CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO

THE CHINESE REVOLUTION OF 1926–1927 (January, 1928)

For more than five hundred years the Swedish people strove against foreign invasion under conditions which strikingly recall the present struggle of the Chinese to get rid of the foreigners.

In the first Swedish town community, Birka, there was such a foreign infusion that a talented observer gave his impression of Birka as not a Swedish city but a Frisian "concession", to use the modern terminology. Demonstrably the influence of foreigners in Birka was very important, and the "men from outside" — to give a verbal translation of the Chinese word for foreigner — were here in the north, as now in China, bearers of the knowledge and spiritual impulse of the new age. The coining of the first Swedish money in feeble imitation of foreign patterns and the sending of missionaries to the heathen Swedes give two striking parallels to present-day China, with its multifarious foreign and Sino-foreign banks and its thick net of foreign missionaries.

If we turn to the ancient Swedish town of Sigtuna, which carried on the heritage of Birka, we find even more striking evidence of the foreigners. The numerous churches of gray stone we must partly interpret as signs that there existed here a community of faith among various nationalities living side by side, just as now in Peking and Shanghai, and the

distinctive character in these churches of combined house of God and fortress leads one's thought to the Peitang cathedral in Peking, which in 1900 successfully withstood the attack of the Boxers. A runic stone which stands in the churchyard of Sigtuna tells of the "Frisian feast-brothers"; it is thus a sign of administrative adjustment which leads one to think of the concessions at Tientsin, Hankow, and other Chinese "treaty ports."

If it is true that the walls of Visby were built, at least in part, to protect the foreign colonists against the peasant population of Gothland, we have there a sort of military-topographical parallel with the wall, moat and glacis surrounding the Legation Quarter in Peking. In Visby, too, the numerous ruins of churches tell of the various groups of religions that were compressed within the area of the city.

According to the law of Magnus Eriksson half the burgomasters and aldermen of the city were to consist of Germans, a condition which may be compared with the question of proportion between foreigners and Chinese in the municipal council of Shanghai.

Under Albrekt of Mecklenburg the land was ravaged not only by the Germans but also by the Swedish chieftains in their lust for power and plunder. Such a lord as Bo Jonsson Grip may well be likened to the worst dictator of the past decade in Chinese history. The worst Swedish expression of this time, "The law now lies on the point of the spear", can now be translated for modern China, "Justice is now

administered by soldiers' bayonets." The Red Spear Society, the peasant levies in Honan who kill soldiers wherever they find them, irrespective of whom the soldiers serve, had also its counterpart in medieval Sweden.

As robbery by land and water and continual treachery in the rapidly changing combinations of military leaders form a part of China's present afflictions, we find the same shadows over our mediaeval history. Sven Lagerbing's description of Karl Knutson's time might appropriately be set over the military dictator period of Chinese history, 1916–1925 "Treachery, villainy, faithlessness — without the slightest love of native land — under the mask of devotion, made the country a horrible den of wild beasts, where virtue and honor were sometimes words without meaning."

Gustaf Vasa became so dependent on the mighty Hanseatic League that he was compelled to give it the privilege of bringing its products into Sweden duty free. We may compare here the control over the Chinese customs which the foreign powers obtained after the subjection of the Boxers, an influence which is now about to fall to pieces.

Finally, after five hundred years of wrangling between the Swedes and the foreigners, Gustaf Vasa's victory over the League in 1536 brought about the decisive success of Swedish nationalism.

Even if the parallels just noted are only the random fingerings of a man without historical training on a fascinating theme, and if Chiang Kai Shih, the young Kuomintang general, never becomes a realm-builder

of Gustaf Vasa's proportions, these comparisons may at least warn us to judge cautiously and moderately what is now going on in China.

Two combined circumstances seem to have caused the political party of Sun Yat Sen, the Kuomintang faction—which earlier played a rather subordinate rôle confined to southern China—to rise in the year 1926 to be one of the leading factors in the civil war.

The first of these circumstances seems to have been that the Moscow Government, which previously had sent all its aid to the Red cause in China through Feng Yü Hsiang, "the Christian general", decided that this mighty but fanatical and unreliable general did not show the signs of being China's strong man which they had previously counted on.

