

CHAPTER V

LOUIS NAPOLEON AS PRESIDENT AND EMPEROR

[1849-1870 A.D.]

On the 20th of December, 1848, commenced the government of that man to whom France delivered herself in an access of dizziness and who was to preside over her destinie till the 2nd of September, 1870. "This unfortunate people," according to the expression of a great national historian, Michelet, "stabbed itself with its own hand." Cavaignac, a man whose ideas were simple and his words sincere, was replaced by a successor with whom all was ulterior purpose and subterranean scheme. Since Louis Napoleon's admission to the constituent assembly, nothing was visible in his politics but a double effort to reassure the conservatives and yet flatter the popular hopes. — MARTIN.^b

THE immense majority by which Prince Louis Napoleon had been created president of the republic added greatly to the power of the executive, and was an important step in the restoration of order after the Revolution; but it was far from appeasing the parties, or producing a similar union in the assembly. It was, in truth, a declaration of France against the Revolution, and bespoke the anxious desire of the inhabitants to terminate the disorders which it had introduced, and return to the occupations of peaceful industry. But to the legislature, or at least a large part of its members, it was a serious blow, and was felt the more severely that it had been so completely unexpected.

The executive power—so important in all countries, so powerful in every age in France—had been appointed over their heads by the general voice of the people; the president was no longer their officer or administrator, but the nominee of a rival power, and might be expected on a crisis to be supported by the army, which looked to him for promotion, employment, and glory. The seeds, in this way, not merely of discontent and division, but probably of strife, were sown in the very outset of the president's power; the balance between a popular chief magistrate and an ambitious but discontented legislature could not long be preserved; and as the nation would

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certainly not again go back to the republic, it was already foreseen that it must go forward to the empire.

The first care of the president, after installation in office, was to organise a powerful army under the command of Marshal Bugeaud at Lyons and the adjacent provinces near the Alps. It was now raised to seventy-two thousand infantry and eight thousand horse. The threatening aspect of affairs in the north of Italy amply justified these precautionary measures; and it was mainly owing to the formidable front thus presented that the Austrians, after their successes over the Piedmontese, had been prevented from crossing the Ticino. But the army was destined also for another object: it was to this powerful force that Louis Napoleon mainly looked for the support of his authority, in the event of that breach with the assembly and democratic party which, it was evident, sooner or later, must ensue.

Public opinion meanwhile in France was so rapidly turning against the legislature that it was foreseen its existence could not be long continued. The general feeling was forcibly expressed in meetings held in Rennes and Lille. "It will no longer do," said an orator in the former city, "for Paris to send us down revolutions by the mail-coach; for it is now no longer political but social revolutions with which we are visited. The departments in Jura have shown unequivocally that they are determined to put an end to this system. Reflect on the days which we denominate by the 24th of February, the 15th of May, the 23rd of June. Is it to be borne that we are still doomed to go to bed at night without knowing whether we shall ever waken in the morning?"

"It is unprecedented in history," said a speaker in Lille, "that a few thousand turbulent adventurers, ever ready for a *coup de main*, should have succeeded on so many occasions in putting in hazard the destinies of a people so advanced in civilisation as that of France. We present to Europe the extraordinary spectacle of a nation of thirty-five million of men ever ready to take the yoke from twenty thousand or thirty thousand creators of revolutions, who descend into the streets at a signal given by a few ambitious leaders, and treat France as a conquered country. A unanimous resistance has now declared itself against the Parisian tyranny; a violent desire to shake off its yoke has made itself felt even by the central government. It is not a conspiracy, still less a dream of a federative government; it is an open and deliberate movement by the provinces of France, as the old ones of Gaul were determined that their interests should no longer be swallowed up in those of Rome."

END OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY (1849)

The general wish found vent in a motion made by Râteau, that the general election should take place on the 4th of next May, and the existing assembly be dissolved on the 19th of that month. The republicans were quite aware that it would annihilate their ascendancy, and they resolved to anticipate the legal dissolution of the assembly by a *coup d'état* against the president. This was a direct appeal to a civil war, and an invitation to a *coup d'état*; for the president, having been elected by the direct votes of the people, and not by the assembly, could not be removed but by the same authority which had created him, before the legal period of his tenure of office expired.

It was the hoisting of the signal for insurrection that was really intended; and this design was carried into execution on the 29th of January, 1849. It took place accordingly, but proved a miserable failure. The fire of democracy

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in the great body of the people was burned out. The government were acquainted with the whole plan of the conspirators, and from an early hour of the morning all their places of rendezvous were occupied by large bodies of troops, who, far from joining them as they expected, forcibly prevented any attempt at assembling. Foiled, disconcerted, and utterly overmatched, the conspirators, who came up in considerable numbers from the clubs, had no alternative but to retire, and they did so worse than defeated — turned into ridicule.

The days of the assembly being now numbered, its legislative acts ceased to be an object of any consideration; and the regulations for the approaching election having been passed without a division on the 15th of February, the clubs were closed after a stormy debate on the 20th of March following, by the slender majority of nineteen votes — the numbers being 378 to 359. This was the last important act of the constituent assembly. It rejected, on May 15th, by a majority of thirty-seven, a motion to the effect that the ministry had lost the confidence of the country, and four days afterwards came to an end. Every eye was now fixed on the approaching general election, fraught as it was with the future destinies of France.

The constitution of the 12th of November, 1848, was not fitted to survive in the time and conditions in which it was produced. The executive and deliberative powers had one origin, since they both proceeded from universal suffrage and were renewed, the one after three, the other after four years' exercise. But the president had this advantage — that, being elected by millions of suffrages, he seemed to represent the entire nation; whilst the assembly consisted only of deputies, each of whom represented some thousands of votes. Moreover, whilst the foundations were laid for an inevitable antagonism, the idea had been to subordinate the executive to the legislative. Thus the president made appointments to innumerable offices in the administration: he negotiated treaties and had the army at his disposition: but he could not be re-elected; he had neither the right to take command of the troops nor that of dissolving the assembly or to oppose a bill which might seem to him pernicious. He had too much or too little; and with the temptation to resume the usual prerogatives of public authority, he had been given the means to acquire them.

Nevertheless, the president and the assembly maintained an understanding so long as it was a question of restoring order and restraining the extreme parties. Thus on the 29th of January, as we have seen, and again on the 13th of June, 1849, the army of Paris under their direction triumphed over revolt without bloodshed.

SIEGE OF ROME

A matter concerning a foreign nation had caused the latter conflict. The European revolutions, to which the revolution of February had given birth, had been promptly put down by the kings whom they had alarmed. Already Austria, victorious in Hungary, thanks to the Russians, had defeated the king of Sardinia, Charles Albert, at Novara; and Lombardy had again fallen into its power. The republic proclaimed at Rome, after the flight of the pope, vainly endeavoured to make the walls of the Holy City the last rampart of the independence of the peninsula. Victorious for an instant six months before, Italy had refused the aid of France; now that she was vanquished and threatened by a heavier yoke, policy, and the solicitations of the Catholics who were then dominant in the chamber and the ministry, made it a duty of the government to protect the Italian peninsula and the

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holy see against the revolutionaries who wished to suppress the pope's temporal royalty. An army commanded by General Oudinot was sent into Italy to restore Rome to the pontiff.

The republicans of Paris endeavoured by an insurrection to save the republic of Rome. A member of the former provisional government, Ledru-Rollin, was with them. On the 13th of June, 1849, a timely display of troops nipped the rising in the bud. This riot cost the party its leaders, who were condemned by the high court of Versailles, and the Romans their last hope. On the 2nd of July General Oudinot, after showing the utmost discretion in the siege of the place, entered Rome, where the pope was reinstated. The legislative assembly, which had succeeded the constituent assembly, May 28th, 1849, although less unanimous on this question, nevertheless approved the president's conduct and it was decided that the troops should remain in Rome for the protection of the pope. From that day France had one arm occupied in Italy, to the advantage of the ultramontanes but to the detriment of her general interests.^d

STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

The first thing the assembly attacked was education, just as the ultra-royalists had done under the Restoration. A curious spectacle presented itself: those of the Orleanists who were best known for never having been devout, but who had shown themselves rather the reverse, as Thiers, for instance, were among the most enthusiastic in helping on this work for the Church. All conservatives, fearing the influence which was pushing the democratic section into the arms of the advanced republicans, courted the alliance of the clergy, and intrusted them with the mental training of France. Montalembert put the question in these terms: "We must choose between socialism and Catholicism."

This was the idea which influenced the best known of the followers of Voltaire to return to the church. They thought the elementary teachers were dangerous to the cause of order. They looked upon the unassuming conscientious men who taught the people to read as the forerunners, if not as apostles of revolution. Therefore the first law dealing with education withdrew from them the sanctions which the monarchy of July had granted them. The prefects had full power to deal with them, and a law treating them as "suspects" was passed.

Nor was the University any more favourably regarded; another law placed it under the supervision of a superior council, in which the bishops were largely represented. Some time after, the classes held by the great historian Michelet were closed. It was not long before universal suffrage was attacked. Some elections had taken place, and the assembly was alarmed to find that the country had changed its opinions, and now gave a majority to the advanced republicans. On the 10th of May Paris nominated its candidates — Carnot, Vidal, and Flotte. In all France, out of twenty-eight elections, the advanced party gained eighteen.

It was impossible openly to attack universal suffrage itself; but a residence of three years was required to entitle a man to vote; and this could only be proved by certain methods — for instance, by the payment of taxes. This measure involved the political fall of the greater part of the working population. Figures will give us an exact idea of the effect of the law: before it was passed, there were 9,926,000 electors in France; afterwards there were only 6,709,000. With a stroke of the pen the assembly had suppressed a

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third part of the nation — 3,200,000 citizens who had had votes since 1848. Thiers stamped this mutilation of the suffrage with its true character when he made use, during the debate, of the notorious words "vile multitude."

These were the principal achievements by which the assembly showed the kind of spirit that animated it. It would take up too much time to recount the details of this long reaction. We will only quote a law on transportation which was described by the tragic expression "a bloodless guillotine." This meant, for the party threatened by the assembly, death in a distant country, with all the physical suffering which the deadly mists of a tropical climate hold in reserve for political offenders. Of course the press was not overlooked, and measures were passed limiting its liberties.

All these laws were brought about by an alliance between Louis Napoleon and the majority. The latter did not foresee how the former would be able to turn their joint work against them in the future. Of the two, which

became unpopular? The assembly. And when, on the 2nd of December, the president wished to get rid of the assembly, what pretext did he allege? The law of the 31st of May, supported by himself. Louis Bonaparte, the president, had assisted through his ministers in the mutilation of universal suffrage. Louis Napoleon, wishing to become emperor, gave as his motive for the *coup d'état* his desire to re-establish universal suffrage.



ADOLPHE THIERS

Nothing now remained but to substitute a monarchy for the republic. It was on this point that the president and the majority in the assembly, who were united against the republican spirit were to disagree. Naturally the Bonapartists wished to reinstate the empire; and the majority of the Right benches only desired a monarchy.

The schism had begun less than a year after the presidential election. Till then, the president, Louis Napoleon, had allowed the united Orleanists and legitimist parties to govern, under the name of Odilon Barrot. On the 31st of October, 1849, with a suddenness that was almost melodramatic, he dismissed his ministers; and saying that France desired "to feel the hand and the will of him who had been elected on the 10th of December"—that "the name of Napoleon in itself constituted a programme," he formed a Bonapartist ministry, including Baroche, Rouher, Fould, Ferdinand Barrot, and others.

This did not prevent the Bonapartist ministry and the royalist majority from working together, in 1850, in their work of reaction against the republic, by means of the laws we have just mentioned. But as soon as the assembly was dispersed, on his return from a journey through France, the president reviewed the army at Satory. The cavalry cried, "Long live the emperor!" but the infantry was silent. And as proof that this demonstration was made to order is the fact that on inquiry the general, having asserted that the troops ought not to have uttered this cry while under arms and that they had thus prevented the infantry from joining in it, was immediately deprived of his command.

In this way plans for a restoration of the empire were revealed; and a visit paid by Berryer to the count de Chambord at Wiesbaden, and the fact

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that Thiers made a journey to Claremont to visit the Orleans family,¹ and energetic attempts to reconcile the two branches of the Bourbons, who had been estranged since 1830, showed that the royalists also were planning a restoration. The imperialists rallied round the president, while the royalists fixed their hopes on General Changarnier, who was in command in Paris. Louis Napoleon had him dismissed by the government, in which he had just made some changes. This showed what his plans were and a storm arose in the assembly. "If you yield," said Thiers, "the empire will be established." The assembly overthrew the ministry, but the president replaced it by another Bonapartist ministry, rather more insignificant than its predecessor. Changarnier, however, was not reinstated.

