

respective Governments, that the Government of China undertakes not to employ any one, not a Chinese subject and not of Chinese nationality, in any capacity whatsoever in Tibet.

I avail, &c.

ERNEST SATOW.

Enclosure 4 in No. 305.

Sir E. Satow to Mr. Tong Shoa-yi.

Private.

Dear Mr. Tong,

Peking, April 27, 1906.

As regards the undertaking given by the Chinese Government in your Note of to-day not to employ any one not a Chinese subject or of Chinese nationality in any capacity in Tibet, I am authorised to state that no objection will be raised by His Majesty's Government to the employment by China of foreigners for a period of 12 months from to-day, being the date of signature of our Convention, in order to give time for the organisation of the Customs in Tibet. But after April 27th 1907 the undertaking in your Note will of course come into force and be faithfully carried out.

Yours, &c.

ERNEST SATOW.

II.—ANGLO-RUSSIAN NEGOTIATIONS, 1906-1907.

No. 306.

Mr. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.

F.O. 371/176.

(No. 251.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, D. April 10, 1906.

R. April 17, 1906.

I have the honour to transmit herewith translation of a telegram addressed by the Emperor to the Dalai Lama, under the title of "supreme head of the Tibetan people." I may observe that the term used may simply imply that the Lama is the spiritual head of the people as for instance the Grand Rabbi might be described as the "supreme head" of the Jewish community. But I understand from the Chinese Minister that he regards the telegram in rather a serious light and as an infringement of China's sovereignty.

I saw Count Lamsdorff yesterday and in the course of conversation I observed that although I had received no instructions to mention the subject I could not help remarking that the terms of the telegram and the fact of its having been sent and published in the "Official Messenger" might create a disagreeable impression in England. He said at once that he was glad to have an opportunity of talking to me on the subject. When the Emperor had received the Dorjiev mission he had taken care that you should be at once informed as he was afraid that it might be misinterpreted. As I was aware, his object was to pursue a policy of perfect frankness, which, in his judgment, was the best way of avoiding complications. He could assure me that the policy of Russia towards Thibet was one of absolute non-intervention. The Russian Government desired that neither Russia nor England, nor any other Power should interfere in Thibetan affairs, and that Thibet should be tranquil both externally and internally. He understood that this was also the policy of His Majesty's Government. But the Emperor could not be indifferent to the sentiment of the large Buddhist population of the Russian Empire. They looked to the Dalai Lama as their spiritual head and his fate could not be a matter of indifference to them. At the present moment

the Dalai Lama was in Mongolia as a guest of one of the Mongol Princes. He desired to return to Lhasa but he was afraid that if he did so his life would be in danger. He had pressed for a safe conduct which of course it was impossible to give. But in order to encourage him to return it had been thought advisable to send a telegram of a cordial nature which could reassure him and the Buddhist population. The Russian Government desired most sincerely that he should remain quiet when he returned and that he should do nothing to give reasonable cause for anxiety. He begged me to give you this message which I promised to do.

I have, &c.

CECIL SPRING-RICE.

Enclosure in No. 306.

August Telegram from The Emperor to His Holiness the Dalai Lama, the Supreme Head of the Thibetan People.

My numerous subjects, professing the Buddhist faith, won the happiness of saluting their spiritual Chief during his sojourn in the north of Mongolia contiguous to the Russian Empire. Rejoicing that my subjects were able to receive a beneficent, spiritual influence from Your Holiness, I beg you to believe my feeling of sincere gratitude and esteem towards you.

NICHOLAS.

March 23 (5 April), 1906.

No. 307.

Mr. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.

F.O. 371/176.

(No. 252.) Confidential.

Sir,

St. Petersburg, D. April 10, 1906.

R. April 17, 1906.

With reference to my immediately preceding despatch on the subject of the telegram sent by the Emperor to the Dalai Lama,⁽¹⁾ I have the honour to state that Count Witte sent a message to me to the effect that the telegram had no political character and was designed mainly for internal consumption, with special regard to the sentiments of the Buddhist communities in Russia.

In my conversation with Count Lamsdorff I confined myself to observations of a very general character on the subject of the desirability of pursuing a policy of perfect frankness in regard to Thibet as to all the subjects which interested the two Governments.

I venture however to remark that the Russian Government must be aware of our objections to the return of the Grand Lama to Lhasa as also of the reception accorded to the Tashi Lama in India. There are therefore symptoms of a possible conflict arising out of the antagonism between the two spiritual potentates one of whom will support Russian and the other British interests. As you are aware, Russian policy has long aimed at consolidating Russian influence in Mongolia and for this purpose an agent in the person of the revered head of the Buddhist communities would be of paramount importance. The Grand Lama appears to be not unwilling to play this rôle. But until he returns to Lhasa he is a living example of Russian helplessness. He appears to have sent word to the Emperor that he is afraid for his life. It is therefore highly desirable from the Russian point of view that these fears should be dispelled and it is no doubt thought that the public recognition of his holy character and of the Emperor's regard, will serve as a species of safe conduct and may induce him to hasten his departure.

(¹) [v. immediately preceding document.]

If he returns to Lhasa there can be little doubt that he will do all in his power to make himself useful to the Russians. On the other hand it is to be presumed that the Tashi Lama will play a somewhat similar part as regards England.

The policy of the Russian Minister in Peking will no doubt be aimed at preventing the Chinese Government from doing what I am assured by the Chinese Minister here they desire to do;—that is, in case the Lama attempts to play a political part, to depose him. Such a step would be regarded as a great blow to Russian prestige and would be violently opposed by the Russian Government.

There appear therefore to be grounds for the fear that complications may arise in the near future and as Count Lamsdorff has expressed his desire that a policy of perfect frankness should be pursued by the two Governments, it might perhaps be advisable, that some more definite understanding should be arrived at, which could preclude the possibility of a serious conflict of interests.

I have, &c.

CECIL SPRING-RICE.

MINUTES.

I rather doubt the advisability of attempting to come to any more detailed arrangement with Russia in regard to Tibet. It is evident from what C[oun]t Lamsdorff said (see desp[atch] No. 251) that what the Russians w[oul]d aim at is that we should be equally debarred with them from all interference in Tibetan affairs. I don't think the Gov[ernment] of India w[oul]d wish to tie their hands for all time by any such declaration; and it w[oul]d be going further than anything we have said so far. Lord Lansdowne for instance told the Russian Amb[assado]r (Oct. 5, '04) that if any Power was to have a voice in the external affairs of Tibet, that Power must be G[rea]t Britain. It therefore seems undesirable that we should place ourselves in a position of absolute equality with Russia, and yet it is obvious that if any sort of negotiation is started, the Russians will lead off from this standpoint.

F. A. C.

Apl. 18, '06.

This is a real difficulty in proposing to Russia a separate agreement about Tibet, but if China adheres I can make another statement to Count Benckendorff and tell him what has been done and what the position is.

E. G.

No. 308.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Spring-Rice.

F.O. 371/176.

Tel. (No. 80.)

Foreign Office, May 1, 1906, 3.15 P.M.

Your telegrams Nos. 74⁽¹⁾ and 75⁽²⁾ of April 29 and my telegram No. 79⁽³⁾ of April 30. Return of Dalai Lama to Tibet.

You should speak to Count Lamsdorff in the sense of my communication to the Russian Ambassador. You should at the same time inform him that in the opinion of H[is] M[ajesty's] Government the presence of a Russian escort beyond the frontier of Tibet would be objectionable as constituting an interference by Russia in the internal affairs of that country and express the hope that immediate orders may be sent to ensure that the Buriat escort shall not proceed beyond the frontier of Mongolia.

(1) [Tel. No. 74 from Mr. Spring-Rice of April 29, 1906, quotes a communication from Count Lamsdorff which states that some Buriats have formed an escort to conduct the Dalai Lama on his return to Lhasa, and provided themselves with arms. The escort was approved by the Russian Government.]

(2) [In Tel. No. 75, of April 29, 1906, Mr. Spring-Rice suggests referring Count Lamsdorff to the conditions of Lord Lansdowne's assurance of June 2, 1904 (*v. supra*, p. 310, No. 293). The Buriat escort was probably armed by Russia and consisted of Russian soldiers.]

(3) [Tel. No. 79 to Mr. Spring-Rice, of April 30, 1906, describes a conversation with Count Benckendorff in which he was told that an armed escort for the Dalai Lama would give rise to trouble. The terms of the Adhesion Agreement were also explained.]

Mr. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.

F.O. 871/176.

(No. 292.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, D. May 2, 1906.

R. May 7, 1906.

I called on Count Lamsdorff to-day, at his official reception, and handed to him a memorandum, copy of which I have the honour to enclose, embodying your telegraphic communications of the last two days on the subject of Thibet.

Count Lamsdorff read the memorandum attentively and then informed me that you were perfectly right in assuming that the principle by which the Russian policy was guided in all questions affecting Thibet was the principle of absolute non-intervention. With regard to the recent incident of the Buriat Guard he said the circumstances were as follow;—A number of the Emperor's subjects looked on the Dalai Lama as their High Priest, and quasi-divinity. The Dalai Lama himself, and his disciples on his behalf, were convinced that his life was threatened in case of his return to Lhasa. It was highly undesirable that he should continue his wanderings in the neighbourhood of Urga and among the Princes of Mongolia. His return to his capital city was to be wished for in the interests of the Buddhist communities of Northern Asia. But he had, as it appeared, refused to return unless he received some solid guarantees that his life would not be in peril. These guarantees the Russian Government had been unable to give him. But it was difficult for them to refuse a request proffered by the Russian Buddhists that some of their number might accompany their master to his home in order to defend him from possible attacks on his sacred person.

The Russian Government, acting on the advice of the officials who had special knowledge of the temper of the Siberian Buriats, had agreed to this request, but nothing was further from their thoughts than a desire to intervene thereby in the internal affairs of Thibet.

With regard to your request that orders should be issued to prevent the Russian subjects from entering Thibetan territory, His Excellence [*sic*] said that his personal impression was that their intention had been to return to their homes as soon as the frontier had been reached. He could not however assure me positively that a definite arrangement to this effect had been arrived at. He thought (speaking for himself) that the idea was a good one: their responsibility should cease as soon as the sacred frontier had been reached and as soon as they had been able to hand over their charge to their fellow disciples in Thibet itself. He would telegraph at once to the Russian Consul at Urga and to the Russian Minister at Peking with a view to ascertaining the facts of the case and, if possible, arranging that the Buriats should return with the utmost despatch.

I pointed out that the antecedents of the Dalai Lama were well known: that if he returned to Lhasa it was quite possible that he would take an active part in politics and would initiate or carry out a policy directed against British interests, as had previously been the case, and that if this were his policy, and if he were known to be surrounded by an armed guard of Russian subjects who had accompanied him on his return, it would be quite impossible for His Majesty's Government to remain indifferent to such a situation and that the results would be unfortunate for those good relations which we had so much at heart, and would be quite inconsistent with those assurances which had already passed between the two Governments.

Count Lamsdorff informed me in reply that there never had been any question of the Buriats remaining at Lhasa. All that the Russian Government desired was that the Lama should arrive safe at his capital and that nothing should befall him *en route*, and that they themselves should be in a position to assure the Emperor's Buddhist subjects that everything had been done, which could properly be done, in order to insure his safety. Every effort had been taken to impress upon his

mind that he must not disturb the tranquillity of Thibet, that he must not assume a provocatory attitude, and that he could count on neither support nor assistance from Russia.

His Excellency assured me that he would spare no effort in order to arrive at a satisfactory settlement of the question and begged me to express to you his thanks for your frankness and his hopes that the same policy of perfect frankness would be pursued in the future.

I have, &c.

CECIL SPRING-RICE.

Enclosure in No. 809.

Communication handed to Count Lamsdorff by Mr. Spring-Rice on May 2, 1906.

