

Canadian sealing-vessels seized in 1902 has been notified to the Imperial Government, but the compensation has not yet been paid.⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ [*v. A. & P.* (1905), CIII, (Cd. 2348), *Correspondence respecting Contraband of War*, pp. 451-84.]

V.—PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE TREATY OF PORTSMOUTH.

No. 57.

Sir C. MacDonald to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

F.O. Japan 579.

(No. 393.) Confidential.

Tókió, D. November 22, 1904.

My Lord,

R. December 28, 1904.

I have the honour to forward copy of an interesting memorandum by Mr. Hohler, 2nd Secretary of this Legation, giving details of an after-dinner conversation with Marquis Ito.

The modesty of Japan's demands, as set forth by Marquis Ito, in case of success in this war, are worthy of note. So far as I have been able to ascertain in conversation with responsible Japanese, these modest views are very general.

I have, &c.

CLAUDE M. MACDONALD.

Enclosure in No. 57.

Memorandum by Mr. Hohler.

Confidential.

Marquess Ito came to take dinner with me last night, and was full of conversation, speaking English better and better as the evening wore on.

After most interesting accounts of his adventures on his first journey to England, of various incidents in which he had played a part during the Restoration, of his interviews with Prince Bismarck, Mr. Gladstone, Mr. Pobiedonostzeff, etc., etc., he came to speak of the present war, and its possible consequences.

On my observing that, assuming Japan obtained the greatest measure of success in the war, still, as she could reach no vital point of Russia, it seemed difficult to foresee how any finality could be attained, or on what situation it would be possible to base a definite and durable peace, he replied that, in his opinion—whether that opinion would be adopted by the Japanese nation he could not say—the only method by which a lasting peace could be secured, would be by the internationalization of the railway from the point where it enters Chinese territory. Russia, he said, had come to the Far East not in obedience to any internal force or natural necessity, but had come solely by means of the railway, away from which she had made and could make no progress, and purely from territorial greed. Japan had been driven to war by sheer fear of this aggression, when she saw that even Corea was not escaping Russian encroachments, and not with a view to aggrandizement.

Granting the final success of Japan in the war, she neither wanted Manchuria, nor was she strong enough to maintain large garrisons indefinitely on the remote borders of that province. She had already made explicit declarations that she would respect the integrity of China, and the Marquess said he considered that that integrity was of the utmost importance to Japan, provided it was always accompanied by the policy of the "open door",—the door being effectually open to free competition which would ensure to Japan all she needed.

Manchuria would thus be restored to China: for policing it, a force of Chinese, officered, he said, perhaps by Japanese, would be quite sufficient, and the cost of such an arrangement would be very small. The force would be under the management of the international committee of control, who would provide for its expenses either from the profits of the railway, or from Chinese sources.

Such an administration of the railway by an international body was, in his opinion, the only method by which Manchuria could be securely preserved from subsequent Russian encroachment. It would not be necessary that a great number of nations should be represented on this body, but the permanence of the internationalization must be guaranteed by it, as well as by Japan and Russia.

Sir W. Nicholson who was also present, and I both thought he said that it would be quite enough if England and the United States were on the control. He certainly stated that the first object of importance in Japan's foreign policy was the friendship of England: in the second place came that of America.

(Thus, if the Marquess' views are eventually adopted, they will on the one hand confirm the advantages derivable from the policy of the "open door": on the other, they will entail the responsibility of the guarantee for the internationalization of the railway).⁽¹⁾

Sir W. Nicholson at this point remarked that the moderation of such terms seemed remarkable, when one considered the magnitude of the efforts which Japan would have made.

Marquess Ito answered that it was unprofitable for any country to endeavour to go beyond those limits which appear to have been set by nature to its powers: to do so was to open a source of weakness, and of this Russia was, he thought, an example. All that the Japanese aimed at, was to ensure solidly and permanently, so far as might possibly be done, the future safety and peace of their country: that gained, they desired nothing but moderation.

(Mr. Denison, the adviser to the Japanese Foreign Office, has told me that the Japanese Government do not regard the Liaotung territory as coming under the heading of Manchuria, inasmuch as it belongs by lease to Russia. I do not imagine that Marquess Ito would dissent from this theory, nor that the Japanese would approve the possibility of having to attempt the capture of Port Arthur a third time.⁽²⁾)

Later on, he said that when he saw Count Lamsdorff in the course of his journey in Europe in the winter of 1901, and was endeavouring to come to some arrangement as to the Manchurian question, Count Lamsdorff agreed that Japan should have a predominant influence in Corea, but he urged that, in return, Russia must at least be given some compensation, say a settlement, in the South of the peninsular [*sic*]. Marquess Ito at once understood that he must be referring to Masampo. The Russian Minister went on to say that his Government would never make any strategic use whatever of such a settlement. In reply to the question, what guarantee would they give for that, he said they would give a guarantee in writing. To this the Marquess answered nothing, but he thought the offer inadequate.

On the following day, he had an interview with Mr. Witte, who professed not to have seen Count Lamsdorff, nor to have heard the upshot of their conversation, but he put forward the identical proposal, basing it, however, in his quality of Minister of Finance, on commercial grounds.

There is no reason to believe that Marquess Ito was not speaking the truth in giving this account, and, if so, it is interesting as showing that even Count Lamsdorff and Mr. Witte were not unwilling to try a little hazard, instead of confining themselves to the limits of sound business.

With regard to China, the Japanese could, Marquess Ito said, by themselves effect but very little. It was true that Japanese could understand Chinese better than

⁽¹⁾ [The brackets appearing in this document are in the original.]

⁽²⁾ [Marginal comment by Lord Lansdowne: "does this mean that Japan is to *keep* the Liaotung peninsula?"]

all but a very few foreigners could ever hope to, but the character of the two nations was too dissimilar and the resources of Japan were too feeble. If, however, England were to co-operate with Japan, then much might be done. He said that England had been the first to open up China, and her influence there was older and wider than that of any other country. The two were thus well fitted to work together.

Having recently read a book upon Japan which laid great stress upon the submissiveness of the people—a quality which would seem almost inevitable in view of the great strictness of the feudal régime, under which the people possessed no rights whatever, but were entirely at the discretion of their lords, I asked how far this was, in fact, a characteristic of the Japanese.

He answered that they were entirely submissive up to a certain point, but that, in olden days, cases such as that of Sogoro (which was celebrated in the volume recently published by Viscount Hayashi) were far from rare, but he said that very often the heroes of such incidents had sacrificed themselves rather for fame (after the fashion of Herostratus) than truly for the benefit of their fellows. (It is possible that he was here thinking of various attempts at political assassination, by which he himself has been more than once imperilled, which occurred in more recent times.)

He continued, that the root of this submissiveness lay in obedience to the Emperor, whose line had reigned unbroken through at least two thousand years. I ventured to suggest that this had been so only in theory, but the Marquess answered that that was sufficient, for all orders had been issued under the ægis of his authority. There was not now, he said, nor ever had been a single Japanese who believed that the Emperor was a god; he was a man—stretching out his arms—just like himself. It was almost impossible for anyone not a Japanese to understand the feeling of a Japanese towards His Majesty: it was most like to that which we entertain towards a father, and the attitude of the Emperor in the present war made every single Japanese regard it as his own special and individual concern.

T. B. HOHLER.

November 18, 1904.

No. 58.

Sir C. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

F.O. Russia 1682.

(No. 651.) Very Confidential.

St. Petersburg, D. December 2, 1904.

My Lord,

R. December 12, 1904.

. . . .⁽¹⁾ When I called at the French Embassy a few days ago Monsieur Bompard expressed his satisfaction at the conclusion of the Agreement with Russia to submit the question of the incident in the North Sea to an International Commission of Enquiry to be held at Paris. On my remarking that the French Government had by their friendly attitude certainly contributed to this peaceful solution, His Excellency observed that the action of the French Government was much criticized in official circles here and that their policy in concluding an agreement with England had been generally attacked in Russia. He further enlarged at some length on the subject of the relations of Great Britain to Russia stating that public opinion in Russia had from the very commencement of the war been thoroughly exasperated against England not merely as the allies of Japan and by the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards various incidents that had occurred, but also by the immoderately hostile tone of the British press. He himself had recently spent a month in Germany and could bear witness to the unfriendly feelings of the German population towards Russia, but the German Government had been more skilful and had given the impression abroad and especially in Russia that Germany was animated by friendly sentiments towards Russia

⁽¹⁾ [The first part of this despatch refers to M. Bompard's sudden return to St. Petersburg.]

and would assist her when possible through her difficulties. The German press might be considered a free press but nevertheless the German Government succeeded in imposing upon it a certain restraint and he could not help feeling that more efforts might have been made in a similar direction in England. He impressed upon me that the attitude of His Majesty's Government during the next year when the conditions of peace would be under discussion would be decisive of the relations between England and Russia for the next twenty five years. Thanks to the Japanese war the German Government were only now recovering the position which they had lost at the congress of Berlin. If His Majesty's Government continued to maintain the same strained relations during the forthcoming year as in the past twelve months there would be no prospect of a rapprochement between the two countries for another generation. He begged me to remember that the many incidents which had occurred had redounded solely to the advantage of the German Emperor who now had a position at the Russian Court which a year ago would have been regarded as impossible. . . .⁽²⁾

I have, &c.

CHARLES HARDINGE.

MINUTE.

All this agrees with what M. Cambon has said altho[ugh] M. Bompard goes a good deal further.
L.

MINUTE BY KING EDWARD.

A most important conversation.

E.R.

⁽²⁾ [The closing paragraphs refer to the possible policies of the European Powers in the prospective Russo-Japanese peace negotiations. *cp. infra*, p. 120, No. 110.]

No. 59.

Sir E. Monson to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

F.O. France 3668.

(No. 656.) Confidential.

Paris, D. December 23, 1904.

My Lord,

R. December 24, 1904.

I have read with great interest Sir C. Hardinge's despatch No. 651 Very Confidential,⁽¹⁾ a copy of which was transmitted to me in Your Lordship's despatch No. 617 of the 16th instant.

M. Delcassé, as might be expected, has neither referred in conversation with me to M. Bompard's sudden departure for Russia; nor has he ever indulged in the slightest speculation as to the duration or result of the war. If his opinion is that of ninety-nine in a hundred of the average Frenchmen he must be convinced of the eventual success of the ally of France, just as M. Bompard appears to be.

Without entering into this speculation, which I should certainly consider an unwarrantably presumptuous act on my part, I venture to express my surprise at the comments made by M. Bompard on the attitude of His Majesty's Government and on the hostility of the British Press towards Russia in regard to the various incidents which have happened since the outbreak of the war. M. Bompard is an intelligent man; and although the position which he occupied in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs before his appointment to be Ambassador in Russia was not nominally connected with any but the commercial policy of France towards Foreign Powers, it is not to be supposed that he was without opportunity of studying and acquainting himself with the most salient characteristics of France's most important neighbour. He does not seem to me to have much excuse for his ignorance in regard to the position of His

⁽¹⁾ [v. immediately preceding document.]

Majesty's Government towards the British Press; or of the wide-reaching independence of the latter. And to a man who cannot avoid being aware of the unscrupulousness, the mendacity, the venality and the coarseness of French journalism, his susceptibility as to the infinitely more decent, more moderate and more discreet tone of the British Press, even under great provocation, appears almost Pecksniffian.

There is no doubt as to the extent of the apprehension entertained in France as to the danger to the Franco-Russian Alliance arising from the overt benevolence of Germany towards the enemy of Japan throughout the present hostilities. However desirous the Government of the Republic may be to preserve the semblance of equitable neutrality, the proceedings of Germany cannot but immensely increase the difficulty of a position which without the aggravation of such foreign rivalry must in itself have been sufficiently intricate. M. Delcassé has latterly been constantly reproached in certain opposition quarters for subordinating the interests of the Alliance with Russia to the more doubtful advantages of an understanding with Great Britain. It is especially to be regretted that the sudden change in the situation in Morocco, and the prospect it raises of serious trouble for France, should have been developed at a moment when the adversaries of that understanding are so eager to avail themselves of the opportunity of justifying their arguments as to the hollowness of the compensation accepted by France for the surrender of her claims in Newfoundland and Egypt. If there is any reproach to be made to recent English journalism it is to my mind to be found in the fact that the coming difficulties of France in Morocco seem to receive insufficient sympathy in the London Press.

I have, &c.

EDMUND MONSON.

No. 60.

Sir C. MacDonald to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

Tôkiô, January 12, 1905.

F.O. Japan 595.

D. NOON.

Tel. (No. 9.) Very Confidential.

R. 8 P.M.

In certain usually well-informed circles an idea seems to be prevalent that now that Port Arthur has fallen peace is within measurable distance.

At an interview I had with the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday I sounded him on this point; following are his views which may be taken to be those of the Japanese Government.

Until the Baltic fleet is destroyed or returns to Russia and until a decisive victory is won by the Japanese at Mukden Russian Government will not, he thinks, make any overtures whatever for peace.

Should however these events come to pass the Russian Government may then recognise that the chances of "dictating terms of peace at Tokio" are very remote and be willing to consider question of coming to terms.

Serious internal troubles in Russia will doubtless accelerate this willingness but Minister for Foreign Affairs does not anticipate any such trouble at any rate for six months.

He added however that the Japanese Government have no very reliable information as to what is now going on in Russia.

Japanese Authorities fully expect and are making every preparation for hostilities on a large scale near Mukden they do not think that the Baltic fleet will continue its journey but they are prepared for all eventualities.

No. 61.

*The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir M. Durand.*F.O. America 2578.
(No. 9A.) Confidential.

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 14, 1905.

The American Amb[assado]r informed me today that it had come to the knowledge of the U[nited] S[tates'] Gov[ernmen]t that apprehension exists on the part of some of the Powers that in the eventual negotiations for peace between Russia and Japan claim may be made for concessions of Chinese territory to neutral Powers. The President of the U[nited] S[tates] would be loth to share this apprehension because he believes that the introduction of extraneous interests would seriously embarrass and postpone the settlement of the issues involved in the present contest in the Far East, and would thus make more remote the attainment of that peace which is so earnestly to be desired. The United States Gov[ernmen]t, for their part, had repeatedly made their position well known and had been gratified at the cordial welcome accorded to their efforts to strengthen and perpetuate the broad policy of maintaining the integrity of China and the open door in the Orient, whereby equality of commercial opportunity and access might be enjoyed by all nations.

Holding these views the U[nited] S[tates] disclaimed any thought of reserved territorial rights or control in the Chinese Empire and they deemed it fitting to make this purpose frankly known and to remove all apprehension on this score so far as concerns the policy of the United States which maintain so considerable a share of the Pacific commerce of China and which hold such important positions in the Western Pacific almost at the gateway of China.

• Mr. Choate stated that he had received instructions to bring this matter to the notice of H[is] M[ajesty's] Gov[ernmen]t with a request for an expression of their views. He was at the same time to inform me confidentially that his Gov[ernmen]t were assured in advance of a favo[u]rable response from Germany, and they earnestly hoped that they might receive a similar answer from H[is] M[ajesty's] Gov[ernmen]t.

I stated to H[is] E[xc]cellency in reply that the U[nited] S[tates'] Gov[ernmen]t might rely upon the full concurrence of H[is] M[ajesty's] Gov[ernmen]t in the proposal: our assent might indeed be looked upon in the light of a foregone conclusion.

[I am, &c.]
L[ANSDOWNE].

[ED. NOTE.—All the Great Powers of Europe ultimately concurred with the circular from the United States of which the text is paraphrased above.]

No. 62.

*The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir M. Durand.*F.O. America 2578.
(No. 13.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 18, 1905.

The American Ambassador handed to me today a note, of which a copy is enclosed with this despatch, upon the subject of the Russian complaint of the manner in which China had discharged her obligations as a neutral.⁽¹⁾ His Excellency asked me what

(1) [The charges, here made against China by Russia, were declared by Lord Lansdowne to be baseless in his despatch to Sir Claude MacDonald No. 16 of January 28, 1905, F.O. Japan 590.]

action His Majesty's Government had taken in reference to the Russian protest, and I said that I had telegraphed the particulars of it to our Minister at Peking, begging him to supply us with certain information in connexion with the Russian complaint. I added that we entirely agreed with the American Government in holding that every effort should be made to inculcate upon China the duty of strictly observing her duties as a neutral. I also said that it might be worth while to make sure that there had not been a violation by Russia of the neutrality of China on the occasion of the recent cavalry operations under the command of General Mistchenko, who, so far as I was able to make out from a study of the map, seemed to have crossed the Liao River during the progress of those operations.