Monarchists of all shades of opinion were warmly petitioning for a revision of the constitution—the Bonapartists in order to prolong the powers of Louis Napoleon, who was about to stand for re-election; the royalists in order to shake the republic. The discussion was a brilliant oratorical struggle between the partisans of monarchy and the republicans. Berryer was the chief mouthpiece of the former. The republican party, already weakened by exile, had still quite a constellation of orators, from Jules Favre to Madier de Montjau. The chief of these heirs of Ledru-Rollin was Michel de Bourges, who, in debate on the revision, rose to splendid heights of oratory.

The advanced democrats had a still more famous orator: Victor Hugo had devoted himself entirely to the republic. His genius, which had at first taken little interest in politics, but which had blossomed in the royalist camp, had marched with the times. The sight of the reaction of 1850 had made him a radical. He was soon to show, amidst the bullets of the *coup d'état* and in exile, his loyalty and intrepidity in the cause of the people. His great speeches on the reactionary laws and his speech on the revision are among the most brilliant and most solid of his works. It was in the latter speech that he called the president, soon to be emperor, "Napoleon the Little."

The struggle between the latter and the royalist majority became more desperate. Even before the debate on the revision, at the opening of a railway, he had openly attacked the assembly. From the tribune Changarnier had replied that the soldiers would never march against the national representatives, adding emphatically, "Representatives of the country, continue your deliberations in peace." But these empty words did not allay the anxiety that was felt, and at the end of 1851, the quaestors of the chamber proposed to promulgate as a law, and to affix in the barracks, the clause in the decree of 1848 giving the president of the chamber the right to call out the troops and compelling the officers to obey him.

The republicans, equally distrusting the royalists who made the proposition and the Bonapartists against whom it was directed, made the mistake of voting against it. Michel de Bourges, in his blind confidence, spoke of the "invisible sentinel who guards the republic and the people." The proposition was rejected.

The *coup d'état* had been long prepared. General Magnan, minister of war, had already sounded and gained over the generals under his orders. The president Louis Napoleon was only waiting for a propitious moment to break the oath which he had sworn to the republic. Many times rumours had been set afloat, and many times the republicans had taken their precautions; and there was actually a question of risking the *coup d'état* earlier. But the

[¹ The chief of the Orleans branch, Louis Philippe, died in exile August 26th, 1850, at the age of seventy-six. As Martin ^b says, "France has not cherished a hostile feeling toward his memory; if he erred in his policy, he made bitter expiation."]

wisest of the party resolved to wait until the vacation of the assembly had begun.^e

THE COUP D'ÉTAT OF DECEMBER 2ND, 1851

All was ready. At the last moment Louis Napoleon began to hesitate. Bold in his projects, undecided in execution, a man of conspiracy without being really a man of action, he was capable of allowing the moment for action to go by; and yet both he and his were at the end of their pecuniary resources. Persigny, who thought he might take any liberty in consideration of his absolute devotion, subjected the president to a violent scene. Morny and Saint-Arnaud also made him feel that the time for dreaming had gone by. The day and hour were fixed.

There were groups in the assembly composed of Bonapartists and of men desirous, from other motives, to come to terms with the president, who now at the last moment also meditated an unconstitutional revision of the constitution, but at the hands of the assembly itself. Some politicians, rather clerical than legitimist or Orleanist, such as Montalembert and Falloux, were working in this direction. A Bonapartist historian (Granier de Cassagnac)^f has asserted that on the evening of the 1st of December Falloux made Louis Napoleon an offer to take the initiative at the tribune in proposing a prolongation of the president's powers by a simple majority, if it were necessary to have recourse to force in case the Left resisted. Louis Napoleon is said to have postponed his answer till the following day. Falloux has protested against this inculpation; in the evening Morny, Saint-Arnaud, and Maupas arrived at the Élysée and in concert with the president took all the steps for the coup d'état the next morning. Louis Napoleon, who paid a superstitious attention to anniversaries, had chosen that of his uncle's coronation and of the day of Austerlitz, the 2nd of December.^b

On that day, the prince went out on horseback, accompanied by a brilliant escorts of generals; they passed through the Champs Élysées, along the streets and the boulevards, greeted by the troops and by some of the people. It was the seal of his victory.

However, the struggle was not ended, lawful resistance was followed by riots, which had no chance of success with a government and generals who were decided on action. Both the representatives of the Mountain — who had declared so proudly on the 17th of November that the assembly was under its protection — and the people had tried in vain on December 2nd to organise resistance. On the morning of the 3rd, a barricade was raised in the faubourg St. Antoine; it was easily destroyed by the troops after a brief fire, during which a delegate, Baudin, was killed. In the course of the day and in the evening new barricades were erected in the districts of St. Martin and the Temple; they offered but a slight resistance to the troops. Measures had been carefully taken, and "the people" replied but faintly to the appeal of its representatives.

The following day, December 4th, was more serious though without endangering the new state of affairs. The troops had returned to their barracks, either because General Saint-Arnaud believed that resistance had come to an end, or because, following the example of Cavaignac in June, he did not wish to disperse his troops, or else because he wished to give the rebels an opportunity to form their army so that he might destroy it by a single blow: barricades were erected freely in the usual quarters; the troops were not brought out till the afternoon. There took place what has been called, not without exaggeration, "the boulevard massacre." A body of troops, which had been

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fired on, returned the fire without orders.⁹ Many onlookers were counted among the dead. Victor Hugo, who was banished for his opposition to Napoleon, wrote in exile an account of this massacre, from which we quote.

VICTOR HUGO'S ACCOUNT OF THE BOULEVARD MASSACRE


A little after one o'clock, December 4th, the whole length of the boulevards, from the Madeleine, was suddenly covered with cavalry and infantry, presenting a total of 16,410 men. Each brigade had its artillery with it. Two of the cannon, with their muzzles turned different ways, had been pointed at the ends of the rue Montmartre and the faubourg Montmartre respectively; no one knew why, as neither the street nor the faubourg presented even the appearance of a barricade. The spectators, who crowded the pavement and the windows, looked with affright at all these cannon, sabres, and bayonets, which thus blocked up the street.

"The troops were laughing and chatting," says one witness. Another witness says, "The soldiers had a strange look about them." Most of them were leaning upon their muskets, with the butt-end upon the ground, and seemed nearly falling from fatigue, or something else. One of those old officers who are accustomed to read a soldier's thoughts in his eyes, General —, said, as he passed the café Frascati, "They are drunk."

There were now some indications of what was about to happen. At one moment, when the crowd was crying to the troops, "*Vive la république! Down with Louis Bonaparte!*" one of the officers was heard to say, in a low voice, "*Ceci va tourner à la charcuterie!*" (We shall soon have a little to do in the pork-butcher line!)

A battalion of infantry debouches from the rue Richelieu. Before the café Cardinal it is greeted by a unanimous cry of "*Vive la république!*" A literary man, the editor of a conservative paper, who happened to be on the spot, adds the words, "Down with Soulouque!" The officer of the staff, who commanded the detachment, makes a blow at him with his sabre. The journalist avoids the blow and the sabre cuts in two one of the small trees on the boulevards.

As the 1st regiment of Lancers, commanded by Colonel Rochefort, came up opposite the rue Taitbout, a numerous crowd covered the pavement of the boulevards. This crowd was composed of some of the inhabitants of that quarter of the town, of merchants, artists, journalists, and even several young mothers leading their children by the hand. As the regiment was passing by, men and women—everyone, in fact—cried, "*Vive la constitution! Vive la loi! Vive la république!*" Colonel Rochefort, the same person who had presided



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at the banquet given on the 31st of October, 1851, at the *École Militaire*, by the 1st regiment of Lancers to the 7th regiment of Lancers, and who at this banquet had proposed as a toast "Prince Louis Napoleon, the chief of the state, the personification of that order of which we are the defenders!"—this colonel, on hearing the crowd utter the above cry, which was perfectly legal, spurred his horse into the midst of the crowd, through all the chairs on the pavement, while the Lancers precipitated themselves after him, and men, women, and children were indiscriminately cut down. "A great number remained dead on the spot," says a defender of the coup d'état; and then adds, "It was done in a moment."

About two o'clock two howitzers were pointed at the extremity of the boulevard Poissonnière, at one hundred and fifty paces from the little advanced barricade of the guardhouse on the boulevard Bonne-Nouvelle. While placing the guns in their proper position, two of the artillerymen, who are not often guilty of a false manoeuvre, broke the pole of a caisson. "Don't you see they are drunk!" exclaimed a man of the lower classes.

At half past two—for it is necessary to follow the progress of this hideous drama minute by minute, and step by step—the firing commenced before the barricade, but it was languid and almost seemed as if done for amusement only. The chief officers appeared to be thinking of anything but a combat. We shall soon see, however, of what they were thinking. The first cannon ball, badly aimed, passed above all the barricades and killed a little boy at the *château d'Eau* as he was procuring water from the basin. The shops were shut, as were also almost all the windows. There was, however, one window left open in an upper story of the house at the corner of the *rue de Sentier*. The principal mass of mere spectators were still on the southern side of the street. It was an ordinary crowd and nothing more—men, women, children, and old people who looked upon the languid attack and defence of the barricade as a sort of sham fight. This barricade served as a spectacle until the moment arrived for making it a pretext.

The soldiers had been skirmishing in this manner, and the defenders of the barricade returning their fire, for about a quarter of an hour, without anyone being wounded on either side, when suddenly, as if by the agency of electricity, an extraordinary and terrible movement was observed, first in the infantry and then in the cavalry. All of a sudden, as we have said before, the cavalry, infantry, and artillery faced towards the dense crowd upon the pavement, and then, without anyone being able to assign a reason for it, unexpectedly, without any motive, without any previous warning, as the infamous proclamations of the morning had announced, the butchery commenced from the theatre of the *Gymnase*, to the *Bains Chinois*—that is to say the whole length of the richest, the most frequented, and the most joyous boulevard of Paris. The army commenced shooting down the people, with the muzzles of their muskets actually touching them.

It was a horrible moment: it would be impossible to describe the cries, the arms of the people raised towards heaven, their surprise, their horror—the crowd flying in all directions, the shower of balls falling on the pavement and bounding to the roofs of the houses, corpses covering the road in a single moment, young men falling with their cigars still in their mouths, women in velvet gowns shot down dead by the long rifles, two booksellers killed on their own thresholds without knowing what offence they had committed, shots fired down the cellar-holes and killing anyone, no matter who happened to be below.

When the butchery was ended—that is to say when night had completely

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set in, and it had begun in the middle of the day—the dead bodies were not removed; they were so numerous that thirty-three of them were counted before a single shop. Every space of ground left open in the asphalt at the foot of the trees on the boulevards was a reservoir of blood. “The dead bodies,” says a witness, “were piled up in heaps, one upon the other, old men, children, persons in blouses and paletots, all collected pell-mell, in one indescribable mass of heads, arms, and legs.”

Ah! you will tell me, M. Bonaparte, that you are sorry, but that it was an unfortunate affair; that in presence of Paris, ready to rise, it was necessary to adopt some decided measure, and that you were forced to this extremity; that as regards the coup d'état, you were in debt, that your ministers were in debt, that your aides-de-camp were in debt, that your footmen were in debt, that you had made yourself answerable for them all, and that, deuce take it, a man cannot be a prince without squandering, from time to time, a few millions too much—that he must amuse himself and enjoy life a little; that the assembly was to blame for not having understood this, and for wishing to restrict you to two wretched millions a year, and, what is more, for wishing to make you resign your authority at the expiration of four years, and act up to the constitution; that, after all, you could not leave the Élysée to enter the debtors' prison at Clichy; that you had in vain had recourse to those little expedients which are provided for by Article 405 of the criminal code; that an exposure was at hand; that the demagogical press was spreading strange tales; that the matter of the gold ingots threatened to become known; that you were bound to respect the name of Napoleon; and that, by my faith, having no other alternative, and not wishing to be a vulgar criminal, to be dealt with in the common course of law, you preferred being one of the assassins of history!

So then, instead of polluting, this blood you shed purified you! Very good.

I continue my account. When all was finished, Paris came to see the sight. The people flocked in crowds to the scenes of these terrible occurrences; no one offered them the least obstruction. This was what the butcher wanted. Louis Napoleon had not done all this to hide it afterwards.

Thirty-seven corpses were heaped up in the cité Bergère; the passers-by could count them through the iron railings. A woman was standing at the corner of the rue Richelieu. She was looking on. All of a sudden, she felt that her feet were wet. “Why, it must have been raining here,” she said; “my shoes are full of water.” “No, Madam,” replied a person who was passing, “it is not water.” Her feet were in a pool of blood.