J'ai dit au Comte Benckendorff que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique tout en appréciant l'esprit amical dont le Gouvernement Russe a fait preuve en communiquant l'information au sujet du Dalai-Lama craint que son retour à Lhassa ne donne lieu à des troubles au Tibet, et est d'avis que dans le cas où le Lama sera accompagné dans son voyage par une escorte armée de sujets russes, il adoptera selon toute probabilité, une attitude provocante et créera des désordres, ce qui pourrait mettre le Gouvernement Britannique dans la nécessité d'avoir recours à une nouvelle intervention; éventualité d'autant plus regrettable que le Tibet jouit actuellement d'une tranquillité parfaite et que le Gouvernement Britannique est aussi loin que possible du désir d'intervenir dans ce pays. Une convention vient d'être signée avec la Chine au sujet du Tibet, dont le Gouvernement anglais n'a pas encore reçu le texte définitif. Le but de cette convention est l'adhésion de la Chine à la convention entre l'Angleterre et le Tibet.

L'Angleterre s'engage à ne pas empiéter sur le territoire tibétain et de ne pas s'ingérer dans le Gouvernement du Tibet: la Chine de sa part s'engage de ne pas permettre d'intervention étrangère dans les affaires du Tibet, extérieures ou intérieures. La convention contient en outre une clause portant que l'Angleterre ne réclame pour elle-même aucune concession qui selon la Convention avec le Tibet est défendue à une autre Puissance ou à ses sujets.

Vous porterez ce qui précède à la connaissance du Comte Lamsdorff qui, j'en suis sûr, verra dans cette convention une nouvelle preuve du désir du Gouvernement Britannique de s'abstenir de toute intervention dans les affaires tibétaines; et vous ajouterez que dans l'opinion du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique la présence au delà de la frontière Tibétaine d'une escorte armée de sujets Russes est de nature à soulever des objections sérieuses comme étant en effet un acte d'intervention de la part de la Russie dans les affaires intérieures de ce pays.

Je suis convaincu que le Gouvernement Russe, en conformité avec des déclarations déjà faites par le Comte Lamsdorff partage notre point de vue que toute intervention étrangère dans les affaires du Tibet est contraire aux intérêts tant Russes qu'Anglais: et dans cet ordre d'idées je vous prie d'exprimer notre espoir que le Gouvernement Russe ne refusera pas d'envoyer des ordres aussitôt que possible dans le but d'empêcher l'escorte de Bouriates de procéder au delà de la frontière de la Mongolie.

Draft Instructions to Sir A. Nicolson.⁽¹⁾

F.O. 971/177.

Foreign Office, May 23, 1906.

In discussing the Thibetan question, Sir A. Nicolson should point out to the Russian Government that His Majesty's Government have sought no new advantages for themselves in their negotiations with the Governments of Thibet and China, except such as are necessary to secure the full enjoyment of the rights acquired under the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 and the Regulations of 1893.⁽²⁾ They have agreed to the indemnity of a reduced amount being paid from funds provided by the Chinese Government in three annual instalments instead of being spread out over a much longer term of years, and on the completion of these three payments the occupation of the Chumbi Valley will cease, provided, however, that the trade-marts referred to in Article II of the Convention of the 7th September, 1904,⁽³⁾ shall have been effectively opened for three years, and that, in the meantime, the Thibetans shall have faithfully complied with the terms of that Convention in all other respects.

The British Government are most anxious to complete the evacuation of Thibet, and merely claim the observance of the provisions of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 and the Regulations of 1893, as well as of the Anglo-Thibetan Convention of the 7th September, 1904, and of the Anglo-Chinese Convention concluded on the 27th April.⁽⁴⁾ Sir A. Nicolson will communicate to the Russian Government a copy of the Adhesion Agreement, such as it is believed to be, and an exact copy as soon as the original has been received from Peking.

It should be borne in mind that we have in the Adhesion Convention obtained the consent of the Chinese Government to establish telegraphic communication between the trade-marts and India. This is, however, necessary for the safety of the Agents we are entitled, under the Convention of the 7th September, 1904, to maintain at those trade-marts, and can hardly be regarded as conferring on us any special advantage.

It must be equally recognised that His Majesty's Government could not admit the presence in Thibet of Russian officials in any capacity whatever.

The following points may be regarded as the bases of the British demands :—

1. Russia to recognize (as Great Britain has done) the suzerainty of China over Thibet, and to engage to respect the territorial integrity of Thibet, and to abstain from all interference in its internal administration.
2. Subject to the above stipulation, Russia to recognize that, by reason of its geographical position, Great Britain has a special interest in seeing that the external relations of Thibet are not disturbed by any other Power.
3. The British and Russian Governments to severally engage not to send a representative to Lhasa.
4. The British and Russian Governments agree not to seek or obtain, whether for themselves or their subjects, any concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, mining, or other rights in Thibet.
5. The British and Russian Governments agree that no Thibetan revenues, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to them, or to any of their subjects.

⁽¹⁾ [The text given here has been checked by a printed copy of May 23, in the Embassy Archives, Russia F.O. 181/860, which is endorsed "amended copy." The original draft was submitted to the Political Committee of the Council of India on May 21, and certain alterations suggested by them were embodied in the amended copy.]

⁽²⁾ [*v. supra*, p. 305, *Ed. note.*]

⁽³⁾ [*v. supra*, pp. 314-5, No. 298.]

⁽⁴⁾ [*v. supra*, pp. 324-5, No. 305, *encl.*]

No. 311.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.

F.O. 371/177.

(No. 352.) Confidential.

St. Petersburg, D. June 8, 1906.

Sir,

R. June 18, 1906.

I called yesterday afternoon by appointment on Monsieur Isvolsky, and we commenced our conversations in regard to Thibet. His Excellency said that he had waited on the Emperor on the previous day, and that His Majesty had mentioned to him what had passed at my audience in regard to an understanding between Great Britain and Russia on several questions of interest to both countries; and His Excellency added that the Emperor was desirous that an agreement should if possible be reached. Monsieur Isvolsky said that I could rely upon his using his best endeavours towards attaining that object, but as he was not very well versed in the questions with which we should have to deal he must crave my indulgence if he took some little time in studying the past records.

I assured His Excellency that I desired in no way to hasten matters, and that in fact it was desirable that the questions should be examined with care.

Monsieur Isvolsky then enquired of me what was the procedure which I proposed to follow.

I said that there were three principal questions which we might discuss, namely, Thibet, Afghanistan and Persia: and that it seemed to me that the best course to pursue would be to examine each question *seriatim*, and that when we had practically come to an understanding on one question we should proceed to the next, and that when we had concluded our discussions we could draw up a convention embracing all the conclusions at which we had arrived.

Monsieur Isvolsky said that he understood that I did not desire to have three separate agreements, but only one; and that I considered that the settlement of each question should depend finally on an agreement on all of them. I said that was precisely my view, and that we should be following the course that had been adopted during the negotiations of the Anglo-French agreement. Monsieur Isvolsky expressed his concurrence with the method which I had proposed.

I thereupon gave verbally to Monsieur Isvolsky a rapid sketch of the Convention with China of 1890 and of the Regulations of 1893, as well as of the Convention with Thibet of 1904, accompanying my statement with some necessary explanatory remarks. I then handed to him a copy of the Convention of April 27, 1906, as we believed it to be, and informed him that I would give him an exact copy as soon as the original had been received from Peking.

I also read to Monsieur Isvolsky certain notes which I had made for my own guidance, taken from the instructions which you had been good enough to furnish me, and I stated that I should be prepared to discuss with him on the basis of the points to which I had referred.

His Excellency asked if he might be supplied with some statement in writing, as it would be difficult for him to remember exactly the points which I had mentioned.

It seemed to me desirable that there should be no possibility of misunderstanding, and I, therefore expressed my readiness to supply, in an informal and private manner, the information which he solicited. I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a private communication⁽¹⁾ with its enclosure, which I made to Monsieur Isvolsky this morning.

I should mention that during our conversation Monsieur Isvolsky spoke with some anxiety as to the future of the Dalai Lama: and enquired of me whether I had any information as to his whereabouts or movements. I said that beyond what the Russian Ambassador in London had communicated to you I had personally no information. Monsieur Isvolsky said that he hoped that it would be clearly understood

⁽¹⁾ [Enclosure 1, the covering letter, is purely formal and is therefore not reproduced.]

in London that the Russian Government had no desire to intervene in the movements of that personage, and that strict orders had been sent to endeavour if possible to prevent the Buriat escort from traversing the frontier of Thibet. He enquired whether my Government were opposed to the re-entry of the Dalai Lama into Lhasa. I said that I could not say that I had any precise instructions on that point, but that I had gathered, when in London, that the return of this personage would not be favourably viewed, as his reappearance might very probably occasion intrigues and troubles. I would, however, telegraph and enquire of you what views His Majesty's Government held on the subject.

Monsieur Isvolsky then remarked that he had learnt that the Dalai Lama had been much pleased with the Convention signed at Peking at the end of last April. I observed that the Dalai Lama must possess facilities for very rapid communication to have been so speedily in possession of the terms of the Convention; but Monsieur Isvolsky added that it was merely a report which had reached him.

Monsieur Isvolsky then enlarged on the great importance which the Russian Government attached to the future of this personage, as he was spiritual chief of a large section of Russian subjects, whose religious susceptibilities it would be most unwise to offend: and that it was desirable that a Dalai Lama should be established at Lhasa. Were my Government opposed to the installation and presence of any Dalai Lama or only to this particular one? I replied that I was really not in a position to give him a reply, as I had not consulted with you on this particular point.

On leaving Monsieur Isvolsky, he said that he thought it would perhaps be better if I did not telegraph what he has said about the Dalai Lama, as he would like to study the question a little more thoroughly. I replied that I would ascertain your views on the subject for my own guidance and information.

I have, &c.

A. NICOLSON.

Enclosure 2 in No. 311.

*Basis of Prospective Conversations between Sir A. Nicolson and M. Isvolski
respecting Thibet.*

June 8, 1906.

(I.) The Russian Government will doubtless recognize as His Majesty's Government have done, the suzerainty of China over Thibet, engaging at the same time to respect the territorial integrity of Thibet and to abstain from all interference with its internal administration.

(II.) It is clear that by reason of its geographical position Great Britain has a special interest in seeing that the external relations of Thibet are not disturbed by any other Power, and I have no doubt that the Russian Government will recognize that fact.

(III.) The British and Russian Governments to severally engage not to send a Representative to Lhasa.

(IV.) The British and Russian Governments to agree not to seek or obtain, whether for themselves or for their subjects any concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, mining, or other rights in Thibet.

(V.) The British and Russian Governments agree that no Thibetan revenues, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to them or to any of their subjects.

It is doubtless unnecessary to add that no Russian Officials should be present in Thibet in any capacity whatsoever.

No. 312.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.

F.O. 371/125.

(No. 358.) Confidential.

St. Petersburg, D. June 11, 1906.

Sir,

R. June 18, 1906.

I informed the French Ambassador yesterday, in confidence, that I had opened conversations with Monsieur Isvolsky on the subject of an arrangement in regard to Thibet, but that I had not done more than explain to His Excellency the outline of the Conventions which had been concluded with that country and China, and that I had communicated to him privately certain points which might form the basis of future discussions. I told Monsieur Bompard privately that Monsieur Isvolsky appeared chiefly anxious on two questions: the future position of the Dalai Lama, and the intention of China to assert and consolidate her position in Mongolia. Monsieur Isvolsky, I said, had spoken to me at some length on both these questions, but that when my interview was concluded he had begged me not to telegraph to my Government any of the views which he had expressed, as on further study and reflection he might feel disposed to alter them. This method of procedure might, I feared, be a little irksome if continually repeated.

