, and the other decreeing protection to foreign nationals in China.§

As one can imagine, the mandate concerning the arrest and punishment of the chief instigators of the outrages committed by the Southern army in Nanking affected only some of the junior officers, notorious local desperados, leaders of the opposition and Communists.¶

The same might be said in regard to the second mandate. Although ostensibly dealing with the question of protection of the lives and property of foreigners, its primary object was to suppress the opposition, which, under the cloak of a popular anti-foreign movement, could easily tamper with the plans of the Nationalist Government.

Both mandates were received by the foreigners in China with a feeling of satisfaction. They were interpreted as a

* Sir Cecil Clementi, Governor of Hongkong, March 2nd, 1928.—
"Reuter," Hongkong, March 2nd, 1928.

† Resolution of the Associated Chambers of Commerce Convention, Shanghai, December 17th and 22nd, 1928.

‡ Bonds of the Second Issuance of the Surtax Treasury Bonds of the Nationalist Government to the amount of Mex. \$40,000,000.

§ "Kuo Min News Agency," Nanking, March 17th, 1928.

¶ Amongst the latter was Lin Tsu-han, ex-Director of the Political Department of the Southern Army and one of the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party.—AUTHOR.

definite sign of a change in the attitude of the Nanking Government in regard to the foreign Powers and its sincere desire to settle the Nanking Incident.*

In fact, simultaneously with the publication of these mandates, Sir Miles Lampson, H.B.M.'s Minister to China, opened informal negotiations with the Nanking Government concerning the settlement of the incident. Whilst these negotiations were proceeding the telegraph brought news that an agreement on the Communist outrage in Nanking had been signed by the American Minister to China and the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Nanking.†

The text of the notes exchanged between the ministers disclosed the nature of this agreement: it contained an expression of mutual regret for what had happened on March 24th, 1927, at Nanking. The Nanking Government gave a solemn undertaking to compensate in full for all personal injuries and material loss of the American nationals,‡ while the United States renewed the pledge of January 27th, 1927, whereby America expressed her willingness "to open negotiations for new treaties to replace the so-called unequal treaties whenever a delegation fairly representative of all China requests such action."§

The effect of the resolute action of the U.S. Minister in China was that of a bomb-shell. It predefined the terms of any future settlement of the incident which might be arrived at between the Nationalist Government and other foreign Powers.¶ It raised the international status of the Nanking Government to a height unwarranted under the circumstances of a civil war, the issue of which was undecided, lessening at the same time the prestige of the Peking Government as the only internationally-recognized body representative of China.

On March 18th, the Minister of Foreign Affairs at Peking made an official announcement regarding the settlement of the railway dispute with Japan. It was a capitulation. The

* "Toho News Agency," Peking, March 16th, 1928.

† Mr. J. V. A. MacMurray and General Huang Fu.—"North-China Herald," April 7th, 1928.

‡ General Huang Fu to the U.S. Minister to China, March 30th, 1928; U. S. Minister to same, same date.

§ Additional Note of the U. S. Minister to China to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nanking, March 30th, 1928.

¶ Statement of Mr. Frank B. Kellogg, U.S. Secretary of State, April 2nd, 1928.—"Reuter," Washington, April 2nd, 1928.

¶ "Reuter Pacific Service," Tokyo, April 3rd, 1928.

enforcement of the through-traffic contracts, previously repudiated by the Chinese authorities as encroaching upon China's sovereign rights,* transformed the newly-built and Chinese-owned railways in the Three Eastern Provinces into tributaries to the Japanese lines in Manchuria and Korea.

However, even this concession, followed by the permission granted to Japan to extend her railway system in Manchuria and construct new branch lines, could not improve the relations of the Tayuanshuai with Japan.†

The general hostilities between the North and the South started in the earlier part of April, 1928. At the beginning they seemed to be developing in favour of the Northern party. The Chihli-Shantung forces made headway along the Lunghai Railway in Shantung, while the Fengtien troops checked the advancement of the combined armies of General Yen Hsi-shan and Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang along the Peking-Hankow Railway and in Chihli. But on April 16th, the situation suddenly changed for the worse.

In a number of battles the Chihli-Shantung troops suffered reverses and were finally forced to start a general retreat. Marshal Sun Chuan-fang's daring flanking movement to relieve the situation ended in the crushing defeat of his troops by Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang who, at the head of his cavalry corps, occupied the walled city of Tsining.

The defeat in Shantung affected very seriously the position of the Fengtien troops in Honan, who received orders to stop the offensive and await further developments in Shantung.

The war situation did not cause any anxiety in Peking. The reverses suffered by the Chihli-Shantung armies, however serious they might have been, did not constitute a decisive factor in the struggle. The immense resources of the Fengtien armies were far from being exhausted. Large reinforcements were regularly arriving from Manchuria, and there was every hope that in the course of a few weeks the Fengtien forces would considerably outnumber the combined Nationalist armies in the field. The financial side of the issue was settled by Marshal

* The Mukden-Heilungkiang-South Manchurian and Feng-Hai-South Manchurian Railway Through-Traffic Agreements, Peking, April 30th, 1928.

† Changchun-Talai, 130 miles; Extension of the Changchun-Kirin-Tunhwa Railway eastwards to Yenchi, on the Korean border, 100 miles; Taonanfu-Solun in Mongolia, 136 miles; Kirin-Wuchang, 90 miles; Yenchi-Hailin, a station on the Chinese Eastern Railway.

This permission was cancelled by the Provincial Government of the Three Eastern Provinces which refused to sanction it.—AUTHOR.

Chang Tso-lin's decision to make good any deficiency in the war-budget out of his own private treasury.*

According to the official statement of the Ankuochun Headquarters, the reports of the continuous Northern reverses were, on many occasions, exaggerated by the Japanese news agencies in order to justify a new despatch of Japanese troops into Shantung.

As a matter of fact, with the advance of the Nationalists, Japan made hurried preparations for the landing of her troops in Shantung.† An official *communiqué* issued in Tokyo stated that the contemplated despatch of the troops was purely for the protection of the lives and properties of the Japanese residing in Shantung, and that strict neutrality would be observed in all cases not directly endangering them.‡ This definite announcement, however, could not allay the anxiety caused among the Chinese by the prospects of further Japanese intervention in Shantung. For, whatever were the real motives of the contemplated steps, the mere fact of the occupation of the strategical line, Tsinanfu-Tsingtao, by Japan enabled her to dictate terms to both contending parties.

On April 22nd, the Shantung forces evacuated Tsinanfu, retiring across the Yellow River. On the 24th, the provincial capital was occupied by Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang's vanguards, who had out-distanced the Nanking armies owing to their superior mobility, and a large Mongolian cavalry corps, which he had succeeded in organizing during his forced stay in Shensi in 1925-1926.

The occupation of Tsinanfu by Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang did not last long. He withdrew his forces, leaving the city to the Nanking army, which arrived on May 1.

The Japanese troops were landed in Tsingtao and slowly moved along the Kiaochow-Tsinan Railway, being held up in their advance by the necessity of repairing the line which had been cut at many points by the Nationalists. On April 30th, just a few hours before the arrival of the Nanking troops, they entered Tsinanfu and occupied various tactical positions in the city.

What happened on May 3rd, the day following the arrival of General Chiang Kai-shek at Tsinanfu, could easily be foreseen in Tokyo when its Cabinet decided to send troops

* "Reuter," Peking, April 26th, 1928.

† *Ibid.*, Tokyo, April 17th, 1928.

‡ Japanese Government Official Statement, April 20th, 1928.

to defend a few Japanese residents in Tsinanfu instead of evacuating them, and to occupy a strategical point, the possession of which was of paramount importance to the Nationalist armies.

In their contention, the Chinese went even further: they accused the Japanese of a wilful attack upon the Nationalist troops, of the cold blooded murder of the Chinese Commissioner for Foreign Affairs for Shantung, Tsai Kung-shih, and his staff, and of many peaceful inhabitants, which forced the Chinese soldiers to turn their arms, in self-defence, against the Japanese. They accused them of deliberate provocation for the purpose of establishing a precedent, whereby the Japanese occupation of Shantung could be justified in the eyes of the world and the progress of the Anti-Northern Expedition stopped.*

The Japanese refuted all these allegations and insisted that the conflict was due solely to treachery and a prearranged plot on the part of the Chinese to massacre all the Japanese in Tsinanfu, resulting in numerous Japanese residents being barbarously killed and wounded.†

In support of their contentions both parties brought forward a mass of documentary evidence and called numerous eye-witnesses, who finally obscured the truth. We repeat that what happened on May 3rd, in Tsinanfu, could easily have been foreseen in Tokyo at the moment when the Government of Baron Tanaka decided to send troops to protect the lives and property of a few Japanese nationals in Tsinanfu, instead of evacuating them to Tsingtao, the strategical importance of which place was for both Chinese contending parties, nil. And if the same Government did not really wish to interfere in Chinese domestic affairs and to remain strictly neutral, it should not have sent troops to China at this juncture. For in consequence of the conflicts on May 3rd, and on subsequent dates, May 8th and 10th, and the disarming of a part of the Nanking troops by the Japanese, the Nationalists were forced to evacuate Tsinanfu and over 100,000 of their troops were stopped in their march northwards. Other troops, which had already succeeded in crossing the Yellow River, were cut off from their base.

* General Chiang Kai-shek's Report to Tan Yen-kai, Chairman, Nationalist Government Council, May 4th, 1928.—"Kuo Min Agency," Nanking, May 6th, 1928.

Protest of the Chinese Nationalist Government to the League of Nations, May 11th, 1928.

† Lieutenant-General Fukuda's, Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Expeditionary Troops in Shantung, Official Report, May 6th, 1928.

The progress of the Anti-Northern Expedition was arrested. Any further movement of the Nationalists depended upon whether or not the Japanese Military Command would grant them permission to pass the zone occupied by the Japanese troops and to cross the Yellow River, using the railway bridge at Tsinanfu. Should this passage be denied them, they would have to regroup their armies, reorganize their rear, and take a long circuitous route, a very difficult and dangerous manoeuvre requiring much time.

The effect of Japanese intervention in favour of the other party was still graver. It deprived the North of all possibility of continuing the struggle against the South.

In fact, at the moment when, as a result of a compromise, the permission to pass through the area occupied by the Japanese troops was graciously granted the Nationalist armies by the Japanese Command, acting under instructions from Tokyo, the Northern party was unable to take the field against them. No Chinese, including Marshal Chang Tso-lin, however powerful he was, could take arms against them and continue the war under these circumstances when the Chinese public at large interpreted the Japanese action in Shantung as a definite attempt to prevent the northward advance of the victorious Nationalist armies and force a cessation of hostilities. Any hostile move against the Nationalists who, in the eyes of this public, were the victims of Japanese aggression, would be tantamount to treachery against China.

The storm of indignation, which seized the Chinese upon learning of the Japanese expedition into Shantung and the Tsinan conflict, precluded any unbiassed criticism of the situation. The deadly effect of the Japanese action in the North was not realized by the masses owing to their blind hatred of the Japanese, which permitted them to see only one side of the issue—the arrest of the progress of the anti-Northern expedition—and nothing else.

On May 9th, as soon as the news of the bombardment of Tsinan and the disarmament of the Nationalist army reached Peking, a circular telegram addressed to all the leading civil and military authorities of the North and South signed by Tayuanshuai, Marshal Chang Tso-lin, was urgently broadcast throughout the country. It contained a pathetic proclamation of peace, and a call to all Chinese to stop fighting.*

* Marshal Chang Tso-lin's Circular Telegram, May 9th, 1928. "Reuter," Peking, same date.

It was an act of sincerity and resoluteness unique in the annals of the modern Chinese Republic wherein, as we know, the treachery and insincerity of the political leaders had attained formidable proportions. The Fengtien troops on all fronts received orders to stop fighting and retire in the direction of Tientsin. The Peking-Tientsin Railway prepared trains for the evacuation of the Government of Tayuanshuai from Peking.

The troops obeyed. They retired in good order, although their retirement served the cause of their enemies by enabling them to recover from the crushing blow which had just been inflicted upon them. Everybody realized that there was no other course left to them if they did not wish to bring upon themselves the hatred of the whole nation.