Toward the end of 1925 there was indeed a time when Feng and his allies nearly became masters of Northern China. General Kuo Sung Lin, an ambitious major general under Chang Tso Lin, had made a secret agreement with Feng and in the autumn of 1925 raised the flag of rebellion against his leader at the same time that Feng advanced to the assault of Tientsin. This city was taken only after a skillful defence which caused Feng immense losses. But Kuo's dramatic march to Mukden lost its strength before it reached the Manchurian capital, and the young rebel and his wife, who had taken an active interest in preparing the coup, paid for the failure with their lives.

In the spring of 1926 Feng was again on the

defensive. During the summer the armies of Chang Tso-Lin drove him out of Nankou Pass north of Peking and forced him to make a general retreat toward the interior of northern China, the provinces of Shensi and Kansu.

Feng himself made a trip to Moscow, a visit which began with great ceremony but ended feebly. On his return he was less Christian and more anti-foreigner than before, but otherwise there was little advance. On the contrary it appears the lords in Moscow concluded that Feng could at best only fill the rôle of a secondary threat up in northwestern China, whereas the Kuomintang at Canton offered better prospects for a victorious fulfillment of the Red cause.

We must, however, be careful not to lay too much weight on whatever help the Soviet Government gave directly or indirectly to Canton, chiefly in the form of military and political advisers. A thorough shake-up of the Kuomintang's previously weak military organization was conducted when the leadership came into the hands of Chiang Kai Shih, a young general from the province of Chekiang.

General Chiang's march from Canton down on the south coast of China up to the Wu-Han cities on the Yangtze River was a brilliant exploit with many striking incidents. On the first part of the way Chiang had the support of a railroad, but on the mountain passes into the province of Honan all his equipment had to be carried by coolies. This transportation was organized by the Cantonese in a quite novel way.



GENERAL CHIANG KAI SHIH

The generals of northern China, Wu Pei Fu, Chang Tso Lin, etc., used to commandeer the number of coolies needed for the occasion and make use of them, unpaid and ill fed, till their strength was exhausted. This procedure, together with their violence and plundering, caused the northern armies to be profoundly hated in the provinces through which they passed.

The Cantonese set to work on a quite different plan. The transportation was arranged along a system of stations between which the various groups of coolies moved back and forth, well fed and sometimes regularly paid, so that the war soon became a popular trade wherever the Cantonese armies went.

If the Red Russian political and military advisers to the Kuomintang did any service in arranging the commissariat and directing on the battlefield, their great and decisive contribution is still that they taught the Cantonese their remarkably effective Red propaganda. The provinces and cities which were the goal of the Kuomintang's advance were flooded with Cantonese political agents. Hundreds of propagandists in civil dress went in front of the armies, preaching the doctrines of Sun Yat Sen and promising higher pay to coolies as well as land to the peasants. As a result great sections of Honan, Kiangsi and Chekiang were conquered without a blow. The northern generals opposing the Cantonese were similarly plied, often with such success that, for example, the very important Yangtze cities of Hanyang with a great arsenal - and Kiukiang were captured with only a little shooting for the sake of form.

After the Canton armies invaded Honan during August, 1926, they captured Hanyang on September 6, through betrayal as just described. Two days later the unhappy Wu Pei Fu, involved in a net of treachery and insubordination, was forced to evacuate Hankow. Only Wuchang, on the southern shore of the Yangtze, surrounded by strong old-fashioned city walls, offered a determined resistance and held out for several weeks against the attack of the Cantonese.

Wu Pei Fu was now driven from the Yangtze valley, and Chiang Kai Shih could turn against the military governor of Nanking, Sun Chuan Fang, who more or less fully controlled the provinces of Kiangsu, Kiangsi, Anhui, Chekiang and Fukien. Severe fighting with varied fortunes raged around Nanchang, the capital of Kiangsi, which was taken and retaken several times; but when in the beginning of November Kiukiang on the Yangtze River was taken by the Cantonese without resistance, Kiangsi was lost to Sun.

The military activities of the Cantonese now turned toward the province of Chekiang, which was partly occupied in the course of December, the fighting going on with varied success until the capital, Hangchow, was taken by the southern troops in February, 1927. By the end of March Shanghai and Nanking were occupied, and the whole of southern China up to the Yangtze was under the Kuomintang's control.

All this advance of the Cantonese to the Yangtze was markedly anti-foreign. The political principles

of the Kuomintang with their strong condemnation of the foreign concessions, extra-territorial rights, etc., naturally created from the very start a certain antagonism, especially against England, which was considered the most dangerous representative of foreign "imperialism." The employment of Red Russian advisers by the Kuomintang sharpened this antagonism still more.