Monsieur Bompard told me that he himself had observed that Monsieur Isvolsky, though ready to converse freely, was nervous lest his statements should be taken as a positive declaration of his views, and was always careful to explain that what he had said should not be interpreted as the opinions of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. He was, Monsieur Bompard remarked, "très fuyant," and he had himself had an instance of this in a conversation which he had held on the subject of Russian co-operation in the Bagdad Railway. Monsieur Isvolsky had on that occasion expressed his entire concurrence with the proposal, but had at the close of the interview receded from the views which he had enunciated. I think that this hesitation will very possibly disappear when Monsieur Isvolsky has been a little longer in office, and has rendered himself more fully acquainted with the multifarious questions with which he has to deal.

As regards the Bagdad Railway, Monsieur Bompard said, as Mr. Spring-Rice has already reported, that the chief of the Staff had no objections to Russian co-operation, but that Monsieur Isvolsky had intimated that the Minister of Finance was opposed to Russian participation, fearing lest heavy responsibilities and charges should be thrown upon the Russian Treasury. Monsieur Bompard intended to take an opportunity of explaining to the Minister of Finance that the Russian Government would not be required to contribute capital, as this was a matter for banks and financial houses to undertake. His fears as to the responsibility of the Russian Treasury were, therefore, needless.

I have, &c.

A. NICOLSON.

MINUTE.

The Russian banks would have no difficulty in finding money in France for the Bagdad Railway.

C. H.

No. 313.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.**St. Petersburg, June 13, 1906.*

F.O. 371/177.

Tcl. (No. 114.)

D. 8.35 P.M.

R. 10 P.M.

Thibet.

At weekly reception to-day Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that he had submitted our bases of discussion to the Emperor. His Majesty and he fully recognised

the liberal nature of our demands, and he had been instructed to negotiate on these bases.

He considered that there would be no difficulty in coming to an agreement on points 1, 3, 4 and 5 (see my draft instructions),(¹) but he did not quite grasp bearing on point 2, or what was intended by external relations not being "disturbed" by any other Power.

I will explain in a despatch his observations and my reply on this point.

Minister for Foreign Affairs is desirous that the question of relations with Russian Buddhist subjects and Dalai Lama should be clearly settled. He laid great stress on necessity for some relations being maintained, and stated that it would not be possible to cut off all communications between Russian Buddhists and their spiritual chief. He also wished to know if we desired to veto any scientific geographical missions into Thibet, maintaining that, in the interests of (group omitted), this would be undesirable. I said I would refer these questions to you, and I will write fully on them. I should prefer not to compress his remarks into a telegram, especially as there is no immediate urgency.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said he wished to be perfectly frank in regard to all the doubts of the Russian Government, so as to preclude possibility of any future misunderstanding. I told him I intended to be equally frank with him, as our agreement, if one should be happily reached, must be open to no possible misinterpretation hereafter.

He added that I had also mentioned that no Russian officials in any capacity whatever should be present in Thibet, and he remarked that we had secured the privilege of sending an official to Lhasa from our trade marts. I answered him that he was in error, and that an agreement of that (group omitted) had been disallowed by His Majesty's late Government (see Blue Book No. 3, p. 86).

I think I had better rectify, in writing, his misapprehension, and propose to address to him a private note on this point.(²)

MINUTES.

There should be no difficulty in allaying any Russian suspicions with regard to point 2, but we must clearly await the despatch explaining the Russian objections.

F. A. C.
14.6.

(¹) [r. *supra*, p. 331, No. 310.]

(²) [The text of this note and that of M. Isvolski's reply was given by Sir A. Nicolson in despatch No. 362 of June 13, which expands the above telegram. The two notes were as follows:

Sir A. Nicolson to M. Isvolski.

F.O. 371/177.

Mon cher Ministre,

Le 14 Juin, 1906.

Vous avez bien voulu exprimer hier l'opinion que nous nous sommes réservé dans la Convention de 1904 le droit d'envoyer en cas de besoin, un agent à Lhasa pour régler les différends commerciaux qui n'ont pas pu être arrangés sur place. Sans doute V[otre] E[xcellence] avait dans l'esprit l'engagement signé à Lhasa par le Col[onel] Younghusband et les autorités Thibétaines le même jour que la signature de la Convention a eu lieu. Cet engagement se trouve à page 266 du Blue Book sur East India (Thibet) No. 3.(³)

L'engagement susmentionné a été cependant désavoué par le Gouvernement Britannique comme il est dit en par[agraphe] 5 d'une dépêche au Viceroy des Indes et qui se trouve à pp. 84-6 du même Blue Book.(⁴)

La Convention de 1904 ne fait pas mention d'un pareil engagement. Je voudrais rectifier un petit malentendu, et je vous prie, &c.

A. NICOLSON.

M. Isvolski to Sir A. Nicolson.

Mon cher Ambassadeur,

Le 2/15 Juin, 1906.

Je m'empresse de Vous remercier de votre aimable billet. C'est avec le plus vif plaisir que je prends note de la rectification qu'il contient, et je profite, &c.

ISWOLSKY.]

(³) [A. & P. (1905). LVIII, (Cd. 2370), p. 724.]

(⁴) [*ib.*, pp. 542-4.]

This telegram does not appear to me quite satisfactory as it looks as though the Russians will try to maintain some sort of relations with the Dalai Lama if he ever succeeds in getting back to Lhasa. We must wait for his despatch before dealing with this matter. Fortunately there is no hurry and it is better to move slowly with these negotiations in view of the internal situation in Russia.

C. H.

I think Mr. Morley has lately prevented some expeditions of geographical explorers and mining prospectors from going into Tibet on our side; the I[ndia] O[ffice] might be asked to tell us whether this is so. If it is the case it will strengthen Sir A. Nicolson's position in these negotiations.

E. G.

It is so: and we might add to draft to I[ndia] O[ffice] that we propose to point this out to Sir A. Nicolson for use in his negotiations.

F. A. C.
15/6.

No. 314.

Memorandum on the Correspondence relating to the proposed Agreement between Great Britain and Russia on the subject of Thibet.

(8926)

Foreign Office, April 18, 1907.⁽¹⁾

With a view to some agreement being arrived at between Great Britain and Russia in regard to Thibet, Sir A. Nicolson was, previous to his departure for St. Petersburg in May 1906, furnished with certain draft instructions which had been drawn up after semi-official consultation with the India Office. Sir A. Nicolson was authorized to discuss the question of an Agreement in regard to Thibet with the Russian Government on the lines of these instructions.

In these instructions Sir A. Nicolson was given, for use in his discussions with the Russian Government, a résumé of the principles which have guided the policy of His Majesty's Government in their negotiations with the Chinese and Thibetan Governments respectively, and a short summary of the conditions existing at the present time as a result of the Anglo-Thibetan Convention of the 7th September, 1904, and the Anglo-Chinese Convention concluded on the 27th April, 1906.⁽²⁾ It was explained that His Majesty's Government could not admit the presence in Thibet of Russian officials in any capacity whatsoever, and the following five points were laid down as the bases of the British demands:—

1. Russia to recognize (as Great Britain has done) the suzerainty of China over Thibet, and to engage to respect the territorial integrity of Thibet, and to abstain from all interference in its internal administration.
2. Subject to the above stipulation, Russia to recognize that, by reason of its geographical position, Great Britain has a special interest in seeing that the external relations of Thibet are not disturbed by any other Power.
3. The British and Russian Governments to severally engage not to send a Representative to Lhasa.
4. The British and Russian Governments agree not to seek or obtain, whether for themselves or their subjects, any concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, mining, or other rights in Thibet.
5. The British and Russian Governments agree that no Thibetan revenues, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to them, or to any of their subjects.

⁽¹⁾ [The memorandum here reproduced is mainly a reprint of one of the same title dated January 26, 1907. It contains however new material on pp. 348-9, continuing the history of the treaty negotiations from January to April.]

⁽²⁾ [*v. supra*, pp. 314-7, No. 298, and pp. 324-5, No. 305, *encl.*]

On the 7th June Sir A. Nicolson reported that he had commenced conversations with M. Isvolsky, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The course of procedure proposed by Sir A. Nicolson to M. Isvolsky in regard to their discussions was as follows:—

Each question, those of Thibet, Afghanistan, and Persia, to be examined *seriatim*, and when views had been exchanged and an agreement had practically been come to on one question, to pass to the next, and, when the examination of subjects for discussion had been terminated, to draw up and sign a Convention comprising all the questions.

To this course M. Isvolsky agreed. Sir A. Nicolson further explained to him that he did not desire an incomplete Agreement, but that a settlement of each question must depend on a general understanding being arrived at.

The question of Thibet was then gone into, and M. Isvolsky requested to be furnished with a copy in writing of the five points of the British demands. Sir A. Nicolson promised he would send him one.

At the interview, M. Isvolsky spoke with some anxiety as to the future of the Dalai Lama, and inquired of Sir A. Nicolson whether he had any information as to his whereabouts or movements. He said that he hoped that it would be clearly understood in London that the Russian Government had no desire to intervene in the movements of that personage, and that strict orders had been sent to endeavour, if possible, to prevent the Buriat escort from traversing the frontier of Thibet. He inquired whether His Majesty's Government were opposed to the re-entry of the Dalai Lama into Lhassa. M. Isvolsky then enlarged on the great importance which the Russian Government attached to the future of this personage, as he was spiritual Chief of a large section of Russian subjects whose religious susceptibilities it would be most unwise to offend, and that it was desirable that a Dalai Lama should be established at Lhassa. He inquired whether His Majesty's Government were opposed to the installation and presence of any Dalai Lama, or only to this particular one. M. Isvolsky did not wish the matter mentioned to His Majesty's Government at present.

On the 13th June M. Isvolsky informed Sir A. Nicolson that he had communicated to the Emperor the bases on which it was proposed the negotiations in regard to Thibet were to proceed. He stated that both the Emperor and himself were highly satisfied with the liberal character of the demands of His Majesty's Government, and that he had received instructions to use his best efforts to arrive at a satisfactory arrangement.

M. Isvolsky stated that he had examined the five points of the British demands, and was of opinion that there would be no difficulty in coming to an agreement on points 1, 3, 4, and 5. He was, however, not clear as to the meaning and scope of point 2, which mentioned that Russia should recognize that Great Britain, by reason of her geographical position, had a special interest in seeing that the external relations of Thibet were not disturbed by any other Power.

The word "disturbed" somewhat puzzled him, and he would like some explanation as to what would be considered a "disturbance." He was of opinion that the various engagements laid down in points 1, 3, 4, and 5, and which the Russian Government would probably accept, covered any possibility of intervention of any nature. At the same time if Russia recognized the special interests of Great Britain by reason of the geographic position of the latter, he thought that His Majesty's Government should be willing to acknowledge what he termed the "spiritual" interest of Russia in Thibet.

As he had pointed out before, the Buddhist subjects of Russia, who were an important section, in view of their habitat and of their military aptitude, looked to the

Sir A. Nicolson,
No. 111,
Telegraphic,
June 7, 1906.

Sir A. Nicolson,
Despatch
No. 353,
June 8, 1906. (*)

Dalai Lama.

Sir A. Nicolson,
No. 362,
June 13, 1906. (*)

Sir A. Nicolson,
No. 114,
Telegraphic,
June 13, 1906. (*)

Point 2 of the
British
demands.

Spiritual
relations with
Lhassa.

(*) [v. *supra*, pp. 332-3, No. 311.]

(*) [v. *supra*, pp. 334-5, No. 313, and note (*).]

Dalai Lama as their spiritual Chief. As Russia, out of regard to her Catholic subjects, had found it necessary to have relations with the spiritual Chief of the Roman Catholic religion, so would she find it desirable to have relations with the spiritual Chief of her Buddhist subjects. He did not see how it would be possible for Russia to engage to abstain from all intercourse with the Dalai Lama without offending, and possibly estranging, her Buddhist subjects. He had no desire to insist on maintaining relations with this or that individual Dalai Lama, but he considered it necessary that some arrangement should be arrived at which would enable Russia to hold communication with whatever Dalai Lama was in authority on matters strictly and solely pertaining to religious questions. He expressed the hope that His Majesty's Government would take the matter into their serious consideration.