It was true that when the advanced guard of Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang's army pressed hard upon the approaches of Tsinanfu, the Fengtien troops undertook a big drive along the Peking-Hankow line. The desperate counter-attack at Shangteh, ordered by Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang, met with overwhelming defeat with heavy losses. It was probably this Fengtien drive southwards which was responsible for his withdrawal from the Tsinan area, which was later occupied by the Nanking troops.

The Chihli-Shantung forces also received orders to stop fighting, although their position had much improved since their retirement across the Yellow River. Marshal Sun Chuanfang who replaced Marshal Chang Chun-chang, dismissed from all his posts after the débâcle, displayed an almost superhuman energy and succeeded in reshaping his troops within a few weeks into an army some 30,000 strong, able to hold its own against the advancing Nationalists.

But the Nanking Government and the Kuomintang rejected the truce offered by the North. They decided that it was useless to pay any heed to Marshal Chang Tso-lin's appeal because they did not consider that the suggestion was sincere.* A telegram was despatched to all Northern generals persuading them to sever their allegiance to Marshal Chang Tso-lin and join the Nationalist cause in order that the country be soon unified.†

* Resolution of the Joint Meeting of the Nationalist Government and the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, May 12th, 1928.—“Kuo Min News Agency,” Nanking, same date.

† *Ibid.* In this connection it is of interest to note that the Chinese diplomats abroad sent a joint telegram to the Peking Ministry of Foreign Affairs urging a cessation of internal strife at once in order “to cope with the national crisis in conjunction with the Nationalist party.”—“North-China Herald,” May 19th, 1928.

The Nationalists and their allies, as Chinese, realized the impasse in which the North found itself as a result of the Japanese intervention. They clearly saw that, in spite of a better army, the Government of Tayuanshuai would finally be forced to capitulate. Very serious calumny regarding its relations to Japan was set afloat to discredit it further in the eyes of the credulous Chinese masses and the foreign Powers, which found support in the Japanese press. The Japanese news agencies, usually very well informed about everything in China, exerted themselves in disseminating false reports regarding the hopeless war situation in the North.*

It seemed as though the Nationalists and the Japanese were working hand in hand to bring about the downfall of Marshal Chang Tso-lin at any cost, just as they did in regard to the régime of Yuan Shih-kai in 1915.

The climax was reached on May 18th, when Mr. K. Yoshisawa, the Japanese Minister at Peking, handed to Marshal Chang Tso-lin a statement in which, under the excuse of the necessity to protect Japanese interests in Manchuria, he suggested to him that no armed troops should be allowed to pass Shanhaikwan, and advised him to return immediately to Manchuria. Four days later, the Chinese Press in the territories controlled by the Nationalists published the text of an agreement purported to have been entered into by Marshal Chang Tso-lin and the Japanese Government whereby the Tayuanshuai agreed to the despatch of Japanese troops into China and accepted a loan of M. \$50,000,000, and granted them in return important railway concessions, freedom of colonization in China and purchase of land in the interior. The agreement signed between China and Japan on May 25th, 1915 (*viz.*, the Twenty One Demands) was confirmed, the lease of the Shantung Peninsula running for 99 years. Another provision of the same treaty provided for the complete cession of Dairen and Port Arthur to Japan.†

The consequences of the publication of these documents were terrific in the North. Even an organization more perfect than that of the Government of the Tayuanshuai and the Ankuochun could hardly have withstood the demoralizing effects of these statements and not have fallen.

The advice of the Japanese Minister, which was of little importance to the Nationalists when communicated to

* *Ibid.*, May 26th, 1928.

† *Ibid.*

them,* was tantamount to an ultimatum to the Northern Party. The courteous form of "the suggestion" of the Japanese Minister not to allow any armed soldier to pass Shanhaikwan and the advice to Marshal Chang Tso-lin to retire to Manchuria was tantamount to a demand to abandon immediately the struggle against the South, to surrender Peking and to retire into Manchuria. It contained an ill-concealed threat to cut off the Fengtien armies from their base and the Fengtien soldiers from their homes.

The Japanese troops in Manchuria were hastily reinforced. The garrisons in Mukden, Shanhaikwan, Tientsin and even the Japanese Legation Guard at Peking, where an aerodrome was being constructed to accommodate the Japanese flying corps, were increased. Families of the Japanese residents in North China received orders to prepare themselves for evacuation.†

The reply of Generalissimo Chang Tso-lin, made in the name of the whole of the Northern armies, was full of dignity and self-command.‡ It pointed out the disastrous results of the Japanese "friendly advice" to the Northern armies should it be accepted, and sarcastically remarked that it was wrongly addressed as "the Peking authorities had no intention of continuing the warfare, but were obliged to respond to the attack of the South."

Outside the specific Chinese face-saving effect, this reply had no practical result. The defence lines and the fighting spirit of the Northern armies were swiftly crumbling away, notwithstanding the initial success obtained by the Fengtien army against the Shansi and Kuominchun troops at Paotingfu.§ The Heilungkiang forces and several Fengtien battalions stationed at Shanhaikwan to protect the retreat were withdrawn to their respective provinces. It was apparent that the only way to save the armies from complete disruption was immediately to withdraw them beyond the Great Wall. A movement was set on foot to bring about a sort of compromise between the Fengtien and Shansi armies. A number of telegrams passed between the Ankuochun generals and General

* Similar statements made to Marshal Chang Tso-lin by Mr. K. Yoshisawa were sent to General Chiang Kai-shek, Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang and General Yen Hsi-shan.

† "Reuter," Peking, May 18th; ; Tokyo, May 19th, 1928.

‡ General Yang Yu-ting to K. Yoshisawa, Japanese Minister at Peking, May 19th, 1928.

§ "Reuter," Peking, May 18th, 1928.

Yen Hsi-shan * whereby the latter was informed beforehand of the evacuation of any given city or village and his troops enabled to occupy it before the arrival of the Kouminchun.

There could be no question that there was a race between General Yen Hsi-shan and Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang for the occupation of Peking and Tientsin as there seemed to have been between the latter and General Chiang Kai-shek for the occupation of Tsinanfu. This time General Chiang Kai-shek was out of the game and was somewhere between Hsuehowfu and Yenchow, holding Marshal Feng's rear.

The Fengtien command rather preferred to see Peking in the hands of General Yen Hsi-shan than occupied by their bitterest enemy, the Christian General, whom they accused of being responsible for the rejection of the truce. †

The Fengtien armies were gradually falling back on Peking. The last and determined stand had to be made at the line of Liuliho and Machang, roughly within thirty miles south of Peking and Tientsin.

Marshal Chang Tso-lin flatly refused to entertain any proposal of a peaceful transference of the reins of government. Generals Chiang Kai-shek and Yen Hsi-shan bound themselves to facilitate the withdrawal of the Fengtien armies outside the Great Wall, and to surround the departure of Marshal Chang Tso-lin from Peking with the decorum necessary to convey no impression of his capitulation.

This plan was favoured by his eldest son, Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang and General Yang Yu-ting, his closest lieutenant and one of the most popular Fengtien leaders. ‡ The resolution of the Generalissimo could not be shaken. He remained firm in his determination to fight to the bitter end.

Meanwhile, events had long since taken such a course, that the situation was entirely outside the control of any individual, irrespective of his political or military power.

On June 1st, the foreign ministers at Peking called on the Generalissimo. Marshal Chang Tso-lin appeared to be calm. He spoke of his determination to continue the struggle against Communism which was the sole object of his coming to Peking and assuming the office of the Tayuanshuai. He

* "Toho News Agency," Mukden, May 17th, 1928.

† Marshal Chang Tso-lin's Punitive Mandate against Marshal Feng Yu-siang, May 17th, 1928.

‡ "Toho News Agency," Peking, May 31st, 1928.

expressed the hope that the opposition of the Chinese against the Reds would continue and Communism would never gain hold in China.* Not a single word was said about his near departure. It was understood that tentative measures were already under way to form a committee for public safety during the evacuation of the Northern forces in the capital.

This committee was to be composed of City Elders, the Cabinet automatically ceasing to exist. One Fengtien brigade under General Pao Yu-lin had to remain in Peking to assist the Metropolitan Police in preserving peace and order during the interregnum.

On June 3rd, early in the morning, Marshal Chang Tso-lin left Peking for Mukden. The capital remained perfectly calm. There was no sign of disorder or panic to cloud the dignified exit of the last Chinese statesman to strive to regenerate China by reverting to the classical principles of her glorious past, and who finally was forced to recognize his defeat.

"Henceforth political issues will be left in the hands of the people". . . ran his last message to the country.†

On the following day at 5.30 a.m. his mutilated body and that of his best friend and partisan, General Wu Chunsheng, the Tupan of Heilungkiang, were removed from the debris of the train in which he was proceeding when it was blown up in passing the intersection of the Peking-Mukden and South Manchurian railways near Mukden.

The blowing up of Marshal Chang Tso-lin's train was the result of a well-prepared scheme, the mystery of which is only partly solved.

The official report of the Japanese Consul-General at Mukden submitted by him to the Foreign Office at Tokyo on June 21st, 1928, is full of contradictions and entirely incomplete.

The report of the Joint Sino-Japanese Committee of Inquiry, formed to investigate the outrage immediately after its occurrence, which was drawn up by the Japanese members was refused signature by the Chinese.‡

The repeated attempts of the opposition in the Tokyo Parliament to throw light on the accident were unsuccessful. The Cabinet of Baron Tanaka refused to give out any

* "North-China Herald," June 2nd, 1928.

† Marshal Chang Tso-lin's Circular Telegram, June 2nd, 1928.—"Toho News Agency," Tokyo, June 3rd, 1928.

‡ "Reuter," Mukden, August 8th, 1928.

details of the investigation under the excuse that the work of the Committee was not concluded.*

However, the material published since the assassination of Marshal Chang Tso-lin, though incomplete, gives a fair idea of what happened at Mukden on June 4th, 1928, and enables us to arrive at certain conclusions and facts.

The wreck was caused by the planting of a great quantity of high explosive on the northern pier, underneath and beside the northern and central spans of the bridge, under which Marshal Chang Tso-lin's train was to pass.† It was a place situated on the track of the South Manchurian Railway, heavily protected and guarded exclusively by Japanese troops.

The Chinese troops who patrolled the track of the Peking-Mukden Railway under the viaduct were prevented from effectually guarding the spot because they were not allowed by the Japanese to come within two hundred yards of the viaduct.‡

The ignition of the blasting charges was done electrically from a safe distance from the bridge. This called for elaborate preparations with electric detonators and connecting wires, which denoted the work of qualified specialists and which required for its completion, together with the laying of explosives, not fewer than six hours.§

The Japanese official and unofficial press may exert themselves in trying to prove that the outrage was committed by the Chinese,¶ and that they alone must be blamed for what happened to one of their greatest men, but the Chinese will remain confident that Marshal Chang Tso-lin and his lieutenants|| were the victims of a Japanese plot.**

This confidence and the given facts cannot be shaken by any elaborate theory which may be put forth at any later date.

* On June 27th, 1929, it was officially announced at Tokyo that a statement giving the results of the official investigations concerning the death of Marshal Chang Tso-lin would be issued in the near future.—It was hinted that two or three officers of the Japanese Garrison at Kwantung would be reprimanded for negligence in failing to prevent the occurrence but that Japan herself will be cleared of any blame in the matter.—AUTHOR.

† "Reuter," Mukden, August 8th, 1928.

‡ Statement of the Tokyo War Office, dated June 18th, 1928.

§ "North-China Herald," July 21st, 1928.

¶ "Toho News Agency," Mukden, June 4th, 1928.

|| Besides Marshal Chang Tso-lin and General Wu Chun-sheng, there were killed in the same train Mo Te-hui, Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, General Wu Kuo-han, Chinese Official Interpreter, and Lieutenant Colonel Giga, Japanese Military Adviser to Marshal Chang Tso-lin.