[I am, &c.
LANSDOWNE.]

Enclosure in No. 62.

Mr. J. H. Choate to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

F.O. America 2587.
My Lord,

*American Embassy, London,
January 18, 1905.*

I have the honour to inform Your Lordship that my Government have transmitted the Russian protest, charging China with violation of neutrality, to the American Minister in Peking, instructing him to urge upon the Chinese Government the strict observance of their obligations, and at the same time Mr. Hay has addressed a note to the Russian Ambassador at Washington bringing to his notice the fact that both the Chinese and Japanese Governments formally deny the charges of breach of neutrality, and he has expressed the earnest hope and confidence of the President that there may not be on the part of either belligerent nor of a neutral Power any breach of the neutrality which the whole civilized world has agreed to respect, a violation of which could only be disastrous to all the Powers concerned.

I have, &c.
JOSEPH H. CHOATE.

No. 63.

Sir M. Durand to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

F.O. America 2579.
(No. 22.)
My Lord,

*Washington, D. January 27, 1905.
R. February 4, 1905.*

I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of two documents⁽¹⁾ sent to me by the Acting Secretary of State yesterday.

The first contains the recent correspondence between the Russian Ambassador in Washington and the United States Government upon the observance of neutrality by China, together with the instructions sent to the United States Minister in Peking and the reply of the Chinese Government.

The second is a copy of the circular telegram addressed by the Secretary of State to the United States Representatives in Great Britain, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and Portugal, disclaiming any thought of reserved territorial rights or control in the Chinese Empire. To this is appended a note stating that replies to this circular telegram have, so far, been received from Great Britain, Austria, France, Germany and Italy agreeing with the position assumed by the United States Govern-

⁽¹⁾ [Not reproduced.]

ment and declaring their constant adhesion to the policy of maintaining the integrity of China and the "open door" in the Orient.

I regret that I am unable to transmit further copies, having only received two of either document from the State Department.

I have, &c.

H. M. DURAND.

No. 64.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir M. Durand.

F.O. America 2578.

(No. 25.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 30, 1905.

In my desp[atch] No. 9A of the 14th instant⁽¹⁾ I informed Y[our] E[xcellency] of the communication made to me by the American Ambassador, under instructions from his Gov[ernmen]t, in regard to the maintenance of the integrity of China, and the principle of equality for the commerce of all nations in the Far East. I was informed by H[is] E[xcellency], on the 20th instant, that he had received on the previous day a telegram from Mr. Hay, to the effect that France fully concurred in the proposal of the U[nited] S[tates'] Gov[ernmen]t and desired no concessions of territory in China.

Mr. Choate added that, according to the papers, this was regarded as completing the general concurrence of the Great Powers and was another step in securing the integrity of China.

[I am, &c.

LANSDOWNE.]

⁽¹⁾ [v. *supra*, p. 69, No. 61.]

No. 65.

Sir C. MacDonald to the Marquess of Lansdowne

F.O. Japan 591.

(No. 84.) Secret.

My Lord,

Tôkiô, D. March 24, 1905.

R. April 26, 1905.

On the 19th instant I received Your Lordship's telegram (No. 23 Secret)⁽¹⁾ informing me that His Majesty's Government had been secretly informed that the Japanese Government had expressed to the American Government a desire for mediation. Your Lordship added that this desire had been expressed quite recently, and asked whether I had any reason for believing the report to be well founded. As all the information in my possession, derived from personal intercourse with Cabinet Ministers and Statesmen, with whom the destinies of Japan now rest, was of a nature to make me believe that an appeal for mediation was the very last thing contemplated by the Japanese Government, Your Lordship's telegram came as a great surprise.

The entire press of Japan has never for one moment, since the commencement of the war, wavered in its determination to continue the war with Russia, until the latter sued for peace.

⁽¹⁾ [Not reproduced. The telegram was despatched on March 16.]

The day before the receipt of Your Lordship's telegram, the Prime Minister, speaking at a banquet given by the leading bankers and business men of Japan, when thanking them for the moral and financial support they had so unhesitatingly and ungrudgingly given the Government in prosecuting the war, had stated in the most emphatic manner that Japan would continue the war unflinchingly until she emerged therefrom victorious. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has repeatedly informed me that Japan's quarrel was with Russia, and with Russia alone would she enter into peace negotiations, and then only when the Russian Government, as represented by the Emperor, the Court and the War Party, shewed an unmistakable desire to commence Peace Negotiations. It was therefore incomprehensible to me that Japan, at a moment when her arms were being triumphantly carried to the walls of Mukden, when the complete command of Far Eastern waters was in her grasp, should "intimate to the United States a desire for mediation."

In view of the above facts and considerations I telegraphed to Your Lordship that I saw no reasons for believing the report respecting mediation to be well founded. I added that it was possible that the United States Government had expressed a desire to act as mediators, although no information to that effect had reached me.

It will be within Your Lordship's recollection that, on the 25th of January, I reported by telegram (my telegram Secret, No. 22)⁽²⁾ that the information in the possession of the Japanese Government was to the effect that the War Party in Russia was still in the ascendant, and likely to remain so, and if the Japanese Government were absolutely certain that the proposals for peace emanated from the War Party, and were seriously put forward, they would be discussed. On the same day, in my telegram No. 23,⁽²⁾ I reported that Baron Komura's personal opinion was that the war would continue, that the Russians were being greatly strengthened on the Sha-ho, and that hostilities would recommence in March. On the 10th of February I again reported by telegraph that Baron Komura had informed me that not until the Tzar and his Government shewed most unmistakably that they were desirous of peace, could the question of peace be even considered.

Baron Komura, the Prime Minister, Marquis Ito and other statesmen have always held the same language to me, and never once has the word mediation been mentioned.

This afternoon I had an interview with Baron Komura on ordinary matters, at the conclusion of which His Excellency said that he would like to put before me the views of the Japanese Government respecting the present general state of affairs—this question had been fully discussed at a Cabinet meeting held that afternoon. Briefly the views of the Japanese Government were as follows. They considered that the battle of Mukden had been a very serious blow to Russia, and that the opinion of all important States, including France, was that Russia's position in the war, both by sea and by land, was well-nigh hopeless. From information at the disposal of the Japanese Government, the vast bulk of the Russian people were of the same opinion, and desired peace; there was also an influential party in Russia of the same opinion, but the Tzar and the Court were more determined than ever to continue the war, and orders for further extensive mobilisation had been issued. Under the circumstances the Japanese Government were equally determined to prosecute the war with the utmost vigour. I remarked that if the important States, including France, were convinced of the hopelessness of the struggle on the part of Russia, had not the time for mediation come—might not France use her influence in the cause of peace?

Baron Komura replied that in view of the determined attitude of the Tzar, it would be very difficult for France to make a move without running grave risks of meeting with a rebuff. I then tentatively suggested that, considering the great issues at stake, might not Japan suggest mediation? To this Baron Komura at once replied, "that would be little short of madness, for the War Party in Russia would

⁽²⁾ [Not reproduced.]

at once look upon it as a sign of weakness, and be strengthened in their resolve to continue the war." "No," he added; "we entered into this war with the full knowledge and belief that it would be a long business, and we are quite prepared to fight to the end."

I made some further observations on the general subject of mediation, and elicited that the Japanese Government had most certainly not made suggestions of mediation to the United States or any other Government, neither had suggestions been received from any Government in the matter. The above information I communicated to Your Lordship by telegram.

I have, &c.

CLAUDE M. MACDONALD.

MINUTE BY KING EDWARD.

Very interesting and important.

E.R.

[*ED. NOTE.*—The peace overtures are described in Tyler Dennett's *Roosevelt*, ch. VIII and following chapters. There had been overtures in the summer of 1904 (p. 166) and in the autumn and winter of 1904 (*G.P.* XIX, II, ch. 137). In February 1905 M. Witte began discussions with Viscount Hayashi (Tyler Dennett, p. 171). On April 5, M. Delcassé opened the subject with the Japanese representative in Paris, and a hint was transmitted to President Roosevelt on April 18 (pp. 176-7) that he might be asked to act as mediator. He was then in Colorado, and a further suggestion was made by the Japanese Government on May 2 (pp. 183-5) which also gives some of Lord Lansdowne's views. For M. Witte's account, v. *Mémoires* (1921), ch. VI. On one occasion the subject seems to have been mentioned in correspondence between King Edward and President Roosevelt, v. Sir Sidney Lee: *King Edward VII*, (1927), II, pp. 492-3. There is some important information supplementary to Tyler Dennett in A. L. P. Dennis: *Adventures in American Diplomacy* (1896-1906) New York (1928), ch. XIV.]

No. 66.

Sir C. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

F.O. Russia 1700.

(No. 228.) Confidential.

St. Petersburg, D. April 4, 1905.

My Lord,

R. April 15, 1905.

In Sir C. Scott's despatch to Your Lordship No. 69 Confidential of the 18th of February 1904,⁽¹⁾ Mr. Kurino is reported to have said that Count Lamsdorff had not imparted to him the actual contents of the Russian note telegraphed to Admiral Alexeioff on the 4th of February 1904, but that he had given him in confidence his personal views of the terms on which a satisfactory settlement might be arrived at. These views, Mr. Kurino told Sir C. Scott, did not, in his opinion hold out any hope of being acceptable to his Government.

The contents of the Russian note have, to the best of my belief, not been made public, but thanks to the courtesy of a gentleman who has had access to the document in question, I am able to give to Your Lordship a summary of the reply of the Russian Government, which takes the form of a series of nine articles, of which I have the honour to enclose a copy herewith.

From a comparison of this document with the instructions given to Mr. Kurino, of which Viscount Hayashi left a copy at the Foreign Office on the 14th of January

⁽¹⁾ [Not reproduced. It described and commented on the Russo-Japanese negotiations of February 4-10, which immediately preceded the outbreak of war.]

1904,⁽²⁾ and, taking the modifications proposed by the Japanese Government successively as numbered therein, Your Lordship will notice that:—

1. The first clause of Article V of the Russian counter-proposal relating to the "use of Korean territory for strategic purposes" is maintained.
2. The creation of a neutral zone is stated in Article IX to be desirable.
3. (a.) The "recognition by Japan of Manchuria and its littoral as being outside her sphere of interest" is inserted in Article VI, while the "engagement on the part of Russia to respect the territorial integrity of China in Manchuria" is ignored.
- (b.) The proposed engagement on the part of Russia to respect the rights and privileges of Japan and other Powers in Manchuria is accepted.
- (c.) The "recognition by Russia of Korea and its littoral" as being outside her sphere of interest is omitted.
4. The proposed additional article containing a "recognition by Japan of Russia's special interests in Manchuria" is also omitted.

The settlement proposed in these nine articles deals almost exclusively with Korea no mention being made of the sovereignty of China in Manchuria nor of the territorial integrity of that province, and it is not surprising that its text has not hitherto been published, in view of the statements repeatedly made by the Russian Government to the effect that their reply contained a satisfactory solution of all pending questions with Japan.

I have, &c.

CHARLES HARDINGE.

Enclosure in No. 66.

Russian Counter-Proposal to Japan, made before the outbreak of War.

1. A mutual engagement to respect the independence and territorial integrity of Korea.
2. An engagement on the part of Russia not to impede the commercial and industrial undertakings of Japan in Korea, nor to oppose measures for the safeguarding of such interests in Korea.
3. Recognition by Russia of Japan's preponderating interests in Korea, and of her right to offer advice and assistance tending to improve the administration of Korea.
4. Mutual obligation not to use any part of Korean territory for strategic purposes,

(²) [*v. Gooch & Temperley*, Vol. II, pp. 233-4. The following extract is printed here for the convenience of readers:—

1st. Suppression of the first clause of Article V of the Russian counter-proposal (presented to the Japanese Government through Baron Rosen on the 11th December last), that is to say, "not to use any part of Korean territory for strategic purposes."

2nd. Suppression of the whole article concerning the establishment of a neutral zone.

3rd. The Russian proposal concerning Manchuria to be agreed to, with the following modifications:—

(a.) Recognition by Japan of Manchuria and its littoral as being outside her sphere of interest, and an engagement on the part of Russia to respect the territorial integrity of China in Manchuria.

(b.) Russia, within the limits of Manchuria, will not impede Japan or other Powers in the enjoyment of rights and privileges acquired by them under existing Treaties with China.

(c.) Recognition by Russia of Korea and its littoral as being outside her sphere of interest.

4th. Addition of an Article to the following effect:—

Recognition by Japan of Russia's special interests in Manchuria, and of the right of Russia to take measures necessary for the protection of those interests.]

nor to undertake any military works on the coasts of Korea which might menace the free navigation of the Korean Straits.

5. Recognition by Russia of Japan's right to send troops into Korea in accordance with the preceding articles, for the suppression of insurrections or disorders calculated to create international complications.

6. Engagement by Russia to respect the rights and privileges acquired by Japan, as well as by other powers in Manchuria through treaties with China; Japan to recognise Manchuria and littoral as beyond her sphere of interest.

7. Mutual agreement not to impede the junction of the Korean and Eastern Chinese Railroads when they reach the Yalu.

8. This agreement to supplant all previous agreements between Russia and Japan respecting Korea.

9. The desirability, if possible, of creating a neutral zone in Korea.

No. 67.

Sir C. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

F.O. Russia 1700.

(No. 244.) Confidential.

St. Petersburg, D. April 11, 1905.

My Lord,

R. April 15, 1905.

During the past few weeks succeeding the battle of Mukden the question of peace has been once more put forward and anxiously discussed by all those desirous of its realisation. The Russian Government have hitherto invariably maintained their readiness to discuss any proposals made to them by Japan, but that no initiative in that sense need be expected on their side. In spite of the persistent rumours which have been prevalent in the European press of the action of the President of the United States as intermediary between Russia and Japan, the Russian Government assert that no step has been taken by them in that direction and that no approach has been made to them by Mr. Roosevelt. This I believe to be intrinsically true, but I hear on good authority that there is no doubt that the views of the Russian Government as to the basis of any discussion viz. that there should be no war indemnity and no surrender of Russian territory were informally communicated to Mr. Roosevelt from French sources, probably through the French Ambassador in Washington with whom the President is said to be on friendly terms. That, after such a communication, there should be no further question of the consideration of peace on such terms by Japan can hardly be surprising in view of the relative position of the Russian and Japanese armies and the series of important victories obtained by the latter during 14 months of war.

The discussion which has been provoked in the Press and in all shades of society, though barren of immediate results, can only tend to make peace draw nearer. The press is almost unanimous in favour of peace, the "Novoe Vremja" and "Moskovskiya Vedomosti" being practically the only advocates of a continuation of the war. The organs even of Prince Oukhtomsky and Prince Meshtshersky are in favour of a cessation of hostilities. In society in St. Petersburg the advocates of peace have obtained numerous adherents, and its possibility is now openly discussed even in military circles where a few months ago any mention of peace would have been regarded as an act of treason. In spite of the arguments to show the futility of prolonging the war being irrefutable, it is known that the Emperor, though now less decided than hitherto in his opposition, is still the chief obstacle to a policy of peace. Although his Ministers have more than once urged upon His Majesty the necessity of peace owing to the internal situation of the country, the Emperor refuses to listen to their counsels and accuses them of a want of patriotism. In the same manner as when the question of peace

was raised before the battle of Mukden, the Military party urged upon the Emperor that it would be impossible to make peace when four hundred thousand invincible troops had been placed in line facing the Japanese, so also the same advisers now urge upon His Majesty that it would be absurd to make peace at a moment when Admiral Rojestvensky is drawing near to the scene of military operations with a large squadron which he has trained and brought to such a state of perfection as to be able to defeat, or at least seriously damage, the Japanese fleet which is persistently described as having leaking boilers, injured turrets, worn out guns and diminished speed, while a decisive victory would entirely change the aspect of the campaign on land. The question of whether such victory as may be achieved would give to the remains of the Russian Fleet more than a temporary command of the sea is studiously ignored. It seems as though the Emperor and his advisers refuse to recognise the situation as it really is, and regardless of the consequences are now about to stake their last card on the chance of Admiral Rojestvensky obtaining a naval success. It is argued that even if Admiral Rojestvensky is decisively beaten the army will be in no worse position than before, and it is hoped that a few ships may be able to escape either to Vladivostock or to a neutral port where they would be disarmed but would still form the nucleus of a fleet after the conclusion of peace.