M. Isvolsky explained that what he desired was that the relations with the Dalai Lama, in so far as an occasional Mission to St. Petersburg and intercourse between the Buriats and that personage were concerned, should be admitted by His Majesty's Government so far as they were restricted to strictly religious questions.

*Scientific
Missions.*

With regard to the exclusion of all Russian officials, in whatever capacity, from Thibet, M. Isvolsky said that of late years the Russian Geographical Society had sent a Mission into Thibet which had rendered great services to geographical science. It was surely not desired by His Majesty's Government that Thibet should be secluded absolutely and entirely from the rest of the world, and that no Mission should be permitted to enter it, even when prosecuting a perfectly non-political and solely scientific object. Every one of any note was an official of some sort in Russia, and if the word "official" were interpreted strictly and literally, this would be an effectual bar to any man of science interesting himself directly in Thibetan geography and other matters of interest to science.

Moreover, while His Majesty's Government wished to rigorously exclude all Russians from Thibet, we had provided by Convention for the occasional visit to Lhassa itself of one of our officials.

Sir A. Nicolson was, however, able to dispose of the last assertion, and promised to obtain the views of His Majesty's Government in regard to the points raised. He was of opinion that M. Isvolsky would endeavour to secure the maintenance of relations in some form with the Dalai Lama which, it appeared to Sir Arthur, he regarded as a set-off to the facilities His Majesty's Government had obtained for commercial intercourse. He proposed to obtain from M. Isvolsky more precise information as to what relations have existed between the Buriats and the Dalai Lama. The question of Geographical Missions would not, Sir A. Nicolson thought, be seriously pressed. He suggested that, while not absolutely and finally excluding such Missions from Thibet, His Majesty's Government might instruct him to intimate to the Russian Government that this question might be left open on condition that no such Mission should be dispatched for a specified term of years, and until the situation in Thibet was more settled and satisfactory.

*Sir A. Nicolson,
No. 384,
June 20, 1906.
Sense in which
the term
"Thibet"
should be
interpreted.*

At a subsequent interview on the 20th June M. Isvolsky mentioned one further point, and that was in speaking of "Thibet" with special reference to no Russian officials being admitted therein. Did His Majesty's Government mean "Thibet" as a geographical expression, that, is, as defined by geographical limits, or as an administrative unit? He explained that he made this inquiry, as there were certain districts in the northern and western parts of Thibet which lay within the boundaries of Thibet but were not under Thibetan administration.

He added that he had previously spoken of the Dalai Lama alone as spiritual head of the country. He had since ascertained that there was also the Tashi Lama, who had almost equal prerogatives, and, as he understood, a separate administrative district. It was possible that, in certain cases, the Russian Buddhists might find it necessary to be in relations with the latter also.

Sir A. Nicolson promised to refer all the points raised by M. Isvolsky to His Majesty's Government.

Course of the Negotiations in regard to (1) Dalai Lama.

Sir A. Nicolson was informed that His Majesty's Minister at Peking was not disposed to press for the permanent exclusion of the Dalai Lama from Thibet, in view of the fact that there would be great difficulty in finding a suitable place of abode if the Lama, who is little over forty years of age, were permanently excluded. Should, however, the Russian Government question him on the subject, he was authorized to state that it was because His Majesty's Government had no desire to interfere with the internal administration of Thibet that they considered the return of the Dalai Lama to Lhasa to be at the present time inexpedient. His action had been so hostile as to provoke the interference of His Majesty's Government on a previous occasion, and might necessitate it again.

To Sir A. Nicolson,
No. 101,
Telegraphic,
June 12, 1906.

If, in the course of the discussions, the Russian Government should request that, if the present Dalai Lama be prevented from returning to Lhasa, some other should be installed in his place, he was instructed to point out to the Russian Government that, as His Majesty's Government had abstained from intervening in the internal affairs of Thibet, neither Government could or should take any steps in that direction.

Sir A. Nicolson
No. 113,
Telegraphic,
June 8, 1906.

To Sir A. Nicolson,
No. 104,
Telegraphic,
June 15, 1906.

Sir C. Hardinge subsequently informed M. Poklevsky that, while His Majesty's Government had no objection in principle to the return of the Dalai Lama, they were afraid that if he returned to Lhasa he would create disturbance and unrest, and that, after his action in provoking a war with this country, it was impossible to have any confidence in him and to feel sure that he would not provoke another conflict. For these reasons His Majesty's Government did not at all desire his return, and hoped that it would not take place.

On the 13th July M. Isvolsky informed Sir A. Nicolson that he had been studying the position and personality of the Dalai Lama, and that he had come to the conclusion that it would be undesirable, in the interest of both Great Britain and Russia, that that personage should return to Thibet, and suggested that some understanding might be come to as to his future. He understood that the Chinese Government were desirous that that personage should return to Thibet, and he thought that this should be counteracted, and would be ready to join in any step which might be useful to that end.

Sir A. Nicolson,
No. 151,
Telegraphic,
July 13, 1906.

Sir A. Nicolson,
No. 442,
July 13, 1906.

On the 18th July M. Isvolsky said that he was anxious, in order to remove all doubts as to the attitude of the Russian Government in respect of the Dalai Lama, that the two Governments should mutually agree not to take steps for facilitating his return to Thibet, leaving China to do what she wished.

Sir A. Nicolson,
No. 157,
Telegraphic,
July 18, 1906.

On the 19th July Sir A. Nicolson was informed that a mutual agreement not to facilitate the return of the Dalai Lama would be quite acceptable to His Majesty's Government, and communicated the information to the Russian Government on the 20th July. It was, however, pointed out to him that the action of China was outside the control of both Governments, and he was instructed not to enter into any agreement which might be construed as prohibiting His Majesty's Government from requesting the Chinese Government not to facilitate or permit the return of the Dalai Lama to Thibet, as circumstances might make it opportune or desirable for His Majesty's Government to do this.

To Sir A. Nicolson,
No. 150,
Telegraphic,
July 19, 1906.

Sir A. Nicolson,
No. 159,
Telegraphic,
July 20;
No. 467,
July 21, 1906.

It has since been ascertained from the Chinese Government that there was no desire on their part that the Dalai Lama should return to Thibet; and on the 19th October Sir J. Jordan reported that they had taken steps to take him to Kanchan, Kansu Province, to remove him from Russian influence.

Mr. Carnegie,
No. 141, Tel.,
July 21, 1906.

Sir J. Jordan,
No. 194, Tel.,
October 19, 1906.

M. Isvolsky confidentially informed Sir A. Nicolson on the 19th November that the Dalai Lama was at Gumbum, and that the Russian Government had let him know that his return to Thibet was at present undesirable. He added that he had heard the Chinese were urging the Dalai Lama to return to Thibet, as he was found to be an inconvenient guest. M. Dorgieff has recently been at St. Petersburg, and it appears that he has been in communication with the Dalai Lama.

Sir A. Nicolson,
No. 293,
Telegraphic,
November 19,
1906.

2. *Article 2 of the British Demands.*

To Sir A. Nicolson, No. 147, Telegraphic, July 16, 1906.

With regard to the word "disturbed" in point 2 of the British demands Sir A. Nicolson was instructed that the meaning would be made quite clear by the expansion of the last five words into "disturbed by the intervention of any other Power such as the establishment of a Protectorate or special Treaty relations."

Sir A. Nicolson, No. 467, July 21, 1906.

This he pointed out to the Russian Government.

M. Isvolsky observed that this explanation undoubtedly rendered the meaning of the phrase perfectly clear, but he said he should like to recast the whole sentence referring to the question. He observed that the other points to which the Russian Government were quite prepared to subscribe fully, in regard to the suzerainty of China, abstention from interference, &c., seemed to him a sufficient safeguard against any Power desiring to establish a Protectorate or special Treaty Regulations.

3. *Spiritual Relations between the Russian Buriats and Lhasa.*

Viceroy of India, July 13, 1906.

With regard to the question of spiritual relations, the Government of India, to whom the question was referred, considered that no deputation of Russian Representatives to Thibet should in any circumstances be allowed. It was impossible in a case like Thibet to draw a distinction between religious and political matters, and the presence of a Representative would lead to all the troubles which it was one of the main objects of Colonel Younghusband's Mission to avert. There was no desire to prevent *bonâ fide* Buriat pilgrims from visiting holy places in Thibet, in accordance with past practice. They could not see, however, why such visits should necessitate any relations between Thibet and Russia, which was not, like India, on the Thibetan boundary, but was separated from the holy places by over 1,000 miles of desert and inhospitable country. In the event of interference with Buriat pilgrims the proper course would be to address the Chinese Government.

Sir A. Nicolson was instructed accordingly.

To Sir A. Nicolson, No. 145, July 16, 1906.

To Sir A. Nicolson, No. 326, July 17, 1906.

In the course of a conversation with Sir C. Hardinge M. Poklevsky informed him that the usual means of communication between the Russian Buriats and the Dalai Lama before the dispatch of the British Mission to Lhasa had been by pilgrims, who conveyed money and presents to the Lama. The Russian Government only desired the continuance of this system, and had no wish to have an Agent at Lhasa since His Majesty's Government had no intention of appointing one.

Sir A. Nicolson, No. 159, Telegraphic, July 20, 1906.
Sir A. Nicolson, No. 467, July 21, 1906.

On the 20th July Sir A. Nicolson informed M. Isvolsky of the views of His Majesty's Government on the subject, the latter stated that he would like the relations between the Russian Buriats and the spiritual Chief in Thibet to remain as before, but without any Agent at Lhasa.

4. *Scientific Missions.*

To Sir A. Nicolson, No. 140, Telegraphic, July 18, 1906.
To Sir A. Nicolson, No. 326, July 17, 1906.

It was pointed out to M. Poklevsky, of the Russian Embassy, by Sir C. Hardinge that the Russian Government could hardly expect that His Majesty's Government would agree to Russian Missions exploring in Thibet when British Missions were prohibited from doing so. M. Poklevsky admitted that the reply in the House of Commons that Sven Hedin had been refused permission to enter Thibet from India, would make it easier for the Russian Government to reply to associations wishing to send Missions.

In the course of a conversation Count Benckendorff informed Sir E. Grey that the Russian Government would, he thought, be prepared to agree to a proposal, if made by His Majesty's Government, that no scientific Missions organized by, or composed of, Russian or British subjects, should be allowed to enter Thibet for

five years, and that when that time had expired the matter should be further considered.

The Government of India were communicated with, but were opposed to any arrangement which might hamper their dealings in regard to Thibet. It was pointed out to them that their refusal to consider the suggestion thrown out by the Russian Ambassador would be inconsistent with the general policy of His Majesty's Government towards Thibet, and would not conduce to the success of the negotiations now proceeding with Russia.

Viceroy of India,
July 21, 1906.

It was therefore decided to make the proposal to the Russian Government; but Sir A. Nicolson was at the same time instructed to avoid language committing His Majesty's Government to the principle that Russia was entitled to claim equality of treatment with Great Britain in Thibet.

To Sir A. Nicolson,
No. 360,
August 8, 1906.

In an interview with Sir A. Nicolson M. Isvolsky had informed him that he did not wish that in the Agreement which might eventually be drawn up the exclusion of Russian officials from Thibet should be specifically mentioned. The end might be obtained by an exchange of notes, or some other means. He thought that it would be well if both Governments agreed to have no direct relations with the Thibetan Government except through the intermediary of the Suzerain Power. He did not, of course, intend to suggest any modification of the special Treaty provisions which existed with respect to our intercourse in connection with the trade marts.

Sir A. Nicolson
No. 417,
July 21, 1906.