** Statement of the Tokyo Cabinet, June 8th, 1928.—"Toho News Agency," Tokyo, June 9th, 1928.

The assertion that the havoc was wrought by "bombs thrown at the train by Southern plain-clothes agents" cannot withstand the slightest criticism. No hand bomb or grenade could have wrought such terrible havoc as that produced by the mine placed on the track of the South Manchurian Railway. The Staff of the Nationalist Army strenuously denied the existence of plain-clothes men in their army.*

Still less convincing were the operetta bomb outrages against the Japanese residents at Mukden, which followed the blowing up of Marshal Chang Tso-lin's train and which were also attributed by the Japanese authorities "to scores of Southern soldiers in plain clothes."† The naiveté of this version speaks for itself: no damage was done by a few grenades thrown in the neighbourhood of Japanese residences.

We need not go into further details as to what was disseminated in order to divert the attention of the Public from the real cause and the actual perpetrators of the outrage.

"The crime," declared Putnam Weale (Mr. B. Lenox Simpson), Adviser to the late Marshal Chang Tso-lin, "was the work of bad men and certain people in the Japanese Army facilitated their work. There have long been in Japan organizations similar to the Serbian organizations which carried out the Sarajevo crime; for instance, the Black Dragon Society, which specializes in Chinese affairs and originated the Twenty-One Demands, and which notoriously employs men of the Soshi class such as were deported by the Japanese civil authorities from Mukden after the Murder."‡

The assassination of Marshal Chang Tso-lin and General Wu Chun-sheng, the two main personages of one of the concluding phases of China's struggle for reunification according to traditional Chinese political doctrines and the right to remain Chinese, was a logical sequence to this struggle. They had to be removed as standing in the way of China's westernization and the Japanese plans with regard to the future of the Far East, and they were removed. Their tragical end was as inevitable as that of Yuan Shih-kai.

* General Ho Yin-ching, Chief of Staff of the Nationalist Forces, June 9th, 1928.—"Reuter," Nanking, same date.

† "Toho News Agency," Mukden, June 10th, 1928.

‡ "Reuter," Peking, August 14th, 1928.

CHAPTER XV

AFTERMATH OF THE ANTI-NORTHERN EXPEDITION: THE CAPITULATION OF THE WEST

Peking was occupied by the Nationalist forces on June 5th, 1928. The Shansi troops under General Hsu Yung-chang arrived at Chang-hsin-tien, a suburb of Peking, and their vanguard entered the capital at 6 o'clock in the evening.

The race between the Shansi army and the Kuominchun for possession of the ancient seat of the Chinese Government ended in the defeat of Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang. The Government Council at Nanking appointed General Yen Hsi-shan, Commander-in-Chief of the Garrison Forces of Peking and Tientsin, and ordered him to proceed there at once with his troops to maintain "peace and order."* The claim to the Chihli Province of Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang, who had been promised Shantung in addition to his original possessions, and who was deprived of this prize by the Japanese occupation of Tsinanfu, was ignored.

However, a large number of the Kuominchun advanced towards Peking, occupied all strategical points around the Capital, and swiftly pushed towards Tientsin in the hope of seizing it and so compensating themselves for the loss of Tsing-tao by obtaining another good seaport.

The Fengtien brigade of General Pao Yu-lin left in the Capital to assist the Metropolitan Police, to which complete safety and free withdrawal to Manchuria had been guaranteed by the Nationalist Government, was suddenly attacked by the advancing Kuominchun and disarmed.† Its fate would have hardly been different from that of the loyal bodyguards of the Provisional Chief Executive, Tuan Chi-jui, in 1926, had

* Nationalist Government Mandate, June 4th, 1928.

† W. J. Oudendijk, Minister of Netherlands and Doyen of the Diplomatic Corps at Peking, to General Tan Yen-kai, Chairman of the Government Council, Nanking, June 4th, 1928; to Y. L. Tong, of the Nationalist Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peking, June 6th, 1928.

not prompt intervention on the part of the Foreign Diplomatic Body saved them from being mercilessly massacred.* The gates of Peking were closed and barricaded.

The position was further aggravated by the attitude of General Pei Chung-hsi, the leader of the Wuhan army, who joined the Anti-Northern Expedition just on the eve of Peking's fall, but not until a large financial subsidy had been paid up and a definite share in the territorial redistribution, subsequent to the expected victory, promised by Nanking. He also demanded more than he was entitled to, viz. : the Lunghai Railway, which would have immensely strengthened, politically, the Wuhan group controlled by the Kwangsi faction of the Kuomintang.

The apparent hopelessness of the situation caused General Chiang Kai-shek to petition the Government to relieve him of his military posts, on the ground that the Northern Punitive Expedition was completed and there was no necessity to keep him as Commander-in-Chief and Chairman of the Military Council of the Nationalist Government : the command of all armies under him to be restored to their respective commanders under the Military Council.†

As a matter of theory the occupation of Peking by the Nationalists and the retirement of the Fengtien forces might be regarded as the completion of the Anti-Northern Expedition, relieving General Chiang Kai-shek from all his responsibilities. But, in reality, this was far from the case. The Chihli-Shantung troops still occupied Tientsin, and the mere retirement of the Fengtien armies beyond the Great Wall did not mean their defeat or surrender.

Not one of the Northern leaders thought of putting down his arms or of admitting defeat, except Marshal Sun Chuan-fang, who, disappointed with the trend of military events, retired into private life.‡ Marshal Chang Chun-chang returned to his troops and in co-operation with General Chu Yu-pu, the Tupan of Chihli, stubbornly defended the approaches of Tientsin.

In spite of orders from the Fengtien Chief Command,§ a desperate struggle continued long after the occupation of

* Same to General Tan Yen-kai, June 9th, 1928 ; Y. L. Tong's Telegram to same, June 10th, 1928.

† General Chiang Kai-shek to the Political Council of the Kuomintang, June 9th, 1928.—"North-China Herald," June 16th, 1928.

‡ "Reuter," Peking, June 4th, 1928.

§ Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang's Circular Telegram, September 15th and 16th, 1928.

Tientsin by General Pei Chung-hsi. Finally the Fengtien authorities were forced to take the field against the disorderly remnants of their former allies, and assist the Nationalists in their extermination.* This was done in the most cruel way. The exhausted and disorganized men were surrounded in masses and shot with machine guns.

Marshal Chang Chun-chang and General Chu Yu-pu happily escaped the fate of their subordinates. The former under most dramatic circumstances, dressed in civilian clothes, succeeded in reaching in a boat the Kwantung Peninsula, where he was granted asylum by the Japanese.

The resignation of General Chiang Kai-shek was not accepted. In response to urgent telegrams from various quarters, including the rival war-lords, General Yen Hsi-shan, Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang and General Pei Chung-hsi, he cancelled his trip to Silver Island at Chinkiang, to which he had gone after tendering his resignation, and returned to Nanking.† A sort of compromise was reached between them, which prevented the outbreak of an armed struggle for the spoils of the war. The compromise was strengthened by a meeting of all the military chieftains at the grave of the great Revolutionary Leader, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, at Peking, where a special ceremony of sacrifice before his remains was held by General Chiang Kai-shek.‡

A military conference was also appointed at Peking to decide upon the extension of the punitive expedition into Manchuria, which was strongly advocated by Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang, whilst other Generals showed an inclination to come to a compromise with Mukden.§

Not so much in obedience to the order of Nanking as actuated by interfactional intrigues, the various Generals reluctantly proceeded to Peking. Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang was the last amongst them to arrive. Under the plea of illness he refused to attend the Military Conference and insisted upon a meeting at his headquarters at Paotingfu.¶

On the 6th of July, the Temple of Piyussu in the Western Hills at Peking, where the remains of Dr. Sun Yat-sen had awaited for over three years the end of the struggle, witnessed the gathering of the élite of the Nationalists.

* Marshal Chang Chun-chang's Circular Telegram, September 14th, 1928.

† "Kuo Min News Agency," Nanking, June 18th, 1928.

‡ "Kuo Wen," June 19th, 1928.

§ "Reuter," Peking, July 18th, 1928.

¶ "North-China Herald," July 18th, 1928.

A sensation was caused by General Lu Chung-lin, Marshal Feng's representative, who attended with the latter's body-guards, armed with loaded automatic rifles, and dressed like Mexican bandits. General Lu Chung-lin carried a heavy knife, like a Roman sword. This guard rushed into the Temple Grounds, covering all visitors with rifles. They cleared the approach to the inner temple, and then formed two lines whilst General Lu Chung-lin made his entrance.*

The ceremony was followed by splendid receptions given in the honour of the distinguished guests by General Yen Hsi-shan, playing the rôle of host, and various other Generals. Speeches were pronounced, public meetings held, and the Nationalist armies eulogized. But all these jubilations found no echo in the country, which remained calm and unperturbed by the victories of the Nationalists, obtained under such peculiar circumstances. The enthusiasm of the people was not roused by the fall of Peking and the collapse of the Anti-Nationalist coalition. The section of Chinese society, which controlled public opinion in China, not to mention the Chinese masses whose sufferings could hardly be lightened by these events, preserved strict aloofness and watchfulness *vis-à-vis* the Nationalist's triumphs; in the North—people waited for some tangible results of the much advertised Anti-Northern Expedition, which was to re-unite China and lead her to Peace and Prosperity; in the South—people wished to see their sacrifices for the Nationalist cause remunerated. The omens were rather against than in favour of the fulfilment of these expectations.

In addition to mutual antagonism of the war-lords of the new Nationalist formation, which foreshadowed a lengthy struggle for supremacy, personal aggrandizement and enrichment, as in the past days of the Northern party, there was one incident which roused public opinion. This was the desecration of the Imperial Tombs of the Manchu Royal Family at Tungling committed by one of the Northern Generals. The blame for this was placed at the door of the Nationalists.

In the long course of Chinese civil wars the Manchus had been forgotten. The last offspring of the Tsing dynasty, Mr. Pu Yi, continued to live in Tientsin far from politics, sharing his time between the dreams of the past glory of his famous ancestors in the homes of his European friends and the Astor House Hotel.

* *Ibid.*

The collapse of Marshal Chang Tso-lin's regime and the triumph of the Republican South, irrespective of the circumstances under which it occurred, meant another blow to the monarchical idea in China. If monarchism could not withstand the onslaught of the ideas of Western democratism represented by the South, or had been strangled by any factor outside of China and was dead, yet there were certain religious and ethical bounds within which the life of the nation moved. The sanctity of graves, in the eyes of Chinese, pertained to those principles of National Religion and Ethics which no consideration of modern sociology or economy could shake. The desecration of the Imperial tombs was an unpardonable crime, and the leniency which its perpetrators found at the hands of the Nationalist Government created a very profound impression.

In fact, General Tang Wen-hu, the former Honan bandit, a Divisional Commander under Marshal Wu Pei-fu and later with the Ankuochun, who personally directed the dynamiting of the Imperial tombs, was not court-martialled, as might have been expected, but received the post of Garrison Commander, north of Nankow. With priceless treasures in his hands taken from the thirteen coffins which were opened, he was able to bribe everybody in the new Administration.* The Military Council at Nanking and General Yen Hsi-shan were powerless to do anything.

Some arrests were made amongst the Generals, subordinate to Tang Wen-hu, junior officers and Chinese curio dealers. The former were soon released under various excuses,† while the trial of the latter was postponed and postponed to give the scandal time to subside before the trial brought out the disreputable facts.‡

* The value of the treasures taken from the graves, including those of the Emperor Kien Lung and the Empress Dowager Tsu Hsi, is impossible to estimate. It is stated that the contents of the coffin of the Empress Tsu Hsi amounted to M.\$50,000,000 in precious stones, pearls, gold, etc., and if all the jewels rifled from the Imperial tombs were sold for their actual value, the amount would be sufficient to pay off all China's external debts and leave a considerable surplus.—Record of Chief Eunuch Li Lien-ying, "North-China Herald," October 13th, 1928.

† "North-China Herald," July 14th, 1928.

‡ The preliminary hearing of the case took place one year later, on June 8th, 1929, at Peking. According to the judgment delivered it appeared that the principal culprits, including General Sun Tien-ying and others, had long since absconded and the court had to satisfy itself with imposing a death penalty by default.—"Toho News Agency," Peking, June 9th, 1929.

The Nationalist Government and the Kuomintang, in their rehabilitation work of the country, had to rely on their own strength and energy. This necessarily determined the course of their policy: it was specifically Kuomintang, based on the political and social theories of their late founder.