In the meantime military preparations are being pushed forward with increased energy, contracts which were at one moment cancelled have now been renewed, and there is every indication of a determination to carry on the campaign vigorously on land. General Linievitch's Army is said to be entirely reorganised and the morale of the troops completely restored. Two additional Army Corps have in the meanwhile reached Head-Quarters, and a hundred and twenty thousand reservists from the last mobilisation in November are being gradually despatched to the front to refill the depleted ranks. They will be followed later by the recruits who were called to the colours last autumn, of whom there are one hundred and thirty thousand belonging to regiments operating in Manchuria. These troops in their entirety cannot possibly reach Manchuria before the end of this year and if, as seems certain, the Japanese armies continue to act on the offensive and the scale of recent Russian losses is maintained, they will be entirely inadequate to raise the effective of the Russian Army beyond that which can be easily outnumbered by the Japanese.

It is said that the return of a defeated and disaffected army would constitute a serious danger to the State, but the alternative of this or a continuation of the war is a choice of evils of which the autocracy and Government will either now or in a few months time have to face the consequences.

I have, &c.
CHARLES HARDINGE.

No. 68.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir C. MacDonald.

F.O. Japan 590.
(No. 72.) Confidential.
Sir,

Foreign Office, April 19, 1905.

The Japanese Minister told me today that on the 3rd instant M. Delcassé had spoken to the Japanese Minister at Paris with regard to the possibility of peace. M. Delcassé was convinced that the Russian Government desired peace, and would make it if terms not too humiliating were put within her reach. Mr. Motono had asked M. Delcassé what terms he had in his mind. M. Delcassé had replied that there must be no cession of Russian territory and no indemnity. Any terms from which these points were omitted might be discussed, but M. Delcassé thought it

advisable that the two Powers should negotiate directly. On the 13th instant M. Delcassé had referred again to the same subject. Mr. Motono had answered, under instructions, that the Japanese Government thought it unfair that they should be bound as to certain points while Russia would enter the negotiations entirely unpledged. In the view of the Japanese Government there must be no such restriction of the limits within which a discussion of the terms of peace might take place.

Viscount Hayashi added that the matter rested there, but that he thought the Japanese Government would not object if some friendly Power were to endeavour to bring the two belligerents together.

I am, &c.
 LANSDOWNE.

No. 69.

Mr. Spring-Rice to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

F.O. Russia 1700.

(No. 299.)

My Lord,

St. Petersburg, D. May 7, 1905.

R. May 19, 1905.

Monsieur de Witte spoke to me today on the subject of the general situation in Russia. He expressed himself in a pessimistic tone. He saw no hope of a victorious issue of the war and little prospect of peace. A continuance of the war meant the general paralysis of Russia as a civilized European power. It meant also a free hand to Germany in Western Europe. Without losing a man or spending a sou Germany had gained more in the last year than by all the sacrifices and victims of 1870.

Russia had been forced to surrender to Germany's commercial demands, by which Germany had been enabled to carry to a triumphant issue her system of commercial treaties by which she had imposed her will on Central Europe, and in the sphere of politics it was impossible for Russia to resent German action, however much opposed to her own interests or those of her ally. From a military point of view, Russia had almost ceased to exist in Europe.

For the last thirty years the power of Germany had been curtailed by her geographical position, between two Powers, one a certain and the other a possible enemy. For a century Russia had enjoyed the immense advantage of having no enemy in her rear. And now, owing to a wholly unnecessary policy of adventure Russia had put herself into that same position which had proved so embarrassing to Germany. The archives of the British Foreign Office, would prove, he said, how from the very beginning he had opposed this policy and how he had done all he could to prevent the occupation of Port Arthur and the construction of the Southern branch of the Manchurian Railway. He had done so because he knew that that occupation would ensure the estrangement of England and the hostility of Japan.

It might be accident, or it might be design; but he could not help believing that the whole policy of Germany for the last ten years had been directed towards the object of creating between Russia and Japan the same relations of permanent hostility as existed between France and Germany. And, if so, her policy, in which every detail seemed carefully adjusted to the end in view, had indeed been crowned with success. He could not help comparing the attitude of Germany towards Russia with that which she had adopted towards other countries with similar results. There was the same encouragement to both parties—first to one and then to the other—which had induced each to embark in a contest in which they counted, and counted in vain, on German support. There was the same "benevolent" and not unprofitable neutrality, and in the end there was the same enfeeblement of the belligerents and the corresponding advantage to Germany.

In conclusion he pointed out with great earnestness that whether or no the "yellow peril" existed in Asia, there was no doubt that from an European point of view, the existence and power of Russia was a matter of the first importance to Western nations and that it was in their interest that a struggle should be put an end to, which, if long continued, would ensure for an indefinite period the supremacy of the German Empire in Europe.

In saying this he begged me to remember that he himself had neither power nor influence.

I have, &c.
CECIL SPRING-RICE.

MINUTE BY KING EDWARD.

M. Witte's remarks are very much to the point.

E.R.

No. 70.

Sir C. MacDonald to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

F.O. Japan 595.

Tôkiô, May 29, 1905.

Tel. (No. 126.) Very Confidential.

D. 11.50 A.M.

Baltic Fleet.

Naval action between the opposing fleets commenced 2 P.M. May 27 in the Tsushima Straits and continued all yesterday. Torpedo attacks were made nights of May 28 and 27th. Sissoi Veliki captured but sank before reaching port. Another battleship of the "Kniaz Suvarov" class sunk, four Russian cruisers sunk or captured, and five torpedo-boat destroyers out of nine sunk.

Main body of Japanese Fleet gone north in pursuit.

Japanese losses one torpedo-boat destroyer sunk and one second-class cruiser badly damaged.

Above from the minister for F[oreign] A[ffairs] who begs it may not be published until the Navy Department issue full report.

No. 71.

Sir M. Durand to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

F.O. America 2581.

Lenox, June 2, 1905.

Tel. (Unnumbered.)

R. 9 P.M.

Japanese Minister asked President yesterday whether he knew views of His Majesty's Government regarding terms Japanese should now impose. President asks whether you are disposed to give him their views confidentially, though he understands difficulty of expressing opinion without knowing what terms Japan

contemplates. Japanese Minister did not mention matter in conversation with me. Please answer to Washington in cypher P.

[*ED. NOTE.*—Lord Lansdowne in reply (Tel. No. 64 of June 3, D. 4.30 P.M., F.O. America 2581) declared he knew nothing of the Japanese terms and would prefer to await "the impression produced by recent maritime catastrophe [Tsushima] on temper and expectations of both belligerents."]

No. 72.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir C. Hardinge.

F.O. Russia 1697.

(No. 180.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 2, 1905.

The Russian Ambassador asked me this afternoon whether I could authorise him to add anything to the report which H[is] E[xcellency] was about to send to St. Petersburg in regard to the statement which I made last night at a public dinner upon the subject of the possibility of an eventual modification of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement.

I said that it did not occur to me that I could usefully add anything to my remarks, except perhaps that I could not insist too strongly upon the fact that our policy in the Far East was essentially non-aggressive and peaceful.

H[is] E[xcellency] enquired whether he might inform the Russian Gov[ernment] that, supposing the Agreement were modified, such modification could not in any case involve a change in the character of the neutrality of H[is] M[ajesty's] Gov[ernment] during the progress of the present war.

I replied that I had no objection to his making such a statement to the Russian Gov[ernment].

[I am, &c.]

L[ANSDOWNE].

No. 73.

Sir M. Durand to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

F.O. America 2581.

Washington, D. June 5, 1905.

Tel. (No. 51.) Secret.

R. 11 P.M.

Mr. O'Beirne called on President yesterday and communicated substance of your telegram No. 64,⁽¹⁾ which the President said was just what he had expected.

The President then said that he gathered from the Japanese Minister that Japan was now disposed to make peace if she got really favourable terms. He had ascertained from Japanese Minister that Japan, in considering question of indemnity, had been inclined to take as a basis the sum paid by France after the war in 1870.

Japanese Government were also taking into account a statement said to have been made by Lord Rothschild, that he could find a loan of 500,000,000 dollars to Russia for the indemnity if one-half remained in London, one-quarter was paid to Japan in cash, and one-quarter in Russian bonds. Japanese Minister's recent inquiry as to the views of His Majesty's Government was probably in connection with this proposal.

(¹) [v. *Ed. note* above.]

Japanese Minister had further made the following inquiry: Did the President think that, if Japan used the German Emperor to bring pressure on the Czar, England would regard it as an offence?(²)

The President had answered that, as far as the United States were concerned, all that they desired was peace. The President thought that the significance of this inquiry was merely that Japanese Minister knew German Emperor to have more influence with the Czar than he had. Japanese Minister had also said that Japan had some reason to think that Germany would seek territorial compensation in the Far East, but that he had (? group omitted: ? told) German Emperor, of course, she could not have.(³)

The President went on to say that in a conversation with Russian Ambassador on 3rd June he had pointed out bluntly the hopelessness of Russia's position, and begged Ambassador to say to the Czar that the President strongly urged the necessity for making peace.

He told the Russian Ambassador that he was ready to take the initiative in proposing to both belligerents to let their Representatives meet at some point between Harbin and Mukden. The President thought [it] best that nothing be said about terms until the Representatives met. Not being sure that Russian Ambassador would lay this proposition before the Czar, President was considering whether he would instruct United States' Ambassador at St. Petersburg to do so. He was going to invite German Emperor, through the German Ambassador, to use his influence in the same direction,(⁴) and he had requested French Ambassador to ask M. Delcassé to do the same.

MARGINAL MINUTES BY KING EDWARD.

(²) *I should say not.—E.R.*

(³) *Of course not.—E.R.*

(⁴) *Quite agree.—E.R.*

No. 74.

Sir M. Durand to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

F.O. America 2581.

Washington, D. June 5, 1905.

T.l. (No. 58.) Secret.

R. June 6, 1905, 7-30 A.M.

My tel[egram] No. 51.(¹)

President today again sent for Mr. O'Beirne to say that he had received a message from the German Emperor.(²) Emperor stated he had informed Czar that he considered it urgently necessary for him to make peace, and that person best suited to make an appeal to the Japanese to grant reasonable terms was the U[nited] S[tates] President. H[is] M[ajesty] had urged Czar to approach the President with that object either through the ordinary channels or by authorizing the German Emperor to put himself into communication on the subject with the President.

The President said he thought it time to act at once as he did not wish to be asked by Russia to approach Japan in the sense suggested and least of all through the instrumentality of the German Emperor.

He had accordingly telegraphed instructions to the U[nited] S[tates] Ambassador at Petersburg to ask for an audience with the Czar, to urge hopelessness of continuing

(¹) [v. immediately preceding document.]

(²) [v. G.P. XIX, II, pp. 607-10. The Kaiser's message was wired on the 3rd and answered by the President on the 5th, v. also letter of Kaiser to Czar of June 3, pp. 419-21 and in *Kaiser's Letters to the Tsar* (1920), pp. 183-90.]

the struggle and to press upon H[is] M[ajesty] the desirability of his consenting to request of President that Russian and Japanese plenipotentiaries should meet to confer as to whether it is not possible for them to agree as to terms of peace. The Ambassador was to say that the President believed that a direct interview without intermediaries was the best course. After the meeting had been held it would be time enough to discuss suggestions as to terms from any outside Power. If Russia would consent to such a meeting the President would try to procure Japan's consent acting on his own initiative and not stating that Russia had agreed. If, as he believed, he succeeded he would then openly ask each Power to agree to meeting. As to the place of meeting, President suggested somewhere between Harbin and Mukden.

The President told Mr. O'Beirne that he had informed German Emperor of the instructions sent to U[nited] S[tates] Ambassador and he had also requested M. Delcassé, without informing him of the message from the German Emperor, to send instructions to the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg to urge Czar to agree to proposal which he was now making. The President hoped that combined representations of Germany, France and the U[nited] S[tates] might overcome reluctance of the Czar.

[ED. NOTE.—Sir M. Durand's despatch No. 98, Secret, June 8, received June 19, 1905, F.O. America 2579, enclosed a statement reporting the interviews described in these telegrams. It also enclosed the following.

The White House, Washington, June 5, 1905.

Memorandum for despatch to be sent by the State Department.

Secret.

Ambassador Meyer will at once call on His Majesty the Czar and say that he does so by personal direction of the President to urge upon His Majesty the desirability of his consenting to the request of the President to have Representatives of Russia meet with Representatives of Japan to confer as to whether peace cannot now be made. The President speaks with the most earnest and sincere desire to advise what is best for Russia. It is the judgment of all outsiders, including all of Russia's most ardent friends, that the present contest is absolutely hopeless and that to continue it can only result in the loss of all Russia's possessions in East Asia. To avert trouble, and, as he fears, what is otherwise inevitable disaster, the President most earnestly advises that an effort be made by a direct interview without intermediary between Russian and Japanese plenipotentiaries, to see if it is not possible for them to agree as to terms of peace. The President believes it would be better for the representatives of the two Powers to discuss the whole peace question themselves rather than for any outside Power to do more than endeavour to arrange the meeting—that is, to ask both Powers whether they will not consent to meet. After the meeting has been held it will be time enough, if need be, to discuss suggestions as to the terms from any outside friend of either party. If Russia will consent to such a meeting the President will try to get Japan's consent, acting simply on his own initiative and not saying that Russia has consented, and the President believes he will succeed. Russia's answer to this request will be kept strictly secret, as will all that has so far transpired, nothing being made public until Japan also agrees. The President will then openly ask each Power to agree to the meeting, which can thereupon be held. As to the place of the meeting, the President would suggest some place between Harbin and Mukden; but this is a mere suggestion. The President earnestly hopes for a speedy and favourable answer to avert bloodshed and calamity.⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ [Printed in Tyler Dennett's *Roosevelt* (1925), pp. 221-2, and reproduced here for convenience.]

No. 75.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir M. Durand.

F.O. America 2578.
(No. 148.) Confidential.

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 5, 1905.

Mr. Whitelaw Reid called upon me yesterday, and brought me a copy of the Letters of Credence which he presented to His Majesty this morning. His Excellency was good enough to deliver to me a message of an extremely friendly character from the President, who had instructed him to express the satisfaction with which he had observed the close correspondence which existed between the policy of His Majesty's Government and that of the United States on the most important international questions. The President had no reason to doubt that the diplomacy of the United States and that of Great Britain would be found moving upon parallel lines in the future. His Excellency added that the President's relations with yourself had been of the most confidential and satisfactory character.

We had some conversation with regard to the situation in the Far East, and I mentioned to His Excellency the substance of your telegram of the 2nd of June,⁽¹⁾ as to which I observed that in my opinion it was impossible, until we had had further opportunities of judging the effect of the recent catastrophe to the Russian Fleet, to form any opinion of the manner in which the attitude of the belligerents would be affected by it. I said however that I would impart to you, for the information of the United States Government, any information which might seem to me likely to be of use to them in forming a judgment.

[I am, &c.
LANSDOWNE.]

MINUTE BY KING EDWARD.

App[rove]d.—E.R.⁽¹⁾ [*v. supra*, pp. 78-9, No. 71.]

No. 76.

Sir C. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

F.O. Russia 1701.
(No. 365.)
My Lord,

St. Petersburg, D. June 5, 1905.
R. June 10, 1905.

The extent of the naval disaster in the Corean Straits⁽¹⁾ has at last become generally known and it is now possible to appreciate to a certain extent the impression which it has made upon public opinion in Russia and upon social and official circles in St. Petersburg, although it is as yet premature to forecast what its political consequences will be.

To explain the humiliation and despair now felt on all sides it must be remembered that on the departure of the First Squadron from Cronstadt in August last under the command of Admiral Rojestvensky few of the general public ever believed that the Baltic Fleet would reach Far Eastern waters and, except amongst naval circles, there was a general indifference to its fate.

