CHAPTER XVI

THE TREATY OF SÈVRES

1918-1921

THE unusual degree of control which Mr. Lloyd George exercised over Foreign Policy after the cessation of hostilities was to a great extent the outcome of abnormal circumstances consequent on the war itself. As Prime Minister he was necessarily the supreme representative of his country at the Peace Conference, and the Peace Conference was the inevitable starting point of British post-war Foreign Policy. The negotiations were, therefore, conducted on behalf of Great Britain by Mr. Lloyd George; and it was always possible for him after his return from France to claim the right to deal with this or that question, on the ground that he had been responsible for the policy pursued at Paris.

That this was natural and, indeed, to some extent inevitable Lord Curzon readily admitted. But while admitting that, in the special circumstances of the time, it was reasonable that the Prime Minister should take the lead, he was very far from agreeing that he should do so almost to the exclusion of the Foreign Minister. And from the first he had viewed with alarm a tendency which he thought that he detected in Mr. Lloyd George to take advantage of the situation by assuming the position almost of a Dictator. Often as the War Cabinet met in these days it was not in such constant session as Lord Curzon thought that it ought to be.

"I am somewhat disturbed," he wrote as early as October, 1918, "at the failure to summon the War Cabinet, and have an

uneasy consciousness that things are being or may be done, for which we shall bear the responsibility but of which we are not aware. In my view the Cabinet ought to be sitting every day in these times. Repeated meetings have been promised and even arranged to discuss German Colonies, Terms of Armistice and other vital considerations. But they are always postponed frequently at the last moment. Important questions are shelved, and even as regards information we are left to pick up what we can from the boxes and telegrams."[1]

And he formed the opinion that, if the control of Foreign Policy was not to pass altogether out of the hands of the Foreign Minister the tendency was one which would have to be strenuously resisted.

It was with particular interest, consequently, and not always without alarm, that he looked on during the year 1919 from the Foreign Office in London, at the proceedings of the British Delegation in Paris. And viewing events from day to day with the detachment of an interested spectator, he placed his own interpretation upon them; and in particular he read into the suppression of the Council of Ten and the rise and rapid apotheosis of "the Big Four," a special and sinister significance. Everything seemed to him to point to the supersession of the Foreign Office and the unchallenged domination of Mr. Lloyd George. And, when later in the year he succeeded to the substantive appointment himself, he did so imbued with the belief that what he regarded as the rightful position of the Foreign Office had already been forfeited by default.

Harmonious collaboration between the Prime Minister and his Foreign Secretary might have been possible, and, indeed, in the circumstances of the time, highly advantageous, had those posts been held by men of less antithetical natures than Lord Curzon and Mr. Lloyd George. The difficulties which arose between them were due not merely to differences of opinion on the merits of the questions which came before them for decision—though in some cases these were considerable—but even more to differences of method. They were sundered by much the same gulf that had yawned between Lord Curzon as Viceroy of India and Lord Kitchener as Commander-

[1] Letter to Mr., afterwards Sir, Austen Chamberlain, October the 23rd, 1918.

in-Chief. Like Lord Kitchener, Mr. Lloyd George had a supreme contempt for convention in administration. His methods had much of the directness which had characterised Lord Kitchener's. In the large Private Secretariat which he built up for himself in Downing Street, he found a convenient and ever-ready agency for carrying into effect any orders which he felt moved to give. In the pressure of the times the necessity for consulting or even informing the Foreign Office was sometimes overlooked. Interviews would be granted to the representatives of foreign Governments without the knowledge of the Foreign Minister; and in these circumstances it is not surprising that occasions arose on which it seemed to other Powers that the British Government spoke with two discordant voices. More particularly was this so, of course, in the case of those questions upon which there existed a definite divergence of view between the Prime Minister and his Foreign Secretary. And on no question did they differ more profoundly, or with more disastrous consequences, than on the attitude to be adopted by Great Britain towards Greece and Turkey.