The era of the "national tutelage," which according to Dr. Sun Yat-sen's political theory had to follow the period of military revolution, opened with the transfer of the capital from Peking to Nanking.* The name of Peking was changed into Peiping and the Chihli province became known as Hopei Province. The former Metropolitan area under Peking was amalgamated with this province, and Peiping and Tientsin were granted charters for municipal government.

The ancient capital was doomed to decay and oblivion. The plea of the Peking gentry † and the considerations of national economy ‡ were ignored. The cherished plan of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, which he advocated in 1911, triumphed. The capital was removed from the "semi-barbarian" North, the stronghold of monarchism, to the purely Chinese South, the ancient capital of the Ming dynasty, where the Republicans felt themselves more stable.

There were, of course, other factors of a more delicate nature, which had not a little to do with this decision of the Government. By removing the capital to Nanking the Nationalist Government freed itself from the danger of being dominated by Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang, whose domains were close to Peking, and from the no less objectionable sight of the troops of the Powers, signatories to the Protocol of 1901, marching along the roads of the Capital.

On June 13th, 1928, the Government Council at Nanking, issued the first manifesto outlining its internal policy and announcing that Nationalist China had entered the political tutelage stage. The reunification of the country was taken for granted.

The realization of the broad programme declared in this manifesto § necessitated the united endeavours of the entire Chinese nation. But the leading Government group of the

* Nationalist Government Notification No. 1, Nanking, June 28th, 1928.

† "North-China Herald," June 30th, 1928.

‡ General Yen Hsi-shan's telegram to Nanking.—*Ibid.*, June 16th, 1928.

§ The Manifesto announced the following five measures which the Government intended to take up first: (1) the institution of a legal administration, (2) improvement of the civil service, (3) extermination of bandits, (4) abolition of exorbitant taxes and (5) reduction of the army.—AUTHOR.

Kuomintang was even afraid to call the Party Congress,* which according to the Kuomintang constitution should meet annually to elect the Central Executive Committee. It was clear that the present leaders would not return to power should this Congress take place. They had lost contact with the rank and file of the party, and with their allies from amongst the northern Generals formed a new variety of tuchuns. The carrying out of all the contemplated reforms was, therefore, entrusted to the present Central Executive Committee assembled at a plenary Session.†

The first meeting of this session was held at Nanking, on August 1st, with a very limited number of members and military leaders in attendance. General Yen Hsi-shan, under the excuse of illness, abstained from coming to the capital.

Only with the greatest difficulty did the Central Group headed by General Chiang Kai-shek succeed in manœuvring safely through Scylla and Charybdis which this conference presented to it. Bringing into play all the means in its possession, it succeeded in wringing from the Conference the authority for the Central Political Council and the Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee to promulgate a new set of organic laws for China, and fix the date of the National Congress of the Kuomintang for January 1st, 1929.‡ Some provisions were also made for the disbandment and centralization of the control of the army and finance.§ The session was brought to a sudden and surprising end. The representatives of the Left Wing, associated with Wang Ching-wei, who was still in Europe and practically in exile, and the Kwangsi faction withdrew, discontented with the decision of the conference to curtail the power of the Branch Political Councils in favour of Nanking, causing thereby the lack of a quorum.

The Organic Law of the National Government of the Republic of China was promulgated at Nanking on October 8th, 1928. It was the famous "Five Power Government" of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, which in his opinion, was a new system amongst the nations and which reconciled the Western political theories with the quintessence of Chinese political thought.

* The Third National Congress of the Kuomintang.—The Second Party Congress was held in May 1925, the Third was to be convened in August 1928.—AUTHOR.

† The Fifth Plenary Conference of the Kuomintang Executive Committee.

‡ Resolution of the Fifth meeting of the Fifth Plenary Conference of the C. E. C., August 14th, 1928.

§ *Ibid.*

It was stated that in hastening to get through with the reform, the Political Council and the Standing Committee were prompted by Hu Han-ming and Sun-fo, Dr. Sun Yat-sen's son, who cabled from Paris urging it to adopt this system as the only possible one under existing conditions in China.*

According to this law the Kuomintang Party was the body which exercised the supreme power in China. In exercising this power it "deemed it necessary to construct the framework for the Constitution of Five Powers with a view to developing the ability of the people to exercise political power, so that constitutional government might soon come into existence and political power be restored to the people." †

The National Government was composed of five Yuans (五院) or councils: (1) the Executive Yuan (行政院), (2) the Legislative Yuan (立法院), (3) the Judicial Yuan (司法院), (4) the Examination Yuan (考試院), and (5) the Control Yuan or Censorate (監察院), the "punishing power" of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. ‡

The operation of the Five Yuans was supervised, directed and unified by the State Council (國務會議) composed of twelve to sixteen State Councillors (委員) appointed from amongst the members of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, and presided over by a President, who represented the Government at all State functions, including the receiving of foreign diplomats.

He also was concurrently the Commander-in-Chief of all forces of the Republic.

The Law was silent in regard to the power of the various Yuans, their mutual relations, the power and duties of their chairmen, their members and their qualifications, except that their Presidents and Vice-Presidents were selected from amongst the State Councillors. The definition of this was left to subsequent legislation and the discretion of the Government. The ministries were made subordinate to the Yuans and the scope of their activity was also left to be determined by subsequent legislation.

* "Kuo Min News Agency," Nanking, August 5th, 1928; Dr. Wang Chung-hui, Chairman of the Judicial Yuan in the "Sinwanpao," Shanghai, October 10th, 1928.

† Organic Law of the National Government of China (中華民國國民政府組織法), 1928, Preamble.

‡ The first set of Regulations Governing the Holding of Civil Examinations was drafted by the Examination Yuan and approved by the Legislative Yuan for promulgation and enforcement in July 1929.—"Kuo Min News Agency," Nanking, July 15th, 1929.

It was, as was stated in the preamble to the act, just "a framework," which had to be filled up by the new National Government. For this purpose it was provided with absolute and self-sufficient authority. The Government was in itself not only the highest executive but also the highest legislative power, which formed one of its integral parts. The National Government once instituted did not require for its legal function any further delegation of power from any people's representative organ, Parliament or National Assembly nor even the Kuomintang which, in theory, exercised the supreme authority in China during the period of her political tutelage.

This unique situation approached a logical impasse when, by virtue of its construction, the National Government had inevitably to become in itself the source of Power, and the rôle played by the Kuomintang Party as a governing body in China had to come to an end.

This was instinctively felt by the politicians at Nanking and abroad, where the foreign Powers gradually began to realize the true "democratic" value of the Chinese government reform. Suspicion still deepened as the names of the members of the State Council became known. It was the same group of leaders closely associated with the Soong family and its military allies, who had kept in their hands the destinies of Southern and Central China since the start of the Anti-Northern Expedition in 1926. It included also Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, the youthful son of the late Marshal Chang Tso-lin and his successor in Manchuria.

The flood of manifestos, declarations, and programmes of various conferences called after the fall of Peking by the Nationalist Government,* where the different public bodies were invited "to share in formulating the policy of the Government," † could not dispel the distrust which surrounded its movement. The impression that the Chinese people were called to pass judgment on national affairs and express their grievances in the concrete form of making constructive proposals was just an illusion. The plain-spoken representations of merchants, bankers, industrialists, professors and experts

* National Economic Conference, Shanghai, June 20th 1928; National Financial Conference, Nanking, July 1st, 1928; National Communications Conference, Nanking, August 17th, 1928, and National Opium Suppression Conference, Nanking, November 1st, 1928.

† Mr. T. V. Soong, Minister of Finance, National Economic Conference, June 20th, 1928.

in all fields of industry and finance, officials and provincial delegates were courteously received by the Government and the Fifth Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee and then ignored.*

But if the enforcement of the political scheme of Dr. Sun Yat-sen in regard to government reforms and home politics failed to win the sympathy of the Chinese public, the enforcement of the foreign programme by the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. C. T. Wang, Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang's *protégé*, who replaced General Huang Fu after the Tsinan incident, had a tremendous success amongst the Chinese masses.

On June 8th, 1928, the Nationalist Government addressed a declaration to the Foreign Powers, in which it announced China's unification and the beginning of the reconstruction of the country on the lines of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's political will. It invited them "to negotiate new treaties on the basis of complete equality and mutual respect for each other's sovereignty," assuring them of its resolution to stamp out Communism in China. Further it declared its determination to abrogate all foreign treaties which had expired, and to promulgate "appropriate interim regulations to meet the exigencies in the case of old treaties, which have already expired, but were not replaced by new treaties." †

These regulations, seven in number, provided for the complete jurisdiction of Chinese law over "the nationals of those countries whose treaties with China have expired and with whom new treaties have not yet been concluded." ‡

The Powers, which came immediately under the operation of these temporary regulations, were Japan, the treaty of which expired on October 20th, 1926, Belgium and Spain.

The termination of the Sino-Belgian treaty § was announced by the late Peking Government on November 6th, 1926. A set of interim regulations similar to those of the Nationalist Government was promulgated and enforced throughout China, ¶ although the Belgian Government strenuously protested against these "arbitrary" actions of the Chinese Government. The controversy was settled, both parties having negotiated a *modus vivendi* until a new treaty could be

* Shanghai Bankers' Association to T. V. Soong, Minister of Finance, June 27th, 1928.

† Nationalist Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Declaration, July 7th, 1928.

‡ Nationalist Government Council's Mandate, July 8th, 1928.

§ October 27th, 1926.

¶ Peking Government Mandate, April 1st, 1927.

signed on the basis of perfect equality.* Between January 17th and March 31st, 1927, four meetings were held but little was accomplished, and at the time of the collapse of the Peking Government the parties were still discussing the terms of the future agreement.

The circumstances surrounding the abrogation of the Sino-Spanish treaty of 1864 by the Peking Government on November 10th, 1927,† presented the same features as the procedure of the abrogation of the Sino-Belgian Treaty. The events of the civil-war precluded the completion of the negotiations concerning the new treaty.

Next to Japan, Belgium and Spain amongst the Powers coming under the operation of the interim regulations were Italy, Denmark ‡ and Portugal. In separate despatches to the diplomatic representatives of these countries Dr. C. T. Wang officially notified them of the expiration of their treaties and proposed commencement of negotiations for the conclusion of new ones on the basis of complete equality, etc.§ A further note informed the French Chargé d'Affaires at Peking of the termination of the three Conventions relative to the frontier trade between China and France.¶ Finally, the Japanese Government was notified that Japan's treaty with China, which expired in 1926 and which had been extended three times, the last arrangement having been made on April 19th, 1928, was cancelled.||

All these declarations and notes did not produce any effect whatsoever in foreign diplomatic circles at Peking. They were taken as something inevitable as the Nationalist Government declared itself bound to follow the political doctrines of its late leader, and, in this manner, tried to win back the sympathy of the nation. They were treated rather as a bluff, on the part of a Government which still was not recognized *de jure*, than a serious matter. Neither of the countries which were served with the notice was inclined to

* Belgian Government Declaration, Brussels, October 22nd, 1926.

† Peking Government Declaration, November 12th, 1927.

‡ The Sino-Italian and Sino-Danish Treaties, expired on June 30th, 1928; the Sino-Portuguese Treaty on April 28th, 1928.

§ Dr. C. T. Wang to the Italian Minister at Peking, July 1st, 1928; Same to the Danish Minister at Peking, July 5th, 1928; same to the Portuguese Minister at Peking, July 11th, 1928.

¶ Same to the French Chargé d'Affaires at Peking, July 7th, 1928.—Convention of Tientsin, April 25th, 1886; Additional Commercial Convention of Peking, June 20th, 1895.

|| Same to the Japanese Minister at Peking, July 20th, 1928.

recognize its validity or agreed to lose its privileges under existing conditions in China.*

The question of recognition by Foreign Powers was, in the eyes of the Nationalist Government, a secondary consideration.† It had been a traditional policy of the Foreign Powers to recognize the Chinese Government in power at Peking. The Nationalists were now in control of that city and recognition was bound to come.