5. *The Sense in which the term Thibet should be Interpreted.*

The Government of India were consulted as to whether the expression Thibet should be used in a geographical sense, or as indicating what M. Isvolsky described as an "administrative unit." They were at the same time requested to give some definition of the geographical area understood by His Majesty's Government in the word "Thibet."

To Viceroy,
Telegraphic,
June 28, 1906.

On the 13th July they replied that in their view Thibet included the whole of the geographical area known as Thibet lying to the south of the Kuenlun range, and extending on the north and east to tracts near Tsaidam, directly under Chinese administration and the provinces of China proper. They stated that the whole tract thus defined was within the plenary and autonomous jurisdiction of the Thibet authorities, so far as any jurisdiction could be exercised over the northern portion, which is uninhabited during the greater part of the year save by wandering hunters and gold-seekers. Upper Tsaidam and Western Thaiji also formed part of Thibetan territory.

Viceroy of India,
Telegraphic,
July 3, 1906.

If by "administrative unit" M. Isvolsky intended to indicate that Thibet was one of the ordinary provinces of China, the Government of India were unable to admit the contention. They regarded Thibet as a feudatory State under Chinese suzerainty, with large autonomous powers, and power to conclude Treaties with coterminous States regarding mutual trade, frontiers, &c.

This information was communicated to Sir A. Nicolson, and he was instructed that the negotiations must be held to apply to the area geographically known as Thibet.

To Sir A. Nicolson,
No. 145, Tel.,
July 16, 1906.

To Sir A. Nicolson,
No. 147, Tel.,
July 16, 1906.

Sir A. Nicolson subsequently reported that M. Isvolsky had suggested that the geographical limits of Thibet should be considered those recognized as such by China.

Sir A. Nicolson,
No. 159, Tel.,
July 20, 1906.

Sir A. Nicolson
No. 417,
July 21, 1906.

6. *Mongolia.*

The question of Mongolia was also touched upon in the course of the negotiations.

M. Poklevsky asked Sir C. Hardinge what was thought of Russian action there. He was informed that, as the result of carefully watching Russian action in Uрга,

To Sir A. Nicolson,
No. 320,
July 17, 1906.

where there was an energetic Consul-General, with, it was believed, an escort composed of three arms, it had long been felt that the Russian Government contemplated some action in that region, although His Majesty's Government felt convinced that Russia had now no desire for a policy of adventure, it seemed beyond doubt that there was still a certain party in Russia in favour of a policy of absorption in Mongolia, more especially as Manchuria no longer offered a favourable ground for a forward policy in that direction.

M. Poklevsky emphasized the fact that the Russian Government were very anxious for the maintenance of the *status quo* in Mongolia, and inquired whether His Majesty's Government could agree to some principle in accordance with the terms of the Japanese alliance. Sir C. Hardinge expressed his confidence that the *status quo* in Mongolia would be in entire accordance with the views of His Majesty's Government, and that the Japanese alliance had been expressly made to insure the maintenance of the *status quo* in Asia. M. Poklevsky mentioned that there were Japanese emissaries in Mongolia encouraging the Chinese authorities to tighten their hold over the Administration, and that such a policy would inevitably end in a conflict with the Mongol Princes.

It was subsequently pointed out to the Russian Ambassador that the Chinese could not be expected to bind themselves not to do what they pleased in their own territory. All that His Majesty's Government could do would be to give diplomatic assistance to get the Chinese Government to recognize the Russian frontier, and to abstain from interference with it. In this the Japanese Government might also assist. Count Benckendorff was told that any proposals which the Russian Government might make in connection with the *status quo* in Mongolia would receive the careful consideration of His Majesty's Government.

Sir A. Nicolson,
No. 770,
November 19,
1906.

M. Dorgieff has recently been in St. Petersburg in regard to Mongolia. It is believed that the Russians are anxious to keep the Dalai Lama at Gumbum in order to utilize his influence over the Mongols. M. Dorgieff had left a Secretary with the Lama.

Sir A. Nicolson,
No. 4,
Telegraphic,
January 3, 1907.

On the 5th January, 1907, M. Isvolsky inquired whether His Majesty's Government would be disposed to make some reference to the maintenance of the *status quo* in Mongolia when the general bases of the Agreement had been settled. Sir A. Nicolson replied that this was a perfectly new suggestion and he could give no reply, but that he would refer home for instructions. M. Isvolsky begged him not to do so at present, as he had merely thrown the proposal out as a suggestion.⁽⁵⁾

Sir A. Nicolson,
No. 260,
Telegraphic,
October 5, 1906.

On the 8th October Sir A. Nicolson telegraphed a summary of the Russian draft Convention which had been handed to him by M. Isvolsky.⁽⁶⁾

Articles I, III, IV and V were found to be identical with those contained in the British draft.

(5) [For the later history of this negotiation with reference to Mongolia, and the project of a Mongolian frontier formula, v. *supra*, pp. 284-6, Nos. 262-3, and *Ed. notes*.]

(6) [The actual text of this draft was sent home by Sir A. Nicolson in his despatch No. 677 of October 8, R. October 15. It is as follows:

F.O. 371/177.

Art[icle] I. Les deux Hautes Parties contractantes reconnaissant les droits suzerains de la Chine sur le Thibet, s'engagent à respecter l'intégrité territoriale du Thibet, et à s'abstenir de toute ingérence (intervention) dans son administration intérieure.

Art[icle] 2. Se conformant au principe admis de la suzeraineté de la Chine sur le Thibet, la Russie et la Grande Bretagne s'engagent à ne traiter avec le Thibet, que par l'entremise du Gouvernement Chinois. Cet engagement n'exclut pas toutefois les rapports directs des agents commerciaux anglais avec les autorités thibétaines locales, prévus par la convention de 1904 entre la Grande Bretagne et le Thibet. Il est bien entendu que les bouddhistes tant sujets russes, que britanniques conservent le droit d'entrer en relations directes sur le terrain religieux avec le Dalai Lama et les autres représentants du bouddhisme au Thibet.

Art[icle] 3. Les Gouvernements Britannique et Russe s'engagent chacun pour sa part à ne pas envoyer de représentants à Lhassa,

In regard to Article II, however, the alternative proposed by M. Isvolsky runs as follows:—

“In conformity with the recognized principle of the suzerainty of China over Thibet, Great Britain and Russia mutually engage not to treat with Thibet except through intermediary of Chinese Government. This engagement does not exclude the direct relations between the British commercial agents and local Thibetan authorities provided for in the Convention of 1904 between Great Britain and Thibet. It is clearly understood that Buddhists, whether Russian or British subjects, retain the right of having direct relations on religious matters with the Dalai Lama and other representatives of Buddhism in Thibet.”

Spiritual relations with Lhasa.

Sir A. Nicolson pointed out that there was no allusion in this Article to the special interests of Great Britain as regards the foreign relations of Thibet.

He stated that M. Isvolsky had at the same time handed him a Memorandum as to the British occupation of the Chumbi Valley, suggesting that it might be well to mention in the Agreement the temporary character of that occupation.⁽⁷⁾

Occupation of Chumbi Valley.

The India Office were asked for their observations in regard to Article II proposed by M. Isvolsky, and also as to the suggestion respecting the Chumbi Valley.

They replied that, as pointed out by Sir A. Nicolson, the Russian Article II not only suppressed all allusion to the special interests of Great Britain as regards foreign relations in Thibet, but by providing that Great Britain, save in respect of local communications under the terms of the Lhasa Convention, shall not treat with Thibet except through the Chinese Government, it placed a restriction on the liberty of action of His Majesty's Government which was not imposed by the Chinese Adhesion Convention. Neither the Lhasa Convention of 1904 nor the Adhesion Convention of 1906 bound His Majesty's Government not to deal direct with the Thibetan Government in the event of the infringement by the latter of the terms of the Lhasa Convention.

India Office, October 17, 1906.

Communication with Thibetan authorities.

Art[icle] 4. Les deux Hautes Parties s'engagent à ne rechercher ou obtenir, ni pour leur propre compte, ni en faveur de leurs sujets, aucunes concessions de chemins de fer, routes, télégraphes et mines, ou autres droits au Thibet.

Art[icle] 5. Les deux Gouvernements sont d'accord qu'aucune partie des revenus du Thibet, soit en nature, soit en espèces ne peut être engagée ou assignée tant à la Russie et à la Grande Bretagne qu'à leurs sujets.]

(7) [The text of this Pro-Memoria was as follows :

F.O. 371/177.

Pro-Memoria.

En vertu de la déclaration, promulg[u]ée par le Vice-Roi des Indes le 11 Novembre 1904 conjointement à la ratification de la Convention du 7 Septembre 1904, l'évacuation de la vallée de Chumbi par les forces britanniques se trouve subordonnée à l'exacte observation par le Thibet de la convention précitée.

D'autre part la nécessité de maintenir l'intégrité du territoire thibétain et de s'abstenir de toute ingérence dans les affaires intérieures du pays a été pleinement reconnue au cours des pourparlers entre les Gouvernements Russe et Anglais au sujet du Thibet. Ce principe en outre a été explicitement formulé à l'article II de la Convention entre la Grande Bretagne et la Chine du 27 Avril 1906.

Toutefois, la stricte observation par les thibétains de la Convention de 1904 ne saurait présenter le caractère d'une certitude absolue et si peu probable que paraisse en lui-même le fait d'une infraction de leur part aux engagements pris, il semblerait nécessaire d'en considérer les conséquences que pourrait impliquer la prolongation *sine die* de l'occupation de la vallée de Chumbi contrairement au principe admis de l'intégrité du Thibet. Dès lors il serait peut-être utile de préciser dans l'accord sur la question thibétaine le caractère temporaire de l'occupation de la vallée de Chumbi.]

Buddhists.

The last sentence of the Russian Article as to religious relations between Buddhists, whether Russian or British subjects, and the Dalai Lama, seemed to require consideration in connection with Article 3 of the British draft Agreement with a view to safeguarding as far as possible the religious relations between the Russian Buriats and Lhasa from being utilized for political purposes.

Chumbi.

With regard to the temporary occupation of the Chumbi Valley, the India Office saw no objection to repeating in the Russian Agreement what had been said on the subject in connection with the ratification of the Lhasa Convention, and accepted by the Chinese Government in the Adhesion Convention. At the same time, in view of the explicit declarations already made by His Majesty's Government, the India Office saw no necessity for doing this.

To India Office,
October 6,
1906.

It was suggested, in reply, that Sir A. Nicolson might be instructed to point out that Article I of the Adhesion Convention of the 27th April, 1906, provides that both Great Britain and China "engage to take at all times such steps as may be necessary to secure the due fulfilment of the terms specified" in the Lhasa Convention of the 7th September, 1904, and to inform the Russian Government that, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, the direct relations between the British commercial agents and the Thibetan local authorities, which are allowed by Article II of the Russian draft, should extend to and include communications through the Thibetan local authorities with the Thibetan Government, should any such become necessary, with regard to the observance by Thibet of the Lhasa Convention. Words to that effect should, therefore, be inserted in the Article, in order that there should be no room for misunderstanding. It was further proposed to add that, in view of the fact that, except as regards China and various native States, the frontiers of Thibet were conterminous only with those of India, His Majesty's Government attached importance to the retention in the Article of words recognizing the special interest of Great Britain as regards the foreign relations of Thibet.

*Communication
with Thibetan
authorities.*

*Buriats and
Dalai Lama.*

With regard to the question of communications between the Buriats and the Dalai Lama, it was proposed to instruct Sir A. Nicolson to endeavour to procure acceptance by the Russian Government of words to the effect that the two Governments would take such steps as might be necessary and possible to prevent these communications from assuming any political character.

It was pointed out that such an addition would give His Majesty's Government considerably stronger grounds for making representations to the Russian Government if it appeared that political communications were passing through the instrumentality of the pilgrims.

India Office,
November 14,
1906.