A witness says, “The boulevards presented a horrible sight. We were literally walking in blood. We counted eighteen corpses in about five-and-twenty paces.” Another witness, the keeper of a wine-shop in the rue du Sentier, says, “I came along the boulevard du Temple to my house. When I got home I had an inch of blood around the bottom of my trousers.”

The massacre was but a means; the end was intimidation. Was this end attained? Yes. Immediately afterwards, as early as the 4th of December, the public excitement was calmed. Paris was stupefied. The voice of indignation which had been raised at the coup d'état was suddenly hushed at the carnage. Matters had assumed an appearance completely unknown in history. People felt that they had to deal with one whose nature was unknown. Crassus had crushed the gladiators; Herod had slaughtered the infants; Charles IX. had exterminated the Huguenots; Peter of Russia, the Strelitz guards; Mehemet Ali, the mamelukes; Mahmoud, the janissaries;

while Danton had massacred the prisoners. Louis Napoleon had just discovered a new sort of massacre—the massacre of the passers-by,

From this moment, in spite of all the efforts of the committees, of the republican representatives, and of their courageous allies, there was—save at certain points only, such as the barricade of the Petit Carreau, for instance, where Denis Dussoubs, the brother of the representative, fell so heroically—naught but a slight effort of resistance which more resembled the convulsions of despair than a combat. All was finished. The next day, the 5th, the victorious troops paraded on the boulevards. A general was seen to show his naked sword to the people, and was heard to exclaim: "There is the republic for you!"

Thus it was this infamous butchery, this massacre of the passers-by, which was meant as a last resource by the measures of the 2nd of December. To undertake them, a man must be a traitor; to render them successful, he must be an assassin. It was by this wolf-like proceeding that the coup d'état conquered France and overcame Paris. Yes, Paris! It was necessary for a man to repeat it over and over again to himself before he can credit it. Is it at Paris that all this happened?

Is it possible that, because we still eat and drink; because the coach-makers' trade is flourishing; because you, navigator, have work in the Bois de Boulogne; because you, mason, gain forty sous a day at the Louvre; because you, banker, have made money by the Austrian metallics, or by a loan from the house of Hope and Co.; because the titles of nobility are restored; because a person can now be called *Monsieur le comte* or *Madame la duchesse*; because religious processions traverse the streets on the occasion of the Fête-Dieu; because people take their pleasure; because they are merry; because the walls of Paris are covered with bills of fêtes and theatres—is it possible that, because this is the case, men forget that there are corpses lying beneath?

Is it possible that because men's daughters have been to the ball at the École Militaire, because they returned home with dazzled eyes, aching heads, torn dresses, and faded bouquets; because, throwing themselves on their couches, they have dozed off to sleep, and dreamed of some handsome officer—is it possible that, because this is the case, we should no longer remember that under the turf beneath our feet, in an obscure grave, in a deep pit, in the inexorable gloom of death, there lies a crowd that is still icy cold and terrible—a multitude of human beings already become a shapeless mass, devoured by the worm, consumed by corruption, and beginning to be con-founded with the earth around them; a multitude of human beings who existed, worked, thought, and loved; who had the right to live, and who were murdered? ^h

SEVERITIES OF THE GOVERNMENT

The aspect of Paris on the morning of December 5th was sinister. Here and there pools of blood were to be seen on the pavements of the boulevards. Corpses had been ranged in the cité Bergère at the entrance to the faubourg Montmartre. A much larger number, more than three hundred and fifty, according to the testimony of the warden of the Cimetière du Nord, were transported to that cemetery; the warden had received orders to bury them immediately; he only half-obeyed and left the heads above ground so that the families might at least recognise their dead!

The Parisians could no longer laugh at Louis Napoleon: he had succeeded in getting himself taken seriously; ridicule had disappeared under horror.

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The coup d'état was winning the day. The weak hastened to come to terms; the strong were furious at their impotence to punish triumphant crime; the crowd, stunned, was silent: the greater number bowed prostrate. During the day of the 5th of December silent and sombre figures breathing concentrated fury were seen wandering slowly about the boulevards; in the central quarters some feeble attempts at barricades were renewed and almost instantly abandoned. All was indeed over in Paris! That same day, the 5th of December, a decree of the president declared that when troops should have contributed by fighting "to re-establish order" at home, that service should be counted as service in the field. Service in civil war was raised to the level of service in foreign war.

On the 6th of December a decree restored the Panthéon to religious worship and reconverted it into the church of Ste. Geneviève. Advances to the clergy followed the favours to the army. By a circular of the 15th Morny exhorted the prefects to do what authority could accomplish to secure respect for the Sunday rest. He prescribed the interruption of public work on Sundays and holy days. He declared that "the man who in contempt of the most venerated traditions reserves no day for the accomplishment of his duties becomes sooner or later a prey to materialism!" The voluptuary with bloodstained hands constituted himself a teacher of religious morality and of orthodoxy. This was characteristic of the new régime, in which every kind of excess was to be associated with every kind of hypocrisy.

A decree of the 7th of December had deferred all overt acts relative to what was called the insurrection, to the military jurisdiction. The next day it was decreed that any individual who should have made part of a secret society or who, having been placed under the surveillance of the *haute police*, should have left the place assigned to him, could be transported, as a measure required by the general safety, to Cayenne or Algeria. This placed a number of persons at the discretion of the government, especially in the south.

In Paris arrests multiplied in an alarming manner. According to the Bonapartist historians they exceeded twenty-six thousand. The prisons of Paris were filled; the overflow of prisoners was sent to the forts, where they were crowded together in damp and freezing casemates. Workmen and bourgeois mingled in almost equal numbers in the fraternity of the cell.

The struggle, stifled at Paris, continued in the departments. The departments were much divided. The democratic-socialistic propaganda had made but insignificant progress in these regions, although the industrial populations were beginning to practise with success the ideas of association—for example, in what concerned the societies of consumption. The democratic propaganda, on the contrary, in spite of the arrest of the first organisers, had developed to an extraordinary extent in the south and in a part of the centre. There it was no longer, as formerly, the workmen of the towns; it was the peasants, who were again taking action, as in '89—with this difference, to the great disadvantage of the new movement: there was no longer, as in '89, a clear idea, a definite object, namely the destruction of privilege and of the old régime. Men accepted the vague word socialism, while rejecting anything which might resemble communism. In all this nothing was clearly determined except the name of "republic" and the resolution of a general rising in 1852. The order had gone forth to go to the voting, each with arms in his hand, in defiance of the law of the 31st of May; it was calculated that a democratic restoration would be the result of this struggle. In what form exactly would it be? No one could well have told.

The year 1852 appeared to a great part of the popular masses as a sort of

mystic date, a new era of liberty and prosperity. The hope of some was the terror of others. This impending revolution inspired the conservatives with such fear that it prepared them to accept anything in order to escape upheaval. It goes without saying that the military and civil functionaries, selected and prepared long beforehand, adhered, with honourable exceptions, to the *soup d'état*. In the north and west the republicans could make only feeble manifestations in a few towns.

The attempts at revolt which had broken out on a hundred different points in the southwest indicated what the rising might have been if one at least of the two great cities of the Garonne had afforded it a centre of support. The democratic party was still more powerful in the southeast. The three old provinces of Languedoc, Provence, and Dauphiné were everywhere covered with affiliations of the society of the Mountairists. Initiations took place with a ceremonial borrowed more or less from the free-masons and the *carbonari*, and calculated to impress the imagination. The neophyte, his eyes bandaged, took an oath on a sword. In Hérault he was made to swear by Christ that he would defend the democratic and socialistic republic. "Dost thou swear," said the initiator to him, "to quit father and mother, wife and children, to fly to the defence of liberty?" "I swear it three times by Christ." It is said that there were sixty thousand persons affiliated in Hérault.

After the suppression of the insurrection in Hérault more than three thousand persons were arrested, of whom more than two thousand were deported. In hunting down the fugitives, the pursuing soldiers constantly shot dead those who endeavoured to escape them. In Basses-Alpes the republican rising had been almost unanimous; there curés had been seen associating themselves with it with a sincere devotion, and sharing its perils. The ruin was general, as the movement had been. Many of the inhabitants fled, to escape the arrests en masse. Villages were depopulated. Sequestrations were employed against the fugitives—in fact, no means of persecution was neglected. In this department, the least populous of all, nearly one thousand persons were deported. The misfortunes and the patriotism of this honest and courageous population deserve the esteem and sympathy of France.

The struggle was everywhere terminated towards the middle of December. The few crimes committed here and there by insurgents cannot be brought into comparison with the atrocity of the tremendous reaction which extended over a great part of France. Many harmless persons, whole groups of the population, had done honour to themselves by their courageous resistance; but as Eugène Ténot, the excellent historian of the *coup d'état*, has remarked, events had exhibited on a large scale the impotence of secret societies to effect the general movements which decide the destinies of countries; and yet in this case those societies had the exceptional advantage of having justice as well as law in their favour.

THE APPEAL TO THE PEOPLE

The struggle had come to an end; it had been replaced by the terrorising of the conquered. Thirty-two departments were in a stage of siege. Nearly one hundred thousand citizens were captives in the prisons or the fortresses. The casemates of the forts about Paris were overflowing with prisoners. The examining magistrates proceeded to summary interrogations, after which the persons detained were sent before military commissions. The latter, in accordance with the *dossiers* of the police and a few words added by the judges

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to those notes, classed the prisoners in one of these three categories: (1) Persons taken with arms in their hands or against whom grave charges are brought; (2) Persons against whom less grave charges are brought; (3) Dangerous persons. The first category was to be judged summarily by court martial; the second sent before various tribunals; the third deported without sentence.

It was under such conditions that the vote on the appeal to the people was proceeded with on the 20th and 21st of December. It may be judged what degree of liberty was left to the electors. There were to be no newspapers, no meetings. The prefects classed electoral meetings with the secret societies. The general commanding the department of Cher had had placards put up to the effect that any person seeking to disturb the voting or criticising the result would be brought before a court martial. The prefect of Bas-Rhin had formally interdicted the distribution of the voting papers. The prefect of Haute-Garonne announced that he would prosecute anyone who should distribute voting papers, even in manuscript, without authority. The gendarmerie arrested electors on charge of having incited others to vote against the president of the republic.

The consultative commission instituted by Louis Napoleon on the 3rd of December was entrusted with the counting of the ballot of the appeal to the people. It reported 7,439,216 ayes, 646,737 noes, 36,880 papers rejected. At Paris there had been 132,181 ayes, 80,691 noes, 3,200 rejected papers; 75,000 electors had not voted.

What was the value of these figures? It is impossible to doubt that violence and fraud had considerably swelled them. What supervision had it been possible to exercise over the votes? What scruples were to be expected from a great number of the men who presided at the elections? The people voted under the influence of terror in many departments where all who were not in prison or in flight voted "aye" to pacify the conqueror. The immense majority of ten to one, which the consultative commission proclaimed was then evidently artificial; nevertheless, without this terrorising, Louis Napoleon would have obtained a much smaller but still a real majority in the greater part of France. the Napoleonic prestige still subsisted with some; others, as was inevitable in such a case, yielded to fear of the unknown, to the dread of a new crisis on the heels of the old.

Louis Napoleon tried to justify his usurpation by a sophism: "France," he said, "has realised that I exceeded the bounds of legality only to return to justice. More than seven millions of votes have now absolved me." He said that with the assistance of "all good men, the devotion of the army, and the protection of heaven," he hoped to render himself worthy of the confidence which the people would continue to place in him. "I hope," he added, "to secure the destinies of France by founding institutions which will answer at once to the democratic instincts of the nation and the universal desire to have henceforth a strong and respected government. To reconstitute authority without wounding equality is to plant the foundations of the sole edifice which will later on be capable of supporting a wise and beneficent liberty." Thus he deigned to promise liberty at a future date, while reserving to himself the choice of the moment.

On the morning of that day of the year which opened a period so different from that on which many hopes had waited in 1852, a decree had substituted the imperial eagle of Rome for the cock by which the constitutional monarchy and the republic recalled ancient Gaul. Another decree announced that the chief of the state was about to take the Tuileries for his residence.

Whilst the man of the 2nd of December was installing himself in the palace of the kings, the chief representatives of the republic were driven into exile.