The Chinese diplomats abroad were instructed to make direct representations to the foreign governments, and to bring pressure to bear upon them through the various public bodies, which always expressed themselves to be in sympathy with the Nationalist cause. On the other hand, in order to overcome the resistance of foreign ministers in China, the latter were subject by the Nationalist Government to a gradual isolation. The Inspectorate-General of the Chinese Maritime Customs, the Salt Gabelle and the Directorate-General of Posts, in the function of which the Foreign Powers were deeply concerned, were transferred from Peking to Shanghai and Nanking. All other Government offices were also removed to the new capital. The communications with the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was appointed by the Nationalist Government to keep contact with the foreign diplomats at Peking, became complicated, as the centre of the political life of the country was at Nanking. The advantages of the Protocol of 1901 did not counterbalance the inconveniences created by the refusal of the Diplomatic Body to give in to the inevitable and to move to the South.

On July 24th, 1928, Mr. J. V. A. MacMurray, the U. S. Minister in China, communicated to the Nationalist Government a note of his Government in which he expressed the deepest sympathy with "China's legitimate aspirations."‡ The next day saw a treaty signed between the United States and China granting her tariff autonomy.§

The general scepticism of the foreign Diplomatic Body at Peking in regard to the new régime was broken. The move of the American Government set quite a new principle in the traditional policy of Foreign Powers in China, which could not

* Italian Note, July 11th, 1928 ; Portuguese Note, August 7th, 1928.

† Statement of Dr. C. C. Wu.—"Reuter," Washington, June 16th, 1928.

‡ Mr. Kellogg's, U. S. Secretary of State, Note, July 24th, 1928.

§ The Sino-American Treaty of July 25th, 1928, ratified by the U. S. Senate on February 12th, 1929.—This Treaty was signed on behalf of the U. S. by John V. A. MacMurray, the U. S. Minister in China, and on behalf of China by T. V. Soong, National Minister of Finance.

remain without grave consequences to all the concerned. It stated that neither the absence of *de jure* recognition of the Chinese Government by the Foreign Powers nor its imperfection and inability to enforce and preserve the stipulations of the treaties, nor any other consideration, were obstacles to China regaining her political and economic independence.

In laying down this principle the American Government followed the policy of Soviet Russia, which, at the time of her greatest success in the Far East, entered into a treaty with the Chinese Government, granting China perfectly equal treatment and renouncing in her favour all the privileges obtained by Russia in the past. It did not demand from the Chinese Government that it should be representative of the entire Chinese nation or capable to enforce the new treaty: it recognized the separate existence of the two bodies, the Chinese Government and the Chinese people: the concessions were made in favour of the latter.

The importance of the event passed almost unnoticed. It was interpreted as a desire of America "to be the first to extend recognition in the usual hope of winning a special position in China, thereby revealing a lack of co-operation among the Powers, and indifference to the fate of others, and encouraging the Chinese to believe that the ancient game of playing one against the other is an easy mode of evading responsibility to all." * None of those who gave a review of the political situation had paid attention to the fact that the action of the American Government determined the course of international politics in the Far East and that whatever changes in China's government system might occur, the exclusive privileges of the foreigners would have to go. For they would not be renounced in consequence of the perfection of any of the Chinese Governments, present or future, but would be abolished in favour of the Chinese masses, the millions of destitute whose living conditions would be thereby allegedly improved directly or indirectly, and in the face of whose gigantic struggle for self-assertion and the creation of a new Chinese China the Foreign Powers were, for some reason or another, powerless.

As a matter of fact, on August 9th, 1928, Great Britain exchanged Notes with the Nationalist Government, and the Nanking Incident was settled along the lines set forth in the American notes on March 30th, 1928. H. B. M's Government

* R. Gilbert, "North-China Herald," August 4th, 1928.

expressed her readiness "in due course to enter into negotiations with the Nationalist Government on the subject of treaty revision."*

This was rapidly followed by treaties with Germany † and the settlement of the Nanking Incident with France and Italy. ‡ One by one the foreign ministers and *chargés d'affaires* forsook their stronghold at Peking and proceeded to Nanking. Within less than six months, from the date of the occupation of Peking by the Tupan of Shansi, China signed treaties with Norway, Belgium, Italy, Denmark, Portugal, Netherlands, Sweden and Spain, which secured her tariff autonomy.§

The Powers whose treaties had expired agreed to relinquish their extraterritoriality as from January 1st, 1930, provided "China has by that date made arrangements for the assumption of jurisdiction over their nationals, failing which the date will be fixed by China after having come to an agreement for the abolition of extraterritoriality with all the Powers, signatory of the Washington Treaties, it being understood that such a date shall be applicable to all such Powers."||

The latter provision and "the most favoured nation" clause was inserted in all the agreements in the vague hope to delay indefinitely their enforcement, for it was obvious that the Powers whose treaties with China were still in force, would

* Sir Sidney Barton, H. B. M's Consul-General at Shanghai, on behalf of H. B. M's Minister in China, to Dr. C. T. Wang, Peking, August 9th, 1928.

† Sino-German Treaty, August 17th, 1928.

‡ Exchange of Notes between Mr. Cosme, French *Chargé d'Affaires*, and Dr. C. T. Wang, dated Nanking, October 1st and 9th, 1928. Same between Mr. D. Vare, Italian Minister in China, and Dr. C. T. Wang, dated Nanking, October 8th, 1928.

§ Sino-Norwegian Preliminary Treaty of Amity and Commerce, November 12th, 1928.

Sino-Belgian Preliminary Treaty of Amity and Commerce, November 22nd, 1928.

Sino-Italian Preliminary Treaty of Amity and Commerce, November 26th, 1928.

Sino-Danish Preliminary Treaty of Amity and Commerce, December 19th, 1928.

Sino-Portuguese Preliminary Treaty of Amity and Commerce, December 19th, 1928.

Sino-Dutch Preliminary Treaty of Amity and Commerce, December 19th, 1928.

Sino-Swedish Preliminary Treaty of Amity and Commerce, December 20th, 1928.

Sino-Spanish Preliminary Treaty of Amity and Commerce, December 27th, 1928.

|| Annex II, identical in all treaties, contained a declaration of the National Minister of Foreign Affairs to the effect that "on or before January 1st, 1930, the Civil Code and the Commercial Code, in addition to other codes and laws now in force, will be promulgated by the National Government of China."

follow the example of America, and refuse to interpret "the expression of their sympathy with China's legitimate aspirations" as an obligation on their part to relinquish their privileges immediately.*

But the number of Powers which did not express themselves "in full sympathy with Nationalist China," was now rapidly decreasing. On December 20th, 1928, the Sino-British Tariff Revision Treaty was signed, and Sir Miles Lampson, H.B.M.'s Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, proceeded to the State Council Building, at Nanking, where he presented his credentials to President Chiang Kai-shek, thus performing the act of *de jure* recognition of the Nationalist Government. Two days earlier Comte de Martel, the French Minister to China, arrived at Nanking and signed the Sino-French Tariff Treaty.† There remained one single country, which neither agreed to recognize the termination of her treaty nor expressed its desire to cede any of the political and economic privileges enjoyed by its nationals. ‡ It was Japan, which thus held in her hands the destiny of China's tariff autonomy and the extraterritorial jurisdiction of foreigners in China.

The signing of the Sino-Spanish Preliminary Treaty of Amity and Commerce on December 27th, 1928, completed the series of the so-called Tariff Autonomy Treaties. Prior to that, China received a formal invitation to affix her signature to the Kellogg Peace Pact as a rightful member of the family of nations.§ The conclusion of these treaties presented an unique feature in the modern history of China, and should be treated as a definite success on the part of China and her new Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Japanese opposition was not viewed as an insuperable obstacle to the enforcement of the tariff autonomy demanded by all the leading public bodies in China.¶

* Dr. C. T. Wang to the U. S. Minister at Peking, July 29th, 1928; U. S. Minister at Peking to same, July 30th, 1928.

† December 19th, 1928.

‡ Y. L. Tong, Nationalist Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, to K. Yoshisawa, Japanese Minister at Peking, July 20th, 1928; Mr. Yoshisawa to same, July 24th, 1928.

§ Mr. Mahlon F. Perkins, U. S. Chargé d'Affaires at Peking, to Dr. C. T. Wang, August 27th, 1928; Dr. C. T. Wang to same, September 13th, 1928.

¶ The National Federation of Chambers of Commerce to the Central Kuomintang Headquarters and Ministers of Finance, Foreign Affairs etc., November 14th, 1928.—"Kuo Min News Agency," Nanking, November 15th, 1928.

However, Chinese public opinion was far from being satisfied with the results obtained. The activity of Dr. C. T. Wang was subject to very severe criticism. His official residence at Nanking was destroyed by a riotous mob as a protest against the signing of the Sino-Belgian and Sino-Italian treaties.*

The Anti-Northern Expedition left the issue of the reunification of China unsolved. The National Government controlled only five provinces—Kiangsu, Kiangsi, Chekiang, Fukien and Anhui. Shantung, Honan, Shensi and Kansu were partly in the hands of Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang, partly in the grip of a new and formidable Mohammedan rebellion, which his troops for some or other reason were unable to suppress. General Yen Hsi-shan controlled Shansi and a section of Chihli (Hopei) including Peking. The Kwangsi faction dominated Kwangsi, Kwangtung, Hupeh, a part of Honan and, in the person of General Pei Chung-hsi, extended its influence to the Northern part of Chihli and Tientsin.

The Three Eastern Provinces and Jehol formed the dominions of the eldest son of the late Marshal Chang Tso-lin, Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang. The news regarding the death of Marshal Chang Tso-lin was withheld from the public until June 21st, when eighteen days after his actual death, the Civil Governor's Yamen at Mukden notified the Chinese official organs of his tragic demise. Fears were entertained that Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang and General Yang Yu-ting also were victims of an outrage. The Young Marshal entered Mukden disguised as a common soldier in a troop train. The train in which he proceeded was derailed not far from Shanhaikuan but he happily escaped danger. The life of General Yang Yu-ting was also saved by chance. He proceeded in the train of the late Generalissimo but left it in Shanhaikuan on an urgent errand connected with the evacuation of the Fengtien troops.

Between these two personages, either of whom had the right to succeed Marshal Chang Tso-lin—one by virtue of being his son, the other as the leader of the Fengtien party—the choice of the Manchurian generals fell on the Young Marshal. The Peace Preservation Committee of the Three Eastern Provinces organized by Marshal Chang Tso-lin appointed Chang Hsueh-liang, the twenty-year old Marshal, Tupan of Mukden Province and concurrently

* December 13th, 1928.

Commander-in-Chief of all armed Manchurian forces.* It was, indeed, an imperial succession strictly conforming to the principles shared by the late Marshal Chang Tso-lin; a succession by virtue of a traditional sense of loyalty of the army and population to their leader and his family, which saved the Fengtien party from disintegration and interfactional strife.

The plans of the Nationalists to subjugate the rich dominions of Marshal Chang Tso-lin and add them to the provinces controlled by the Government at Nanking were upset.† They had to arrange a compromise with the Fengtien party within the limits defined by the latter,‡ and satisfy themselves with the hoisting of the Kuomintang flag in Manchuria and the expression of "personal sympathy" of the new Manchurian lord in exchange for his appointment as one of the fourteen State Councillors.

But the movements of the new head of the Manchurian Government were closely watched in Japan. The Japanese Government recognized Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang as Marshal Chang Tso-lin's lawful successor only on the understanding that he would observe agreements between Japan and the late Generalissimo.§ It was very far from encouraging any move on his part tending to strengthen the prestige of "a Government that dares violate its treaty stipulations."¶ The autonomous status of the Three Eastern Provinces was essential as a counter-balance against the rest of China and Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang was sternly warned that "the flying of the Nationalist flag would be prevented even if Japan should interfere in China's internal affairs."||

* The installation ceremony of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang took place at Mukden on June 19th, 1929. On July 3rd, his appointment was formally confirmed by a vote of the so-called Mukden Conference, a joint conference of representatives of the Provincial Assemblies of the Three Provinces and various high Manchurian military and civil dignitaries.—AUTHOR.

† Nationalist Government Council's Mandate, June 4th, 1928.—"Kuo Min News Agency," Nanking, June 5th, 1928.