To Sir A.
Nicolson,
No. 530,
December 5,
1906.

The India Office replied that they concurred generally in the instructions which it was proposed to send to Sir A. Nicolson, with certain slight alterations.

Sir A. Nicolson was accordingly instructed to inform M. Isvolsky that His Majesty's Government had carefully considered the proposals put forward by the Russian Government with regard to Article II of the draft Convention. He should point out that Article I of the Adhesion Convention of the 27th April, 1906, provides that both Great Britain and China "engage to take at all times such steps as may be necessary to secure the due fulfilment of the terms specified" in the Lhasa Convention of the 7th September, 1904, and that, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, Article V of the latter Convention secures to them the right to send letters through the British Agent mentioned in that Article to the Thibetan Government as well as to the Thibetan local authorities. He was therefore to propose the omission of the word "locales" after the words "autorités Thibétaines" in the Russian draft, and the addition, at the end of the sentence, of a reference to the Convention of the 27th April, 1906, with China.

Sir Arthur was also to state that, in view of the fact that, except as regards China, the frontiers of Thibet are conterminous only with those of the Indian Empire. His Majesty's Government attached importance to the retention in the Article of words recognizing the special interest of Great Britain with regard to the foreign relations of Thibet. He was further to propose the addition to the last sentence of

the Russian draft of words to the effect that no communications between Great Britain and Russia and any Thibetan authority should pass through the instrumentality of Buddhist pilgrims, and that the two Governments would take such steps as were necessary and possible to prevent the relations of British and Russian Buddhists with the representatives of Buddhism in Thibet from assuming a political character. Special stress was laid on the desirability of obtaining the acceptance of these words by the Russian Government. No objection was raised to the proposal to deal with the questions of scientific expeditions to Thibet and the exclusion of Russian officials from that country by an exchange of notes rather than by a clause in the Convention itself; nor was there any reason to object to the proposal to repeat in the Russian Agreement what had been accepted by the Chinese Government on the subject of the occupation of the Chumbi Valley in the Adhesion Convention.

In accordance with these instructions, Sir A. Nicolson prepared a fresh draft of Article II, which he forwarded to the Foreign Office for consideration.^(*)

The India Office were consulted and agreed to the draft with the exception of the words "It is understood that" in the third paragraph, which they changed to "It is recognized that it may be necessary for." Sir Arthur therefore communicated the revised draft to M. Isvolsky. His attitude was satisfactory, but he demurred to certain passages, especially paragraph 2 regarding Great Britain's special interests in Thibet. After some discussion, he suggested that the paragraph might come out and be inserted as a preamble, if the word "disturb" were eliminated or modified.

Sir Arthur, therefore, drew up a formula, which he sent home by telegraph on the 7th January.

This draft was approved, but before the telegram saying so had reached Sir Arthur, M. Isvolsky had handed him a draft preamble, a slight modification of Article I, and a modified version of Article II.^(*)

Sir A. Nicolson,
No. 3,
Telegraphic,
January 5, 1907.

Sir A. Nicolson,
No. 5, Tel.,
January 7, 1907.
To Sir A.
Nicolson,
No. 6, Tel.,
January 16,
1907.

(*) [Enclosed in his despatch No. 834 of December 26, 1906, R. January 7. The wording was as follows :

F.O. 371/382.

Proposed Article II of the Draft Convention respecting Thibet.

In conformity with the principle of the suzerainty of China over Thibet, Russia and Great Britain severally engage not to enter into negotiations with Thibet except through the intermediary of the Chinese Government. This engagement does not exclude the direct relations between British Commercial Agents and the Thibetan Authorities as provided for in Article V of the Convention between Great Britain and Thibet of September 7th 1904 and confirmed by the Convention between Great Britain and China of April 27th 1906; nor does it modify the engagements taken by Great Britain and China in Article I of the said Convention of 1906.

Russia Recognises that by reason of its geographical position Great Britain has a special interest in seeing that the external relations of Thibet are not disturbed by the intervention of any other Power.

It is understood that British and Russian Buddhists may enter into direct relations on strictly religious matters with the Dalai Lama and other Buddhist representatives in Thibet. At the same time Great Britain and Russia severally engage to take such steps as may be necessary and possible to prevent the relations between British and Russian Buddhists with the representatives of Buddhism in Thibet from assuming a political character; and they also engage that no communications between the Governments of Great Britain and Russia, or their agents, and any Thibetan authority should pass through the instrumentality of Buddhist pilgrims into Thibet.]

(*) [The text of these revised drafts was sent home by Sir A. Nicolson in his despatch No. 81 of January 15, R. January 21. It is as follows :

F.O. 371/382.

Preamble and Articles I and II of Draft Thibetan Convention.—(Communicated informally by M. Isvolski, January 2/15, 1907.)

Les Gouvernements de Russie et de la Grande-Bretagne reconnaissant les droits suzerains de la Chine sur le Tibet et considérant que par suite de sa situation géographique la Grande Bretagne a un intérêt spécial à voir le régime actuel des relations extérieures de Tibet intégralement maintenu, sont convenus de l'accord suivant.

ARTICLE I.

Les deux Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent à respecter l'intégrité territoriale du Tibet et à s'abstenir de toute ingérence dans son administration intérieure.

Sir A. Nicolson,
No. 31,
January 15,
1907.

In M. Isvolsky's new draft the second paragraph of Sir Arthur's draft was eliminated, and its place taken by the preamble. Paragraph 1 of Sir Arthur's draft was accepted; but paragraph 3 was considerably modified. The words "Il est bien entendu" were substituted for "it is recognized that it may be necessary for," and the clause at the end of the paragraph, stipulating that no communications between Great Britain or Russia and the Thibetan authorities shall pass through the Buddhist pilgrims, has been eliminated. M. Isvolsky gave as his reason for removing this paragraph that as the Russian Government undertake in the first paragraph of the Article not to enter into negotiations with Thibet except through the Chinese Government, they will not, if they observe the terms of the Convention, communicate through the Buddhist pilgrims.

M. Isvolsky's proposals have been sent to the India Office for their consideration, and at the same time they have been informed that, in the opinion of Sir E. Grey, the text now offered by the Russian Government appears to offer security against undue foreign interference in Thibet, and without being absolutely prohibitive to cover all the ground desired by the India Office.

*Scientific
Missions.*

Sir A. Nicolson,
No. 18,
January 6, 1907.

M. Isvolsky seemed very unwilling to forbid the dispatch of scientific missions to Thibet. He said that he did not see how he should be able to justify it to the Russian Geographical Society. He then inquired as to our view regarding the boundaries of Thibet, and said that we should have to define them, in order to know what was forbidden ground and what not. Sir A. Nicolson replied that he thought we had agreed to take as Thibet the country recognized by China as such.

Sir J. Jordan,
No. 17,
Telegraphic,
January 21,
1907.

M. Isvolsky replied that the Chinese did not seem to have very clear and positive ideas on the subject. This is perfectly true, as, in reply to Sir J. Jordan's inquiry regarding the boundaries of Thibet, Tong replied that he was ignorant of those to the north and east. He promised to make inquiries and let us know; but he was not able to obtain any precise information, and it was decided to accept as the boundaries of Thibet those laid down by the India Office.

Chumbi Valley.

Sir A. Nicolson,
No. 35,
Jan. 16, 1907.

Sir A. Nicolson drew up a formula repeating the Declaration annexed to the ratification of the Convention of 1904, and it was proposed that this Declaration should form an Annex to the present Agreement,⁽¹⁰⁾ Sir A. Nicolson's draft was sent

ARTICLE II.

Se conformant au principe admis de la suzeraineté de la Chine sur le Tibet, la Russie et la Grande Bretagne s'engagent à ne traiter avec le Tibet que par l'entremise du Gouvernement Chinois. Cet engagement n'exclut par toutefois les rapports des agents commerciaux anglais avec les autorités tibétaines prévus par l'article V de la convention du 7 Septembre 1904 entre la Grande Bretagne et le Tibet et confirmés par la Convention du 27 avril 1906 entre la Grande Bretagne et la Chine; il ne modifie pas non plus les engagements assumés par la Grande Bretagne et la Chine en vertu de l'article I de la dite Convention de 1906.

Il est bien entendu que les bouddhistes tant sujets russes que britanniques peuvent entrer en relations directes sur le terrain strictement religieux avec le Dalai Lama et les autres représentants du bouddhisme au Tibet; les Gouvernements de Russie et de la Grande Bretagne s'engagent pour autant qu'il dépendra d'eux à ne pas admettre que ces relations puissent porter atteinte aux stipulations du présent accord.]

(¹⁰) [The text was enclosed in Sir A. Nicolson's despatch No. 35 of January 16, R. January 21, and is as follows:

F.O. 371/882.

Annex to the Convention between Great Britain and Russia regarding Thibet.

Great Britain reaffirms the declaration, signed by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India and appended to the ratified Convention of September 7, 1904, to the effect that the British occupation of the Chumbi Valley shall cease after the due payment of the three annual instalments of the indemnity of 25,00,000 rupees, and provided that the trade marts as stipulated in Article II of the Convention shall have been effectively opened for three years, and that in the meantime the Thibetans shall have faithfully complied with the terms of the said Convention of 1904 in all other respects.]

to the India Office, who approved it, and his Excellency presented it to the Russian Government.

Sir A. Nicolson,
No. 30, Tel.
Feb. 20, 1907.

After consultation with the India Office, it was agreed to accept Articles I and II as proposed by M. Isvolsky, but preference was expressed for the preamble drafted by Sir Arthur over that proposed by the Russian Government, for the reason that the Russian draft only indicated that we possessed a special interest in the maintenance of the *status quo* in Thibet, whereas we claim that in consequence of our geographical position, we have a special interest in the external relations of Thibet generally.

To Sir A.
Nicolson,
No. 10,
Telegraphic,
February 8,
1907.

The Russian Government expressed their willingness to accept the British preamble, and thus the whole Convention was agreed to by both sides. It was proposed to treat the question of the prohibition of the entry of scientific missions into Thibet by an exchange of notes; and a note was drafted in conjunction with the India Office whereby, in return for a similar undertaking on the part of the Russian Government, His Majesty's Government agreed not to permit any mission organized by or composed of British subjects designed for the purpose of scientific investigation to enter Thibet. His Majesty's Government would also undertake to request the Chinese Government to prohibit so far as lay in their power the entry of similar expeditions into Thibet from the north and west. This undertaking was to hold good for five years, at the expiration of which time His Majesty's Government, in consultation with the Russian Government, would consider the advisability of extending the prohibition for a further period.⁽¹¹⁾

To Sir A.
Nicolson,
No. 33,
Telegraphic,
February 21,
1907.

This proposal was submitted to M. Isvolsky, who informed Sir A. Nicolson that though personally in agreement with it as to the inadvisability of scientific missions proceeding to Thibet, for the present he found that much opposition to such a measure would be aroused in Russia, and that he would be severely attacked if the prohibition were announced in such a formal manner. He could and would prevent missions from being organized, but this was different from publicly announcing that they were prohibited. He promised, however, to look into the matter, and try and discover whether the desired end could be attained by a different method.

Sir A. Nicolson,
No. 33,
Telegraphic,
February 23,
1907.

In Sir A. Nicolson's original instructions, he was to obtain the consent of the Russian Government to a declaration that His Majesty's Government were unable to admit the presence in Thibet of Russian officials in any capacity whatever. Considerable objection was raised to this point by M. Isvolsky, as has been recorded above, and Sir A. Nicolson submitted that in view of the guarantees afforded by

Sir A. Nicolson,
No. 60,
January 3, 1907.

(11) [The draft note of February 1907 was in the following terms:

F.O. 371/382.

Draft Note for communication to the Russian Government by Sir A. Nicolson.

M. le Ministre,

February , 1907.