The excitement caused by the incident on the Dogger Bank in October last, the gradual progress of the fleet round the coasts of Africa, and the meeting of its component parts at Madagascar, attracted public attention, and the praise bestowed upon the movements and tactics of the Fleet by French naval critics in African

⁽¹⁾ [*cp. supra*, p. 78, No. 70.]

waters raised Russian hopes until the opinion dawned upon the people that the Squadrons which had met at Madagascar formed not merely an assembly of naval units of varying values but a powerful fighting machine in the hands of an Admiral in whose bravery, skill and determination the whole of the country had every confidence. The safe arrival of the fleet without loss in Indo-Chinese waters was hailed as an extraordinary feat, and public confidence in the Admiral and his ships was still further enhanced by the junction of Admiral Nebogatoff's Squadron, thus forming on paper a most imposing array of battleships far surpassing in number and guns those which the Japanese could bring to meet them. The fact that the fleet was composed of vessels of every type, date, and speed was ignored as was also the fact that, in spite of constant practice and repeated manœuvres, crews which were at the outset undrilled and inexperienced in their duties, could not, even through the energy and ceaseless activity of their Admiral, become thoroughly efficient and well trained when their officers were themselves wanting in experience and training. The hopes of the Russian public had thus by a series of events been raised from a state of callous indifference to one of overweening confidence in the probable success of the Baltic Fleet which was not justified by either the quality of the ships or of the men, the superiority over the Japanese naval forces being in fact merely on paper.

The disillusion which followed the news of the catastrophe, when it became each hour more impossible to conceal the extent of the disaster, was all the greater owing to the hopeful expectations which had been created. The press was at first incredulous, but as the earlier rumours of disaster were steadily corroborated from various sources with even more harrowing details than those that preceded them, leaving no room for further doubt, a shadow of gloom and consternation spread over the land. The cup of bitterness and humiliation was filled to overflowing by the news of the surrender of four Russian battleships together with the Admiral in command of the Fourth Squadron. Various rumours are current in explanation of what is regarded as a discreditable incident, and it is stated that this squadron had already mutinied in the Red Sea when four of the mutineers were hung as exemplary punishment, and that a further mutiny had occurred during the battle, the flags of three of Admiral Nebogatoff's battleships being struck in defiance of the Admiral's orders. On the other hand the surrender is explained on the not improbable hypothesis of inferior guns, bad and insufficient ammunition, antiquated machinery and worn-out boilers and engines. It will only be later that the real truth will be known.

Society in St. Petersburg is full of lamentation for lost relations and friends and of sickening doubt as to the fate of many of whom no certain information has been received. It may with truth be said that this is the first occasion during the present campaign that the horrors of war have been brought home to people in St. Petersburg, since none of the regiments of the Guards have left the capital and only a very limited number of officers of the garrison has volunteered for active service in the Far East, and as these mostly held Staff appointments the losses have been comparatively small. In the present instance a large percentage of the officers on board the ships of the Baltic Fleet belong to the "Equipage" of the Guard which comprises members of the best families in Russia, while the officers of the battle-ship "Alexander III" were the *élite* of the Russian nobility.

The question which is now uppermost in the minds of all is how far the question of the continuation of the war will be affected by the crushing defeat and complete destruction of the whole of the Russian Navy.

The organs of the liberal press advocate peace and the immediate convocation of a Zemsky Sobor. The "Novoe Vremya" and some of the reactionary press urge the prolongation of the war and the summons of a Zemsky Sobor to decide the question of how to continue the war and how to find the necessary means of doing so. The oft repeated statement is made that it would be impossible to make peace without having achieved at least one victory, the spectre of the yellow peril is conjured up for the benefit of foreign countries, allusions are made to the hundred years' war and the thirty years' war, and Napoleon's capture of Moscow is quoted as an occasion

when Russia defeated did not sue for peace. The idea of this section of the press is that The Emperor and Government by making concessions to the people with a view to ensuring their future welfare would be thus able to quiet the agitation now simmering throughout the country, to extend the area of mobilisation now restricted by disturbance, and to induce the people to make still further sacrifices for the continuance of the war. On the other hand it is very widely stated, and to judge by the general feeling in the country, with more probability of truth, that as soon as a Zemsky Sobor had been convoked the first demands made by such an Assembly would be for peace and reforms.

It is significant that on the news of the catastrophe becoming known Russian Consols rose half a point on the St. Petersburg Bourse, the explanation of this being the conviction of the financiers of the imminence of peace.

As regards the all important question of the attitude of The Emperor towards the opening of peace negotiations or the continuation of war there is a general consensus of opinion that His Majesty is still opposed to peace, in spite of the fact that the Government and Chief officials, with the exception of some of the military party, are opposed to the further continuation of hostilities. It is currently reported, and I have every reason to believe it to be true, that the question of peace or war was discussed at a Council of War a few days ago in the presence of The Emperor at Tsarskoe Selo. The Emperor appeared to be hesitating in his opinion, but the Grand Duke Vladimir rose and made an impressive speech advocating peace. His Imperial Highness was however outvoted by the military and naval carpet knights and finally no decision was taken by The Emperor. The Grand Duke, with his characteristic frankness of speech is stated to have said in the presence of The Emperor that the war was now so hopeless that the best course to pursue would be to send a blank paper with His Majesty's signature at its foot to Tôkiô and to ask the Japanese to fill in their conditions of peace.

The general opinion of The Emperor's frame of mind at the present moment is that, just as after the battle of Mukden, when the question of peace was under discussion he resolutely put it on one side until a trial of strength had been made between the Russian and Japanese fleets, so now refusing to admit final defeat and turning a deaf ear to any suggestion of conditions of peace of a humiliating character, His Majesty remembers only the fact that he has still an army of three hundred thousand men in Manchuria and still nourishes the hope that the fortune of war may yet turn and that the Russian arms may at the eleventh hour secure a success which would satisfy the national self esteem and avoid the necessity of accepting onerous and humiliating conditions of peace. Persistence in this attitude will probably end in a further defeat and retreat on land within the next few weeks, and the position of The Emperor and the dynasty who are deeply compromised in this war will after each reverse become more critical. I am of opinion with many others that the safest course for The Emperor in order to extricate himself from the *impasse* in which he now finds himself would be to submit the question of peace or war to his people either by the immediate convocation of a Zemsky Sobor, or, what would be more simple still, by taking the opinion of the provincial zemstvos and so to cover the responsibility of the Crown for whatever course may be decided upon.

It is to be hoped in the interest of Russia and of Europe that the logic of facts will make itself felt and that the folly of prolonging a war which has been a long series of continuous defeats terminating in the absolute annihilation of what eighteen months ago was a powerful Navy, will within the next few days be realised and that an end will be put to a disastrous war which has only been productive of defeat and loss of prestige abroad and of commercial ruin, financial depression and revolutionary agitation at home.

I have, &c.

CHARLES HARDINGE.

No. 77.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir C. MacDonald.

F.O. Japan 594.

Foreign Office, June 6, 1905.

Tel. (No. 66.) Secret.

D. 5.30 P.M.

President of the United States has been informed by German Emperor that he has advised Czar that it is urgently necessary for him to make peace and that he should approach President as person best suited to appeal to the Japanese to grant reasonable terms.

President has instructed American Ambassador to ask for audience of the Czar and propose that Russian and Japanese Plenipotentiaries should meet somewhere between Harbin and Mukden to consider possibility of agreement as to the terms of peace.

If Russia would consent President, acting on his own initiative and not stating that Russia had agreed, would try to obtain consent of Japan. Should his overtures be well received he would then openly ask each Power to agree to meeting.

President has informed German Emperor of instructions sent to American Ambassador and has requested French Minister for Foreign Affairs, without informing him of message from German Emperor, to instruct French Ambassador at St. Petersburg to urge Czar to agree to proposal.

No. 78.

Sir M. Durand to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

F.O. America 2581.

Washington, D. June 8, 1905.

Tel. (No. 57.)

R. June 9, 1905, 7.30 A.M.

The President asked me to call this afternoon. He told me that, in answer to message he sent by Russian Ambassador here to the Czar he was informed that Russian Gov[ernmen]t desired neither peace nor an offer of mediation.

Next day after a visit paid to the Czar by U[nited] S[tates] Ambassador at Petersburg he received a message from the Czar consenting to meeting of Russian and Japanese representatives. The President now intends to make formal proposal to the two Gov[ernmen]ts.

Above is secret.

No. 79.

Sir M. Durand to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

F.O. America 2581.

Washington, D. June 8, 1905.

Tel. (No. 58.) Secret.

R. June 9, 1905, 7.30 A.M.

My immediately preceding telegram.⁽¹⁾

Japanese Min[iste]r in conversation with me before I saw President gave me to understand that Japan did not mean to disclose her terms unless Russians consented to treat for peace, and that it would be useless for Russians to do so unless they were prepared to make large sacrifices in money and possibly in territory. He said he did not know the Japanese terms but that they would insist on indemnity. He did not say anything about cession of Vladivostok.

(¹) [v. immediately preceding document.]

No. 80.

Sir M. Durand to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

F.O. America 2581.

Washington, June 13, 1905.

Tel. (No. 61.)

R. 8 A.M.

Russian Ambassador called on President this morning and informed him of Russia's assent to his proposal. He said that Russian Plenipotentiaries would meet Plenipotentiaries from Japan "to discuss question of peace."⁽¹⁾

There is no written communication from Russia, but White House is confident that Russian Government is in earnest. Place of meeting not settled.

⁽¹⁾ [An examination of the attitude of Lord Lansdowne towards peace in June and the President's views thereon is contained in Tyler Dennett's *Roosevelt*, pp. 210-4.]

No. 81.

Sir M. Durand to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

F.O. America 2581.

Washington, June 13, 1905.

Tel. (No. 62.) Secret.

R. 8 A.M.

The President would I think like me to urge upon the Japanese Min[ister] the desirability of moderation in peace terms. There seems to be feeling here that H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] might properly use its influence with Japan in that direction. I have avoided everything of the kind, supposing that H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] would probably be reluctant to take any step which could embarrass Japanese, and that in any case it is not my business. Would Y[our] L[ordship] kindly inform me whether this is the attitude I should maintain?

No. 82.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir M. Durand.

F.O. America 2581.

Foreign Office, June 13, 1905.

Tel. (No. 74.)

D. 3-20 P.M.

Your tel[egram] No. 62 (of June 13.)⁽¹⁾ Russo-Japanese Peace Negotiations).

Attitude which you have adopted is quite in accordance with our view and should be maintained in the absence of instructions to the contrary.

⁽¹⁾ [v. immediately preceding document.]

No. 83.

Sir C. MacDonald to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

F.O. Japan 592.

(No. 161.)

My Lord,

Tōkiō, D. June 14, 1905.

R. July 31, 1905.

. . .⁽¹⁾ I was therefore sceptical as to the manner in which the Japanese Government would receive the President's overtures, thinking it possible that, unless Mr. Roosevelt mentioned to the Japanese Government that the initiative had come

⁽¹⁾ [Details as to the course of the negotiations are omitted as they are related in previous documents.]

from the Tzar, which, according to Your Lordship's telegram, the President did not intend to say, they would probably act up to what they had on several occasions said to me, and decline to negotiate.

On the 8th instant, I saw Baron Komura, and an announcement in that morning's paper to the effect that the President was moving in the matter, gave me an opportunity of mentioning the subject. Baron Komura said that the report was incorrect, and that the President had not approached the Japanese Government officially in the matter, and repeated that Japan could not consider any advances, which did not emanate from the Tzar [*sic*] and the War Party; he added that it was immaterial in what manner these advances came to the Japanese Government, whether direct or through a third party. I could see from His Excellency's manner that in all probability the Japanese Government had already been sounded by the President. . . .⁽²⁾

On the 10th instant, Baron Komura wrote to me, and said that the Japanese Government had been officially approached by the President of the United States on the previous day, suggesting a meeting of Japanese and Russian plenipotentiaries without an intermediary in order to see if it would not be possible for these representatives to agree to terms of peace. A reply had been sent accepting the President's proposals, and agreeing to appoint plenipotentiaries of Japan to meet plenipotentiaries of Russia for the purpose of negotiating and concluding terms of peace directly and exclusively between the belligerent powers.

I saw Baron Komura the same afternoon (10th instant) and he said that my surmise was correct, and that the Japanese Government had been sounded early in the week through the Japanese Representative in Washington, but that the official note from the President had only been received on the previous day. Baron Komura handed me the full text of the President's message and the Japanese reply, which he said had been telegraphed to Viscount Hayashi, and would be made public in Tokyo almost at once. It appeared in the evening papers of the 10th. I enclose a copy of these documents.⁽³⁾ Your Lordship will observe that the President's note suggests that plenipotentiaries should be appointed to "agree to terms of peace," whereas the Japanese reply agrees to appoint plenipotentiaries for the purpose of "negotiating and concluding terms of peace." In the course of my interview, Baron Komura made it very clear that the Japanese Government understood that the desire for peace and the first step in the matter had been taken by the Tzar, who had doubtless approached the President of the United States, and it was for this reason that the Japanese Government had accepted with such promptness. He also thought that, under the circumstances, the Russian reply would be equally prompt.

On receipt of Baron Komura's letter I immediately telegraphed to Your Lordship stating that the Japanese Government had accepted the President's suggestions.

On the 11th of June, the following day, I received Your Lordship's telegram, dated the 10th, stating that the Japanese Minister had informed Your Lordship that the Russian and Japanese Governments had now (the 10th instant) *both* accepted the suggestion of the President of the United States.

This morning (June 14th) I have received Your Lordship's telegram, stating that the formal acceptance of the President's suggestion by the Russian Government was handed to the American Ambassador only on the 12th instant,—two days after the despatch of the Japanese acceptance. This fact has become generally known and has created a bad impression here. The idea is gaining ground that the Russian Government is endeavouring to make the world believe that Japan is suing for peace. Every section of the Japanese press is urging the Government not to be deceived by Russia, but to continue the war with the utmost vigour, until the plenipotentiaries, have met. There is also unanimity of opinion that an armistice should not be granted unless Russia gives up Vladivostock and Saghalien as a guarantee that the armistice will be observed.

⁽²⁾ [Some personal details here follow connected with the peace overtures of the United States to Japan.]

⁽³⁾ [Not reproduced.]

In the course of a conversation I had with Baron Komura this morning, I mentioned this subject of an armistice, pointing out that it would be difficult for peace plenipotentiaries to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion, unless they had a fixed starting line, and if the war was to be carried on while the negotiations were still in progress, this line would be a moveable one, and, with the fortunes of war, would change from day to day. Baron Komura admitted the truth of this, but said that there was a precedent in the China-Japan war, negotiations having been carried on while the war was still in progress, and it was only when the Chinese plenipotentiary, Li Hung Chang, had been wounded by a fanatic that the Japanese Government, as an act of grace, granted an armistice. However, added His Excellency, the Japanese Government had no intention of granting an armistice unless, and until, they are asked to do so by the Russian Government; neither do they intend to relax for one moment the prosecution of the war by land and sea. Altogether the prospects that the President's well-meant overtures will lead to any successful issue are, at present, not promising, and much will depend upon the way in which Russia treats these overtures and conducts subsequent negotiations, and whether the Tzar and the War Party will recognize that Russia is beaten and act in a suitably chastened spirit. Of this much-to-be-desired frame of mind there is at present no sign.

I have, &c.

CLAUDE M. MACDONALD.

[*ED. NOTE.*—A formal communication was made by the United States Minister at Tôkiô on June 9, offering the good offices of the President for the purpose. On the 10th the Japanese Government replied, agreeing to appoint plenipotentiaries to meet plenipotentiaries of Russia for the purpose of peace. The communications were published on the 12th.]

No. 84.

Sir M. Durand to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

F.O. America 2581.

Washington, D. June 16, 1905.

Tel. (No. 65.) Secret.

R. June 17, 1905, 7:30 A.M.

I saw President last night. I found him in great spirits and very confident of satisfactory issue to his peace negotiations. Both Russians and Japanese are giving him some trouble, especially Russians, but he says that both mean business. He does not think that there will be an armistice for some time.

After meeting in Washington, Plenipotentiaries will probably move to some cooler and quieter place in the north.*

President says that our attitude of reserve seems to him wise and proper, and that any advice given by us hereafter will come with double force.

MINUTE BY KING EDWARD.

*Perhaps the Rocky Mountains!

E.R.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir M. Durand.

F.O. America 2578.
(No. 163.) Confidential.
Sir,

Foreign Office, June 16, 1905.

The American Ambassador told me this afternoon that His Majesty The King had spoken to him at Windsor on the subject of the peace negotiations which were so fortunately about to commence between Russia and Japan. His Majesty had observed that the best thing to do was, in his opinion, to leave the negotiators alone. Mr. Whitelaw Reid had repeated this observation of the King's to the President, who had replied that he did not differ from His Majesty in believing that it was best that the parties should be left to themselves, but that he considered that at a later stage an opportunity might perhaps occur for giving useful advice to Japan in the direction of not pressing extreme demands. Mr. Reid added that between the lines of the Sec[retary] of State's despatch he thought he detected an impression that this country might be likely to create difficulties in the way of peace by encouraging Japan to insist upon excessive terms. I said that there could be no greater mistake than to imagine that we should interpose obstacles in the way of peace. As for advising Japan, it would in my opinion be inadvisable that we should take upon ourselves to tender such advice at a moment when we were not even aware of the terms for which she intended to ask.