‡ Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang's terms of peace presented to General Yen Hsi-shan by his representative, Mr. Yui-chen, July 5th, 1928. According to these terms the Nationalists should organize a branch Political Council governing the Three Eastern Provinces and appoint the Young Marshal as its President.—"Toho News Agency," Peking, July 7th, 1928.

§ "Reuter," Tokyo, July 10th, 1928.

¶ Statement of Baron Tanaka to the Diplomatic Representatives at Tokyo, August 13th, 1928.

|| Statement of Baron Hayashi, Special Representative of Baron Tanaka at Mukden, August 9th, 1928.—"Reuter," Mukden, August 10th, 1928.

The hoisting of the flag, which, in the eyes of the Chinese, was a sign of submission, was delayed until December 29th, 1928, when it lost its importance and the Manchurian autonomy was a *fait accompli*. The pompous declaration that "complying with the late Marshal's will, the Government of the Three Eastern Provinces has decided to accept the San Min Chu I and to submit to the authority of the National Government as token of which the White Sun flag will be hoisted,"* did not add a particle to the prestige of the Nanking Government.

In obeying the Japanese "order" the Fengtien leaders could neither disregard their own Chinese feelings nor ignore those of their people which, since the bombing outrage on Marshal Chang Tso-lin, were, more than ever, moved by the latter's wish to free China from the necessity of following the course of policy prescribed by Tokyo. Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang refused to enter into any separate negotiations with Japan, maintaining that the prerogative of concluding international treaties belonged solely to the central authority at Nanking. This made the position of Japan very complicated. It was not easy to handle the delicate matter of Japanese "special interests" in Manchuria with a Government which frankly declared itself to be anti-Japanese and devised elaborate methods of boycotting the Japanese in China.†

As in the past the wave of the anti-Japanese movement proclaimed immediately after the Tsinan incident as a protest against Japanese intervention affected Japanese trade in China very little. The main sufferers were the Chinese merchants and banks, who were subject to the rigid control of the boycott pickets. All goods of Japanese origin were registered, heavily taxed, and defaulters fined and put into wooden cages, a penalty which in 1925-1926 proved to be an effective deterrent against the violaters of the boycott regulations against Great Britain.

The trade returns for the first ten months of 1928 published by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry at Tokyo ‡

* Circular Telegram of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, Generals Chang Tso-hsiang, of Kirin and Wan Fu-lin, of Heilungkiang; Chai Wen-hsien, of Fengtien, and Chang Yung-huai, of the Salt Administration, dated December 29th, 1928.

† Manifesto of the National Anti-Japanese Conference, Nanking, July 20th, 1928.—"North-China Herald," August 4th, 1928.

‡ "Toho News Agency," Tokyo, November 3rd, 1928.

showed an increase in exports of Yen 27,000,000 as compared with the same period of 1927. Imports for the same period showed a decrease of Yen 44,000,000 as compared with the corresponding months of 1927. The general trade turnover for the entire year (1928) was more striking. It reached the record sum of Hk. Tls. 547,895,892, showing an increase in imports and exports of Hk. Tls. 45,263,836 or 9 per cent over the previous year.*

The insignificant results of the boycott movement in spite of its noisy manifestation did not impress very deeply the Japanese Government, morally supported by the leading Japanese economic organizations in its "positive policy." † But the movement afforded a chance to the Western countries to extend their markets in China and supplant Japanese products. ‡ The growth of British and American trade in China in 1928 was in many respects due to the anti-Japanese boycott. This could not be ignored by the responsible leaders of Japanese politics in the Far East. It was just the opposite of what was desired by Japan and what had been her chief aim since the Great War.

Moreover, the National Government made strenuous efforts to induce American capital to assist China in her reconstruction along modern lines. These efforts failed, § but a crowd of experts and specialists readily responded to the call of the Nationalist Government, bringing along with them, if no money, American distrust and American animosity to Japan. ¶ The domination of Americans in all branches of national finance and economy was so manifest that it became essential to appoint some foreigners of other nationalities to allay the suspicion of the Foreign Powers, || but none of them

* Chinese Maritime Customs Report for 1928, Part I, p. 141.

† Resolution of the National Conference of Economic Organizations at Tokyo, May 17th, 1928.—"Reuter," Tokyo, May 18th, 1928.

‡ Report of the Friday Association. Japanese organization composed of Japanese Trade bodies at Shanghai.—"North-China Herald," March 9th, 1929.

§ Mr. Thomas W. Lamont, at the International Chambers of Commerce Congress, Amsterdam, July 10th, 1929.

¶ The so-called "Kemmerer Commission" headed by Dr. Edwin Walter Kemmerer, Financial Expert and Counsellor; Mr. John J. Mantell, Railway Expert; Mr. Thomas F. Millard; Mr. Ernest Payne Goodrich, architect and city designer.

|| Sir Frederick Whyte, J. A. Fontenoy (French).

was Japanese. The reorganization of the National Army was entrusted to German officers.*

The situation was very precarious. It threatened to set at nought all the achievements of the Japanese policy since 1915, for even the Three Eastern Provinces politely declined Japanese help in the rehabilitation of their country.†

Prompt measures were devised to cope with this state of affairs. The jealousy between the small group of close followers of the Young Marshal and older members of the Fengtien party, quite natural under any circumstances, was skillfully utilized for the removal of the most irreconcilable partisans of the specifically Chinese policy of Marshal Chang Tso-lin. On January 11th, 1929, early in the morning, General Yang Yu-ting, one of the most intimate friends and advisers of the late Generalissimo, and Chang Ying-hui, civil governor of Heilungkiang and managing director of the Peking-Mukden Railway, were arrested and summarily shot by order of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang. A charge of insubordination, plotting revolt, speculation and complicity with a "certain foreign Power" was advanced against them. ‡ Privately it was stated that they were accused of being directly implicated in the assassination of Marshal Chang Tso-lin and conspiring with the Soviets.

Fengtien was thoroughly cleared of the element which was primarily responsible for the failure of the Japanese railway policy in Manchuria. The Government of the Three Eastern Provinces was deprived of its staunchest members and its popularity suffered very considerably. But in executing this scheme, the Japanese overlooked one thing; the Government of the Young Marshal deprived of its conservative members became more sensitive to the influence of the Nationalist ideas than it had been before. The success of the foreign policy of the National Government turned the heads of the Fengtien leaders, and only new political shocks were able to bring them to obedience again.

* It was proposed first to entrust the reorganization of the army to Field-Marshal Lüdendorff, but the latter declined the appointment on political grounds, and recommended in his place one of his ablest lieutenants, Colonel Max Bauer, who at the head of a group of German officers arrived at Nanking at the end of 1928. During the Kwangsi war in the spring of 1929, Colonel M. Bauer acted as General Chiang Kai-shek's adviser. In May, 1929, he died of small-pox, which he contracted during the expedition to Hankow.

† "Reuter," Mukden, August 16th.; Tokyo, August 26th, 1928.

‡ Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang's Circular Telegram, Mukden, January 11th, 1929.

In fact, only continued shocks could save Japan from losing the advantages of her unique position created by the conciliatory mood of other foreign Powers; only the outbreak of a new war could save the "positive policy" of Baron Tanaka from a complete failure and Japan from being thrown back to the time when she commenced to establish her hegemony in Chinese politics.

The critical position was keenly realized in Tokyo. Leaders of political factions went in person to China to investigate the situation on the spot.* The Minseito, the powerful political party in opposition to the Government, declared itself in favour of a radical change of policy in China "which should be given every opportunity to ensure internal peace and unity."† But the very structure of the National Government, as we have stated, contained the germ of discord, which was used for the fostering of internal strife in China.

The inevitable assumption of the whole power by a few selected members of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee forming the Government resulted in bitter feeling between the Kwangsi faction and the Government group. This enmity found ready response amongst the Nationalist war-lords who were afraid that the farce of the Disbandment Conference on January 1st, 1929, at Nanking would enable General Chiang Kai-shek to encroach on their authority. The Third National Kuomintang Congress set at the Fifth Plenary Session of the Party for January 1st, 1929, was again postponed until March 15th.‡ The war clouds were swiftly gathering. However, in spite of these favourable circumstances, the Japanese Government succeeded only with the greatest difficulty in obtaining a temporary postponement of the enforcement of the interim regulations.§

In the matter of China's tariff autonomy her diplomats were more successful.¶ China's absolute tariff autonomy was not recognized; Japan confined herself to the recognition of the interim tariff promulgated by the National Government

* Mr. Takejiro Tokonami, President of the Shinto Club.

† Mr. Hamaguchi, President of Minseito, at the Party Conference, September 18th, 1928.—"Reuter," Osaka, September 19th, 1928.

‡ Resolution of the 183rd meeting of the Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee, November 16th, 1928.

§ Statement of Dr. C. T. Wang to the Press, September 13th, 1928.—"Toho News Agency," Nanking, September 13th, 1928.

¶ Sino-Japanese Tariff Agreement (Two Notes), January 30th, 1929.

in December, 1928, in exchange for China's agreeing to repay a portion of the unsecured Japanese loans out of the increased surplus of the customs revenue.* The terms were favourable for Japan, and the National Government was seriously perturbed over the publication of the agreement, "lest it would produce a very bad impression in China." †

But this was the last diplomatic victory of Baron Tanaka. It was quickly followed by a number of crushing defeats. The Tsinan incident was settled on lines practically suggested by China: mutual apologies, mutual compensation to be paid to the victims of the massacre, and unconditional evacuation of the Shantung Peninsula within two months from the date of the signing of the agreement, March 28th, 1929. The Chinese Government bound itself to protect the lives and properties of the Japanese residents in Shantung.

One of the most important trumps in the game, the possession of the strategical entry to Central and Northern China, slipped out of the hands of Japan without securing her any material advantage, or bringing her nearer to the much coveted goal of a complete *entente cordiale* with China in regard to world politics.

The anti-Japanese boycott, under the official auspices of the Kuomintang, continued unabated, and the pickets ravaged with redoubled energy the stores of the unfortunate Chinese merchants; the National Government politely declining to interfere "with the people's own patriotism" and agreeing only "to persuade the various Anti-Japanese organs to stop their activities against Japan." ‡

An attempt to undermine the arrangement, and to demonstrate China's inability to safeguard the lives and property of the foreigners, establishing thereby a precedent for the indefinite occupation of Shantung, was unsuccessful. It caused China to request Japan to delay the evacuation of the Japanese troops until she should be able to suppress the outbreak of a new insurrection in the Tsinanfu-Kiaochow area. §

* The exact position of Japan's unsecured loans in China, commonly known as the Nishihara loans, are far from clear, as opinions differ as to the interpretation of the word "unsecured" and calculations vary accordingly. The Chinese at the time of the Tariff Conference of 1926 gave their amount, in round figures, at Yen 255,000,000, whilst the Japanese estimated them at Yen 330,000,000, not including the interest which has accrued since. In addition, there is Yen 138,000,000 without interest not paid.—AUTHOR.

† "Reuter," Tokyo, January 31st, 1928.

‡ "Kuo Wen News Agency" (Official), Nanking, April 16th, 1928.

§ "Reuter," Tokyo, April 17th, 1928; Nanking, April 19th, 1928.

On February 19th, 1928, Marshal Chang Chun-chang suddenly left his refuge in Port Arthur and landed at Lungkow. He was provided with sufficient funds to assume the leadership of a new movement against the National Government in co-operation with General Chu Yu-pu, the ex-Tupan of Chihli. The movement aimed to extend to the entire Chihli province and to the troops of General Yen Hsi-shan, which embraced a large contingent of ex-Chihli-Shantung soldiers. But the revolt of some of these troops at Peking was promptly quelled, while Marshal Chang Chun-chang, after an initial success in Shantung and the capture of Chefoo,* was severely beaten. He retired to Dairen again and thence to Japan, where he was soon joined by General Chu Yu-pu. On May 16th, 1928, the first transport of the Japanese troops sailed from Tsingtao, and by May 20th the evacuation was completed.

The agreements settling the Nanking and Hankow Incidents were signed on March 24th, and April 3rd, 1927, respectively. The blame for what was inevitable was put on the Communists, and the Kuomintang and the National Government were entirely exonerated from any responsibility for the spread of anti-foreign propaganda, which excited the animal spirits of the Nationalist soldiers and caused them to commit acts of brutal savagery on defenceless women and children.