EXILE BY WHOLESALE

From the day which followed the coup d'état the executors of the plot had given very different treatment to the captive representatives, according to whether they were conservatives or republicans. They had at first divided the 282 representatives, confined in the barracks of the quai d'Orsay, into three convoys; they had crowded them into the prison vans in which malefactors are carried. Forty members of the Right were set at liberty. The republicans were conducted to Mazas, where they were placed in the cells and under the same rules as thieves. The imprisoned generals had just been sent from Mazas to Ham. At Mazas they had left Thiers who, like the generals, had been arrested during the preceding night.

On the 4th, almost all the prisoners of Vincennes were set at liberty. On the 8th of January the generals detained at Ham and their companion in captivity, the *questeur* Baze, were conducted into Belgium. The next day appeared a series of decrees of proscription. The individuals "convicted of having taken part in the recent insurrections" were to be deported—some to Guiana, others to Algeria. A decree designated five representatives of the Mountain for deportation. The sentence of deportation was afterwards commuted into exile for three of them. A second decree expelled from France, from Algeria, and from the colonies, "on grounds of the general safety," sixty-six representatives of the Left, amongst them Victor Hugo and several others who were destined to aid in the foundation of the third republic.

A third decree temporarily removed from France and Algeria eighteen other representatives, amongst whom the generals figured, together with Thiers, Rémusat, and some members of the Left, of whom were Edgar Quinet and Émile de Girardin. The same day January 9th, a first convoy of four hundred and twenty of the Parisian captives was sent from the fort of Bicêtre to Le Havre; they were crowded together at the bottom of the hold of a frigate. Convoys followed one another incessantly in the direction of the ports where, amid all kinds of moral and physical sufferings, thousands of unfortunates waited for the departure of the vessels. Cayenne and Lambessa divided the victims.

Whilst the prisons of Paris were being emptied in this fashion, attention was also given to the departments. The new government was embarrassed by the multitude of its captives. It authorised its prefects to set at liberty all those of the prisoners whom they might judge not dangerous (January 29th). This measure was the famous "mixed commissions" (*commissions mixtes*). In each department a sort of tribunal was set up, composed of the prefect, the military commandant, and the *chef du parquet* (procureur-général or prosecutor for the republic). On these commissions was conferred the power to decree citation before a court martial, transportation, or release.

It was the reversal of all law and justice—something worse than the revolutionary tribunals of '93 and than the provosts' courts (*cours prévôtales*) of the restoration, which at least admitted discussion and defence in public. The mixed commissions of 1852, as the historian of the coup d'état (Eugène Ténoc) says, "decided without procedure, without hearing of witnesses, without public sentence the fate of thousands and thousands of republicans." The mixed commissions have left the ineffaceable memory of one of the most monstrous facts of history.

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THE CONSTITUTION OF 1852

An act quite as extraordinary in another class was the promulgation of the new constitution fabricated by the dictator himself without assistance (January 14th, 1852). The conqueror of Italy and Egypt, the vanquisher of Austria, had at least, for the sake of formality, required eminent men to deliberate on his constitution of the year VIII. The vanquisher of the 2nd of December had not thought it necessary to cover himself by such form. In a preamble skillfully enough drawn up, with the object of proving that for the last fifty years the French nation had only continued in virtue of the institutions of the consulate and the empire, he affirmed that society as existing was nothing other than France regenerated by the revolution of '89 and organised by the emperor. Having kept everything belonging to the consulate and the empire, save the political institutions overturned by the European coalition, why should France not resume those political institutions with the rest?

The constitution of 1852 starts by "recognising, confirming, and guaranteeing the great principles proclaimed in 1789, which are the base of the public law of the French." Only it says not a word of the liberty of the press, nor of the liberty of assembly and association. "The government of the French Republic is confided for ten years to Prince Louis Napoleon Bonaparte." The constitution declares the chief of the state responsible to the French people; but it forgets to mention how this responsibility is to be realised; the French people will have no means of applying it except by the way of revolution. "The chief being responsible, his action must be free and unshackled." The minister then must depend only on him and will no longer form a collectively and individually responsible council. They will no longer bear any relation to the deliberative assemblies. "The president of the republic commands the sea and land forces, declares war, makes treaties of peace, of alliance and of commerce, nominates to all offices, makes the regulations and decrees necessary to the execution of the laws."

Justice is rendered in his name. He alone initiates laws. He sanctions and promulgates laws. All public functionaries make the oath of fidelity to him. The first wheel in the new organisation is to be a council of state of forty to fifty members, nominated and liable to be dismissed by the president of the republic, discussing bills with closed doors, then presenting them for the acceptance of the legislative body. In fact the constitution of 1852 outdid, as a monarchical reaction, the constitution of the year VIII. It was not the consulate; it was already the empire, organised dictatorship, and the total confiscation of public liberties. Thirty-seven years after the fall of Napoleon the Great, the long struggles of French liberty ended in re-establishing absolute power in hands without genius and without glory.

The same day, the 22nd of January, appeared a decree which obliged the members of the house of Orleans to sell within the space of a year all the property belonging to them in the territory of the republic. On the 29th of March the prince-president proceeded to the inauguration of the chambers in the Hall of the Marshals at the Tuileries. It was thought that in his speech he would make it understood that he expected another title—that of emperor. He left this subject still undetermined. He spoke of still preserving the republic. This was to mock at his listeners and at France; but he did not wish to appear to be in a hurry to seize what could not now escape him.

The session of the two chambers was then opened by the presidents whom

the dictator had given them. In the senate Louis Napoleon had chosen his uncle, Jerome, the ex-king of Westphalia. In virtue of the new constitution the presidents claimed from the members of the two chambers the oath of obedience to the constitution and of fidelity to the president of the republic.

During the session a rumour was current that Louis Napoleon would be proclaimed emperor on the 10th of May, after the distribution of the eagles to the army. The dictator did not wish to make himself emperor in this manner. He would proceed more artfully, and intended to obtain a guarantee that the accomplishment of his wishes should be imposed on him by the country. He therefore undertook a new tour through the departments.^b

NAPOLEON'S ADDRESS AT BORDEAUX (1852)

Master of himself in the midst of the general enthusiasm, Louis Napoleon was preparing for the great speech which would definitely decide his destiny and the destiny of France. It was made at Bordeaux on the 9th of October, at the close of a banquet which had been given him by the chamber of commerce. Contrary to his custom he went straight to the point:

"I say with a frankness as far removed from pride as from false modesty, that never has any nation manifested in a more direct, more spontaneous, more unanimous manner its wish to rid itself of all anxiety as to the future, by strengthening under one control the government which is sympathetic to it. The reason is that this people now realises both the false hopes which lulled it and the perils which threatened it. It knows that in 1852 Society was hurrying to its downfall. It is grateful to me for having saved the ship by setting up only the flag of France. Disabused of absurd theories, the nation has acquired the conviction that its so-called reformers were but dreamers, for there was always an inconsistency, a disproportion, between their resources and the promised results. To bring about the well-being of the country it is not necessary to apply new methods, but to give it, before all else, confidence in the present and security as to the future. These are the reasons why France appears anxious to revert to an empire."

The important word had at last been uttered. With insinuating cleverness Louis Napoleon also brought forward the principal objection to the scheme: "There is an apprehension abroad of which I must take note. In a spirit of distrust, certain persons are saying that imperialism means war. I say imperialism means peace. It means peace because France desires it, and when France is satisfied the world is at rest. Glory may well be bequeathed as an inheritance, but not war. Did those princes who were justly proud of being descendants of Louis XIV revive his quarrels? War is not made for pleasure, but by necessity; and in these times of transition when, side by side with so many elements of prosperity, on every hand so many causes of death arise, one may truly say: 'Woe unto him who first gives the signal in Europe for a collision whose consequences would be incalculable.'"

Prolonged cheers greeted these sentiments of pacific pride. The enthusiasm became tinged with emotion when the prince, continuing, outlined in superb language the programme of his future government—a safely plan for an edifice never, alas! erected. On the 10th of October the presidential address, "The Bordeaux Speech" as it was promptly dubbed, was telegraphed to Paris. So dignified, conciliatory, and loyal did its language appear, that it instantly produced an emotion which was not artificial or simulated, but profound and sincere.

Louis Napoleon visited in rapid succession Angoulême, Rochefort, La

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Rochelle, and Tours; he made a last halt at Amboise and there, to impress the public fancy by some new and striking act, he set free the imprisoned Abdulkadir.

At two o'clock in the afternoon of the 16th of October, he arrived in Paris, and was received with full official pomp and circumstance. Representatives of official bodies went to the Gare d'Orléans to salute him. The sound of cannon mingled with the pealing of bells, while strains of military music alternated with patriotic songs. On the place de la Bastille the president of the municipal council, M. Delangle, publicly congratulated him.

Throughout the long line of the boulevards the theatres, public buildings, even some of the shops were decorated with triumphal arches. On one of them might be read some lines from Virgil: "May the Gods of our fathers be favourable to this youth in this troubled age." More even than the apt quotation, the continuous cheers of the crowd gave its true significance to the reception. Thus was Louis Napoleon borne to the palace of the Tuileries. Then in the evening, satiated with homage, eager for rest and repose, he escaped from the ovations and made his way to the château of St. Cloud.ⁱ

THE UNIQUE POSITION OF LOUIS NAPOLEON

Bradford^j has emphasised the fact that in showing its preference for Louis Napoleon, France was the first European nation that had "attempted to form or express any common will." No other ruler in Europe could know definitely, except by the vaguest of inferences, whether or not he held his official position with the approval of the majority of his subjects. But there could be no question as to the attitude of the French people as a whole toward the man who was about to become their supreme ruler. And in expressing their approval of that man, the people of France expressed also, in the view of Bradford, a desire for peace and order. They believed, justly enough, that to attain that end there must exist a strong executive power. It was not strange that they should feel that the most likely wielder of such a power would be the bearer of the magic name of Bonaparte.

It was the fond hope of the multitudes, then, that now in France, as in the Rome of an elder day, empire should mean peace. But this hope, as all the world knows, was not to be immediately realised. Within a few years Louis Napoleon, actuated by self-seekers like Morny and Saint-Arnaud, was to precipitate the Crimean War. Similar forces were to bring about the Austrian War within the same decade, with the resulting independence of Italy, paid for with the heavy price of abrogated treaties. Then there was to follow the "surpassing folly" of the Mexican expedition, with the execution of Maximilian for its humiliating sequel. And not so far beyond was to come the crowning disaster of the Franco-Prussian War, which might almost be regarded as a just retribution upon the empire, but which fell heavily upon a people who suffered not so much for their own sins as for the delinquencies of their ruler. But few indeed were the prophets who could foretell, even vaguely, the disasters that the enthusiasts of 1852 were unwittingly preparing.^a

THE ACCESSION OF NAPOLEON III

On December 1st, 1852, at eight o'clock in the evening, in the midst of a thick fog, two hundred carriages, lighted by torchbearers on horseback, crossed the bridge of Boulogne, and went in the direction of the palace of St. Cloud, the windows of which were seen shining from afar; the members

of the senate occupied these carriages; they carried the prince-president the decree of the senate which named him emperor.

The fête of the proclamation of the empire was very similar to that of the return of the prince-president, and curiosity began to be exhausted: the same flags, the same uniforms, the same people, the same decorations, a smaller crowd in the streets, but more animation in the theme. The new government, by way of a gift to celebrate the joyous accession, delivered from imprisonment and fine those who were condemned for misdemeanours and infractions of the laws covering the press and the book trade: official warnings which had been sent to the journals were considered null and void; there was to be no amnesty; exiles might return "if they acknowledged the national will," that is, if they demanded pardon. The absence of clemency, and the monotony of the same decorations, the same banners, the same arches, the same transparencies made the day dreary for some, fatiguing for others, long for all. Paris was anxious to escape from the outward trappings and to enter into the reality. A banquet for sixty persons and a simple reception at the residence of the sovereign ended the evening. At midnight a new guest slept in the Tuileries. So began the reign which was to finish at Sedan.^k

NAPOLÉON'S MARRIAGE

The foreign powers which had greeted the coup d'état as a bulwark against revolution did not so highly approve the second empire; but none the less they had nothing to do but accord it recognition. The three eastern powers were the slowest; and, as in the case of Louis Philippe, the czar Nicholas could not bring himself to grant the usual title "brother," but called him "good friend." Like his uncle in the case of his second marriage, the parvenu emperor sought a bride among the ancient royal families; but the eastern powers managed to foil his suit for the princess Charlotte of Vasa.^l He thereupon married the beautiful Spanish woman Eugénie Montijo, duchess of Teba, January 30th, 1853. On March 16th, 1856, she bore him an heir, Prince Napoleon Eugène.^l

THE COURT LIFE OF LOUIS NAPOLÉON

It was but natural that Louis Napoleon, after the coup d'état, should endeavour to surround himself with the most distinguished men in France, following in this as in so many other directions, the example of his illustrious namesake. But the attempt was only partially successful. "The nobility of the first empire," says Erskine May,^m "were naturally the chief ornaments of his court; but the old legitimist and Orleanist nobles generally held themselves aloof from the Bonapartist circle, and affected the more select society of their own friends in the faubourgs St. Germain and St. Honoré." Nevertheless the name Bonaparte had an allurements that could not be altogether resisted. It was a word of such mystic influence that it could be conjured with almost without regard to the personality of its bearer. This must not be interpreted as implying, however, that the new Napoleon was a man of insignificant personality. The fact was quite otherwise. Louis Napoleon was a man of parts; it is no disparagement to say that he did not attain to the intellectual stature of his great predecessor. It seemed for a

[^l The Hohenzollerns also received his advances discouragingly. The Spanish beauty he took for queen was not of royal blood. The legitimist nobility, as a rule, kept away from court and regarded the usurper and his circle with scorn.]