With reference to the Convention signed this day respecting Tibet, I am authorized by H[is] B[ritannic] M[ajesty's] Gov[ernment] to state that they undertake not to allow, for a period of five years from the date of this communication, the entry into Thibet of any Mission organized by, or composed of, British subjects, designed for the purpose of scientific investigation, provided, however, that a similar undertaking is given by the Russian Gov[ernment] in regard to the entry into Tibet of any scientific mission organized by, or composed of, Russian subjects. H[is] M[ajesty's] Gov[ernment] further undertake to request the Chinese Gov[ernment] to prohibit, for the same period, so far as lies in their power, any scientific expeditions of any foreign nationality from entering Tibet from the North and East, on the understanding that similar action is taken by the Russian Gov[ernment]. At the expiration of five years, His Majesty's Gov[ernment] will consider, in consultation with the Russian Gov[ernment], the advisability, or otherwise of extending this prohibition for a further period.

For the purposes of the present undertaking Tibet shall be held to include the whole of the geographical area known as Tibet lying to the south of the Kuenlan and Naushan ranges, and extending on the north and east to tracts near Tsaidam directly under Chinese administration and the provinces of China proper. Upper Tsaidam and Western Thaiji shall also be held to form part of Tibetan territory.

I have, &c.]

To Sir A. Nicolson, No. 23, Tel., Feb. 21, 1907.

the Convention itself, it was unnecessary to obtain a specific stipulation against the entry of all Russian officials into Thibet. Sir Arthur's suggestion was approved, and it was agreed that a specific stipulation was unnecessary.

Sir A. Nicolson, No. 100, February 20, 1907.

The Russian version of the draft Convention has now been received, and it appears to be in conformity with our version with the exception of Article II, paragraph 2. The French text contains the words "relations directes," whereas the English has simply "relations." It is proposed to include the word "direct" in the English version to make it correspond with the French.⁽¹²⁾

Sir A. Nicolson, Telegraphic, March 18, 1907.

The question of the prohibition of scientific missions has also been arranged, and a draft note submitted by M. Isvolsky has been accepted. This note is similar to the English draft, but limits the admission of scientific missions to three years instead of five.⁽¹³⁾

Sir A. Nicolson, No. 63, Telegraphic, March 23, 1907.

The matter is thus settled with the exception of—

Sir A. Nicolson, No. 54, Telegraphic, March 28, 1907.

1. The Russian Government signified their willingness to accept the draft Annex regarding the British occupation of the Chumbi Valley, but suggested that

(12) [The Russian draft sent by Sir A. Nicolson on February 20 was as follows : F.O. 371/382.

Pro-memoriâ communicated by M. Isvolski to Sir A. Nicolson.

Le Gouvernement Impérial de Russie serait prêt à accepter l'accord avec le Gouvernement Britannique sur la question Tibétaine dans les termes du projet remis par S[on] E[xcellence] Sir Arthur Nicolson le 1/14 février courant dont un texte français se trouve ci-joint.

Toutefois avant de considérer la présente question comme définitivement réglée, le Gouvernement Impérial tiendrait à connaître les vues du Gouvernement Britannique sur la durée de l'occupation de la vallée de Chumbi (*pro-memoriâ* du 25 septembre 1906) ainsi que sur l'autorisation aux explorateurs et savants russes de voyager en territoire Tibétain dans des buts exclusivement scientifiques.

Le 6 (19) Février, 1907.

Draft.

En raison de l'intérêt spécial que par suite de sa situation géographique la Grande Bretagne a dans les relations extérieures du Tibet et en vue du désir de la Grande Bretagne et de la Russie d'arriver à un accord à ce sujet les deux Hautes Parties contractantes sont convenues des articles suivants.

ARTICLE I.

Les deux Hautes Parties contractantes s'engagent à respecter l'intégrité territoriale du Tibet et à s'abstenir de toute ingérence dans son administration intérieure.

ARTICLE II.

Se conformant au principe de la suzeraineté de la Chine sur le Tibet la Russie et la Grande Bretagne s'engagent à ne traiter avec le Tibet que par l'entremise du Gouvernement Chinois. Cet engagement n'exclut pas toutefois les rapports des agents commerciaux anglais avec les autorités tibétaines prévus par l'article V de la convention du 7 septembre 1904 entre la Grande Bretagne et le Tibet et confirmés par la Convention du 27 avril 1906 entre la Grande Bretagne et la Chine; il ne modifie pas non plus les engagements assurés par la Grande Bretagne et la Chine en vertu de l'article I de la dite Convention de 1906.

Il est bien entendu que les bouddhistes tant sujets russes que britanniques peuvent entrer en relations directes sur le terrain strictement religieux avec le Dalaï Lama et les autres représentants du bouddhisme au Tibet; les Gouvernements de Russie et de la Grande Bretagne s'engagent pour autant qu'il dépendra d'eux à ne pas admettre que ces relations puissent porter atteinte aux stipulations du présent accord.

ARTICLE III.

Les Gouvernements Britannique et Russe s'engagent chacun pour sa part à ne pas envoyer de représentants à Lhasa.

ARTICLE IV.

Les Deux Hautes Parties s'engagent à ne rechercher ou obtenir, ni pour leur propre compte, ni en faveur de leurs sujets aucunes concessions de chemins de fer, routes, télégraphes et mines, ou autres droits, au Tibet.

ARTICLE V.

Les deux Gouvernements sont d'accord qu'aucune partie des revenus du Tibet, soit en nature, soit en espèces, ne peut être engagée ou assignée tant à la Russie et à la Grande Bretagne qu'à leurs sujets.]

(13) [cp. *infra*, p. 352, No. 816, *encl.* 5.]

a clause should be added providing that, in the event of anything occurring to prevent the evacuation, the definitive term of the evacuation should be the subject of friendly negotiation between the two Governments. His Majesty's Government are prepared to accept the draft with the omission of the words providing for a discussion regarding the definitive term of the evacuation, and Sir A. Nicolson has been instructed to point out to the Russian Government that the evacuation of the Chumbi Valley is entirely dependent on the fulfilment by the Thibetans of our Convention of 1904, and that it would be quite impossible that we should agree to discuss with another Power the question whether the stipulations of that Convention had been complied with. Sir Arthur was also to point out that His Majesty's Government had no reason to anticipate that the terms of the Convention will not be carried out, and they sincerely desired that the date of evacuation will not be retarded at all. A draft containing the paragraph suggested by the Russian Government with the omission of the last five words will be handed to M. Isvolsky.⁽¹⁴⁾

2. The question of an understanding respecting the status of Russian traders in Thibet, which has been raised by M. Isvolsky. Sir Arthur has been instructed not to recur to the matter again unless M. Isvolsky revives it. In the event of his Excellency doing so, Sir Arthur will request a written statement of his views.

3. Sir A. Nicolson has been instructed to inform M. Isvolsky that we prefer not to import into the negotiations subjects such as Mongolia, which have no direct bearing on the question of Thibet, but that in any case we could not go further than to say that we are prepared to recognize Russia's special interest in the districts of Mongolia coterminous with the Russian frontier. Before we did so, however, we should require that the special interests and the area to which they extend were defined.

4. The boundaries of Thibet. These were laid down as the country lying south of the Kuenlan and Nanshan ranges, and extending on the north and east to tracts near Tsaidam directly under Chinese administration and the provinces of China proper. Upper Tsaidam and Western Thajji were also considered part of Thibet. M. Isvolsky stated that in his opinion these limits were rather extended, and he suggested that we should accept the Chinese boundaries of Thibet as delimiting its area. An opportunity for inquiring would present itself when we approached the Chinese Government in order to obtain their consent to prohibiting the entry into Thibet of scientific missions.

Foreign Office, April 18, 1907.

(14) [*v. infra*, pp. 349-50, No. 315.]

Sir A. Nicolson,
No. 83,
Jan. 12, 1907.

To Sir A.
Nicolson,
No. 28, Tel.,
Feb. 25, 1907.

To Sir A.
Nicolson.
No. 11,
Telegraphic,
February 8,
1907.

To Sir A.
Nicolson.
No. 23,
Telegraphic,
February 21,
1907.

No. 315.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.

F.O. 371/382.

(No. 219.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, D. April 22, 1907.

R. April 29, 1907.

With reference to your despatch No. 145 of the 8th instant, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith an *aide-mémoire* which I left with M. Isvolsky this afternoon in reply to the memorandum which His Excellency had communicated to me respecting the British occupation of the Chumbi valley.

I have, &c.

A. NICOLSON.

Enclosure in No. 315.

Aide-mémoire communicated to Russian Government, April 9 (22), 1907.

H[is] M[ajesty's] Embassy had the honour to receive the Memorandum in which it was suggested that a paragraph should be added to the annex to the Thibetan Convention regarding the occupation of the Chumbi valley. The paragraph in question was to the effect that if the occupation for some cause or another were prolonged over the specified period "les Gouvernements Britannique et Russe entreront dans un échange de vues amical concernant le terme définitif de l'évacuation."

H[is] M[ajesty's] Embassy is authorized to accept this additional paragraph provided that the words "concernant le terme définitif de l'évacuation" are omitted.

H[is] M[ajesty's] Embassy would wish to point out that the evacuation of the Chumbi valley is entirely dependent on the fulfilment by the Thibetan Government of the Convention of 1904, and it is clear that H[is] B[ritannic] M[ajesty's] Gov[ernment] could not agree to discuss with another Power whether the stipulations of the Convention of 1904 had been complied with.

H[is] M[ajesty's] Embassy is, however, enabled to state that there is no reason to anticipate that the stipulations will not be fulfilled, and that H[is] B[ritannic] M[ajesty's] Government are sincerely desirous that the date of the evacuation should not in any way be retarded.

No. 316.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.

F.O. 371/882.

(No. 241.)

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, D. May 4, 1907.**R. May 18, 1907.*

I have the honour to transmit, herewith, copy of an *Aide Mémoire*, with its enclosure, which I have received from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs stating that the Russian Government agree to the omission of the words "concernant le terme définitif de l'évacuation" from the Annexe to the Thibetan Convention concerning the British occupation of the Chumbi Valley. They wish to replace the above words by "à ce sujet" in order to complete the phrase, and it seems to me that this substitution is unobjectionable.

I had informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs verbally that His Majesty's Government accepted the terms of the Russian Draft note concerning scientific missions, but I have now communicated this assurance in an *Aide Mémoire* of which I beg leave to enclose a copy.

For convenience of reference I transmit copies of the Annexe to the Thibetan Convention, and also of the note concerning scientific missions in French and English, and I should be grateful if you would inform me if you would wish any corrections made in the English translations of the French text.

I have, &c.

A. NICOLSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 316.

Aide-mémoire.

Le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères a eu l'honneur de recevoir l'aide mémoire de l'Ambassade Britannique en date du 10/23 avril e[ourant]t⁽¹⁾ au sujet de l'occupation de la vallée de Chumby par les forces anglaises.

Prenant acte du désir énoncé par le Gouvernement Britannique de ne pas voir retardée la date fixée pour l'évacuation de cette partie du territoire thibétain, le

(1) [v. supra, No. 315, encl. The date given there, April 9/22, is correct.]

Gouvernement Impérial est prêt à omettre dans le texte de l'annexe à la convention concernant le Thibet les mots " concernant le terme définitif de l'évacuation " en les remplaçant par " à ce sujet " pour compléter la phrase au point de vue de la rédaction. Le texte ainsi arrêté se trouve ci-joint.

En portant ce qui précède à la connaissance de l'Ambassade Britannique le Gouvernement Impérial aime à espérer qu'il pourra recevoir une réponse favorable quant au projet de note ayant trait aux expéditions scientifiques dans le Thibet et soumis à l'approbation du Cabinet de Londres.

Saint-Pétersbourg, le 20 Avril (8 Mai), 1907.

Enclosure 2 in No. 316.

Annexe à la Convention entre la Grande Bretagne et la Russie concernant le Thibet.