There is also along the Yangtze River a particular animosity against foreigners concerning which we must in justice make allowances for the common people. Navigation on the great river was conducted in former days by native vessels, junks and sampans. When then the foreigners came with their great steamships, the entire navigation on the Yangtze was changed. The animosity against these changes is especially strong in the upper bend of the river above Ichang. The foreign steamboats with their great freight capacity took away a great deal of the traffic, and the numerous guild of junk captains rightly felt their existence threatened by the foreign invasion.

What was worse, however, the foreign steamers often ran down and sank Chinese junks, and this happened most often in the section above Ichang, where the current flows violently through narrow ravines, compelling the use of specially constructed steamers with particularly strong engines. It is very possible that the sinking of junks in the rapids could not in certain cases have been avoided without risking the safety of the steamer, but on the other hand

we must understand the widespread indignation at this loss of Chinese life and property.

It was for this reason that the foreign powers, England, Japan and America, patroled the Yangtze with their gunboats constructed especially for these waters. The Chinese are a proud and sensitive people who do not care to see their finest river policed by foreign men-of-war.

I have thus far described only the Chinese side of the Yangtze conflict. But the foreigners also have reason for complaint. The river used to be a constant field of operations for bandits, and during the earlier years of the war the contending generals would sometimes endeavor to commandeer foreign vessels to transport their troops and war material.

Add to this that the Yangtze valley, with Shanghai, is the chief industrial district of China and contains great masses of ill-paid laborers, and it will be evident that this river region abounded in dangerous provocations to conflict. As early as the autumn of 1926 the situation became almost untenable for missionaries in southern China, and in many places the foreign personnel went home on furlough.

After the Kuomintang had conquered the Wu and Han cities — Wuchang, Hanyang and Hankow — a movement began which was directed against the foreigners. Strikes were the order of the day. Trades societies were formed which raised the wages and made a great many more or less reasonable demands on the employers. The customs, salt and postal administrations, which the foreigners controlled,

began to grow lax, and there was a bitter propaganda against missions.

On January 4, 1927, in Hankow the mob invaded the British concession. Except for the local volunteers, the British consul general had only a handful of sailors to protect the concession. Because of the bitter experiences of May 30, 1925, at Shanghai every effort was made to avoid the use of firearms. For hours the English soldiers stood drawn up in an attitude of defence while exposed to the raging Chinese mob, which reviled them, threw mud upon them, and endeavored to break through their thin array. The discipline and self-control shown in these critical hours by the English sailors and volunteers were almost unparalleled and constitute a splendid example of the calm, well-balanced English national spirit.

The situation at last became so acute that the local English authorities gave orders to take the women and children to the English ships which lay in the river, after which the band of defenders retired and the British concession was turned over to the protection of the Cantonese military authorities.

The action of the English consul general in evacuating the concession and giving up its control is much debated. Some critics consider that he might have been able to hold the concession with the small force at his disposal and that the prestige of the white man suffered a fatal loss in this capitulation. Others think that the consul's behavior was a praiseworthy act of moderation and foresight.

The immediate consequence, however, was that similar excesses were begun in other Yangtze ports, notably in Kiukiang, where there was serious destruction to foreign property. In England the Hankow affair aroused strong popular feeling for the defence of English interests in China, and under the pressure of this opinion the government, which had hitherto carried on a very passive Chinese policy, decided to send a division of English troops to Shanghai to protect this, the largest of the foreign colonies in China. This was undoubtedly an act of keen foresight. During the critical months of the spring this growing body of English troops at Shanghai was the only fixed point in China. There is hardly any doubt that its presence saved the foreigners as well as China from the most serious complications in the great manufacturing city, where a hasty evacuation would have been simply impossible. So far as I know, the English defensive force has behaved with the greatest consideration, and the more moderate Chinese are said to admit that it was lucky for all parties that there were foreign warships and troops enough to protect the foreign settlement against all eventuali-Other powers — the United States, Japan, France, etc. - followed England's example, so that during the spring there were concentrated at Shanghai military forces of considerable strength and an international battle fleet of very imposing dimensions.

It was on March 24, when the Kuomintang troops — in this case mostly men from Honan, the province most strongly hostile to foreigners — occupied Nan-

·king, that the most serious aggression was made against the foreigners. Many of the foreign consulates were plundered, and in especial the Japanese consul, who was ill at the time, was handled most ruthlessly. The missions and private houses of foreigners were looted and at first it was feared that the foreign loss of life was very great, but it fortunately turned out that with a few exceptions the one hundred and fifty members of the foreign colony at Nanking escaped with their lives, though only after treatment which, especially in regard to the women, was indescribably brutal.