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time as if he would prove himself a very great man, even as adjudged by high standards; though later events were not to sustain this early promise, as we shall see.

To make amends for the absence of the old time notables, the emperor supplied himself with an abundant company of new dignitaries by the profuse, not to say indiscriminate, distribution of various titles of nobility. Many a plebeian name was dignified with an ennobling prefix, and the red ribbon of the Legion of Honour was so generously distributed that it came to be almost a distinction to be without it. But with an outward show of display and grandeur that characterised the new court, it was noted that there was no such gathering of the men of real distinction—the upholders of French traditions in art, science, and literature—as had characterised the court of Napoleon I. Men like Victor Hugo remained true to their ideals of the republican epoch, and held aloof from the court, or even retired altogether from the French domain.

But in all that made for the surface showing of brilliancy and display the court of the new emperor became as notable as he could well desire. Nor had he cause to complain of any limitation to his political power. "He had been chosen by universal suffrage," says May,^m "yet he wielded a power all but absolute and irresponsible. He ruled by the voice of the people, but he forbade the expression of their sentiments in the press or at public meetings." In a word, he came to exercise a personal influence within the limits of his empire almost comparable to that of any of his forerunners on the throne of France. Yet, in point of fact, the new emperor, even at the height of his power, stood always in awe of the populace. From first to last he was striving to ascertain the wishes of the people, and to support himself and maintain his hold upon popular favour by catering to these wishes. The Paris of to-day, with its broad boulevards and its ornamental buildings, is in a considerable measure a standing testimonial to the effort Louis Napoleon made to gain popularity through flattering the vanity of his subjects. And there is good reason to suppose that it was part of this same desire, rather than any innate wish for military glory, that led the emperor to take those measures that led to the Crimean War, the events of which must now claim our attention.^a

THE CRIMEAN WAR (1854-1856)

Since the treaties of 1815 Russia had exercised a threatening preponderance over Europe. The czar Nicholas had become the personification of a formidable system of compression and conquest. He had never forgiven the dynasty of July for having owed its existence to a rebellion; in Germany he had upheld the sovereigns in their resistance to the wishes of the peoples. He had done his utmost to denationalise Poland, his possession of which had been recognised by the treaties of 1815 on condition that he should assure to it a constitutional government. Dumfounded for a moment by the revolution of 1848, the czar had soon returned to his ambition. After having saved Austria by crushing the Hungarians who had revolted against her, he had thought that the presence of a Napoleon on the throne of France guaranteed to Russia the alliance of the English, and he had believed that the moment was come to seize the perpetual object of Muscovite covetousness—Constantinople. On every opportunity he affected a protectorate over the Christian subjects of the Turkish Empire: he ended by trying to come to a secret understanding with England for the partition of the spoil

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of the Sick Man (the sultan). In 1853 he occupied the Danubian principalities and armed what seemed a formidable fleet at Sebastopol:

The emperor Napoleon gave the first signal of resistance by boldly sending the French Mediterranean fleet to Salamis to have it within reach of Constantinople and the Black Sea. He won over England, at first hesitating, to his alliance, and assured himself of the neutrality of Austria and Prussia. Hostilities opened with the destruction by the Russians of a Turkish flotilla at Sinope. The Anglo-French fleet entered the Black Sea, whilst an army despatched from the ports of Great Britain and France assembled under the walls of Constantinople. The 14th of September, 1854, the army of the allies, seventy thousand strong, debarked on the Crimean coasts, and the victory of Alma allowed the commencement of the siege of Sebastopol, a formidable fortress whose annihilation was necessary in order to protect Constantinople against a sudden attack.

This siege, one of the most terrible in the annals of modern history, lasted for more than a year.¹ Generals Canrobert and Pélissier successively commanded the French troops. Continual fighting, two victories, those of Inkerman and the Tchernaya, earned for the French soldiers less glory than their dauntless courage against a terrible climate and an enemy who ceaselessly renewed his ranks. At last, on the 8th of September, 1855, after miracles of constancy, French dash and English solidity had their reward. The tower of the Malakoff was carried and the town taken. The emperor Nicholas had died a few months before.

In the Baltic the Anglo-French fleet had destroyed Bomarsund, the advanced bulwark of Russia against Sweden, and in the Black Sea the French iron-plated gunboats, now used for the first time, had compelled the fortress of Kinburn to surrender, thus opening southern Russia. An allied squadron had even taken Petropavlovsk on the Pacific Ocean. Finally French diplomacy had induced the king of Sweden and the king of Sardinia to enter the league against Russia, and was perhaps on the point of winning over the emperor of Austria. The czar Alexander II, successor of Nicholas, demanded peace; it was concluded at Paris, March 30th, 1856, under the eyes of the emperor of the French.^d

THE CONGRESS OF PARIS (1856)

The congress of Paris (March-April, 1856) was composed of two plenipotentiaries from each of the six powers—France, England, Russia, Turkey, Austria, and Sardinia—under the presidency of the French plenipotentiaries. Prussia was invited to take part afterwards.

The congress began by regulating the Eastern question. (1) The integrity of the Ottoman Empire was guaranteed by the powers; the sultan promised reforms and the powers renounced all intervention in the internal affairs of the empire. (2) The Danube was declared free for navigation. (3) The Black Sea was recognised as neutral; no state might have arsenals or war ships in it, with the exception of small ships. (4) Moldavia and Wallachia became autonomous.

After having signed the peace the congress regulated the question of maritime law by four decisions which were incorporated in international European law. (1) Privateering is abolished. (2) All hostile merchandise sailing under a neutral flag is neutral. (3) All neutral merchandise under a hostile flag

[¹ Fuller accounts of this siege, as of the whole war, will be found in the histories of England and of Russia.]

[1856-1858 A.D.]

is neutral. (4) A blockade cannot be established by a simple declaration—it is not valid unless it is effective.

Cavour, representing Sardinia, succeeded in bringing up the Italian question in the congress, by coming to an understanding with the representatives of France and England. They spoke of the evacuation of the Piræus by French troops (which was still a discussion of the oriental question), and à propos of the occupation of the Piræus they spoke of the occupation (which still continued) of Tuscany by the Austrians. England demanded that it should come to an end; Austria refused to discuss it. But Cavour profited by the occasion to describe the lamentable condition of Italy.

The congress of Paris had been a personal success for Napoleon and his policy. Not only had he made France re-enter the European concert, but for the first time he had caused a European congress to be held on French territory and under her presidency. He had obtained the autonomy of the Rumanian nation and had posed the national question of Italy, making the instrument which had been created by Metternich against the nations to serve the cause of nationalities. He remained under this impression, and his policy was directed towards bringing together a new congress to alter the *status quo* of Europe and to abolish the treaties of 1815, but he never succeeded in his attempt.

The congress of Paris changed Napoleon's position in Europe. The sovereigns, seeing him solid at home and powerful abroad, drew closer to him. The example was set by the princes of the Coburg family. Ernest of Coburg-Gotha was the first to pay him a visit (March, 1854); then came Leopold, king of the Belgians; then the king of Portugal; finally Prince Albert, husband of Queen Victoria, consented to see Napoleon (September, 1854). Napoleon and the empress went to England (April, 1855); Victoria and Albert returned their visit (it was the first time since 1422 that a king of England had come to Paris). The example of the Coburgs decided Victor Emmanuel, who had refused till then. After the congress, the rulers of Würtemberg, Bavaria, and Tuscany arrived (1856-57).

Napoleon wished to profit by these relations to adopt an active policy. He tried to win over the king of Prussia, who refused to be won; he spoke at the English court of revising the treaties of 1815, but was coldly received (August, 1857). He then approached Russia in an interview at Stuttgart with the czar, in 1857. In 1858 France and Russia acted together to maintain Rumanian unity, against Turkey, Austria, and England; in Servia they together sustained the Obrenovitch dynasty against Austria.

Cavour, who was determined on war with Austria, declared publicly in the chamber that the principles of Vienna were irreconcilable with those of Turin. Austria replied that the emperor would continue to make use of his right of intervention (May, 1856). She ended by breaking off diplomatic relations with Sardinia (March, 1857).

But Napoleon still hesitated.ⁿ

INTERNAL AFFAIRS (1856-1858)

During the session of 1856 the baptism of the prince imperial, who had been born (March 16th) during the congress of Paris, was celebrated with great pomp at Notre Dame. The godfather was Pius IX, represented by a Roman cardinal. This intimate bond with the pope was to involve the policy of the empire on grave occasions. The powers of the legislative body elected in 1852, if they can be called powers, expired in 1857. It goes without saying

that the official candidature was worked by the prefects in every possible way. Billault, the minister of the interior, declared in a circular that "the government considered it just and politic to present for re-election the members of an assembly which had so well seconded the emperor and served the country." He was willing to admit that in face of these conditions "openly avowed and resolutely sustained," others might be brought forward. "If, however," he added, "the enemies of the public peace should find in this latitude an occasion for a serious protest against our institutions; if they try to make it an instrument of trouble and scandal, you know your duty, Monsieur le préfet, and justice will also know how to execute its duty with severity."

The prefects went further than the minister. One of them simply wrote to the officials of his department: "Impose silence on opponents if any are met with." Another was going so far as to interdict the publication and posting of circulars and declarations of opinion on the part of non-official candidates. The prefects set their newspapers violently not only against the enemies of the government, but against those of its friends who might permit themselves to dispute the ground with the official candidates. In presence of this attitude of the government agents the peasants said simply: "Why should we trouble ourselves to nominate deputies?" The government might as well nominate them itself. The opposition had assuredly no chance of depriving the government of its majority. It might attempt protests and obtain some partial success. There were eager debates between the republicans concerning the course to pursue.

The elections took place the 20th of June. Of the eight deputies of Paris the opposition gained five—Carnot, Goudchaux, Cavaignac, Ollivier, and Darimon; two republicans were nominated at Lyons and at Bordeaux. The struggle became almost impossible in the departments; meanwhile, in the large cities, a strong minority, sometimes even a majority, had declared itself in favour of the opposition.

The Chambers reopened on the 28th of November. Of the five republican deputies of Paris, one, Cavaignac, had died; two refused the oath, Carnot and Goudchaux; Ollivier and Darimon took it. The session of 1857 to 1858 seemed destined to be uneventful, when a tragic incident suddenly disturbed everything and added gravity to the situation.

ORSINI'S ATTEMPT TO KILL THE EMPEROR

The evening of the 14th of January, 1858, at the moment of the arrival of the emperor and empress at the opera, three explosions were heard. Three bombs had been thrown at the emperor's carriage. Cries of grief and horror resounded on all sides. The bursting of the projectiles had injured more than one hundred and forty persons, some of whom were mortally wounded. The carriage of the emperor was broken and one of the horses killed. A terrible anxiety filled the opera house as the royal pair entered their box; both had escaped injury.

The police arrested four Italians. It was seen immediately that three of them were but instruments; the fourth, Orsini, was remarkable in every way. His father had perished in 1831 in the insurrection against the pope in which Napoleon III and his elder brother had taken part. The son since his childhood had taken part in all the national Italian conspiracies.

In its form the attempt on Napoleon III recalled that of Fieschi under Louis Philippe; but in reality there was a wide gulf between the Corsican

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bandit of 1835 and the Roman conspirator of 1858. In spite of the horror of a crime which took aim at its object across so many indifferent and unknown victims, Orsini inspired in all those who saw and heard him during his trial an interest which it was impossible to withstand. This man had been actuated solely by an impersonal passion; he was under the spell of a misdirected patriotism. He had chosen as his counsel Jules Favre, who defended him as he wished to be defended, by endeavouring to save, not his head, but his memory as far as it could be saved. A profound impression was made on the audience when Jules Favre, by permission of the emperor, read aloud a letter addressed to the latter by Orsini. The criminal did not ask mercy for himself; he asked freedom for his unhappy country, "the constant object of all his affections." He did not go so far as to demand that the blood of Frenchmen should be shed for the Italians, but only that France should interdict the support of Austria by Germany—"in the struggles which are perhaps soon to begin. I adjure your majesty," he wrote, "to restore to Italy the independence which her children lost in 1849 by the fault of the French themselves (by the war of Rome). Let not your majesty repulse the last wish of a patriot on the steps of the scaffold!"