[I am, &c.]
L[ANSDOWNE].

MINUTE BY KING EDWARD.

App[rove]d.—E.R.

Sir C. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

F.O. Russia 1701.
(No. 896.)
My Lord,

St. Petersburg, D. June 20, 1905.
R. June 24, 1905.

More than a fortnight has now elapsed since the question of the possibility of putting an end to the present war by the conclusion of peace was first raised by the President of the United States and the pourparlers which were then initiated have so far met with success that an agreement has been arrived at between Russia and Japan to enter into negotiations, and the place of meeting of the plenipotentiaries has been fixed.

It is worthy of note that during the first days of June the language of those members of the court who are in closest proximity to the person of the Emperor was, as I know for a fact, uncompromisingly hostile to any suggestion of peace until at least one substantial victory had been obtained, while the reply of the Russian Government through Count Cassini to the President's first suggestion of peace negotiations would have been sufficient in itself to discourage any further steps in the same direction. President Roosevelt, with wise foresight, had in the meantime instructed the American Ambassador to submit his proposal directly to the Emperor himself, and Mr. Meyer's tact and skill appear to have amply fulfilled all expectations, since His Majesty, after only a short interval of hesitation, assented in principle to the opening of peace negotiations.

Whether Mr. Meyer's audience of the Emperor took place at a psychological moment when the futility of prolonging a hopeless campaign was at last brought home to the Emperor, or whether the fact of Monsieur Delcassé's resignation in

connection with the Morocco incident, the danger felt in France of an attack from Germany and the consequent obligations of Russia as the ally of France to help to resist any German aggression may not have influenced the Emperor and made His Majesty realise that in wasting blood and treasure uselessly in the Far East, Russia was sacrificing her position and authority in Europe and rendering her alliance valueless to France, or whether the change in His Majesty's attitude was due to some other cause, it is impossible except for those in the immediate entourage of the Emperor to say. It is however indisputable that a remarkable and unexpected change took place and on the day following Mr. Meyer's interview it was known that the President's initial effort to bring the two belligerents together had been crowned with success. Some suspicion of the motives of this *volte-face* was naturally aroused as it was known that the greatest anxiety prevailed in official circles to learn the extent of the conditions which Japan would demand, and as the payment of an indemnity, the cession of any territory, and the restriction of Russian Naval Power in Far Eastern waters were loudly and aggressively announced on all sides as humiliating conditions which it would be quite impossible to accept, it was generally felt that the prospect of a successful issue to the negotiations was improbable. This impression was enhanced by the unsatisfactory terms of the official communication issued by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs relating to the peace negotiations (enclosed in my despatch No. 889 of the 14th instant)⁽¹⁾ and by the supercilious attitude of the Russian Government towards Japan which made it difficult to be convinced of Russia's sincerity in really desiring peace or in seeking to make it on terms which would be regarded as compatible with the actual results of the war. Count Lamsdorff's statement to me on the 14th instant, which I hear he made to other Ambassadors on the same day, to the effect that the Emperor in accepting the proposal to enter into *pourparlers* with Japan had only been actuated by humanitarian principles, that Russia did not want peace unless Japan expressed a desire for it and was prepared to continue the war indefinitely, was quite in consonance with the arrogant tone in which it is customary in the press and in St. Petersburg to speak of the Japanese and which hardly corresponds with the actual achievements and relative positions of the two belligerents in the Far East.

There has however been an undoubted improvement in tone during the last few days and now that the second point to be agreed upon *i.e.*, the place of meeting, has been satisfactorily settled, circumstances appear to be steadily moving in the direction of peace and the interruption of negotiations once initiated is contrary to the teaching of history. The crucial moment will however arise when the Japanese Government communicate their conditions of peace, and, however moderate they may be, they will present an almost irresistible temptation to the advocates of war to proclaim them as humiliating and dishonourable to Russia and to try to make them a rallying cry with the view of giving to the war a popularity which it has never enjoyed and thus obtaining the means of carrying it on. It will then remain for the Emperor and the Russian Government to decide whether they prefer to save Russia's possessions in the Far East before they have been wrested from her, by making peace on conditions acceptable to the Japanese and probably comprising the payment of a moderate war indemnity, or whether they will wait till their possessions have been conquered and pay a heavy indemnity for their evacuation if the Japanese should consent to it.

I have, &c.

CHARLES HARDINGE.

⁽¹⁾ [Not reproduced.]

[ED. NOTE.—On June 28 the Russian Government officially announced that they were sending plenipotentiaries to Washington.]

No. 87.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir M. Durand.

F.O. America 2578.

(No. 187.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 12, 1905.

I mentioned to Mr. Whitelaw Reid today that it had come to my knowledge that we were supposed by the Government of the United States to be lukewarm in our desire for peace between Japan and Russia, if indeed we did not regard with a certain amount of satisfaction the continuation of a struggle out of which both parties would emerge greatly weakened for some time to come. It was, I said, unnecessary for me to assure His Excellency that no Power was more desirous of seeing peace restored than this country. I mentioned in support of my statement the Prime Minister's reference to the subject on the occasion of the banquet given to His Excellency on his arrival in this country.

Mr. Whitelaw Reid said that he did not believe that the President entertained this view, although it was one which might possibly have been suggested to him by interested parties.

[I am, &c.]

L[ANSLOWNE].

No. 88.

Sir C. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

F.O. Russia 1701.

(No. 449.) Confidential.

St. Petersburg, D. July 15, 1905.

My Lord,

R. July 22, 1905.

It was only on the 9th instant that Monsieur Muravieff, Russian Ambassador in Rome, arrived in St. Petersburg, and although he commenced at once to select those who should accompany him to Washington as members of his staff and to make other preparations, it was already whispered that he would not proceed on his mission as Russian plenipotentiary to the peace conference, and that Monsieur Witte would be appointed in his place.

As I had the honour to report in my despatch No. 423 Confidential of the 4th instant,⁽¹⁾ the appointment of Monsieur Muravieff and Baron Rosen as Russian plenipotentiaries was made in opposition to the recommendations of Count Lamsdorff who, from the moment that the question of a peace conference was decided, had been anxious for the nomination of Monsieur Witte as First Plenipotentiary, but his intentions had been frustrated by the Emperor's opposition owing to His Majesty's personal dislike of that statesman. The reason given in the press for Monsieur Muravieff's withdrawal from the position to which he had been appointed is his alleged "grave illness," but as he has already left St. Petersburg on his return to Rome his illness happily does not appear to be very serious. His appointment as Russia's representative at Washington was not at all favourably received by the Russian press, stress was laid on his inexperience in diplomacy and on the absence of any special qualifications which might recommend him for the mission with which he had been entrusted. The language which he used regarding Japan when President of the Venezuelan Arbitration Commission at The Hague is an additional proof of the unsuitability of his appointment.

The announcement of Monsieur Witte's selection as First Plenipotentiary has been hailed with pleasure and the press is unanimous in its approval. His patriotism, ability as a statesman and technical knowledge of the many questions at issue are

⁽¹⁾ [Not reproduced.]

quoted as justifying his nomination. What is more interesting is the fact that the appointment is one which Monsieur Witte himself has ardently desired and there is no doubt that he will spare no effort to make his mission a success. In this he will be ably seconded by Monsieur Pokotiloff, Russian Minister at Peking, now on his way to Washington, who was in close touch with Monsieur Witte when the latter was at the Ministry of Finance, and who is said to be equally imbued with the opinion of the absolute necessity of peace owing to the state of internal anarchy prevailing in Russia. It is interesting to note that Monsieur Witte has a very poor opinion of Baron Rosen, the second Russian Plenipotentiary, and of his ability, and it is unlikely that he will be in any way influenced by him or by his opinions which are bitterly anti-Japanese.

As special importance now attaches to Monsieur Witte's views on the possible conditions of peace, I venture to quote here an extract from my despatch No. 207 Secret in which I had the honour to report to Your Lordship the substance of a long conversation with Monsieur Witte on March 25 of this year, during which he expressed his personal views on the question of peace with remarkable frankness:—

“The campaign had been irretrievably lost and there only remained now to make the best terms possible with Japan and to be quit once for all of the Manchurian adventure. He would be ready to recognize Corea as under Japanese influence, Port Arthur with the Liaotung Peninsula and the railway to Kharbin as a Japanese leasehold and to agree, with a view to securing a durable peace, that there should for a term of years be no Russian warships in Chinese waters except those necessary for police and local purposes. He would however strongly oppose as quite unacceptable any condition entailing the payment of a war indemnity or the surrender of the Siberian line to Vladivostock. He would raise no objection to making Vladivostock an open port provided that the railway was guaranteed by the Powers from aggression on the part of the Japanese. These terms might be considered by many of his compatriots as too favourable to Japan, but he considered them to be in accordance with the true interests of Russia. He had never been in favour of the Manchurian adventure and had his advice been listened to the present deplorable situation might have been avoided. To continue the war at the present time would be a policy of madness not so much on account of the financial position as of the internal situation. In war time the equilibrium between paper and currency was everywhere thrown to the winds, but there yet remained the gold reserve which would serve for at least another year of war. He would sooner spend these millions on prolonging the war than in paying an indemnity to the Japanese. The internal situation was however so threatening and so infinitely worse than it had been at any time during the past three hundred years that it would in his opinion be absolutely impossible to continue the war without incurring the gravest risk of internal revolution.”

Four months have passed since Monsieur Witte used these words, and however grave the risk of internal revolution may then have been, there is not the slightest doubt that the risk is now infinitely greater. The conditions of peace then mentioned were the expression of Monsieur Witte's personal views and it must be remembered that the interview took place before the battle of the Tsushima Straits, before the outbreaks in Poland and the Caucasus and before the open disaffection of some of the ships of the Black Sea Fleet. If any confidence is to be placed in Monsieur Witte's words his appointment should be the surest guarantee of the approaching conclusion of peace, and his character being one in which ambition plays a considerable part, his own personal advantage would seem to point to a successful and peaceful termination of the mission which has been confided to him.

I have, &c.

CHARLES HARDINGE.

Sir C. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

F.O. Russia 1701.

(No. 478.) Confidential.

St. Petersburg, D. July 25, 1905.

My Lord,

R. July 31, 1905.

As I had the honour to report in my despatch No. 457 of the 20th instant⁽¹⁾ Mr. Witte left on the 19th instant for Paris *en route* for the United States to attend the Peace Conference to be convened there.

Although I had not the opportunity of a conversation with Mr. Witte before he left he appears to have spoken to the French Ambassador and to some of his friends with considerable freedom as to his plans and intentions. These have been retailed to me and are not without interest.

Mr. Witte remains as convinced as ever of the absolute necessity of peace and of escape from the Manchurian entanglement. His statements to the press of the strength and influence of the war party and of the danger to the prospects of peace to be apprehended from exaggerated demands on the part of Japan are, I believe, intended chiefly for Japanese and home consumption.

According to his written instructions, which are the same as those given to Mr. Mouravieff, neither the payment of an indemnity nor a cession of territory are to be accepted as possible conditions of peace.

Mr. Witte fully recognises that according to general public opinion the Japanese Government are entirely justified in their demand for a monetary contribution, but he maintains that this is a condition which is so opposed to the psychological character of the Russian mind, not merely amongst the Upper Classes but especially amongst the peasants, as to become impossible of discussion.

• There is no doubt however that the probable necessity of having to pay an indemnity has been foreseen, and that a combination for disguising it has been already prepared.

I must admit, in corroboration of Mr. Witte's statement, that from what I hear from friends who have returned from disturbed districts in the country the peasants who last year were entirely opposed to the war are now in favour of its continuation, having been told that peace will entail the payment of an indemnity. This is no doubt partly explained by the fact that the only direct war tax which they pay amounts to about one shilling per annum, and they are under the belief that, in the event of an indemnity being paid to the Japanese, the whole of it would be levied upon them.

As regards the question of cession of territory Mr. Witte proposes to give the Japanese a lesson in modern history and to point out that Prince Bismarck made two important Treaties in 1866 and 1871. In the first he foresaw the future advantage of an Austrian alliance, and consequently in the Treaty of Prague of 1866 no territorial compensation was exacted from Austria for the losses sustained by Prussia during the war. In 1871 he recognised the fact that a powerful France could never be in harmony with the true aims and interests of Germany, and he therefore proceeded to weaken his enemy by the annexation of two provinces, an act which has resulted in rendering any working agreement between France and Germany as out of the question. So also if Japan shows wisdom and a desire to maintain friendly relations with Russia in the future and even to cooperate with her in the development of the joint interests of the two countries in the Far East the demand, which is anticipated, for a cession of territory should be withheld, any and every concession being granted to Japan so long as Russian sovereignty (or even suzerainty) over Sakhalin and Russian *amour-propre* are maintained intact.

These are the two rocks upon which it is fully recognised that the negotiations are likely to be wrecked, but in the audience which Mr. Witte had of the Emperor

(¹) [Not reproduced.]

on the day before he left, he proposed to His Majesty that simultaneously with the negotiations for peace he should negotiate an all round arrangement with Japan with a view to securing a durable peace for a long period of years in the Far East, of which an essential condition should be the adhesion of Great Britain or her recognition of the agreement, and a possible condition the accession of France. If it should be feasible to arrive at such an arrangement the difficulties respecting the cession of Sakhalin and the payment of an indemnity would be probably surmounted and the dignity of Russia would be saved. Mr. Witte fully recognised the futility of the idea of endeavouring to supplant the Anglo-Japanese by a Russo-Japanese alliance but he advocated an agreement with Japan to which Great Britain as the ally of Japan should also be a party or at least a sympathetic witness. It is said that the Emperor received Mr. Witte's proposals with marked approbation.

I am naturally unable to vouch for the absolute correctness of the above information but I know on reliable authority that Mr. Witte used language in that sense to several persons before he left, and my French colleague tells me that he believes it to be absolutely correct.

Whether the Japanese will see Mr. Witte's views in quite the same light and, in spite of their profound suspicion of Russian aims, will at this moment be equally desirous of making an all round agreement with Russia in the Far East is a matter upon which I do not venture to offer an opinion.

In the meantime a gigantic piece of bluff is being carried on by the press and Generals of the Manchurian army which is described as being in the most perfect condition, far more perfect than before, and anxiously awaiting the signal for attack when victory would be completely assured. Although no apparent reason is given why this signal is withheld, nor why immediate action is not taken by General Linievitch which if successful might entirely modify the situation when the peace congress meets in a fortnight's time, the fact remains that the Russian Army, except for some insignificant raids by Cossacks, remains on the defensive behind the fortifications which they have raised, and the exuberant telegrams from Generals and correspondents in Manchuria recall similar telegrams which appeared in the Russian press before the battles of Liao-yang and Mukden. The information received by the Embassies in St. Petersburg from the Attachés at the front give a very different account of the Russian armies at the seat of war.

Unfortunately for the prospects of peace this bluff is not without its effect upon the Emperor who, I am reliably informed, is much impressed by the telegrams promising victory which he is constantly receiving from his Generals, and is at the same time convinced that if only a decisive victory could be obtained it would not only present an occasion for concluding an honourable peace but that it would also serve as a panacea for all internal troubles nearer home, and would enable His Majesty to relegate all distasteful projects of constitutional reform to the distant future and to re-establish once more the bureaucratic autocracy on the solid basis which it enjoyed till a year ago.

I have, &c.

CHARLES HARDINGE.

No. 90.

Mr. Johnstone to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

F.O. Denmark 585.

Copenhagen, D. July 31, 1905, 11.10 P.M.

Tel. (No. 35.) Confidential.

R. August 1, 1905, 7.30 A.M.

Prince Albert of Schleswig-Holstein, who landed with the Emperor at 4 o'clock this afternoon, assures me that Emperor's visit is one of pure friendliness, and that

only subjects discussed between Emperor of Russia and German Emperor at their late meeting referred to peace negotiations and the internal state of Russia.

German Emperor strongly advised Emperor of Russia and Russia [*sic*] to make peace and institute internal reforms.

No. 91.

Sir C. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

F.O. Russia 1702.

(No. 482.) Confidential.

St. Petersburg, D. August 1, 1905.