From the first Lord Curzon had urged the importance of dealing promptly with Turkey and of effecting a settlement of the whole Near Eastern question—with how little success a reference to what has already been said in chapter XII will show. There is little doubt that if the Powers had found it possible to deal with Turkey during the opening months of 1919, they would have found her in no position to reject any reasonable terms that they might have decided to offer her. But they did not find it possible. Innumerable questions were clamouring for settlement and Mr. Lloyd George, with little previous knowledge of Foreign Policy, found himself suddenly called upon to play a leading part in arranging the affairs of half the nations of Europe. It is difficult to know which to admire most, the courage or the assurance with which he set about devising new and often purely arbitrary frontiers for the protesting peoples of Central Europe, and unravelling the tangles of Silesia, Fiume, Poland and other foci of continental trouble. It was his misfortune rather than his fault that, at a time when prompt action was above all things called for, he should have been drawn by President Wilson, together with the representatives of the other Powers assembled in Paris for

the Peace Conference, into the morass of the League of Nations discussion. Lord Curzon looked on at the proceedings of the Peace Conference with feelings of growing apprehension, and in May he put his fears on paper in a letter to Mr. Chamberlain—"The methods of the Peace Conference have, I think, been mistaken throughout; and it has been tragic to read of decisions arrived at in independence of any expert authority and containing the seeds of certain failure."

Lord Curzon had certainly given his colleagues no excuse for pleading ignorance of his view either as to the urgency of the Near Eastern question, or as to the nature of the settlement to be aimed at. The ejection of the Turk from Europe and the establishment of a much reduced but compact and homogeneous Turkish State in Asia Minor were to his mind the essentials of any permanent settlement of this age-long question. Such a policy entailed the amputation of large tracts even of the Asiatic dominions of the former Turkish Empire. Syria and Palestine, Arabia, Mesopotamia and Armenia—all these extensive lands hitherto incorporated in the loosely knit Sovereignty of the Sultan must be freed finally from the capricious and too often savage tyranny of Turkish domination. On the other hand the future Turkish State, with its seat of Government at Brusa, Angora or Konia, must be permitted to occupy in its integrity the historic tongue of land thrust out from Asia in the direction of Europe and known comprehensively as Asia Minor. No European encroachment upon the natural geographical boundaries of this territory, whether Italian, French or Greek, must be allowed. In a Minute drawn up some time before the termination of the war, he had set forth the arguments for such a policy. He dealt first with the case for confining the future Turkish State to Asia.

> "For nearly five centuries the presence of the Turk in Europe has been a source of distraction, intrigue and corruption in European politics, of oppression and misrule to the subject nationalities, and an incentive to undue and overweening ambitions in the Moslem World. It has encouraged the Turk to regard himself as a Great Power, and has enabled him to impose upon others the same illusion. It has placed him in a position to play off one Power against another, and in their

jealousies and his own machinations to find pretexts for his continued immunity. It has been an unexpugnable barrier to the solution of the Balkan problem or the full emancipation of the Balkan peoples. It has been an equal obstacle to the proper or good government of his own people whose resources have been squandered in the polluted *corridors* of Constantinople, or in the expenditure required for the upkeep of military and naval forces disproportionate to the real strength or requirements of the Turkish nation."

Next, he discussed the question of the successors to the Turks in their erstwhile capital. Powerful arguments were shown to exist against the installation of any one Power in the seats of the mighty on the shores of the Golden Horn. Great Britain because of her traditional policy and her great Eastern connections would be in some respects the most suitable heir to the Turk, and the choice would probably be more acceptable than any other to the Eastern World. But the main duties and responsibilities of Great Britain lay elsewhere. She would emerge from the war with an increase of obligations which she would with difficulty sustain, and no British Government would dream of adding to them by the assumption of so vast and perilous a charge. Some other solution must therefore be sought:

"The successive elimination of the various possible or available Powers brings us to the discussion of the final alternative of some form of international authority; and many and obvious as are the objections to a condominium, it may yet be found that, short of keeping the Turk in his capital, this is the only possible alternative."

Under such a scheme, an International Commission presided over possibly by an American, or as a conceivable alternative, America herself as the Mandatory of a League of Nations, would occupy and administer Constantinople and the shores, both European and Asiatic, of the Bosphorus. With a Turkish capital established securely in the highlands of Anatolia many of the Turks who "already consti-

tuted only forty per cent. of the population of Constantinople" might be expected to seek new homes across the Straits; the remainder would continue to reside in "what would have become *par excellence* the Cosmopolis or international city of the Eastern World."