Orsini and his accomplices were condemned to death on the 26th of February. Orsini thanked the emperor for having authorised the publication of his letter. His second letter was not less moving than the first. He formally condemned political assassination and disavowed "the fatal aberration of mind" which had led him to prepare his crime. He exhorted his compatriots to employ only their abnegation, their devotion, their union, their virtue to deliver their country. He himself offered his blood in expiation to the victims of the 14th of January. The question of the commutation of the penalty was energetically agitated by those about the emperor. Napoleon would have judged such mercy politic if so many victims had not been struck by the instruments of death intended for his own person. Orsini was executed on the 14th of March, with one of his accomplices. He died without display as without weakness, crying, "*Vive l'Italie! Vive la France!*"

His death was soon to bring forth happy results to Italy. Before that his crime had had deplorable ones for France. In 1801 the first consul had made the affair of the infernal machine prepared by some royalists a pretext for proscribing a host of republicans. Napoleon III imitated and surpassed his uncle.

THE "NEW TERROR" OF 1858

At the reopening of the chambers, a few days after the attempt of the opera (14th of January), the emperor delivered a speech which began with a splendid picture of the public prosperity. He called on the legislative body not to permit the renewal of "the scandal" of the refusals of the oath by elected candidates, and to vote a law which should oblige all those eligible for election to take the oath to the constitution before standing for election. Finally he appealed to the assembly of the representatives of the country to "find means to silence factious opposition." The meaning of this threat was soon made known. On the 1st of February a bill was presented to the legislative body; it punished with an imprisonment of from two to five years and a fine of from five hundred to ten thousand francs, whoever should have publicly incited to the crimes mentioned in articles 86 and 87 of the penal code (sedition, insurrection, etc.) when that provocation had not resulted in action. It punished with an imprisonment of one month to two years and a fine of

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from one hundred to two thousand francs whoever should have manoeuvred or entered into negotiations either at home or abroad with the object of disturbing the public peace. Every person sentenced for one of the above misdemeanours or for certain others also mentioned in the bill, including the detention of arms, seditious assemblies, etc., should as a measure for the general safety be incarcerated in France or Algeria or expelled from French territory. This same measure for the general safety could be applied to any person who had been either condemned, incarcerated, expelled, or transported on the occasion of the events of May and June, 1848; of June, 1849; or December, 1851, and whom "grave facts should again mark as dangerous to the public safety."

This was to deliver a multitude of citizens to the most lawlessly arbitrary treatment; the wide field covered by the categories and the vagueness of the definitions made anything possible. A man might be deported for having a musket in his possession!

The government was perfectly aware that the republican party had nothing to do with the isolated crime of Orsini; but this calumny had seemed necessary to serve as a motive for what was to follow. Émile Ollivier made his début as a political orator in contesting this bill. A few conservatives joined him, alarmed to see that a return to the 2nd of December was being made in a time of complete public tranquillity. Many deputies voted with reluctance and with a sense of shame; there were 227 voices for the law: twenty-four had the courage to vote against it. When the law was brought before the senate, whose mission it was to examine whether the laws adopted by the legislative body were conformable to the constitution, there was but a single vote against this so-called "Law of Suspects"; it was that of General MacMahon. History should give him credit for it.

The law was monstrous, its execution was worse. The new terror of 1858 did not echo so far as that of the 2nd of December; as no one resisted or could resist there were no fusillades, no massacres; but the absence of all struggle and of all peril to the persecutors rendered the persecution so much the more revolting. This time it was no longer, as on the 2nd of December, triumphant conspirators striking in fury at fallen adversaries to prevent them from rising; it was an absolute power which, in order to produce an effect of intimidation and to discourage a few attempts at legal opposition, proscribed in cold blood hundreds of victims, not for their acts but for their opinions. Even before the law had been presented to the legislative body, citizens had been carried into exile.

Immediately after the despatch of his circular the new minister of the interior "and of the general safety," as he styled himself, had sent for all the prefects to Paris. He received each by himself. He had in his hand a list in which the departments were inscribed with figures opposite their names. "You are prefect of such a department," he said: "so many arrests." "But who is to be arrested?" questioned the prefect. "Whoever you like! I have given you the number; the rest is your affair."

That so many high functionaries should have consented to make themselves the executors of such instructions is perhaps the most shameful fact in eighty years of revolutions. Besides some political adversaries who were still capable of and disposed to action, the government caused to be torn from their families and their professions a host of republicans who, while retaining their own opinions, sought only to court oblivion and had taken refuge in their work and in silence. When one was not to be found another was taken at haphazard: Espinasse and his delegates had to make up their number. A

[1858-1859 A.D.]

special attack was directed against a select number of active bourgeoisie: merchants, lawyers, doctors, notaries were mingled with honest and industrious working men; the old, the sick, mothers of families, were dragged to prison and thence to exile. The agents forced their way into houses, like nocturnal malefactors, carried off the appointed victims without allowing them time to provide themselves with money and clothing or to bid farewell to their families, and threw them into prison vans which did not stop till they reached the port of embarkation. Of about two thousand persons arrested more than 420 were transported to Africa. Arrived there the exiles received some miserable subsidies, scarcely sufficient to prevent them from dying of hunger until they could procure the means of subsistence; then those who did not find work were left to the care of such of their companions as were a little less unfortunate.

The aim of the new terror was not attained: the government had not succeeded in stifling the opposition, which on the contrary increased in the legislative body—if not in numbers at least in talents; of three seats left empty amongst the deputies of Paris, the Parisian electors filled two with republicans. Jules Favre and Ernest Picard formed, together with Ollivier, Hénon, and Darimon, that celebrated bench of the "Five" which held its own, for several years, against almost the whole assembly.

In this imperialist quasi-unanimity on the part of the legislative body, a considerable number of the members asked no better than to put some reserve into their devotion, and did not regard the course of events as entirely for the best. In the session of 1858 the law of military exemption was brought up. It was proved that this law had only aggravated the burden of the service to the detriment of the population, and the profit of the exchequer, which was in reality the beneficiary of what was called the endowment of the army. The law, instead of being mitigated, was rendered more onerous by the interdiction of substitutions except among relatives. Exemption by state intervention cost double what it had cost before; free substitution was forbidden, and fellow soldiers from the same canton were no longer authorised to change their numbers at the drawing of lots.

As to laws of social interests, the government presented one which contained penalties against the usurpers of titles of nobility. Napoleon III had restored the nobility by a decree which declared it one of the institutions of the state. The parodists of the past were still more ridiculous in 1858 than in 1814, when the ultras at least were the natural heirs of the old régime. Most of those who voted the law were ashamed of it; a small number took these things with a grotesque seriousness.^b

WAR IN ITALY: SOLFERINO (1858-1859)

As Russia was pressing on Turkey, so Austria was pressing on Italy. She had played an equivocal part during the Crimean War, whilst the kingdom of Sardinia, the only independent and constitutional state in Italy, had not feared to join her young army to the Anglo-French troops. This circumstance had made France the natural protectress of Piedmont, and by consequence of Italy, of which this little kingdom was the last citadel. Thus when the emperor of Austria, Francis Joseph, in defiance of European diplomacy, passed the Ticino as the emperor Nicholas had passed the Pruth, France once more found herself face to face with this new aggressor and on the side of the oppressed.

In this war the emperor Napoleon resumed the secular policy of France,

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which consists in not suffering the preponderance of Austria or Germany in Italy—that is to say, on the French southeastern frontier. A French army reappeared on that soil where three centuries before the arms of France had left so many glorious traces. Europe looked on with keen attention; England as a well-wisher, Russia and Prussia amazed. Austria and France were left alone facing each other. The war lasted scarcely two months.

After the brilliant affair of Montebello, which defeated an attempted surprise on the part of the Austrians, the Franco-Piedmontese army concentrated round Alessandria; then by a bold and skilful movement turned the right of the Austrians, who had already passed the Ticino, and compelled them to recross that river. Caught between the army corps of General MacMahon and the guard at Magenta, the Austrians lost 7,000 killed or wounded and 8,000 prisoners (June 4th). Two days later the French regiments entered Milan.




AN OFFICER OF INFANTRY

The enemy, astounded at so rude a shock, abandoned his first line of defence, where, however, he had long been accumulating powerful means of action and resistance. He retired on the Adda, after vainly making a momentary stand at the already famous town of Marignano and on the Mincio, behind the illustrious plains of Castiglione and between the two fortresses of Peschiera and Mantua; then he took up his position, backed by the great city of Verona as an impregnable base. The emperor of Austria, with a new general and considerable reinforcements, had arrived there to await the French army.

The Austrians had long studied this battlefield; there were 160 000 of them ranged on the heights with their centre at the village and tower of Solferino, and ready to descend on the French in the plain. Napoleon III had scarcely 140,000 men available, and was obliged to fight on a line extending over five leagues. Whilst the right wing was struggling against the enemy in the plain in order to prevent itself from being turned, and King Victor Emmanuel with

his Piedmontese was bravely resisting on the left, the centre delivered a vigorous attack, and after a heroic struggle successively carried Mount Fenile, the mount of the cypresses, and finally the village of Solferino. The enemy's line was broken; his reserves, before they could come into action, were reached by the balls from the new rifled cannon of the French. All fled in frightful confusion; but a fearful storm, accompanied by hail and torrents of rain, stopped the victors and permitted the Austrians to recross the Mincio; they left twenty-five thousand men put out of action. In the evening the emperor Napoleon took up his headquarters in the very room which Francis Joseph had occupied in the morning (June 24th). Twice a conqueror, the emperor suddenly offered peace to his enemy. Italy was freed, although a portion of Italian territory, namely Venetia, still remained in the hands of Austria.



THE AMBUSCADE OF SOLFERINO (JUNE 24TH, 1859)

(From the painting by Armand-Dumaresq)

[1860 A.D.]

Europe, bewildered by these rapid victories, allowed her awakening jealousy to appear. The emperor thought he had done enough for Italy by pushing Austria, so recently established on the banks of the Ticino, back behind the Mincio, and at Villafranca he signed with Francis Joseph a peace, the principal conditions of which were confirmed at the end of the year by the Treaty of Zurich. By this peace Austria resigned Lombardy, which France added to Piedmont that she might make for herself a faithful ally beyond the Alps. The Mincio became the boundary of Austria in the peninsula, where the various states were to form a great confederation under the presidency of the pope. But all those concerned rejected this plan, and the revolutionary movement continued. The emperor confined himself to preventing Austria from intervening. Then those governments of Parma, Modena, the Roman legations, Tuscany and Naples, which ever since 1814 had been merely lieutenants of Austria, were seen to fall to pieces successively, and Italy, minus Venice and Rome, was about to form a single kingdom, when the emperor thought himself called upon to take a precaution necessary to the security of France; he claimed the price of the assistance he had given and by the Treaty of Turin, March 24th, 1860, obtained the cession to himself of Savoy and the county of Nice (Nizza), which added three departments to France and carried her southern frontier to the summit of the Alps.

For the first time since 1815 France, not by force and surprise but as the result of a great service rendered to a friendly nation, by pacific agreement, and according to the solemn vote of the inhabitants, had overstepped the limits traced round her at the period of her reverses. Europe dared not protest.

EXPEDITIONS AND WARS IN SYRIA, CHINA, COCHIN CHINA, AND MEXICO

Europe can no longer isolate herself from the other continents; with the progress of civilisation, commerce, and the general relations of the peoples, it is the duty of France, the second of the maritime nations, to carry her eyes or her hand beyond the seas wherever her honour or her interests may be engaged. It is the first time that, with or without the support of England and often under her jealous surveillance, she has done so with so much independence and firmness.

In 1860 the massacre of the Christian Maronites by the Druses of Syria demonstrated anew the Ottoman Empire's powerlessness to protect its subjects, and excited the interested complaints of Russia. France, which was the first to move, had the honour of being charged by the great powers to send and maintain a body of troops in Syria to aid the Turkish government in punishing the guilty parties. The following year a diplomatic conference, assembled at Constantinople, regulated the government of Lebanon in such a manner as to avoid the return of these deplorable catastrophes. This apparition of the French flag in the East was not without utility in the pursuit of a great enterprise begun by M. de Lesseps under the auspices of the French government, namely the establishment at the isthmus of Suez of a canal which was to join the Mediterranean with the Red Sea, and put Europe in direct communication with the Far East.