The activity of the Communists appeared to be a universal excuse for any step, measure or act of the Nationalists, which, for some reason or other, failed to rouse protest abroad. It served as a useful excuse to the group of the Kuomintang in power at Nanking to usurp the right to nominate fifty per cent. of the delegates to the forthcoming Third National Congress † and to move for the abolition of the Branch Political Councils as the last obstacle to the unification of the country. On the other hand, it helped all the dissatisfied politicians of the Nationalist camp, who turned their eyes to the glorious past of the Kuomintang; when, guided by the Left Wing, it moved China towards the fulfilment of "her national aspirations," to claim independence from the central authority of Nanking. The two parties clashed before the

* General Liu Chien-mien, the Nationalist appointee, evacuated Chefoo on March 27th, 1929.

† Regulations Governing the Election of Delegates to the Third National Congress of the Kuomintang, December, 1928.—"Kuo Min News Agency" December 16th, 1928.

much advertised Congress had been opened; the Wuhan Provincial Government controlled by the Kwangsi faction forcibly ejected General Lu Tih-ping, the Chairman of the Hunan Government and appointee of Nanking, from his post on the ground that Hunan under his leadership became "a nest of Communists." *

There was no alternative left to the Congress called to strengthen the authority of the Government except to fulfil its duty and take the responsibility for the renewing of the era of internal conflicts in China in "authorizing General Chiang Kai-shek to use force against the rebels." †

Troops were hurriedly concentrated. The former heroes of the Anti-Northern expedition and friends were denounced as traitors. General Li Shi-shen, the popular leader of the Kwangsi group and once an intimate friend of General Chiang Kai-shek, was arrested when attending the Congress. General Pei Chung-hsi was dismissed and replaced by General Tang Sheng-chi, the former head of the Wuhan Government and rival of Chiang Kai-shek in the period of 1926-1927. ‡ Money was lavishly spent to buy over their officers and make them desert. § War threatened to break out in Szechuan, Yunnan, Kweichow, Kwangsi and Kwangtung. The achievements of the revolutionary movement started at Canton in 1926 were cast to the wind, and the Government was forced to recognize that "China's peace under the National Government and China's unity were just illusions." ¶

The Kwangsi party was defeated. But neither this victory of the military and diplomatic genius of General Chiang Kai-shek nor the subsequent elections of the new Central Executive Committee and other supervisory organs of the Kuomintang, which included the ruling group of the Soong family, could improve the situation.

Hardly had the last sound of the cannon died out when Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang, who had remained neutral during the

* General Li Chung-jen, Chairman of the Wuhan Division Council, to the State Council, February 21st, 1929.—"North-China Herald," March 2nd, 1929.

† Resolution of the Third National Congress of the Kuomintang, Nanking, March 18th, 1929.

‡ Punitive Mandates of the National Government, March 26th and 28th, 1929.—"Kuo Min News Agency," Nanking, March 29th, 1929.

§ Circular Telegram of General Li Ping-hsien and twenty-one others of the Fourth Group Armies.—"North-China Herald," March 29th, 1929.

¶ Statement of General Chiang Kai-shek at the Third National Congress of the Kuomintang, March 15th, 1929.

Kwangsi war, declared his solidarity with the cause of the defeated generals. In his person the National Government had against it a formidable foe. He was one of the most shrewd and astute modern Chinese politicians backed by a military organization, the discipline and courage of which was almost proverbial since the Anti-Northern campaign. Amongst the many members of the Kuomintang military, he was one of those few who was able to break away completely from the Kuomintang and openly ridicule its mandates and principles. He revealed himself as a typical Chinese tuchun. In accepting with his army the doctrines of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, he preserved his intellectual independence, and his tall figure with unshaven face; his common soldier's uniform, shabby and worn out; his entire life, that of a poor Chinese farmer, presented a living protest to the luxury and refinement which surrounded the foreign-educated and modernized leaders of the National Government and their foreign advisors and experts. He saved his army from the demoralizing effect of "purification" from the Communists, and, in spite of all the hardship and poverty which it had to suffer when stationed in the famine- and war-stricken areas of Shantung, Shensi and Honan, managed to retain its loyalty. Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang was the first who openly declared that the dictatorship by a small group of the Kuomintang must go.*

He denounced the wastefulness of the officials of the new régime and their big salaries in the face of the misery rampant in China. He himself displayed a rigid economy, and the officials in his province received most scanty wages. The simple life and stern personal discipline voluntarily imposed upon himself blunted the sharp edge of criticism, and his subordinates were willy-nilly compelled to follow suit. He built roads and schools, encouraged agriculture, fought corruption of officials, and his unceasing energy won him a widespread popularity amongst the masses, who were absolutely indifferent to the means applied by him in the past to conquer his enemies and raise him to his present power. Sincerely or not, he appeared, in their eyes, the champion of the poor who, amid the triumphs of international policy and party squabbles, were forgotten in Nanking. But above all, and what is important to us, he was a Chinese. He remained at heart the old-fashioned tuchun who might recognize

* R. Gilbert, "North-China Herald," July 28th, 1928.

the government *for the people* but who could never agree to the government *by the people*.

The first step of Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang against the Government was the blowing up of a number of bridges and tunnels on the Peking-Hankow and Lunghai railways, which made the use of these railways impossible for the Nanking troops, and permitted him to complete undisturbed the concentration of his armies.*

The actions of Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang caused consternation at Nanking. He was ejected from the party as a rebel and "ally of the Soviets, in complicity and co-operation with whom he intended to establish a separate government."† He was invited to come to Nanking to answer these charges, if they were false, ‡ but Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang was too clever to follow this invitation. The fate of General Li Shi-shen, who was lured to Nanking to attend the Party Congress and then arrested at one of its sessions, was a good warning to him. §

Notwithstanding the promised help on the part of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, who could not forgive Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang his bitter enmity to his late father, and Generals Ma Ting-hsiang and Chen Ting-hsin, the Mohammedan leaders of Sinkiang, the outcome of the struggle was far from being certain. Moreover, the outbreak of hostilities might arrest the state-burial of Dr. Sun Yat-sen to which invitations had been sent to the Foreign Powers, and which, it was hoped, would raise the popularity of the National Government.

But all these apprehensions were groundless. In spite of all his bellicose preparations and his formal warning to the Diplomatic Body at Peking "to keep strict neutrality in his struggle against the illegal government," ¶ Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang was farther than ever from the idea of fighting Nanking.

The National Government had ample time to complete the elaborate preparations for the funeral of its late ideologist

* The blowing up of bridges and tunnels continued through the whole of May, 1929, causing damage of many millions of dollars.—AUTHOR.

† Resolution of the Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, May 23rd, 1929; Punitive Mandate, May 24th, 1929.

‡ General Chiang Kai-shek to Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang, May 13th, 1929. Circular Telegram of the Presidents of the Five Yuans, May 20th, 1929.

§ Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang to General Chiang Kai-shek, May 15th, 1929.

¶ Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang's Commander-in-Chief of the North Western Route Army of the Party Safeguarding and National Salvation Forces of the Kuomintang of China (new title of Marshal Feng), Circular Telegram, May 15th, 1929.

and carry his body from the Temple of Piyussu at Peking to Nanking, without fearing that the solemnity of the ceremony would be broken by the sound of guns.

On June 1st, 1929, thousands of people lined the two miles from the Party Headquarters at Nanking to the marble mausoleum on Purple Mountain, and the Nationalists had all the satisfaction of seeing an array of foreign diplomats and military and naval representatives in their brilliant uniforms walking behind the catafalque along the beautiful Chung Chan Road, the pride of the Government city designers and the curse of the people whose houses were mercilessly demolished, without compensation, to give way to the new "Liberty Avenue."

None of those taking part in the ceremony seemed to be confused when W. J. Oudendijk, the Netherlands Minister and Doyen of the Diplomatic Corps at Nanking, read an address eulogizing the late leader and expressing the hope that the unification of China was now an accomplished fact; no one except an observing newspaperman noticed that the numerous gendarmes posted every few yards along the road of procession kept their fingers on the triggers of their Mausers.*

On May 27th, Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang suddenly announced his retirement from politics and his willingness, on "certain conditions," to make a trip abroad for the purpose of restoring his health and self-education.† This news did not create a sensation. The game he played in 1926, when he also "officially retired" and went abroad to study economics, was still fresh in people's memory. But Marshal Feng's circular telegram was followed by an identical message of General Yen Hsi-shan, and that was quite a different matter,‡ for it showed that there was some understanding between them.

Efforts to prevent further intimacy between them and to dissuade General Yen Hsi-shan from his decision were unsuccessful. He politely declined to accept the appointment as the Commissioner for the Pacification of the Northwest,§ insisting that this task should be entrusted to one of the Kuominchun Generals.¶ The Government had no alternative but to accept the humiliating terms of Marshal Feng Yu-

* J. M. D. Hoste, "North-China Herald," June 8th, 1929.

† "Kuo Min News Agency," Nanking, May 31st, 1929.

‡ Ibid., Nanking, June 3rd, 1929.

§ State Council's Mandate, June 21st, 1929.

¶ General Yen Hsi-shan to the National Government, June 23rd, 1929.

hsiang, rescind the punitive mandate against him,* remit to his troops M. \$3,000,000, the arrears of their pay, and in addition, grant him personally M. \$200,000 for travelling expenses abroad. But the nearer the date of departure approached the more numerous were indications that neither of the two Northern potentates intended to leave China. On June 30th, General Yen Hsi-shan arrived in Peking, where an interview between him and General Chiang Kai-shek took place. The Young Marshal of Manchuria also arrived, while Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang had to meet the President of the Government at Tientsin.

New efforts were made to persuade General Yen Hsi-shan to abandon his idea to accompany Feng on his journey, but he pleaded sickness and caused himself be removed to hospital. It was again an intricate political game, incomprehensible to most European observers, for, a few days later, an urgent despatch addressed to Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang stated that "owing to strong opposition General Yen Hsi-shan finds it very difficult to carry out his plan at present and that in these circumstances he considers it most advisable to postpone his and Marshal Feng's departure on a tour abroad for the time being." The National Government received back its M. \$200,000.†

This farce, too frequent in Chinese history to preserve its humour, resulted, however, in a very considerable modification of the policy of the National Government. The Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang decreed that the period of political tutelage, i.e., the period of the dictatorship of the National Government, should be limited to six years.‡ Probably, the Conference of Generals Chiang Kai-shek, Yen Hsi-shan and the Young Marshal would have brought about other important changes, if their announced pleasure trip to the Western Hills, during which questions of paramount importance were to be discussed, had not been suddenly interrupted.§

On July 10th, 1929, by order of the Communications Committee of the Three Eastern Provinces, the authorities at Harbin took over the control of the Chinese Eastern Railway, removing A. J. Emshanoft, the Soviet General Manager, and

* State Council's Mandate, July 5th, 1929.

† "Kuo Min News Agency," Peking, July 10th, 1929.

‡ Manifesto of the Central Executive Committee, June 18th, 1929.

§ "Kuo Min News Agency," Peking, July 10th, 1929.

appointing in his place a Chinese director.* The U.S.S.R. Trades Unions and State Trading Organizations were closed down and a number of high Soviet officials arrested and deported.

The actions of the local Chinese authorities were swift and resolute. Not only people in Nanking were taken by surprise, but, as we have grounds to believe, also the Mukden authorities, though these actions were inevitable as a natural consequence of the general movement in China for the recovery of her political and economic independence. They formed an integral part of China's struggle for emancipation from foreign domination, and, incidentally, conformed to Japan's plans in China. The Sino-Soviet conflict was just an event which might develop into a violent shock, able to upset all the achievements of the Nationalists and to assist Japan to regain her lost positions.

The responsibility for the act of the group of local authorities in Harbin was at once shifted to Nanking, and the latter had to accept it. Such an opportunity of ascertaining its authority over the autonomous Three Eastern Provinces—even if this step was accompanied by the risk of the public wrath in case of failure—could not be missed. As for the rest, neither Nanking nor Mukden believed in the probability of the Soviets seriously resorting to arms except for demonstrations † along the frontier. ‡

The prestige of the U.S.S.R. had been hopelessly lost since the events at Peking of April, 1927, when the Soviet Embassy was subjected to an ignominious search, and the forcible closing down of the Soviet Consulate-General and the execution of consular officers at Canton in December of the same year. The inability of the Soviet Government to exact at that time reparations from China was interpreted as a sign of its hopeless weakness.