Into the concluding passage of his Minute crept that note of romance which gave so peculiar a distinction to his treatment of all questions associated with ancient or mediæval history. Not the least of the advantages of such a settlement in the eyes of some would be the fact that in these circumstances, "Justinian's great Byzantine fane of St. Sophia, which was for nine hundred years a Christian church, and has only been for little more than half that period a Muhammadan mosque, would naturally revert to its original dedication. On the other hand the integrity and sanctity of the great Islamic mosques of Constantinople, more than sufficient for the Moslem population, would be scrupulously respected and guaranteed."[1]

Such was the solution "at once drastic and decisive" which commended itself to Lord Curzon and which he believed could be effected by prompt and resolute handling. And from the day that he took up his duties as Mr. Balfour's deputy at the Foreign Office, he urged it upon the Government. Delay in dealing with the question exasperated him. "I wish to express to my colleagues," he wrote on March the 25th, 1919, "certain apprehensions which I cannot help entertaining about the progress of events in the Near and Middle East." The terms of the Armistice granted to Turkey had been neither so comprehensive nor so severe as Lord Curzon himself had advised. And three months' neglect at the hands of the Peace Conference had already resulted in a serious deterioration in the situation. In Constantinople the Committee of Union and Progress far from being dissolved was everywhere active in the background. Enver Pasha was still acclaimed as a national hero. The forts of the Dardanelles remained intact, occupied only by weak Allied detachments. On all sides evidence of the ability of the Allied Powers to enforce their will was steadily dissolving. The French and Greeks had been ejected from the Ukraine. We ourselves

[1] Minute dated January the 2nd, 1918, and circulated to the Cabinet in January, 1919.

were withdrawing from Transcaspia; it was widely known that we intended to evacuate the Caucasus; ere long our flag would cease to fly upon the Caspian. Egypt was in widespread and serious revolt, and the Turkish flag had actually been raised again in the Valley of the Nile. The fate of Palestine remained undecided; in Syria France and Great Britain were sharply divided. Such was the picture upon which "the Old Turk who still hopes to re-establish the former regime, and the Young Turk who means to cheat us, if he can, of the spoils of victory, look out from the crumbling watchtowers of Stambul."[1]

But the warning fell upon deaf ears; and three weeks later Lord Curzon again drew attention to the steady deterioration which delay was producing in the situation. The Turks had recovered from the first dismay of defeat and were intriguing with all their old spirit and skill. The decision as to Constantinople had already been so long delayed that what might have have been in January would probably be found more than difficult in May or June. No decision had been come to as to the future of Armenia. More lamentable still, failure to compose Anglo-French differences over Syria had led to the expedient of a Commission, which so far from being confined to the Syrian question had, "with perfect logic but with deplorable imprudence," been instructed to examine and report upon the entire Middle Eastern situation. A sinister development due to constant delay was that, in the absence of definite decisions by the Powers in Conference, individual nations were showing signs of acting independently. Italy had already anticipated and, indeed, precipitated the ultimate decision by a military descent upon Adalia and the neighbouring coasts and by sending troops to Konia. She had also "with a rashness to which it is difficult to find a parallel" accepted a Mandate for the Caucasus and the Caspian. And, besides this accomplished fact, it was rumoured that a claim put forward by Greece to Smyrna and the vilayet of Aidin was likely to be conceded by the Peace Conference, not on account of any urgent political or military necessity, but thanks to "the superior diplomatic ability of M. Venizelos." Was it to be believed, asked Lord Curzon, that the Greeks "who cannot keep order five miles outside the gates of

[1] Note dated March the 25th, 1919.

Salonika," would be allowed contentedly to occupy and administer a great city like Smyrna or a province like Aidin?

These excursions by individual Powers into the thorny mazes of the Near Eastern problem filled him with alarm for the future.

> "That the Turks should be deprived of Constantinople is, in my opinion, inevitable and desirable as the crowning evidence of their defeat in the war; and I believe that it will be accepted with whatever wrathful reluctance by the Eastern World. But when it is realised that the fugitives are to be kicked from pillar to post and that there is to be practically no Turkish Empire and probably no Caliphate at all, I believe that we shall be giving a most dangerous and most unnecessary stimulus to Moslem passions throughout the Eastern World and that sullen resentment may easily burst into savage frenzy."