The same year, at the other extremity of Asia, France and England had been obliged to direct an expedition against China, who had violated the conditions of a treaty previously made with her. In less than six months the allied fleets had transported fifteen thousand men and the whole of an immense equipment a distance of six thousand leagues from the French

coast, to the shores of the Peiho. The emperor of China sent seventy thousand men to meet those whom he called barbarians. This army and the forts accumulated on the road to Peking did not stand before the small European force commanded by General Cousin-Montauban. The mouths of the river were forced, and the forts which defended them carried by an energetic and brilliant attack, after which the allies marched resolutely on Peking. The Chinese court tried to deceive them by feigned negotiations, to which some of the envoys fell victims, and to surprise the troops which won the battle of Palikao. The city of Peking, being laid open to attack, was bombarded; the summer palace had already been taken and given up to pillage. Prince Kong, the emperor's brother, made up his mind to treat seriously (October 25th, 1860). The allied armies entered Peking to receive the ratifications of the treaty, in virtue of which the Chinese government pledged itself to admit English and French ambassadors to the capital, paid an indemnity of 120,000,000 francs, opened the port of Tientsin, guaranteed advantageous commercial conditions to the conquerors, and restored to France the churches and cemeteries belonging to the Christians. The Celestial Empire was opened and, by way of consequence, the empire of Japan also, which, having in 1853 made treaties of commerce with the principal European states, was disposed by dread of a similar lesson to observe them better.

The French government took advantage of its strength in these regions to complete the expedition against the empire of Annam in Cochin China, an expedition begun two years before in concert with the Spaniards. It was impossible to obtain from this government security for French missionary and commercial relations. France had resolved to form a settlement at the mouths of the great river Mekong, and had taken possession of Saigon in order to make it the capital. But the French lived there in continual disquiet. Vice-Admiral Charner, who had returned from China with his troops, defeated the Annamites in the plains of Ki-Hoa and seized Mytho. Admiral Bonnard in his turn took Bien-Hoa and imposed on the emperor Tu-Duc a peace signed in 1863 which stipulated respect for missionaries, an advantageous treaty of commerce, and the possession of three provinces at the mouths of the Mekong, in a wonderfully fertile country between India and China, and within reach of the Philippines and the Moluccas. "The settlement of Saigon," an English traveller had said not long before, "might change the direction of trade and become the nucleus of an empire which perhaps might one day equal that of India."

Thus France, which it had become too much the custom to regard as an especially continental power, was carrying her activity to all the shores of the ocean. She was at the same time called to another end of the world. France, England, and Spain had long had injuries to avenge and claims to vindicate against the anarchical government of Mexico. At the beginning of the year 1862 the three powers came to an understanding to act in common, as the French had done in China with the English, in Cochin China with the Spaniards. The expedition was already on the way to be carried into effect when the cabinets of London and Madrid, in consequence of misunderstandings, renounced the enterprise. France, left alone, persisted in avenging the common injuries. A check having called in question the honour of the flag, the mistake was committed of declaring that France would not treat with the president Juarez; so that the French were condemned either to import a foreign government into the country or to conquer its immense solitudes. Instead of the six thousand men who had first started, it was necessary to send as many as thirty-five thousand soldiers. Puebla made a heroic re-

[1863-1867 A.D.]

sistance; but the keys of Mexico were there and the army took them (May 18th, 1863). A few days later (June 10th) it entered Mexico, and the population, prompted by France, proclaimed as emperor an Austrian prince, the archduke Maximilian. After the departure of the French troops in 1867 [owing to the forcible protest of the United States¹] the unfortunate prince was taken and shot by the republicans after the mockery of a trial. This imprudent and ill-conceived expedition was a grave check to French politics and finance.^d

THE RISE OF PRUSSIA

The Crimean and the Italian wars having been carried out to a triumphant issue, the French had come to regard themselves as the foremost nation in Europe. But from the middle of the '60's Napoleon's fortune had begun to turn. During the American Civil War he had embarked, as we have seen, on the adventurous undertaking in Mexico, where he attempted to establish an empire, dependent upon himself, under Maximilian, the unfortunate brother of Emperor Francis Joseph; but after wasting immense sums of money and thousands of human lives, he was compelled to evacuate that country, and the bloody ghost of Maximilian, who was deserted by Napoleon's army and executed by the republicans, stood forth as the accuser of his guilty ambition.

In France itself the voice of the republicans rose ever higher against Bonaparte, while the victories of the Prussians over the Austrians [at Sadowa or Königgrätz, July 3rd, 1866, and elsewhere], as unexpected as they were overwhelming, weakened his position in Europe. Napoleon had hoped that Prussia would be defeated, or that a civil war of long duration would be started in Germany; in either case he had hoped to intervene as a peacemaker, taking as the reward of his labours certain Rhenish and Belgian districts, and being enabled, in addition, to play the rôle of protector over Germany and arbiter of the destinies of Europe. But it was fated otherwise; Prussia acquired a military reputation almost rivalling that of the first Napoleon, and Germany stood forth, not weak and disrupted, but more firmly united and stronger than ever before. And though Napoleon himself was far too prudent to venture on a military demonstration against the successes of Prussia, yet the French nation, and especially the French army, could not tolerate that another people should excel it in the honours of war, while statesmen of the type of Thiers upbraided Napoleon for permitting the union of North Germany. "Revenge for Sadowa!" became the general cry. The French government made demands for "compensation" to France in the shape of cessions of German frontier territory, but these were rejected by Prussia. Under these circumstances the latter country had to be prepared every moment for an attack.^e

NAPOLEON AT HIS APOGEE

Fyfe² notes that Napoleon had achieved, during the first decade of his reign, a measure of military success that established his position in a most flattering light before the world. The commercial relations and general economic conditions of France had steadily improved; and Paris had been fairly regenerated as to its exterior appearance, contrasting most favourably

¹ For fuller accounts of this affair, see in later volumes the histories of the United States and Mexico.]

with the other capitals of Europe. In a word, Napoleon had followed what seemed a highly successful career. "He had done some great things," says Fyffe, "and he had conspicuously failed in nothing. Had his reign ended before 1863, he would probably have left behind him in popular memory the name of a great ruler."

A CONTEMPORARY VIEW

This view of Fyffe's is paralleled by the estimates printed in the London *Times* of January 10, 1873, on the occasion of the emperor's death. "Had Napoleon succumbed some years ago to the first attacks of the disease he died of," says the *Times* article, "he would have found eulogists enough to justify his policy by its brilliant success; and to deny that the imperial system carried the inevitable seeds of dissolution. Had it collapsed after his decease they might have urged that the collapse was but a proof the more of his unrivalled genius—that such a man could leave no successor to develop the ideas he had originated. As it is, it can hardly be doubted that his contemporaries will do him injustice, and that his memoir will be, in a measure, rehabilitated by posterity. The third Napoleon was called upon to exercise, by mere moral ascendancy, that sway over the European councils which the first failed to establish by might of arms; and for many years there is no doubt he acquitted himself of the task with unparalleled success. But he pressed that success beyond its due limits; he fretted himself about congresses and conferences, the only object or result of which was to be the enhancement of his own importance. There is no doubt that he suffered from the notion that it was at all times necessary to be busy, and so to say, to amuse the French people, to gain too strong a hold upon his fancy. The scheme of diverting public attention from domestic affairs by distant expeditions to China, Japan, Syria, and, finally, to Mexico, had, little to recommend it on the score of originality. Most of the emperor's quixotic undertakings beyond sea proved, as was to be expected, barren of result, but one, as might have been feared, turned out fatal. The project of a Mexican empire, the scheme of the exaltation of the Latin races on the American continent, would have been sheer failures even if the emperor's belief that the breach in the United States was incurable had been correct." ^a

FRENCH AND PRUSSIAN DISPUTE OVER LUXEMBURG

Luxemburg was a small province the western portion of which had belonged to Belgium since the revolution of 1830, whilst the eastern portion formed a grand duchy belonging to the king of Holland. Napoleon III wished to buy the grand duchy, which had no natural tie with Holland and was of a certain importance to France on account of the town of Luxemburg, which had been strongly fortified by Vauban; this fortress would have protected a part of the French frontier. The grand duchy had been annexed to the German confederation by the treaties of 1815, and was garrisoned by Prussia in the name of the confederation. Prussia, having violated the treaties and split up the confederation in her war with Austria, had no longer any right to occupy Luxemburg. There had seemed no doubt

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before the war as to the handing over to France of this stronghold; the fortress had already been evacuated by the Prussians. Neither after the war had Bismarck changed his tone in the matter. After having evaded the signing of the treaty about Belgium, he had promised to oppose the inclusion of Luxemburg in the northern confederation; he had advised the French government to treat with the king of Holland without including Prussia, and to excite in the grand duchy manifestations which might be taken as indicating the people's desire to become French. He also recommended them to put the matter through before the parliament of the new confederation met. It is possible that on this occasion he may have been sincere.

The government did not even understand how to profit by this advice and act quickly. Bismarck's advice was given at the beginning of September; it was not until the early days of February, 1867, that Napoleon's government sounded the Dutch government as to a contingent cession of the grand duchy. They demanded from the king, William III, a total abandonment of his sovereign rights, in consideration of a sum of several millions; then a vote was taken among the populations. The propaganda of the French agents was very well received in Luxemburg; the inhabitants, albeit the majority were German-speaking, inclining to France rather than to Germany. The idea of a double treaty was advanced as a start. The one would guarantee to Holland Limburg, which, like Luxemburg, had been united to the German confederation, and which Holland dreaded to have claimed by Germany; a defensive alliance with France would thus be assured to Holland. The other treaty would cede Luxemburg to the French.

Had there not followed so much delay the French would have been taken at their word. But there was general hesitation. The royal family was divided as to the policy of an alliance. Doubts were entertained as to the emperor's health and the future of his dynasty. Then, too, great uneasiness was felt at the seemingly equivocal attitude of Prussia, who continually increased the strength of her armaments. Bismarck at Berlin, and Goltz, the ambassador at Paris, reiterated their advice for prompt and direct treating between France and Holland. It is true that Bismarck did not bind himself by any direct promise, and his king still less; however, the king of Prussia had the appearance of also allowing France to make her own arrangements with the king of Holland. But the attitude of the press, the army, and the Prussian diplomats, beyond the Rhine, became more and more spiteful and provoking towards France at this time.

It was while all this was going on that the stormy sittings of the legislative body took place, and the publication of the secret treaties between Prussia and South Germany. This alarmed the king of Holland. He proposed that the question of the ceding of Luxemburg should be submitted to the powers that had signed the treaty of 1839, and had definitely settled the dispute between France and Belgium. Therefore the French government tried to obtain the direct consent of the king of Prussia to the cession, but did not succeed. The Prussian government maintained its attitude of reserve; but the new parliament of northern Germany, that is to say the Prussian majority which dominated it, did not show the same reserve. This majority showed itself most violent and arrogant towards the representatives of Frankfort and the other annexed countries, for the strongest reasons very hostile to France. Imperative questions had been framed as to whether Luxemburg and Limburg were to remain united to Germany.

The king of Holland, on his side, put the question to the king of Prussia. To him, as to France, an equivocal answer was given. However, the reply

was interpreted in the sense that haste must be made to bring the matter to a conclusion. Finally the king of Holland acceded to the proposals made by France and signified the same to the emperor by his son, the prince of Orange, on the 30th of March. The two acts of guarantee and of cession were on the point of being signed, when the Dutch minister, Van Zuylen, detected an irregularity and demanded that the signature should be postponed till the morrow.

In Paris the decisive despatch was awaited in all confidence. In place of the representative of the king of Holland, it was Herr von der Goltz, the Prussian ambassador, who presented himself at the house of the French foreign minister. He had hurried to Moustier to urge him to break off all negotiations, because the transaction, as he pretended to have foreseen, was, he said, presenting the worst possible aspect to Germany. As a fact Goltz had always represented the transaction to Paris as assured, and had not ceased and to the end did not cease to play a double game. In Paris, he was the friend of France and on an intimate footing at the Tuileries, attentively listened to, and, above all, an attentive listener, surprising the badly kept secrets of the court; in his correspondence with Berlin, he was the enemy of France and in connivance with the war party.

Indignant and astonished, Moustier replied that he came too late, that the French had been decoyed into a trap, but that they would not draw back. There is every evidence that the "irregularity" which had delayed the signing of the double treaty was not an accidental one, and that Prussia had checked the king of Holland by promising on behalf of Germany to renounce all claims over Limburg on condition of Luxemburg not being ceded to France.