My Lord,

R. August 5, 1905.

Speculation continues on all sides as to what passed between the two Emperors during their interview at Borgo [*sic*], but nothing authentic is so far known.

I hear from a reliable source that the Emperor received Count Lamsdorff on the day after his return, and although His Majesty spoke to him of the various incidents of the short cruise which, being the first time that he had left his palace surroundings for the space of seven months, he seems to have thoroughly enjoyed, no mention was made of the political topics of conversation which had been under discussion between the two Emperors. All that is known is that the Emperor returned to Peterhof thoroughly pleased with his interview, and from this it is generally assumed that the Emperor William took pains to flatter the Emperor Nicholas, and to avoid giving any advice which might be distasteful to His Majesty.

The impression moreover appears to prevail that the German Emperor advised the Emperor Nicholas to continue the war unless satisfactory terms of peace could be obtained, renewing his promise that the western frontier of Russia would not be disturbed, and recommended that in order to obtain the support of the nation in prolonging the war liberal reforms should be granted.⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ [This meeting resulted in the well known Treaty of Björko, signed between the Emperors Nicholas II and William II, with two witnesses only, on July 11/24. The text is here given for convenience from *G.P. XIX, II, p. 465.*

Leurs Majestés les Empereurs de toutes les Russies et d'Allemagne, afin d'assurer le maintien de la paix en Europe, ont arrêté les Articles suivants d'un Traité d'Alliance défensif.

ARTICLE I.

Au cas où l'un des deux Empires serait attaqué par une Puissance Européenne son allié l'aidera en Europe de toutes ses forces de terre et de mer.

ARTICLE II.

Les hautes parties contractantes s'engagent à ne conclure de paix séparée avec aucun adversaire commun.

ARTICLE III.

Le présent Traité entrera en vigueur aussitôt que la paix entre la Russie et le Japon sera conclue et restera tant qu'il ne sera pas dénoncé une année à l'avance.

ARTICLE IV.

L'Empereur de toutes les Russies, après l'entrée en vigueur de ce traité, fera les démarches nécessaires pour initier la France à cet accord et l'engager à s'y associer comme alliée.

WILHELM, I.R.

VON TSCHIRSCHKY UND BÜGENDORFF.

NICOLAS.

A. BIRILEFF.

According to Article III this Treaty came technically into force on October 14, 1905, when the Russo-Japanese Treaty was ratified, *v. infra*, p. 111, note ⁽²⁾. But it was in fact nullified because the Russian Ministers made its efficacy dependent on the consent of France, *v. G.P. XIX, II, ch. 138 passim, The Kaiser's Letters to the Tsar* (1920), pp. 123-47, Count Witte: *Mémoires* (1921), pp. 373-84, and *infra*, p. 202, note ⁽³⁾.

It is not clear that the British Government ever saw the text of the Björko Treaty. But Lord Newton has informed the Editors that Lord Lansdowne in a private letter to Mr. R. T. Tower of August 20, 1905, said that the communication received from him was the "only account having any pretence to authenticity of what passed" at Björko. No trace has been found of this communication in the Foreign Office Archives.]

I report this impression not because I believe in it, but because I believe it is inspired by the probability of what is about to take place.

There is no doubt that the Emperor has never been really in favour of peace, and that the acceptance by His Majesty of President Roosevelt's overtures was largely due to His Majesty's aversion to giving a point blank refusal to a proposal made personally to him by the United States' Ambassador and emanating from the Chief of another state. Moreover, the Emperor has, in spite of all the defeats suffered by the Russian arms during the war, been always absolutely convinced of the ultimate triumph of the Russian armies in the field. These circumstances together with the glowing reports received by His Majesty from the Generals in Manchuria as to the excellent condition and position of the Russian armies, of which I had the honour to report in my despatch No. 473 of July 25,⁽²⁾ have encouraged the Emperor to assume an attitude towards the peace negotiations about to be opened which would render their satisfactory conclusion impossible except by the sacrifice of the advantages to which the Japanese may legitimately lay claim as the fruits of their series of victories on land and sea. This attitude is confirmed by a note made in the Emperor's own handwriting on a petition received from the clergy of Orenburg praying that a dishonourable peace should not be concluded which is couched in the following terms:—

“ All true Russians can depend on my not concluding a dishonourable peace or one incompatible with Russia's greatness.”

This attitude on the part of the Emperor and the satisfactory accounts of the state of the army received from the front have produced a great change in public opinion, and I have no hesitation in saying that the chances of peace are now considerably less hopeful than they were a fortnight ago. The interviews given by Monsieur Sato, Baron Komura's secretary, to representatives of the American press, in which he is reported to have given a general outline of the Japanese conditions of peace, have made the worst possible impression in Russia, and the question is asked, where is the moderation in the Japanese terms which the Russian Government had been led to expect?

Although it is fully recognised by all intelligent persons in Russia that the Japanese have a moral right to an indemnity in some form, and that the island of Sakhalin now occupied by Japanese troops can never be reconquered during the present war, the change which has been effected during the past two weeks since the departure of Monsieur Witte for America would render even the concession of such moderate terms difficult in the present phase of public opinion.

I have, &c.

CHARLES HARDINGE.

(²) [*v. supra*, pp. 93-4, No. 89.]

No. 92.

Sir C. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

F.O. Russia 1702.

(No. 497.) Confidential.

My Lord,

St. Petersburg, D. August 15, 1905.

R. August 19, 1905.

The prospect of a peaceful conclusion of the negotiations now in progress at Portsmouth, U[nited] S[tates of] A[merica] has, since the publication in the press of what purported to be the Japanese terms, appeared to be even more doubtful than when I had the honour to address Your Lordship in my despatch No. 482 of the 1st instant.⁽¹⁾

(¹) [*v. immediately preceding document.*]

Although evidently unauthentic, the alleged Japanese conditions have aroused a storm of protest in the press and public opinion; appears to be unanimous that it would be preferable to continue the war rather than submit to such humiliating terms.

In spite of the prevalent pessimism, I have been confidentially informed that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs are not at all despondent of arriving at a satisfactory compromise with the Japanese plenipotentiaries now that the latter have shown their readiness to enter into discussion of the demands which they have put forward and have not, as was feared, communicated their conditions as the irreducible minimum of what they are prepared to accept. The question of an indemnity is not regarded as an insuperable obstacle to peace, nor the cession of Saghalien impossible if some concessions were offered in compensation. It is known that Monsieur Witte has prepared several combinations to overcome these two essential difficulties and it is hoped that one or other of them may prove acceptable to the Japanese.

The proposal to surrender the Russian ships of war interned in neutral ports would be firmly resisted as derogatory to the dignity of Russia, but it is not anticipated that this condition will be insisted upon. It is thought that the negotiations may be protracted, but that they will eventually be successful, and my informant who occupies a high position in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs remarked that he was ready to bet on peace.

Public opinion in Russia is apt to change rapidly and often without apparent reason, but it appears to me that any peace embodying in its outlines the terms communicated to Your Lordship by Viscount Hayashi would be very unpopular at the present moment and would provoke serious opposition. The Russian public do not reason, and, while accepting the absurd stories telegraphed to Russia of the financial bankruptcy of Japan and of the enrolment of old men, boys, and Koreans in the front rank of the Japanese Armies, they do not appreciate what the loss of Vladivostock and the Primorsky province would mean to the position of Russia on the shores of the Pacific, and they believe that they have only to continue a defensive retreat to wear out their enemy and to recover most, if not all, of the territory that they have lost.

If the condition of Russia were normal there would be much to recommend such a policy, but, in view of the serious danger presented by the internal situation and of the precarious position of Russian finances, it is evident that peace is of essential importance to Russia. All that she could hope for in prolonging the war indefinitely would be to exhaust her enemy while draining her own strength, ruining her finances and compromising her position in Europe as a Great Power.

I have, &c.

CHARLES HARDINGE.

No. 93.

Sir C. MacDonald to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

Tōkiō, August 18, 1905.

F.O. Japan 595.

D. 1-50 P.M.

Tel. (No. 196.) Strictly Confidential.

R. 7 P.M.

My telegram No. 194. (1) Japanese terms of peace.

Prime Minister has just informed me following is result of negotiations up to date:—

Article I has been agreed to. Wording is practically the same as in Japanese Minister at London's draft, with the addition that Japan and Russia agree not to take any measures which might menace security of Korean frontier.

(1) [Not reproduced. It gave a *précis* of the Russian reply to the Japanese terms. v. immediately preceding document.]

Article II and Article III made into one Article and agreed to in principle.

Article IV agreed to practically without discussion.

Article V. Cession of Sakhalin. Russians decline to consider this, and use arguments contained in Russian reply (my telegram above mentioned). Discussion postponed.

Article VI. Lease of Port Arthur, &c., agreed to with addition that both Russia and Japan undertake to obtain consent of Chinese Government to the aforesaid stipulation.

Article VII and Article VIII. Agreed to in principle.

Article IX. Indemnity; Article X, Interned ships of war; and Article XI, limitation of naval strength, are strongly opposed by the Russian Plenipotentiaries.

Article XII. Practically agreed to.

(Secret.)

Prime Minister seems, on the whole, hopeful. He recognizes that Article IX, regarding reimbursement of expenses, is the most serious of all, but he thinks when Russia thoroughly realizes her situation she will be reasonable.

Article X and Article XI, his Excellency thinks, will not present much difficulty.

As to the cession of Sakhalin: As Japan is already in possession, Japanese Government do not anticipate much difficulty in remaining so.

MINUTE BY KING EDWARD.

This is more satisfactory than could have been expected.

E.R.

No. 94.

Sir C. MacDonald to the Marquess of Lansdowne.⁽¹⁾

F.O. Japan 593.

(No. 220.) Very Confidential.

Tōkiō, D. August 18, 1905.

My Lord,

R. September 18, 1905.

I have the honour to enclose herewith copy of the terms of peace which were handed to me on the 14th inst[ant], also the full text of the Russian reply thereto, which I received from the Japanese Foreign Office on the 15th inst[ant].

This morning I saw the Prime Minister, when he was good enough to enter, with some detail, into the present state of the negotiations.

So far as Art[icle] I was concerned, which referred to the measures of guidance, protection, and control, which Japan might find it necessary to exercise in Corea, His Excellency said that no difficulty had been experienced, and the article had been agreed to in practically the form it was presented. On my asking whether the Russian Plenipotentiaries had pressed the point which appears in their reply, namely that the measures to be taken would not "bring prejudice to the sovereign rights of the Emperor of Corea," His Excellency said that this point had been pressed and a note had been inserted in the *procès-verbal*. His Excellency then went to his study and brought back the Japanese copy of the note, which was verbally translated by Mr. Matsui, Acting Chief of the Political Bureau, who was again in attendance.

⁽¹⁾ [The Japanese terms (*encl.* 1) had been communicated privately to Lord Lansdowne on the 12th, *v.* Lord Lansdowne to Sir C. MacDonald, No. 140 of August 12, 1905, F.O. Japan 590.]

It ran as follows:—"Japanese Government declare that the measures which they find it necessary to take in Corea and which affect the Sovereign rights of the Emperor of Corea will be taken after consultation with His Majesty." This note will not appear in the Treaty of Peace.

The following was added to Art[icle] I. "Japan and Russia agree not to take any military measures which might menace general security on the Corean frontier." His Excellency explained that the wording was only approximate, as it had not been definitely decided upon, though the sense was as stated.

Art[icles] II and III, relating to the evacuation of Manchuria, had been arranged as one article, and had been agreed to in principle. Art[icle] IV, in which both Powers engage not to obstruct general measures, common to all countries, which China may take for the development of commerce and industries of Manchuria, was agreed to without discussion.

Art[icle] V, relating to the cession of Saghalien, gave rise to considerable discussion, and ultimately it was set aside for further discussion. The Russian Plenipotentiaries used the arguments set forth in their reply; as, however, the Japanese are in complete possession of the island, I do not think they will yield this point.

Art[icle] VI, which relates to the transfer of the Russian lease of Port Arthur Talienswan and adjacent territories to Japan, and Article VII, respecting the portion of the Manchurian Railway, were both agreed to in principle, but a clause to the following effect had been added:—

"Both Japan and Russia undertake to obtain the consent of China to the aforesaid arrangement."

Art[icle] VIII, which stipulates that Russia is to retain and work part of the Trans-Manchurian Railway on the terms and conditions of the concession under which it was constructed, was agreed to in principle.

Art[icle] IX, which stipulates that Russia is to reimburse to Japan the actual expenses of the war, met, as the Japanese Government expected, with the strongest opposition. With regard to this article, Count Katsura said that it had been specially worded to prevent hurting the feelings of the Russian Government, the word indemnity had not been used, and no specific sum had been mentioned.

With regard to Art[icle] X, respecting the restoration of interned ships of war, and Art[icle] XI, in which Russia engages to limit her naval strength, no progress had been made.

Art[icle] XII, respecting the granting to Japanese subjects of fishing rights on the Russian coast of the Japan, Okhotsk and Behring Seas, had been practically settled.

From the general tone of Count Katsura's remarks, I gathered that he was fairly hopeful of the successful outcome of the negotiations. He said that Japan did not expect to have all her terms agreed to without discussion, but was prepared to meet the Russian Counter-proposals in a fair and reasonable spirit.

The Russians talked a great deal about their dignity, and seemed very anxious to "save their face"—but they must remember that they had been invariably beaten both on sea and land, so that their dignity was somewhat impaired, and their face had also been damaged; personally he thought the Russian Government would see the folly of carrying on the war and would ultimately give way. He was, therefore, hopeful of the result of the peace negotiations.

If, however, the Russian Government wished to continue the war, His Excellency added, the Japanese Government and people were as one in their readiness to do so.

I have, &c.

CLAUDE M. MACDONALD.

Enclosure 1 in No. 94.

Japanese Terms of Peace.

Strictly Confidential.

I. Russia, acknowledging that Japan possess in Corea paramount political, military and economical interests, to engage not to obstruct or interfere with any measures of guidance, protection and control which Japan finds it necessary to take in Corea.

II. Engagement on the part of Russia completely to evacuate Manchuria within a period to be specified, and to relinquish all territorial advantages and all preferential and exclusive concessions and franchises in that region in impairment of Chinese sovereignty or inconsistent with principle of equal opportunity.

III. Japan to engage to restore to China, subject to guarantee of reform and improved administration, all those portions of Manchuria which are in her occupation, saving only the regions affected by lease of the Liaotung Peninsula.

IV. Japan and Russia reciprocally to engage not to obstruct any general measures common to all countries which China may take for the development of commerce and industries of Manchuria.

V. Sakhalin and all islands appertaining thereto and all public works and properties to be ceded to Japan.

VI. The lease of Port Arthur, Ta-lien and adjacent territory and territorial waters together with all rights, privileges, and franchises, acquired by Russia from China in connection with or as a part of such lease and all public works and properties to be transferred and assigned to Japan.

VII. Russia to assign and transfer to Japan free of all claims and encumbrances railway between Harbin and Port Arthur and all its branches privileges and properties appertaining thereto and all coal mines belonging to or worked for the benefit of the railway.

VIII. Russia to retain and work Trans-Manchurian railway, subject to the terms and conditions of the concession, under which it was constructed and subject also to the condition, that it is to be employed exclusively for commercial and industrial purposes.

IX. Russia to reimburse to Japan actual expenses of the war, the amount as well as the time and manner of such reimbursement to be agreed upon.

X. All Russian ships of war, which in consequence of damage received in battle, sought asylum in neutral ports and were there interned, to be surrendered to Japan as lawful prizes.

XI. Russia to engage to limit her naval strength in the waters of the extreme East.

XII. Russia to grant to Japanese subjects full fishery rights along the coast and in the bays, harbours, inlets and rivers of her possession in Japan, Okhotsk and Bering Seas.

KOMURA.

Enclosure 2 in No. 94.

Russian Reply to Japanese Demands. (2)

Strictly confidential.

1. Article 1 does not call for any objection. Imperial Government, recognizing that Japan possesses in Corea paramount political, military and economical interests, are ready to engage neither to obstruct nor interfere with measures of guidance, protection and control which Japan will consider necessary to take in Corea. It is a matter of course that Russia and Russian subjects will enjoy all rights which belong or will belong to other foreign Powers and their subjects or citizens. Also it is understood that execution by Japan of the above mentioned measures will not bring prejudice to

(2) [v. also in shorter form in Tel. No. 194, Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Lansdowne, D. August 15, R. August 16. F.O. Japan 595.]

the sovereign rights of the Emperor of Corea. As to the military measures particularly, Japan, in order to remove any cause of misunderstanding, will abstain from taking measures which might menace security of Russian territory on the frontier of Corea.