The reaction in Peking to the proceedings at Nan-king was instantaneous and far-reaching. The Americans ordered the evacuation of all American mission-aries in the parts of southern China occupied by the Kuomintang, American women and children were sent from Peking as quickly as possible, and the possible removal of all American subjects from China was discussed.

However, it gradually became clear that the disturbances at Nanking were not directed exclusively against foreigners but that they were rather an outcrop of the shifting conflict between the parties of the Right and Left in the Kuomintang. Chiang Kai Shih, the commander in chief of the Cantonese forces, a man noted for his moderation, had at the time Nanking was taken been on the Yangtze on his way down from Hankow to Shanghai, and it was supposed that the radical Left group at Hankow, fearing Chiang would come to an understanding with the

foreigners, had decided to strike a blow at Nanking-which would compromise him irretrievably in the opinion of the foreign powers. The violent demonstrations which were first discussed as reprisals for the Nanking affair never came off, since the powers could not unite on what should be done. Thus it gradually became evident that it would be better not to stir too much in these questions, since Chiang was going to call to account those who had presumably been behind the disturbance at Nanking, viz., the communistic Left wing of the Kuomintang party.

The first blow against the communism inspired in China by Russia was struck in Peking on April 6. It had been known for some time at Chang Tso Lin's headquarters that communistic propaganda was being carried on in the parts of the Legation Quarter adjacent to the Russian embassy and under its control. When the Chinese authorities in control at Peking had sounded the position of the diplomatic corps, they made on April 6 a visit of inspection to these homes, including the office of the Russian military attaché.

Malice relates that old Chang Tso Lin, who is known to be poor at keeping secrets, learned only when he was about to go to bed on the evening of the fifth what had been planned by the active heads in his camp. In any case I can testify from my own observation that the investigation was conducted with great speed and tact. By accident I was to go to the Russian consulate on that very morning to have my passport viséd, but found the embassy

closed. The Chinese porter was, however, in good spirits and advised me to go a little farther down the street because "there was something amusing going on with a lot of Chinese police and soldiers." Quite true, it was a remarkable sight to find part of the Legation Quarter occupied by bands of armed Chinese. Automobiles came and went in rapid succession, Chinese policemen led out small groups of pale communists, who were tossed into the automobiles, while other vehicles were being loaded with red flags, pistols and documentary material. Nearly a hundred persons were arrested on this occasion, seventy five of them Chinese and the rest Russians. A number of the Chinese communists were executed by strangling some time later.

The police authorities of Peking announced that Russian documents of great importance were secured in perfectly legible form, despite the attempt to destroy them at the last moment by throwing parassin on them and setting them on fire.

About the same time as the raid in Peking, General Chiang Kai Shih began a movement to expel the communistic radicals from the Kuomintang party.

The raid on the Peking communists gave new prestige to Chang Tso Lin and his party, and at the beginning of May the position of the northern troops in Honan was very favorable. But again the treachery of certain generals seems to have played a decisive part, and at the end of May Chang Tso Lin was forced to abandon his newly won gains in Honan and to withdraw his troops to the north of the

Yellow River. Simultaneously his allies in Anhui had severe reverses, which allowed the southern troops to take possession of the southern part of the Tientsin-Pukow Railroad as far up as Hsuchow.

A couple of weeks later, however, Chang Tso Lin pulled himself together again in that on June 15 he proclaimed himself dictator in Peking. A month later Chiang Kai Shih was forced to retire southward from Hsuchow toward the Yangtze River and on August 13 he laid down his command and betook himself, first to his native province of Chekiang and then to Japan. The cause of Chiang's resignation was the increase of the conflict between the moderate element of the Kuomintang under him on one side and the extremists in Hankow on the other. Two of Chiang's lieutenants, Li Tsungjen and Chen Chien, had also been directly insubordinate toward him.

Chiang's retirement inflicted a great loss of prestige on the Kuomintang cause. The English, who till then had been waiting passively at Shanghai, gave the Kuomintang troops an ultimatum on August 16 on a quite unimportant matter of an aeroplane. The Shanghai-Hangchow Railroad was torn up by the English troops when the English demands were not complied with. A couple of days later, however, a peaceable adjustment was reached through Japanese intervention and the whole matter relapsed into a local and transitory incident.