La Grande Bretagne réaffirme la déclaration signée par S[on] E[xcellence] le Vice-Roi et Gouverneur-Général des Indes et annexée à la ratification de la Convention du 7 Septembre 1904, stipulant que l'occupation de la vallée de Chumby par les forces britanniques prendra fin après le paiement des trois annuités de 25,00,000 roupies, à condition que les places de marché mentionnées dans l'article II de la dite Convention soient effectivement ouvertes depuis trois ans, et que les autorités thibétaines durant cette période se conforment strictement sous tous les rapports aux termes de la dite Convention de 1904. Il est bien entendu que si l'occupation de la vallée de Chumby par les forces britanniques n'aura pas pris fin pour quelque raison que ce soit, à l'époque prévue par la déclaration précitée, les Gouvernements Britannique et Russe entreront dans un échange de vues amical à ce sujet.

Enclosure 3 in No. 316.

Aide-mémoire.—(Communicated May 4, 1907.)

H[is] M[ajesty's] Embassy has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the *Aide-Mémoire* of the 20th April/3 May, stating that the Imperial Gov[ernmen]t are willing to omit the words " concernant le terme définitif de l'évacuation " from the text of the annexe to the Convention regarding Thibet.

H[is] M[ajesty's] Embassy begs leave to inform the Imp[erial] Min[ister] for F[oreign] A[ffairs] that H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] accept the text of the note regarding scientific expeditions to Thibet, which was communicated by the Imperial Gov[ernmen]t in the *Pro Memoria* of March 13/26, 1907.

Enclosure 4 in No. 316.

Draft Annexe to Thibet Convention.

La Grande Bretagne réaffirme la déclaration signée par Son Excellence le Viceroy et Gouverneur-Général des Indes et annexée à la ratification de la Convention du 7 septembre 1904, stipulant que l'occupation de la vallée de Chumby par les forces britanniques prendra fin après le paiement des trois annuités de 25,00,000 roupies, à condition que les places de marché mentionnées dans l'article II de la dite Convention soient effectivement

Great Britain reaffirms the declaration signed by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, appended to the ratified Convention of September 7, 1904 and stipulating that the British occupation of the Chumby valley shall cease after the due payment of the three annual instalments of the indemnity of 25,00,000 rupees, provided that the trade marts as mentioned in Article II of the said Convention shall

ouvertes depuis trois ans et que les autorités thibétaines durant cette période se conforment strictement sous tous les rapports aux termes de la dite Convention de 1904. Il est bien entendu que si l'occupation de la vallée de Chumby par les forces britanniques n'aura pas pris fin, pour quelque raison que ce soit, à l'époque prévue par la déclaration précitée, les Gouvernements Britannique et Russe entreront dans un échange de vues amical à ce sujet.

have been effectively opened for three years, and that in the meantime the Thibetan authorities shall have faithfully complied with the terms of the said Convention of 1904 in all other respects. It is understood that if the occupation of the Chumby valley by the British forces shall not have terminated, for some reason or other, at the date indicated in the above-mentioned declaration, the British and Russian Governments will enter into a friendly interchange of views on the subject.

Enclosure 5 in No. 316.

Draft Project of Note.

Me référant à la Convention au sujet du Thibet, signée aujourd'hui, j'ai l'honneur de faire savoir à Votre Excellence la déclaration suivante.

Le Gouvernement Britannique juge utile, pour autant qu'il dépendra de lui, de ne pas admettre—sauf accord préalable avec le Gouvernement Russe—pour une durée de trois ans à partir de la date de la présente communication, l'entrée au Thibet d'une mission scientifique quelconque, à condition toutefois qu'une assurance pareille soit donnée de la part du Gouvernement Impérial de Russie.

Le Gouvernement Britannique se propose en outre de s'adresser au Gouvernement Chinois afin de faire agréer à ce dernier une obligation analogue pour une période correspondante: il va de soi que la même démarche sera faite par le Gouvernement Russe.

A l'expiration du terme précité, le Gouvernement Britannique avisera d'un commun accord avec le Gouvernement Russe à l'opportunité, s'il y a lieu, de mesures ultérieures à prendre concernant les expéditions scientifiques au Thibet.

With reference to the convention concerning Thibet signed to-day, I have the honour to make the following declaration to Your Excellency.

The British Government consider it to be desirable not to allow, without previous agreement with the Russian Government, and so far as it lies in their power, the entry of scientific missions into Thibet for a period of three years from the date of the present communication, on the understanding that a similar assurance is given by the Imperial Russian Government.

Furthermore, the British Government propose to address themselves to the Chinese Government with the view of obtaining the consent of the latter to a like undertaking for a corresponding period, always on the understanding that the Russian Government will take a similar step.

On the expiration of the above-mentioned term, the British Government will consider in accord with the Russian Government as to the expediency, should such exist, of further measures being adopted concerning scientific missions to Thibet.

[*ED. NOTE.*—The following is the text of the Anglo-Russian Arrangement concerning Thibet taken from the British original text, which was sent to Sir E. Grey by Sir A. Nicolson with his despatch No. 445 of August 31, 1907, R. September 3, v. *infra*, p. 502, No. 456. The preamble to the Convention is also printed there, as the Persian arrangement formed the first part of the Convention. The full text is printed *infra*, pp. 618-20, *Appendix I.*]

No. 317.

Arrangement concernant le Thibet.

Les Gouvernements de la Grande Bretagne et de Russie, reconnaissant les droits suzerains de la Chine sur le Thibet et considérant que par suite de sa situation

géographique la Grande Bretagne a un intérêt spécial à voir le régime actuel des relations extérieures du Thibet intégralement maintenu, sont convenus de l'arrangement suivant :

ARTICLE I.

Les deux Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent à respecter l'intégrité territoriale du Thibet et à s'abstenir de toute ingérence dans son administration intérieure.

ARTICLE II.

Se conformant au principe admis de la suzeraineté de la Chine sur le Thibet, la Grande Bretagne et la Russie s'engagent à ne traiter avec le Thibet que par l'entremise du Gouvernement Chinois. Cet engagement n'exclut pas toutefois les rapports directs des agents commerciaux anglais avec les autorités thibétaines prévus par l'article V de la convention du 7 Septembre 1904 entre la Grande Bretagne et le Thibet et confirmés par la convention du 27 Avril 1906 entre la Grande Bretagne et la Chine; il ne modifie pas non plus les engagements assumés par la Grande Bretagne et la Chine en vertu de l'article I de ladite convention de 1906.

Il est bien entendu que les bouddhistes tant sujets britanniques que russes peuvent entrer en relations directes sur le terrain strictement religieux avec le Dalai-Lama et les autres représentants du bouddhisme au Thibet; les Gouvernements de la Grande Bretagne et de Russie s'engagent, pour autant qu'il dépendra d'eux, à ne pas admettre que ces relations puissent porter atteinte aux stipulations du présent arrangement.

ARTICLE III.

Les Gouvernements Britannique et Russe s'engagent, chacun pour sa part, à ne pas envoyer de Représentants à Lhassa.

ARTICLE IV.

Les deux Hautes Parties s'engagent à ne rechercher ou obtenir, ni pour leur propre compte, ni en faveur de leurs sujets, aucunes concessions de chemins de fer, routes, télégraphes et mines, ou autres droits au Thibet.

ARTICLE V.

Les deux Gouvernements sont d'accord qu'aucune partie des revenus du Thibet, soit en nature, soit en espèces, ne peut être engagée ou assignée tant à la Grande Bretagne et à la Russie qu'à leurs sujets.

Annexe à l'Arrangement entre la Grande Bretagne et la Russie concernant le Thibet.

La Grande Bretagne réaffirme la déclaration signée par son Excellence le Vice-Roi et Gouverneur Général des Indes et annexée à la ratification de la convention du 7 septembre 1904, stipulant que l'occupation de la vallée de Chumbi par les forces britanniques prendra fin après le paiement de trois annuités de l'indemnité de 25.00.000 roupies, à condition que les places de marché mentionnées dans l'article II de ladite convention aient été effectivement ouvertes depuis trois ans et que les autorités thibétaines durant cette période se soient conformées strictement sous tous les rapports aux termes de ladite convention de 1904. Il est bien entendu que si l'occupation de la vallée du Chumbi par les forces britanniques n'aura pas pris fin, pour quelque raison que ce soit, à l'époque prévue par la déclaration précitée, les Gouvernements Britannique et Russe entreront dans un échange de vues amical à ce sujet.

La présente Convention sera ratifiée et les ratifications en seront échangées à St. Pétersbourg aussitôt que faire se pourra.⁽¹⁾

En foi de quoi les Plénipotentiaires respectifs ont signé la présente convention et y ont apposé leurs cachets.

Fait à St. Pétersbourg, en double expédition, le 18/31 Août, 1907.

A. NICOLSON.
(L.S.)

ISWOLSKY.
(L.S.)

⁽¹⁾ [Ratifications were exchanged on September 23. A formal communication of the text was made to the Great Powers on the 24th, to China on the 25th, and to the public on the 26th. A substantially accurate summary had appeared in the Russian newspaper the "Itetch" on September 19.

The English text of the agreements, which was a translation only, is printed in *B.F.S.P.*, Vol. 100 (1911), p. 555, *sqq.* The full French text is printed *infra*, pp. 618-20, *Appendix I.*]

No. 318 (a).

Sir A. Nicolson to M. Isvolski.⁽¹⁾

F.O. 371/325.

M. le Ministre,

Saint-Pétersbourg, le 18 (31) Août, 1907.

Me référant à l'arrangement au sujet du Thibet signé aujourd'hui, j'ai l'honneur de faire à Votre Excellence la Déclaration suivante :—

“Le Gouvernement Britannique juge utile, pour autant qu'il dépendra de lui, de ne pas admettre, sauf accord préalable avec le Gouvernement Russe, pour une durée de trois ans à partir de la date de la présente communication, l'entrée au Thibet d'une mission scientifique quelconque, à condition toutefois qu'une assurance pareille soit donnée de la part du Gouvernement Impérial de Russie.

“Le Gouvernement Britannique se propose, en outre, de s'adresser au Gouvernement Chinois afin de faire agréer à ce dernier une obligation analogue pour une période correspondante; il va de soi que la même démarche sera faite par le Gouvernement Russe.

“A l'expiration du terme de trois ans précité, le Gouvernement Britannique avisera d'un commun accord avec le Gouvernement Russe à l'opportunité, s'il y a lieu, de mesures ultérieures à prendre concernant les expéditions scientifiques au Thibet.”

Je saisis, &c.
(Signé) A. NICOLSON.

⁽¹⁾ [A certified copy of Sir A. Nicolson's note was enclosed in his despatch No. 445 of August 31, 1907, *infra*, p. 502, No. 456. The original text of M. Isvolski's reply (*v.* below) is bound up with the British original treaty.]

No. 318 (b).

M. Isvolski to Sir A. Nicolson.

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,

Saint-Pétersbourg, le 18 (31) Août, 1907.

En réponse à la note de Votre Excellence en date de ce jour, j'ai l'honneur de déclarer à mon tour que le Gouvernement Impérial de Russie juge utile, pour autant qu'il dépendra de lui, de ne pas admettre,—sauf accord préalable avec le

Gouvernement Britannique,—pour une durée de trois ans à partir de la date de la présente communication, l'entrée au Thibet d'une mission scientifique quelconque.

De même que le Gouvernement Britannique, le Gouvernement Impérial se propose de s'adresser au Gouvernement Chinois afin de faire agréer à ce dernier une obligation analogue pour une période correspondante.

Il reste entendu qu'à l'expiration du terme de trois ans les deux Gouvernements aviseront d'un commun accord à l'opportunité, s'il y a lieu, de mesures ultérieures à prendre concernant les expéditions scientifiques au Thibet.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, l'assurance de ma haute considération.

ISWOLSKY.