2. Imperial Government are ready to accept the first part of this article and are disposed to evacuate her troops from Manchuria simultaneously with evacuation of Japanese troops. Details and terms of evacuation might be decided afterwards. As to the last part of this article, Imperial Government are ready to declare that they have no claims to territorial privileges, exclusive concessions or facilities which would be of such nature as to menace sovereign right of the Empire of China and which would be inconsistent with principle of equality of rights. Imperial Government are disposed to give to that effect necessary guarantees. This fundamental principle once established, Plenipotentiaries of Russia propose to Plenipotentiaries of Japan to make precise the desire of Japanese Government regarding this part of Article II and they declare that Imperial Government are disposed to eliminate anything that may bring prejudice to the interests of Japan or other Powers. The only Russian private enterprise in Manchuria having public character is the East Chinese Railway. The examination of question connected with this railway is specially treated also in other article.

3. Imperial Government are ready to accept this article but it is matter of course that Russia and Russian subjects shall conserve in these portions of Manchuria all rights which belong or will belong in these regions to other foreign Powers and their subjects or citizens. As to the region affected by lease of the Liaotung Peninsula, Russia is disposed to cede to Japan her rights in the regions in question. However considering sovereign right of China in these regions and the treaties concluded to that effect with the Chinese Government, such cession may not be made but by virtue of an understanding with the latter.

4. Acceding entirely to the principles laid down in Article 1, Imperial Government declare that if this stipulation had not been inserted in the conditions proposed by Japan Russia would have had duty of proposing it herself.

5. The ancient rights of Russia on the island of Saghalien existed already at an epoch when Japan did not possess or at least did not exercise any rights of proprietorship on the greater part of this island; on the other hand, Saghalien is only natural continuation of Russian possession in Asia, as this island is separated from the Continent by a strait of a very little depth and a length of seven versts. From these considerations Russia would be unable to consent to a cession of this island, but she is quite disposed to admit to Japan right of wide exploitation of sea fishery and other commercial enterprises in this island. Conditions of such exploitation may be the object of special arrangement.

6. Imperial Government would have no objection to this article; but considering sovereign rights of China on the territories enumerated, Russia could not cede her rights to Japan without the previous agreement with China. It is a matter of course that the rights of private individuals in the whole regions affected by lease concluded between Russia and China should remain intact.

7. Imperial Government accept in principle this article on condition, however, that they could abandon only the part of railway which is actually occupied in fact by Japanese troops. Terminus of each portion of railway to be ceded on these conditions shall be determined on common accord. It is, however, indispensable to keep in view that it is to a private company that the concession for constructing and exploiting the line has been granted by China, which conserves sovereign rights thereon and that military occupation should bring no prejudice to the rights of this Company. Imperial Government are ready to take upon themselves to arrange with the said Company authorizing Chinese Government to exercise from now right of purchasing line in question. Premium of the purchase accruing to Company will be ceded to Japan. By virtue of Section 2 of the Act of August 27th (September 8th) 1896, granting to Russo-Chinese Bank the construction of railway, act of which was confirmed by the Convention of June 12th (June 29th), 1898, for the construction

of South Manchurian branch, Chinese Government has right to purchase line at the expiration of the term of 96 years from the day of completion and opening line.

8. This Article will not call for any objection. The Railway Company will strictly conform, concerning exploitation of the main line of Manchuria as well as portion of South Manchurian branch which will remain in its possession, to the terms of Act of Concession of August 27th (Sept[ember] 8th), paragraph 8 of which stipulates that troops as well as war material of Russia which will be transported by the line should not make stop in Chinese territory.

9. Russia would be unable to consent to stipulation of this Article. Only vanquished countries reimburse expenses of war, but Russia is not vanquished. A country will be unable to recognize itself as such, while its territory has hardly been attacked by enemy. Even if Japan will have taken all maritime provinces of Amur, vital force of Russia will be in no wise impaired, and she will continue struggle. Only in case when victorious Japanese army would have invaded interior of Russia might nation understand that the question of reimbursement of war expenses could be brought forth. Plenipotentiaries of Russia believe it their duty to call the attention of Plenipotentiaries of Japan to the fact that, even at the Congress of Paris which took place after the fall of Sevastopol, the allies did not believe it possible to raise the question of reimbursement of war expenses. Such expenses are reimbursed only by countries which have no more means of continuing war. Such is in no way the case with Russia. While refusing to reimburse war expenses, Imperial Government will recognize it equitable to indemnify Japan of such as she would have incurred, not for war itself and to prejudice of Russia, but for welfare of those Russians who suffered from act of war; such are expenses for the maintenance of war prisoners, for the care of sick and other persons.

10. Russia will be unable to consent to this demand. It would appear difficult to find out, in practice of international relations, precedent which might serve as the support of such demand. Besides, this demand is hardly in accord with pacific intention, with which the two negotiating parties should be animated. Material advantages, which could be acquired by Japan in case when Russian vessels remaining in neutral ports should be assigned to her, would be comparatively slight. Moreover, consent to such clause would be incompatible with dignity of Russia.

11. Russia would be unable to consent to succumbing engagements imposed by a foreign power, as this would be equally incompatible with her dignity. Imperial Government believe themselves, however, to be in a position to declare that it is not in their mind to keep in near future any considerable naval force in the waters of the Pacific.

12. Russia will be ready to arrange with Japan for granting to Japanese subjects rights of fishery on the coasts of Japan, Okhotsk and Behring Seas. These rights, however, can only be extended to coasts of these seas themselves without including inlets and rivers. It is a matter of course that the rights already appertaining in this region to the Russian or foreign subjects should remain in force.⁽³⁾

(3) [For German influences. v. G.P. XIX, II, chs. 137, 189.]

No. 95.

Sir C. MacDonald to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

Tôkiô, August 20, 1905.

F.O. Japan 595.

D. 5-30 P.M.

Tel. (No. 197.) Most Secret.

R. 6-50 P.M.

Following information was imparted to me this afternoon by the Prime Minister—

At the last formal meeting held on Friday August 18th the discussion regarding

article 9, payment of war expenses, became very heated. Finally as a compromise Japanese Plenipotentiaries undertook that if their Russian Colleagues would discuss this Article and Article 5, cession of Sakhalin, in a reasonable and conciliatory spirit Japan would withdraw article 10 relative to interned ships of war, and article 11 relative to limitation of naval strength.

No reply was given by the Russian Plenipotentiaries but there have since been several secret meetings between Russian and Japanese Plenipotentiaries, and the compromise has been discussed by them unofficially. It has been referred home to the respective Gov[ernmen]ts for instructions.

On asking Prime Minister whether he would have any objection to tell me for the secret information of H[is] M[ajesty's] Gov[ernmen]t what instructions the Japanese Gov[ernmen]t proposed to give their Rep[resentati]ves regarding this point, H[is] E[xc]ellency said that as an evidence of the confidence and good feeling which the Japanese Gov[ernmen]t had towards H[is] M[ajesty's] Gov[ernmen]t, he would tell me that Japanese Gov[ernmen]t considered Japan should be repaid her actual war expenses, but that so far as Sakhalin was concerned, Japan would be prepared to modify her demand.

He begged most cordially that Y[our L]ordship would treat this information as absolutely secret and he trusted that the British Gov[ernmen]t would recognize that Japan was doing her utmost by these concessions to bring about peace.

No. 96.

Sir C. MacDonald to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

F.O. Japan 595.

Tôkiô, D. August 24, 1905, 4 P.M.

Tel. (No. 199.) Most Secret.

R. August 25, 1905, 8 A.M.

Peace Negotiations.

Prime Minister informed me this morning that the state of the negotiations was at present as follows:—

Plenipotentiaries having received replies from their respective Governments to the queries mentioned in my telegram No. 197 of 20th August,⁽¹⁾ met on the 22nd, and again on the 23rd. Russian Plenipotentiaries stated that Russian Government were unable to agree to compromise suggested by the Japanese Plenipotentiaries with regard to withdrawal of Article X referring to interned ships and Article XI with reference to limitation of naval force and the modification of Article V regarding the cession of Sakhalin. M. Witte had privately suggested that "reimbursement of war expenses" might be further toned down by calling it a sum of money in repayment of certain concessions granted by Japan to Russia in Sakhalin. This change Japanese Government also accepted, but neither this nor the other concessions above mentioned appear to have met with the approval of the Russian Government.

Russian Plenipotentiaries have asked for a further meeting on 26th August at 3 P.M. Japanese Government have agreed.

Prime Minister thinks either that Russia intends to break off negotiations or that the various elements of which the Russian Government are composed cannot arrive at a decision, and have therefore asked for further delay. Prime Minister points out that in these negotiations Japan has used every effort to conciliate Russia, and to "save her face."

To this end Articles X and XI which were supposed to humiliate Russia have been withdrawn, and an offer to modify Article V has been made; the word

⁽¹⁾ [v. immediately preceding document.]

"indemnity" has been avoided and reimbursement of war expenses substituted, and now payment of a sum of money in return for concessions in Sakhalin has been substituted, but all apparently to no purpose.

Japanese Government, in the interests of humanity, are most anxious for peace, but they do not wish for peace at any price, and if Russia is determined to carry on the war, Japan is ready.

On my asking to what extent the Japanese Government were prepared to modify Article V, his Excellency said that that depended upon extent to which Russian Government were prepared to accept Article IX respecting reimbursement.

No. 97.

Sir M. Durand to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

F.O. America 2581.

Tel. (No. 92.)

Lenox, August 24, 1905.

Confidential. President writes under date of yesterday asking me to let you know his views about Conference.⁽¹⁾ He has told Japanese that the opinion of the civilized world will not support them in continuing the war merely for the purpose of extorting money from Russia. He thinks that they would be right in continuing the war if Russia refused to cede Sakhalin but in as much as they wish to hold all they have taken it is difficult to see what possible claim they have for a heavy indemnity. President points out that if Japanese continue the war all they can possibly get is Eastern Siberia

(¹) [The text, enclosed in No. 127 from Sir M. Durand, D. August 25, R. September 4, America 2580, is as follows:—

President Roosevelt to Sir M. Durand.

(Confidential.)

My dear Mr. Ambassador,

Oyster Bay, New York, August 23, 1905.

In my judgment every true friend of Japan should tell it as I have already told it,⁽²⁾ that the opinion of the civilized world will not support it in continuing the war merely for the purpose of extorting money from Russia. Of the twelve points submitted by Japan to Russia their plenipotentiaries have in substance agreed to about eight. Two others, which were on their face foolish, have been abandoned by the Japanese. There remain the questions of Sakhalin and the indemnity. Sakhalin is now practically Japanese and the Japanese would be entirely right in continuing the war if Russia refused to give it up, for this would amount simply to a foolish attempt by Russia to reconquer it. But inasmuch as Japan wishes to hold everything she has taken it is difficult to see what possible claim she has for a heavy indemnity. She announces that she does not wish east Siberia, apparently for the reason that it would be a white elephant on her hands. Yet if she continues the war all she can possibly get is east Siberia, and this after an expenditure which will probably amount to at least five or six hundred millions of dollars together with countless lives, with undoubted national exhaustion and with the feeling of the civilized world turning against her; not to speak of the possibility of reverses, which, though in my judgment not great, must yet be taken into account. It seems to me that the greatest act of friendship which the friends of Japan can at this time show her is to do as I have already done, and urge her in her own interest not to follow a course which might do her great damage, and can do her no real benefit. If the Russians persist in refusing reasonable terms and make it evident to the world that the war is continued because of their own blind obstinacy and stupidity, then Japan will not be hurt but on the contrary will have general sympathy and will have to do the best that she can. But if Japan shows to the world that she is fighting simply to get money I think the effect will be bad upon her in every way, and that, moreover, there is a fair chance that in the end she will find she has lost more money, instead of getting any. I wish your people could get my views.

Sincerely yours,

THEODORE ROOSEVELT.]

(²) [cp. Tyler Dennett's *Roosevelt* (1925), pp. 268-9, which contains a confidential letter from President Roosevelt to Baron Kaneko.]

which they do not want, and this after great expenditure and loss of life with the feeling of the civilized world turning against them and a possibility of reverses. It seems to him the greatest act of friendship to urge Japan in her own interest not to follow a course which may do her great damage and can do her no real benefit.

MINUTE.

This is a suggestion that we should press the Japanese to make further concessions. Were we to do so our advice would not be taken and would be resented. I am in commun[icatio]n with Mr. Balfour as to the course to be taken.

L.

No. 98.

Sir M. Durand to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

F.O. America 2581.

Tel. (No. 93.)

Lenox, August 24, 1905.

Sir D. MacKenzie Wallace says Russian envoys declare they will not give way on question of indemnity. They admit they may receive orders from St. Petersburg to do so but their information is to the effect that warlike feeling is particularly strong at present at Peterhof. Times Correspondent also says Kaneko belongs to the party which desires alliance with Russia.

No. 99.

Copy of Telegram sent by President Roosevelt to the Emperor Nicholas II, August 25, 1905.⁽¹⁾

(Enclosure in Despatch from Sir C. MacDonald, No. 288 of August 30, 1905, R. October 2, 1905.)

F.O. Japan 598.

I feel bound to approach Your Majesty once more, and, lest there should have been any misunderstanding of my previous telegram, to explain its meaning further. I appeal to Your Majesty, praying that, guided by your conscience, you may be disposed to accept the compromise, which has been drawn up by the plenipotentiaries of Russia and Japan.

A telegram received this morning from St. Petersburg announces that Count Lamsdorff had declared the payment of an indemnity and the cession of territory by Russia to be impossible. The signification of this is that the war must be continued.

If war is continued it is certain that Japan will meet with very considerable difficulties; but it is to be feared that Russia would meet with such calamities as she has never before suffered in her history. According to the opinions of experts, which have reached me from various quarters, the Russian army cannot stand against that of Japan, and in due course, Vladivostock, Harbin and all Eastern Siberia will fall into the hands of the Japanese, and thus Russia, which has never lost an inch of her territory from the days of Ivan the Terrible, on, will see her possessions taken by the enemy.

It is, therefore, earnestly to be desired that peace should be established upon the basis of the compromise.

The plenipotentiaries of the two countries should decide as to the payment to be made for half of Saghalin, and if they are unable to come to an agreement on the

⁽¹⁾ [cp. Tyler Dennett's *Roosevelt* (1925), pp. 272-4, which contains another communication of this date.]

matter, then persons of the highest rank in Great Britain and France might be requested to make an estimate of the amount to be paid, which they would communicate to the plenipotentiaries. If this plan were to be adopted, either Japan might designate an English and Russia a French functionary, or else the two Governments might accept persons nominated by the Governments of Great Britain and France. The plenipotentiaries need not be bound to accept the estimate thus made.

If Your Majesty will accede to this suggestion, I will communicate it to the Japanese Government. My sole object in making it is, in the interests of Japan and Russia, and in the interests of humanity, to put an end to useless bloodshed and to restore peace between the two countries.

No. 100.

Sir M. Durand to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

F.O. America 2581.

Lenox, September 1, 1905.

Tel. (No. 98A.)

R. 9 A.M.

The President sends me copies of messages sent by (group left out ? him) to U[nited] S[tates] Ambassador at St. Petersburg on Aug[ust] 21st, Aug[ust] 23rd and Aug[ust] 25th and copies of two letters addressed to Kaneko on Aug[ust] 22 and Aug[ust] 23rd.⁽¹⁾ He suggests my telegraphing the letters for your confidential information. The messages to U[nited] S[tates] Ambassador at St. Petersburg urge Russia to make peace on basis of division of Sakhalin, Russia paying redemption money for the northern half and Okuba (Russian prisons). The letters contain appeal to Japanese not to continue the war for indemnity. Text of last letter is as follows: "It seems to me that it is to the interest of the great empire of Nippon now to make peace for two reasons: (i) self-interest; (ii) the interest of the world to which she owes a certain duty.

Remember I do not speak of continuing the war rather than give up Sakhalin which I think would be right, but of continuing the war in order to get a great sum of money from Russia which I think would be wrong. Of course you may succeed in getting it but in my judgment even this success would be too dearly paid for and if you failed to get the money no additional humiliations and losses inflicted on Russia would repay Japan for the additional expenditure in blood, in money, in national exhaustion.