The northern troops under Sun Chuan Fang followed in the tracks of the retreating Kuomintangists

and crossed the Yangtze River at Pukow with the object of retaking Nanking, but in the last days of August met a very vigorous resistance, which caused Sun to lose twenty thousand men on the southern side of the river.

Yen Hsi Shan, the model governor in Taiyuanfu, who has managed to keep his province comparatively free from fighting through all these years, had been showing increasing sympathy toward the Kuomintangs in 1927. At the end of November he engaged on two fronts - one on the north along the Suiyuan-Peking Railroad, one with a starting point from Shih Chia Chuang, a junction between the Peking-Hankow Line and the side line up to Taiyuanfu - as an offensive against Chang Tso Lin. The attack was skillfully begun and was crowned at the start with considerable success, but the superiority of the Mukden troops in numbers and equipment soon made itself felt and at the end of the year the Shansi forces were driven back from nearly all quarters within the boundaries of their own province. Chang Tso Lin did not, however, win any decisive victory against this new and extremely popular adversary.

The Kuomintang party, whose disintegration had continued in the autumn of 1927, turned again to Chiang Kai Shih as its only possible savior from the chaos into which it had come. In November he returned to Shanghai, the Kuomintang was purged of its communistic elements, and at the beginning of the new year he was again commander in chief at Nanking, at the same time as his troops reoccupied

the southern part of the Pukow-Tientsin Railroad and had reached the border of Shantung.

The situation at the turn of the year, 1927–1928, is therefore that Chang Tso Lin is in Peking as lord of the Manchurian provinces, together with Chihli and Shantung, while the rest of China is occupied by the Kuomintang on behalf of southern China, and by Feng Yü Hsiang, who has Honan, Shensi and Kansu. Yen Hsi Shan still rules over his province of Shansi, Yang Sen and Wu Pei Fu form a more indefinite background toward the west in Szechuan.

Chiang, Feng and Yen are more or less clearly hostile to the Mukden party now reigning at Peking, where, however, a fraction of the younger element is said to be trying to combine with Yen and Chiang, while nearly all avoid Feng, whose unreliability has become proverbial.

The year of 1928 should surely show whether Chang Tso Lin will be able to make his dictatorship effective over the larger part of China, or whether he will be forced back to his stronghold in Manchuria.

If the Kuomintang gets possession of China proper, it will devolve upon that party, which has proclaimed that it stands for progress, to show its ability to rebuild the unhappy country which has been suffering for ten years the desolation of civil war. That this southern Chinese party has a deeper understanding and desire for reform than had the northern generals there can be no doubt.

In the summer of 1927 the foreign powers extended their precautionary measures to northern China,

where they concentrated more than five thousand troops, principally at Tientsin. Besides these the Japanese, despite the protests of China, sent for a time considerable forces to Tsingtao and Tsinanfu to protect the large Japanese population in Shantung.

At the same time with these struggles of the civil war and the protective measures on the part of the foreign powers there has been diplomatic action, in which the foreign nations have lost in all essential matters and the Chinese have won.

In the clearing up of the Shanghai episode of May 30, 1925, the diplomatic corps already showed a modcration which would have been unthinkable some years earlier. The negotiations between the Chinese Government and the foreign powers as to extraterritorial rights was also marked by an increased understanding of the need for abolishing the anomalies in the intercourse between China and the outside world, anomalies which are now without parallel, since the Turks have freed themselves from their "capitulations." On the other side the evidence offered by the powers in the attempted agreement on the question of extra-territorial rights contains many examples of the lawlessness which military force has created in China and which naturally disinclines the powers to give up these rights before the Chinese can guarantee an established system of justice.

Notwithstanding, the Peking Government is beginning to take the development of these matters more and more into its own hands without first asking the consent of the powers.

Just before Christmas last year the English Government tried to come to an agreement with the Chinese in proposing an immediate enforcement of the higher customs rates which, under certain guarantees, had been contemplated at the Washington Conference, and it was intimated in the English memorandum that both extra-territorial rights and the one-sided treaties between China and numerous foreign powers should be revised as soon as possible.

These British proposals were undoubtedly liberal and far-reaching but they seem to have come a few years too late to have a beneficial effect for either side. The comment of the foreign powers and press on these proposals was not wholly laudatory, and the Chinese in Canton as well as in Peking were either opposed or indifferent to the action of England.