Meanwhile the efficiency of the Chinese soldier had greatly increased since the civil war. The Chinese army was no longer the Cantonese army of Dr. Sun Yat-sen with sparks of patriotism and revolutionary enthusiasm to inspire it. It was no longer the army referred to by Marshal Wu Pei-fu, the lonely knight of the Chinese revolution, now in seclusion in a Buddhist temple in remote Szechuen, when he said to

* Mr. Fan Tai-kuang.

† U.S.S.R. Government Ultimatum to China, July 10th, 1929.

‡ Dr. C. T. Wang's Statement to the Press.—"Shun-Pao," July 12th, 1929.

his officers: "It will be a good while before our men can stand up to them."

The Chinese soldier had ceased to be an outcast. The Western soldier-worship during the Great War had a large share in breaking down the old Confucian attitude towards fighting. The stream of students which flowed into the army of Marshal Wu Pei-fu during the anti-Japanese movement of 1919, and the reforms of the Southern armies by the Soviet military experts had resulted in a complete metamorphosis of the psychology of the Chinese soldier within the last few years; he was now capable of fighting for a cause rather than for a man, and of enduring appalling hardships without deserting the ranks as had been so usual in the Chinese army of the past.

Of course, the equipment of the Chinese army still left much to be desired so far as heavy artillery, tanks, armoured cars and aeroplanes were concerned. But it was quite up-to-date in regard to the smaller arms of which mass production is possible by the arsenals at Mukden, Shanghai and Nanyang. Perhaps, the fighting qualities of the army have been exaggerated by the Chinese chauvinists of both Nationalist and Northern camps, but respect for the Chinese soldier and the Fengtien troops in particular had not a little to do with the prompt solution of the problem of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

In conclusion it may be remarked that both contending powers were signatories to the Kellogg Pact. The Chinese sincerely believed that nations having taken part in this act would exercise their influence to arrest the development of the conflict and enable China to retain the control of the railway.

There was another and a very delicate factor, which hardly any Chinese would dare to admit; but which was, perhaps, decisive—the Sino-Soviet conflict, irrespective of its outcome, conformed to the plans of Japan in China.

There existed a firm conviction in Manchuria, if not throughout China, skilfully fostered by Japan, that Japan would not view indifferently China's defeat; that she could not remain neutral in the event of the rich Northern region, close to her own territory, falling into the hands of the Soviets and under their régime. Nor could anything be allowed to threaten the autonomous status of the Three Eastern Provinces, even if Fengtien were forced to ask active assistance from Nanking and the latter's troops should occupy Manchuria.

Under no condition could Japan agree to the lessening of Mukden's autonomy. She had to come forward as soon as the "peace and order" of Manchuria was endangered, and side with China against the Soviets.

This belief could not be shaken by the persistent reports regarding Japan's secret understanding with the Soviets,* and the mysterious missions of Japanese statesmen to Moscow.† A sincere understanding between them was inconceivable, and the reported Soviet offer of the Chinese Eastern Railway to Japan for sale was, in spite of its feasibility, a product of pure imagination.‡

In fact, since the Treaty of Portsmouth of 1905, which gave her possession of the South Manchurian Railway with outlets to the sea at Dalny and Port Arthur, the Japanese had been keenly interested in the operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway and the agricultural and industrial development of North Manchuria.

According to the original Russian plan, the South Manchurian Railway formed only a branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which was to Russia of more strategical than of economic importance. The development of the vast and immensely rich territories in the North and in Mongolia supplied sufficient freight for both lines, but exercising her power in North Manchuria, Russia directed the bulk of the exports *via* Vladivostok. The same attitude was rigidly maintained by Russia, at all times after the Russo-Japanese war, and relaxed only in 1910 when the Japanese succeeded in obtaining from the Russian Imperial Government a special tariff agreement § whereby a part of this export found its way to the South Manchurian Railway. In 1916 a track of the Southern branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway, about 100 miles in length, was ceded to Japan as a compensation to her for the assistance rendered to Russia during the Great War. The outbreak of the Russian Revolution and the subsequent international intervention in Siberia when, owing to the Russian civil war, the entire exports from Manchuria and Mongolia were automatically diverted to the South, deprived this arrangement of its importance.

* "North-China Herald," December 24th, 1927.

† *Ibid.*, January 14th, 1928; "Toho News Agency," Tokyo, January 8th, 1928.

‡ "North-China Herald," January 19th, 1929.

§ Russo-Japanese Convention, July 4th, 1910.

The restoration of the Soviet control on the Chinese Eastern Railway brought to the fore the question of the exports again. The Soviets made every effort to direct them to the East by granting liberal tariffs on the Ussuri Railway and, in this way, to revive the importance of the port of Vladivostok.

The situation was further aggravated by alarming reports from Mongolia. The Soviets planned to annex forcibly a part of the Heilungkiang province, the Barga-Hulumba district, including a tract of the Chinese Eastern Railway, near Hailar, and incorporate it with outer Mongolia, which since 1921 had formed an independent republic under Soviet protection.*

This plan failed. The Mongolian insurgents occupied in August, 1928, six stations along the Chinese Eastern Railway, east of Manchuli, but were repulsed with heavy losses by the Fengtien troops. Investigation proved that large sums belonging to the Chinese Eastern Railway were used by the Soviet administration to foster the plot. There also was some justification for the belief that originally this movement was contemplated in concert with the Japanese, who were anxious to create complications in Manchuria and force the authorities of the Three Eastern Provinces to adopt a more conciliatory attitude towards Japan.

But regardless whether this was true or not, in exercising their power on the Chinese Eastern Railway the Soviets exploited the position to their advantage and for the furtherance of communistic propaganda. This had very little effect upon the Chinese population, and was almost exclusively confined to the railway workers of Russian nationality, but it set free China's hands in dealing with the Soviets. The propaganda constituted a breach of the Soviet-Mukden Treaty of 1924.†

The Japanese statesmen were startled by the sudden turn of events in Manchuria not less than the Chinese Government. The all-powerful Genro refused to back the political game further in China, and to share the responsibility for what appeared to be Baron Tanaka's last stake. He resigned on

* The Constitution of the Republic of Mongolia was promulgated by the Great Huraldan (People's Assembly) of Mongolia in November, 1924.

† On May 27th, 1929, the Chinese police raided the premises of the U.S.S.R. Consulate-General at Harbin where a meeting of Communist leaders was proceeding, arrested many people, including the Soviet Consul-General at Mukden, who attended the meeting, and seized a quantity of Communist literature and documents. The latter did not disclose anything new but furnished important documentary evidence which could be used to justify the actions of the Chinese Authorities.—AUTHOR.

July 2nd, a few days before the actual seizure of the Chinese Eastern Railway by the Harbin authorities, when it was already hardly possible to neutralize the effects of the "positive policy." The elements once set in motion continued to move and the new Cabinet of Mr. Yuko Hamaguchi had no other option than to accept the situation as it was.*

We have approached the moment when history merges into events of the day and historical analysis becomes a matter of conjecture.

The Sino-Soviet conflict has come to an abrupt end. After the first encounters the Soviet army proved to be technically far superior to the Fengtien troops. A score of Soviet aeroplanes was enough to force the Manchurian lords to reinstate the *status quo ante bellum* on the Chinese Eastern Railway. The Nanking leaders were shocked, when they learned the nature of the "preliminary agreement" signed at Nikolsk-Ussurisk on December 3rd, 1929,† but the Three Eastern Provinces preferred to lose face rather than to wait for Nanking's lamentations to reach the ears of the signatories to the Kellogg Pact; they preferred to come to terms with the Soviets rather than to fall into the widely-opened helping arms of Japan.

In effect, the appeals of the Nationalist Government to the United States of America, Britain, France and other nations, whose names adorn the piece of paper known as the Kellogg Pact, and the League of Nations, ‡ have aroused only laughter in Moscow. § The awkwardness of the position was realized by the Powers and the news regarding the Habarovsk Agreement was met with a sigh of relief. ¶

China is still in the throes of internecine war. The Nationalist Government fights against enemies whose number does not show any signs of decreasing. Events follow each other⁷ with a kaleidoscopic swiftness, carrying along with them

* The official reasons of Baron Tanaka's resignation were given as his failure to settle satisfactorily "the Mukden incident", meaning the affair which caused Marshal Chang Tso-lin's death and the manner in which the negotiations concerning the Kellogg Pact were carried out by the Japanese representatives. The phraseology of the treaty signed by Japan was not in harmony with the spirit of the Japanese National Constitution.—Tokyo, July 2nd, 1929.

† "Reuter," Tokyo, January 18th, 1930.

‡ State Council to the Powers signatory to the Kellogg Anti-War Pact and the League of Nations, November 24th, 1929.

§ "United Press," Moscow, December 7th, 1929.

¶ Statement of Mr. Arthur Henderson in the House of Commons, December 18th, 1929.

death to thousands. Many times the ship of the Nationalist Government has been on the point of sinking, but, in defiance of logic, has weathered the storm.

The group of leaders with General Chiang Kai-shek at the head still lead the nation. No matter that after each victory the number of their enemies has not diminished; that the victory over the powerful allies, Generals Yen Hsi-shan and Feng Yu-hsiang, in the North in the summer of 1930, has brought them face to face with the son of the late Manchurian Lord, Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, whose sudden intervention deprived them of the triumphal entrance into the old capital of China, but who has since paid them lip service and accepted the title of vice-Commander-in-Chief of the Northern and Southern armies nominally commanded by General Chang Kai-shek. The end of China's domination by foreigners seems near to her rulers, who strive in season and out to cast off the ascendancy of the West.

The surrender of the concessions in Chinkiang on November 11th, 1929, and Amoy on September 17th, and the rendition of Weihaiwei on October 1st, 1930, by Great Britain, the tariff agreement with Japan, which the latter was finally compelled to sign on May 6th, 1930, the treaty with France, May 16th, 1930, etc., are the prologue to the complete surrender of all extraterritorial privileges enjoyed by foreigners in China.

The military and diplomatic victories of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics are but a temporary set-back preceding its complete surrender. The issue of the Chinese Eastern Railway forms a part of the same elementary process in China which none of the Western Powers, Soviet Russia or Japan, seem able to prevent.

It is out of the question that China can yet attain such a state of perfection as to warrant the Western Powers and Japan relinquishing their privileges. The recommendations of the Commission on Extraterritoriality may be all fulfilled,* yet China will still be far from that standard of political and social maturity, in the Western sense of these words, which can be considered by the Powers to be the minimum justifying the abolition of extraterritoriality. It will take time before China can hope to assimilate laws, modelled upon Western patterns, as guiding principles in her national life. For many long years these laws must remain a source of irritation from which she

* In spite of the civil war this Commission has completed its work, and its findings were published at Peking on September 16th, 1926.

will strive to liberate herself. And if we, for a moment, discard our Western prejudices, we can clearly see that the events of the last thirty years in China are no more than the results of her titanic struggle to get rid of foreign ideas and foreign forms of life, forced upon her by political and economic processes by Western countries and Japan. This process is still violently shaking Europe and the Land of the Rising Sun. Their front against China, united at all times before the Great War, has been manifestly shaken.

Meanwhile, China, torn asunder by internal dissension, continues to be the same China, still animated by the spirit of self-preservation, which, at the beginning of the Nineteenth Century, raised the standard of war against foreign invaders. This standard has never since been lowered. All the concessions by the Powers to China have been made not to any particular Government but to the Chinese people as a whole, with no regard to their political, social or economic achievements. The once rigid grip of the foreigners is slipping, and there is every indication that, possibly in this present generation, China will succeed in casting off the last few links, more imaginary than real, that create in her a sense of inferiority among the other great nations of the world.

Whether peace and wisdom or dissension and war will gain the ascendancy when China is once more left to stand alone will be one of the great issues of the Twentieth Century.

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