I. It is in Japan's interest now to close the war. She has won the control over Corea and Manchuria; she has disorganized the majority of her own fleet in destroying that of Russia; she has Port Arthur, Dalny and the Manchurian Railway; she has Sakhalin. It is not worth her while to continue the war for money when so to continue would probably eat up more money than she could at the end get back from Russia. She will be wise now to close the war in triumph and to take henceforward seat as a leading member at the Council table of the nations. II. Ethically it seems to me that Japan owes a duty to the world at this crisis. The civilized world looks to her to make peace; the nations believe in her; let her show her leadership in matters ethical no less than in matters military. The appeal is made to her in the name of all that is lofty and noble; and to this appeal I hope she will not be deaf."

⁽¹⁾ [v. Tyler Dennett's *Roosevelt*, (1925), pp. 268-9, 274. Messages from the President to the Emperor William II of August 16, 21, are in G.P. XIX, II, pp. 615-21.]

Imperial Order submitted to the Senate by the Minister of Justice.

(Enclosure in Despatch from Sir C. Hardinge, No. 620 of October 18, 1905,
R. October 23, 1905. (1))

F.O. Russia 1703.
(Translation.)

As to the Ratification of the Treaty of Peace between Russia and Japan,
signed at Portsmouth 23rd August, 1905.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, by a letter (No. 5450) dated 2nd October 1905, informed the Minister of Justice, that on the first day of the same month His Imperial Majesty had been graciously pleased to ratify the Treaty of Peace, signed at Portsmouth on 23rd August [5 September], 1905, between Russia and Japan, and that in virtue of a special agreement with the Japanese Government, the mutual notifications that the ratification of the Treaty had been effected followed on the 2nd October 1905,—that to the Imperial Government being made through the Representative of the United States of America at St. Petersburg, and that to the Japanese Government through the French Representative at Tokio.

The Minister of Justice, on the 3rd [16th] October 1905, handed to the Senate, for publication, the text, as communicated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, of the above-mentioned Treaty, with that of two articles, supplementary thereto, together with a Russian translation of the same.

By God's assisting grace We, Nicholas the Second, Emperor and Autocrat of all the Russias, &c. &c.,

• Hereby declare that by mutual agreement between Ourselves and His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, Our Plenipotentiaries have concluded and signed at Portsmouth on the 23rd August [5 September] 1905 a Treaty of Peace, which word for word reads as follows:—

Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, d'une part, et Sa Majesté l'Empereur du Japon, d'autre part, étant animés du désir de rétablir les bienfaits de la paix pour Leurs pays et pour Leurs peuples, ont décidé de conclure un Traité de Paix et ont nommé à cet effet Leurs Plénipotentiaires, savoir :

Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie : Son Excellence M. Serge Witte, Son Secrétaire d'Etat et Président du Comité des Ministres de l'Empire de Russie et Son Excellence le Baron Roman Rosen, Maître de la Cour Impériale de Russie et Son Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et Plénipotentiaire auprès des États-Unis d'Amérique; et

Sa Majesté l'Empereur du Japon : Son Excellence le Baron Komura Iutaro, Iusammi, grand cordon de l'ordre Impérial du Soleil Levant, Son Ministre des Affaires Étrangères et Son Excellence M. Takahira Kogoro, Iusammi, grand cordon de l'ordre Impérial du Trésor Sacré, Son Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire auprès des États-Unis d'Amérique;

Lesquels, après avoir échangé leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, ont conclu les Articles suivants:—

ARTICLE I.

Il y aura à l'avenir paix et amitié entre Leurs Majestés l'Empereur de toutes les Russies et l'Empereur du Japon, ainsi qu'entre Leurs États et sujets respectifs.

(1) [Sir C. Hardinge's despatch enclosed a printed paper giving the text of the Imperial Order in Russian, the treaty in French (with a Russian translation), and the ratification in Russian. Sir C. Hardinge enclosed also an English translation of the Imperial Order and ratification. The French text of the treaty is here reproduced, together with the English translation of the Imperial Order and ratification. The English translation of the treaty is given in *B.F.S.P.*, Vol. 98, p. 785 *sqq.*]

ARTICLE II.

Le Gouvernement Impérial de Russie, reconnaissant que le Japon possède en Corée des intérêts prédominants politiques, militaires et économiques, s'engage à ne point intervenir ni mettre d'obstacles aux mesures de direction, de protection et de contrôle que le Gouvernement Impérial du Japon pourrait considérer nécessaire de prendre en Corée.

Il est entendu que les sujets Russes en Corée seront traités exactement de la même manière que les ressortissants des autres pays étrangers, à savoir qu'ils seront placés sur le même pied que les ressortissants de la nation la plus favorisée.

Il est de même convenu que pour éviter toute cause de malentendu, les deux Hautes Parties Contractantes s'abstiendront, sur la frontière Russo-Coréenne, de prendre toute mesure militaire qui pourrait menacer la sécurité du territoire Russe ou Coréen.

ARTICLE III.

La Russie et le Japon s'engagent mutuellement :

1. A évacuer complètement et simultanément la Manchourie, à l'exception du territoire sur lequel s'étend le bail de la presqu'île de Liao-tong, conformément aux dispositions de l'Article additionnel I annexé à ce traité ; et

2. restituer entièrement et complètement à l'administration exclusive de la Chine toutes les parties de la Manchourie qui sont occupées maintenant par les troupes Russes et Japonaises, ou qui sont sous leur contrôle, à l'exception du territoire susmentionné.

Le Gouvernement Impérial de Russie déclare qu'il n'a point en Manchourie d'avantages territoriaux ou concessions préférentielles ou exclusives de nature à porter atteinte à la souveraineté de la Chine ou incompatibles avec le principe d'opportunité égale.

ARTICLE IV.

La Russie et le Japon s'engagent réciproquement à ne mettre aucun obstacle aux mesures générales qui s'appliquent également à toutes les nations et que la Chine pourrait prendre pour le développement du commerce et de l'industrie en Manchourie.

ARTICLE V.

Le Gouvernement Impérial de Russie cède au Gouvernement Impérial du Japon, avec le consentement du Gouvernement de Chine, le bail de Port-Arthur, de Talién et des territoires et eaux territoriales adjacents, ainsi que tous les droits, privilèges et concessions se rattachant à ce bail ou en faisant partie, et il cède, de même, au Gouvernement Impérial du Japon tous les travaux et propriétés publics dans le territoire sur lequel s'étend le bail susmentionné.

Les deux Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent mutuellement à obtenir du Gouvernement de Chine le consentement mentionné dans la stipulation ci-dessus.

Le Gouvernement Impérial du Japon donne de sa part l'assurance que les droits de propriété des sujets russes dans le territoire susmentionné seront parfaitement respectés.

ARTICLE VI.

Le Gouvernement Impérial de Russie s'engage à céder au Gouvernement Impérial du Japon, sans compensation, avec le consentement du Gouvernement de Chine, le chemin de fer Tchan-Tchoun (Kouan-Tchien-Tsy) et Port-Arthur et tous ses embranchements avec tous les droits, privilèges et propriétés y appartenant dans cette région, ainsi que toutes les mines de charbon dans ladite région, appartenant à ce chemin de fer ou en exploitation pour son profit.

Les deux Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent mutuellement à obtenir du Gouvernement de Chine le consentement mentionné dans la stipulation ci-dessus.

ARTICLE VII.

La Russie et le Japon s'engagent à exploiter leurs chemins de fer respectifs en Manchourie exclusivement dans un but commercial et industriel, mais nullement dans un but stratégique.

Il est entendu que cette restriction ne s'applique pas aux chemins de fer dans le territoire sur lequel s'étend le bail de la presqu'île de Liao-tong.

ARTICLE VIII.

Les Gouvernements Impériaux de Russie et du Japon, en vue de favoriser et de faciliter les relations et le trafic, concluront, aussitôt que possible, une convention séparée, pour le règlement de leurs services de raccordement de chemins de fer en Manchourie.

ARTICLE IX.

Le Gouvernement Impérial de Russie cède au Gouvernement Impérial du Japon en perpétuité et en pleine souveraineté la partie sud de l'île de Sakhaline et toutes les îles qui y sont adjacentes, ainsi que tous les travaux et propriétés publics qui s'y trouvent. Le cinquantième parallèle de latitude nord est adopté comme la limite du territoire cédé.—La ligne frontière exacte de ce territoire sera déterminée conformément aux dispositions de l'Article additionnel II annexé à ce Traité.

Le Japon et la Russie conviennent mutuellement de ne construire dans leurs possessions respectives sur l'île de Sakhaline et sur les îles qui y sont adjacentes aucune fortification ni travaux militaires semblables. De même, ils s'engagent respectivement à ne prendre aucune mesure militaire qui pourrait entraver la libre navigation des Détroits de Lapérouse et de Tartarie.

ARTICLE X.

Il est réservé aux sujets Russes habitants du territoire cédé au Japon de vendre leurs propriétés immobilières et de se retirer dans leur pays; mais, s'ils préfèrent rester dans le territoire cédé, ils seront maintenus et protégés dans le plein exercice de leurs industries et droits de propriété à la condition de se soumettre aux lois et à la juridiction japonaises. Le Japon aura la pleine liberté de retirer le droit de résidence dans ce territoire à tous les habitants se trouvant dans l'incapacité politique ou administrative, ou de les déporter de ce territoire. Il s'engage toutefois à ce que les droits de propriété de ces habitants soient pleinement respectés.

ARTICLE XI.

La Russie s'engage à s'entendre avec le Japon pour concéder aux sujets Japonais des droits de pêche le long des côtes des possessions Russes dans les Mers du Japon, d'Okhotsk et de Behring.

Il est convenu que l'engagement susmentionné ne portera pas atteinte aux droits déjà appartenant aux sujets Russes ou étrangers dans ces régions.

ARTICLE XII.

Le Traité de Commerce et de Navigation entre la Russie et le Japon ayant été annulé par la guerre, les Gouvernements Impériaux de Russie et du Japon s'engagent à adopter, comme base de leurs relations commerciales, jusqu'à la conclusion d'un nouveau traité de commerce et de navigation sur la base du Traité qui était en vigueur antérieurement à la guerre actuelle, le système du traitement réciproque sur le pied de la nation la plus favorisée, y compris les tarifs d'importation et d'exporta-

tion, les formalités de douane, les droits de transit et de tonnage, et l'admission et le traitement des agents, des sujets et des vaisseaux d'un pays dans le territoire de l'autre.

ARTICLE XIII.

Aussitôt que possible après la mise en vigueur du présent Traité, tous les prisonniers de guerre seront réciproquement restitués. Les Gouvernements Impériaux de Russie et du Japon nommeront, chacun de son côté, un Commissaire spécial qui se chargera des prisonniers. Tous les prisonniers se trouvant entre les mains de l'un des Gouvernements seront remis au Commissaire de l'autre Gouvernement, ou à son représentant, dûment autorisé, qui les recevra en tel nombre et dans tels ports convenables de l'État remettant que ce dernier aura notifié d'avance au Commissaire de l'État recevant.

Les Gouvernements de Russie et du Japon présenteront l'un à l'autre, le plus tôt possible, après que la remise des prisonniers aura été achevée, un compte documenté des dépenses directes faites respectivement par eux pour le soin et l'entretien des prisonniers depuis la date de la capture ou de la reddition jusqu'à celle de la mort ou de la remise. La Russie s'engage à rembourser au Japon, aussitôt que possible après l'échange de ces comptes, comme il est stipulé ci-dessus, la différence entre le montant réel ainsi dépensé par le Japon et le montant réel également déboursé par la Russie.

ARTICLE XIV.

Le présent Traité sera ratifié par leurs Majestés l'Empereur de toutes les Russies et l'Empereur du Japon. Cette ratification sera, dans le plus bref délai possible, et en tous cas pas plus tard que dans cinquante jours à partir de la date de la signature du Traité, notifiée aux Gouvernements Impériaux de Russie et du Japon respectivement, par l'intermédiaire de l'Ambassadeur des États-Unis d'Amérique à S[ain]t-Pétersbourg et du Ministre de France à Tokio, et à partir de la date de la dernière de ces notifications ce Traité entrera, dans toutes ses parties, en pleine vigueur.

L'échange formel des ratifications se fera à Washington aussitôt que possible.

ARTICLE XV.

Le présent Traité sera signé en double : en langues Française et Anglaise. Les deux textes sont absolument conformes ; mais, en cas de divergence d'interprétation, le texte Français fera foi.

En foi de quoi les Plénipotentiaires respectifs ont signé et scellé de leurs sceaux le présent Traité de Paix.

Fait à Portsmouth (New Hampshire) le vingt-trois Août (cinq Septembre) de l'an mil neuf cent cinq, correspondant au cinquième jour du neuvième mois de la trente-huitième année de Meidji.

(signé) IUTARO KOMURA.
(signé) K. TAKAHIRA.
(L.S.) (L.S.)

(signé) SERGIE WITTE.
(signé) ROSEN.
(L.S.) L.S.)

Conformément aux dispositions des Articles III et IX du Traité de Paix entre la Russie et le Japon en date de ce jour, les Plénipotentiaires soussignés ont conclu les Articles additionnels suivants :

1. Ad Article III.

Les Gouvernements Impériaux de Russie et du Japon s'engagent mutuellement à commencer le retrait de leurs forces militaires du territoire de la Manchourie simultanément et immédiatement après la mise en vigueur du Traité de Paix ; et dans une période de dix-huit mois à partir de cette date les armées des deux Puissances seront complètement retirées de la Manchourie à l'exception du territoire à bail de la presqu'île de Liaotong.

Les forces des deux Puissances occupant les positions frontales seront retirées les premières.

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes se réservent le droit de maintenir des gardes pour protéger leurs lignes de chemins de fer respectives en Manchourie.

Le nombre de ces gardes n'excèdera pas quinze hommes par kilomètre; et, dans la limite de ce nombre maximum, les Commandants des armées Russes et Japonaises fixeront, de commun accord, le nombre des gardes qui seront employés, le plus minime possible, conformément aux exigences réelles.

Les Commandants des forces Russes et Japonaises en Manchourie s'entendront sur tous les détails relatifs à l'exécution de l'évacuation conformément aux principes ci-dessus énumérés et prendront, de commun accord, les mesures nécessaires pour effectuer l'évacuation aussitôt que possible et en tout cas pas plus tard que dans la période de dix-huit mois.

2. Ad Article IX.

Aussitôt que possible après la mise en vigueur du présent Traité une Commission de Délimitation, composée de nombre égal de membres qui seront nommés respectivement par les deux Hautes Parties Contractantes, marquera sur les lieux, d'une manière permanente, la ligne exacte entre les possessions Russes et Japonaises de l'Île de Sakhaline. La Commission sera tenue, autant que les considérations topographiques le permettront, à suivre le cinquantième parallèle de latitude nord pour la ligne de démarcation, et dans le cas où des déviations de la dite ligne sur quelques points seront trouvées nécessaires, compensation en sera faite par des déviations corrélatives sur d'autres points. Il sera de même le devoir de la dite Commission de préparer une liste et description des îles adjacentes qui seront comprises dans la cession, et finalement la Commission préparera et signera les cartes constatant les limites du territoire cédé. Les travaux de la Commission seront soumis à l'approbation des Hautes Parties Contractantes.

Les Articles additionnels mentionnés ci-dessus seront considérés comme ratifiés par la ratification du Traité de Paix, auquel ils sont annexés.

Portsmouth, le 23 Août (5 Septembre) 1905, correspondant au 5^{me} jour, 9^{me} mois, 38^{me} année de Meidji.

(signé) IUTARO KOMURA.
(signé) K. TAKAHIRA.

(signé) SERGE WITTE.
(signé) ROSEN.

Wherefore, after due perusal of this Treaty and its two Supplementary Articles, We have accepted the same as satisfactory, have confirmed and ratified it, and we also accept it hereby as satisfactory, and confirm and ratify it in all its contents, promising by Our Imperial word, on Our own behalf, and that of Our Heirs and Successors, that everything laid down in the above-mentioned acts will be inviolably observed.

In token whereof, We, having signed with Our own hand this Our Imperial Ratification, have commanded it to be confirmed by Our Imperial Seal.

Given at Peterhof the first [14th] day of October in the year of Our Lord 1905, and in the eleventh year of Our Reign.⁽²⁾

Signed NICHOLAS.

Countersigned

Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Secretary of State,
Count LAMSDORFF.

⁽²⁾ [The Emperor of Japan also ratified the Treaty on October 14, whereupon the Treaty came into force.]