At Canton the customs rates had already been raised in agreement with the proposal of the Washington Conference, and the same arrangement was now made at Hankow.

Without asking the consent of the powers, the Peking Government followed the example of the Cantonese, announcing on January 14 that from February 1 the increased customs rates would be put in force and that complete customs autonomy would be established January 1, 1929.

The English-born Chief of Customs, Sir Francis Aglen, an official of unimpeachable character who had rendered China great service in stabilizing the government loan, refused to obey the order of the Peking Government as to enforcing the higher

customs rates without referring the matter to the foreign powers, for which action he was curtly dismissed.

During the late autumn of 1926 there was an exchange of notes between the Peking Government and the Belgian legation as to replacing the current treaty between China and Belgium with another founded on equality. At the start the opinions were sharply opposed and there was a question of taking the dispute before some international tribunal, but on January 17 the negotiations were resumed on the assumption that the new treaty should be based on complete equality. On this occasion Belgium also made a surprisingly liberal gesture when the Belgian minister declared himself ready to restore the Belgian concession at Tientsin. In itself this gesture had little value, since the Belgian concession is a small district inhabited by only two thousand Chinese and not a single foreigner. On the other side it is obvious that Belgium's anticipation of China's wish has the most far-reaching significance as a precedent in the great question of restoring the foreign concessions to China.

The future of the Tientsin concessions was the subject of later consideration, and the attitude of the powers toward China is developing in that Japan has started negotiations with the Peking Government as to revising the treaty between the two nations. Also in November, 1927, the Peking Government terminated the treaty with Spain, which had been valid since 1864.

On the whole it is evident that China's relations with foreign powers is going to be readjusted in a

manner that recalls the events in Turkey some years ago. The nationalistic movement has swept away obstacles that previously seemed almost insurmountable, and the foreign powers meet the new demands with alacrity. This shows they have at last realized that the present disturbances have the character of a pan-Chinese revolution in which the nationalistic cause is advancing victoriously despite civil war and state bankruptcy.

It is as well first as last to see clearly that this is the end of the quarter-century when the foreigners out there lived in the sun. Foreigners in China must now take up their work under less favorable prospects, under the defective shelter of Chinese jurisdiction — which probably will be none too reliable for some time to come — and under the depression which follows a chaotic condition of government finance.

Interesting and difficult problems face the Chinese statesmen and foreign diplomats in arranging the administration over the great foreign centers, Shanghai, Hankow and Tientsin. During the last twelve months the foreign powers have shown such a ready understanding of China's natural aspirations that it is now incumbent on the Chinese leaders to create the needed security for the great foreign business centers which for a long time on will be necessary to China's material progress.

A question of almost unlimited range is the future of the missions. The mission stations are now largely vacant because of the political unrest and the

ill will toward foreigners. This is therefore a time when it may suitably be questioned whether or to what extent mission work should be developed or revised. Many far-sighted missionaries are inclined, as far as it can be done, to leave to the Chinese Christians the task of creating a national Chinese Church, which will then show what it can do in competition with the other religious movements.

If foreign missionaries should work in China in the future, it seems to me inevitable that the Board of Missions should realize how quickly and radically the cultural situation there has changed, so that a high standard of education may be required of those who go out as missionaries. In our time, when crowds of Chinese students stream back to their native land with a thorough knowledge of Europe and America, the simple, true-hearted, but poorly educated missionary is no longer effective. It should be a minimum requirement that a foreign religious teacher should know foreign conditions as well as does the Chinese official of the new type with whom he comes in contact, and besides this, he should have greater knowledge and appreciation of Chinese history and culture.

I therefore propose that the Swedish Mission Board, which has now taken back a large number of its workers, should arrange for courses of training to include in particular the history of culture and religion.

Should it happen that many of the missionaries cannot pass the new examinations and so be unfit to

return to the field in China, it seems to me that there should be fine opportunities for them in the home missions of our own country.

Many foreigners out in China speak with supercilious contempt of Chinese graft and conscienceless greed for money. This is no doubt very bad, especially in these times of unrest. But I have been surprised at the widespread dishonesty even in our well-ordered land. Newspapers are full of embezzlements: bank cashiers, government servants and men in other places of public trust who default with their funds. And now a priest in the national church has shot himself in his own church after making away with all the money in his coffers. Would it not be a sign of Christian humility to deal first with our heathen here in Sweden?