During this time Bismarck was addressing recriminations to the French ambassador, Benedetti, in which, according to his usual practice, he inverted their respective rôles. It is easy to perceive that if the negotiations had been more rapidly opened and concluded he would have claimed his share of credit in them. But he was now pressed between the equally warlike Prussian military party on the one side and the parliament of the northern confederation on the other, and, knowing that Germany was ready and that France was not, he asked nothing better than to involve France in a quarrel.

On the 1st of April, Bennigsen, leader of the national liberal party, which had become the devoted instrument of Bismarck, revived the questions addressed to this minister on the subject of Luxemburg, and demanded war in preference to allowing "a prince of a German race (the king of Holland) to traffic in a country of German origin and sympathies." These pretended German sympathies were not at the moment manifesting themselves in Luxemburg, except by popular demonstrations in favour of union with France—demonstrations which the Prussian governor of the fortress lamented bitterly.

Bismarck's reply to Bennigsen was measured as to its form: he would not for the world have the air of provoking the French government; but, as a fact, he sheltered himself behind public opinion and the parliament, which was the mouthpiece of that opinion. The sense of his reply was, indeed, that Luxemburg ought not to be given either to the northern confederation or to France, but not, however, that it should be evacuated by Prussia. Without explicitly saying so, he was awaiting an opportunity to claim for Prussia a pretended right of garrison which he intended to extract from the convention of the Great Powers in 1839. He began again to protest his good intentions to Napoleon III; but at the same time that the minister at the Hague insisted on the signing of the treaty, and that the king of Holland seemed on

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the point of acquiescing, the Prussian minister at the Hague received orders to announce to the Dutch government that the Prussian government would be driven by public opinion to consider the ceding of Luxemburg as a declaration of war.

The Prussian troops were already massing themselves on the Dutch frontier, with the evident intention of ignoring the Belgian neutrality. Holland thereupon drew back, and did not sign the treaties. It was a humiliating check for Napoleon III, crowning the series of diplomatic defeats which began on the morrow of Sadowa.

The minister for foreign affairs did not sit still under the blow. Moustier was a judicious and skilful diplomatist who merited association with a different government. He made great efforts to palliate this reverse and to help France to make a dignified exit from the position into which she had been beguiled. Moustier knew that she was not in a position to have recourse to arms; though the war minister, Marshal Niel, in public uttered the contrary opinion, in the cabinet he was the first actively to discountenance the taking of the offensive.

Since Sadowa Prussia had completely re-organised her forces, and now, with her northern confederation, could command close upon nine hundred thousand men; and this irrespective of the engagements towards her undertaken by the southern states. The French had not half this number at their disposal. Their forts were in the worst possible state; their magazines empty. A circular of Bismarck's, derogatory to all the diplomatic proprieties, dragged the emperor personally into the matter. He pretended that the emperor had been forced into war in spite of himself, and represented Prussia as all for peace and France as only thirsting for war. Napoleon III, who had not moved when he might and should have moved, had been on the point of hurling himself into action when it was too late; but Moustier and Niel succeeded in preventing him from yielding to the calculated provocations of Berlin. Moustier employed a most ingenious ruse. He maintained the validity of the king of Holland's pledges, but left the question of the cession of Luxemburg in suspense, and referred to the powers which had signed the treaty of 1839 the question of Prussia's pretended right to garrison.

On April 26th Bismarck resigned himself to giving the consent demanded from him by the Russian ambassador to open negotiations in London, having the neutrality of Luxemburg as their object. Neutrality, guaranteed by the European powers, implied evacuation. This made the Prussian press shout more loudly for war. Not only Alsace and Lorraine, but Holland also, were now coveted. Bismarck, accused by the war party of moderation, sometimes flung away, sometimes clung to his daily papers. He delayed by several days the opening of the negotiations, through his claims and acquirements as to the formalities of the conference and the securities resulting from it. Russia intervened in this matter between Prussia and England, and the conference at last took place in London on May 7th. While the negotiations were in progress Bismarck made fresh efforts to goad France into some impudent action by his aggravating conduct.

The French minister did not however fall into the trap, and the treaty for the neutralisation of Luxemburg was signed on the 16th of May. Bismarck executed a brusque about-face. The Prussian official organs had orders to alter their tone. Napoleon, whom the evening before they had insulted, they now covered with flowers, and they announced the impending visit of King William to the Universal Exhibition. On the 14th of May, 1867, Moustier communicated the treaty to the chambers. The neutralised grand

duchy of Luxemburg remained under the sovereignty of Holland. The Prussian government pledged itself to evacuate the fortress, and the king grand duke was to see that it was dismantled. The Prussians did effect a military but not a commercial evacuation of Luxemburg. The ties between the grand duchy and the German *Zollverein* were not severed.^b

NEW FRICTION WITH PRUSSIA

By the superiority of its army Prussia had attained the preponderance in Europe and was preparing the complete unity of Germany. The other great powers were not resigned to these two revolutions, which were a menace to the old European balance of power. But Austria was discouraged, England powerless, the czar pacific. France alone believed herself strong enough to stop Prussia and re-establish her own preponderance. Opinion had become bluntly hostile to German unity. In Prussia the national pride, exalted by success, manifested itself in threats against the "hereditary enemy." But on both sides these belligerent sentiments were counterbalanced by the fear of a war which all could foresee would be terrible.

Secret negotiations were carried on, the extent of which had been variously estimated, but which did not accomplish any practical result. The occasion was the affair of the Belgian railways which had been purchased by the French eastern company. The Belgian government interdicted the sale (February, 1869); the French government attributed this check to Bismarck. Napoleon, in irritation, proposed to Austria and Italy a triple alliance to stop the encroachments of Prussia and restore to Austria her position in Germany (March). The negotiation was conducted between the ambassadors. Austria accepted a defensive alliance, but reserved the right to remain neutral if France should be obliged to begin war (April). The Italians demanded the withdrawal of the French troops from Rome; they were satisfied with Napoleon's promise to withdraw them as soon as possible, but when it came to the ratification of the project, the Italian ministry demanded evacuation and a declaration that France recognised the principle of non-intervention. Negotiations were suspended, the three sovereigns merely promising to conclude no alliance without previous notice. Then Napoleon accepted a parliamentary ministry whose head, Ollivier, had declared in favour of peace and conciliation with Germany. This ministry took up again (January, 1870) the project of giving security to Europe by bringing about the disarmament of both France and Prussia; England agreed to transmit the proposal. France offered to diminish her military contingent by ten thousand men. Bismarck refused on the ground that the reorganisation of Prussia made any disarmament impossible.ⁿ

THE MINISTRY OF OLLIVIER

When Émile Ollivier rose to power, he brought with him men who had long been considered members of the opposition; the best known of these was Buffet. The party which had formed the imperial government was set aside. Everything seemed changed. The so-called liberal royalists, the Orleanists, rose in a body. All the staff of 1830 reappeared in the official salons. An attempt was going to be made to carry on the government of the 2nd of December by the methods of Louis Philippe.

Suddenly a sinister piece of news was announced. Pierre Boraparte, a cousin of the emperor, living at Auteuil, had challenged Henri Rochefort

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to fight a duel. The journalist-deputy had sent him his seconds, Ulrich de Fonvielle and Victor Noir; the latter, who was quite young, was a rising and very popular journalist. The two seconds went to the prince's house at Auteuil. Suddenly shots were heard, Ulrich de Fonvielle rushed out of the house, and the corpse of Victor Noir bathed in blood was seen lying before the door. Pierre Bonaparte had fired on the seconds sent by Rochefort. The public indignation was extreme. The funeral took place on the twelfth. Beneath a sullen grey sky a sombre crowd of two hundred thousand persons passed along the streets of Neuilly, following the corpse to the cemetery, and returned to Paris in a long procession through the Champs Élysées, singing the Marseillaise and led by Rochefort. The government had called out the troops, and a trifle would have sufficed to turn that day into one of revolution or of a terrible massacre. When the crowd reached the place de la Concorde, where the police were drawn up, it dispersed on the advice of those who had most influence over it.

Soon afterwards, Pierre Bonaparte, who was tried by a special court (the high court of Four), was acquitted. The death of Victor Noir and the acquittal of Prince Pierre formed an inauspicious opening for the liberal empire. However, the decree was being prepared which was to make known what reforms had been made in the constitution in the interests of liberty. These reforms went no further than giving the senate and the legislative body the right of taking the initiative in matters of legislation; fixing the categories whence the emperor might draw the new senators; regulating the order of succession to the throne; and deciding that any change in the constitution should be made by a plebiscite. To begin with, the decree itself was to be submitted to the vote of a plebiscite on universal suffrage.

The nature of these reforms alienated from the liberal empire some of those who were inclined to support it, and led to the resignation of two ministers, of whom one was Buffet. Nothing seemed to them more opposed to liberty than the imperial plebiscites; that is, the popular vote on a question proposed by the emperor. The people could only say yes or no, and no meant a revolution. It was equivalent to putting the government into the hands of one man. So nothing was really changed and the government was still a personal government. After heated debates, in the course of which Gambetta delivered what was perhaps his most eloquent speech, the plebiscite was proceeded with. The empire, so to speak, put itself to the vote. There were 7,500,000 affirmative against 1,500,000 negative votes. The public considered that the empire was firmly established, and it was destined to fall in two months and four days! The government had perhaps a clearer insight. To ask of the peace-loving people who compose the mass of the country, "Yes or No, do you wish to overthrow me?" is a sure way of gaining the votes of many people, whose support in time of peril would be more than doubtful. Only determined and invincible enemies will vote against you. In fact, a



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million and a half contrary votes out of a total of 9,000,000 was a large percentage. It is said that the emperor was very anxious about the votes of the army, which had included a great many noes.

CAUSE OF THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR

The plebiscite had the most unexpected results — the imperial government determined to seek in victory the power it had lost. The idea was to render the dynasty strong enough to ensure to the son the inheritance of his father's empire. "This is my war," said the empress. So the conflict between France and Prussia, which had been threatening Europe for four years, broke out. The immediate cause was as follows: There had been a revolution in Spain, and Queen Isabella had been expelled. General Prim, however, had no intention of establishing a republic, and soon it became known that the crown had been offered to a Hohenzollern, a prince of the Prussian royal family. This would be a most unacceptable addition to the power of Prussia. France protested.¹ Prussia gave way and the prince renounced the crown, or rather his father renounced it for him.


The whole affair seemed ended when suddenly a rumour was spread that the king of Prussia had grossly insulted the French ambassador, Benedetti. The king had refused to receive him. This was stated on the authority of a German paper.² Benedetti had been sent to wring from the Prussian king, at Ems, not only a promise that the prince should not take the Spanish crown, but also a positive order forbidding him to do so. This was too humiliating to endure, and the king refused. Benedetti was then sent to demand a personal letter of good will to France. William, angered, refused to receive him at all. An oral tradition states that the king's language was such, according to Seignobos,³ that no one would even dare to publish it.⁴

The French ministers, Émile Ollivier and Gramont, declared in the chamber that war was necessary. Thiers and the republicans strongly protested. In the midst of the tumult they repeated that France should have satisfaction, and demanded the telegram⁵ in which her ambassador stated that he had been insulted. The majority overwhelmed them with abuse, especially Thiers, who persisted energetically in his protests. They called him "émigré!" and "traitor!" amid scenes of incredible violence and disorder. Commissioners were appointed who alone were to ask and hear the necessary explanations. They returned, asserting that they had seen evidence that war was inevitable and declaring that the army was in a good state. It was proved later that they had seen nothing at all. Marshal Leboeuf, when asked, "Is the army ready?" replied: "There is not so much as the button of a gaiter wanting." The war was voted.

Bismarck had led France to the point he wished. Thoroughly acquainted with the wretched state of her army, and knowing what passions and what interests at the Tuileries would be sure to urge on a war, he had been sufficiently artful to persuade the king of Prussia to yield to her on one point after another, so as to incite her government to declare war, after having, in the eyes of Europe, deprived her of all reasonable pretexts for such a course.⁶

¹ It was said that France could not tolerate the revival of the empire of Charles V. The Germans protested that the sovereignty was a private family affair of the Hohenzollerns.

² It is now definitely known that Bismarck himself had this telegram sent, and suppressed certain modifying words purely for the purpose of goading France to make the first declaration of war.]



GRAVELOTTE (ST. PRIVAT, OR REZONVILLE, AUGUST 16TH, 1870)

(From the painting by Aimé Morot, in the Luxembourg)