He urged, therefore, that if it was not too late, the partitioning or Mandatory policy should not be pursued in Asia Minor beyond the geographical limits which were the inevitable consequences of the war, and that presuming the Italians had already accepted the Mandate for the Caucasus—"though I am not aware of any existing authority for offering it to them"—they should be asked even at the last moment "to desist from an act of such deplorable levity, for which no justification can be found on any plea of local self-determination, of public or private interest, or morality or even of expediency."[1]

No protest had the smallest effect in staying the steady march of events in the direction which Lord Curzon most earnestly deprecated. The encroachments of Italy and Greece on the Asiatic territories of the Turks went rapidly forward. Between May the 15th and 22nd, 1919, 15,000 Greek troops were disembarked at Smyrna and a number of places in the coastal district were occupied in accordance with an authorisation issued by the Peace Conference in Paris. And, in June, Lord Curzon took up his pen once more in a vain hope of arousing those primarily concerned to a sense of the disastrous future towards which matters were plainly drifting.

[1] Note dated April the 18th, 1919, and circulated to the Cabinet on April 22nd.

Since at a later date an attempt was made to hold Lord Curzon responsible for the very disasters against which he constantly warned the Government, it is due to him that his Despatch of June the 20th, 1919, should be published *in extenso*.

Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour

Foreign Office, June 20, 1919.

"Sir,

On grounds of public policy I have been a good deal disturbed at the continuous and as yet unarrested advance of the Italian and Greek forces in the Western parts of the Turkish dominions in Asia Minor, and I have the honour to transmit herewith a statement from such information as is available in the Foreign Office of the extent to which that advance has so far in each of the two cases been pursued. Though these movements were in part undertaken in the first instance with the knowledge, and in the case of the Greeks with the sanction, of the Allied Powers at Paris, they appear to be continued in their later stages, so far as is known here, with no similar authority, and in open disregard of the principle, laid down in the early days of the Paris Conference, that its ultimate decisions should not be prejudiced by premature and aggressive action in respect of the occupation of territory by any of the interested States or Powers. Moreover, in the case of the Greeks in particular, they are alleged to have been accompanied by scenes of discreditable and unprovoked outrage.

I am the more concerned at the occurrence of this twofold penetration because it is apparently being prosecuted without interference or protest (save from the Turks) at a time when the importance of retaining at least some portion of the Turkish Sovereignty and of the former Turkish dominions in Asia is reported to have received a somewhat tardy recognition at the hands of the Allied Powers, although it must be clear that the realisation of any such policy will be seriously compromised by the presence in the regions affected of the forces of two States whose ulterior intentions so small an attempt is made to conceal. A further disquieting symptom is the constant recur-

rence of warnings from our representatives at Constantinople of the consequences that must ensue from these continued encroachments upon what remains of Turkish Sovereignty in Asia, and the likelihood that this part of the Middle East will thereby be plunged into a state of renewed and, in all probability, protracted violence and disorder. The further these advances, whether of Greeks or of Italians, are pushed, the greater becomes the difficulty of withdrawal, and the more inevitable the prospect of future strife, if not of serious bloodshed.

In the various appreciations that reach the Foreign Office of the policy that is now being pursued with regard to Turkey, I cannot find any voice that welcomes or indeed defends these encroachments. And yet the persistence of the actors appears successfully to effect what the considered judgment of the spectators declines to approve.

I have ventured to submit this representation, not as a protest, which I cannot but feel will be useless, but with a view to ascertaining whether it is in contemplation to place any limit to the extension of these advances, and whether there is any ground for regarding them as provisional in character and duration. I shall be very grateful for any information that you may be able to give me on these points.

I have, etc.

Curzon of Kedleston."

Still the Powers delayed. They clung to the hope that America might consent to play a predominant part in straightening out the tangle into which matters in the Near East had fallen. They were not without grounds for their belief, for President Wilson had gone so far as to ask that action might be postponed; and for a time there was a definite expectation that America would not only emerge from her traditional isolation but was contemplating doing so on a large and dramatic scale. This hope was doomed to disappointment; but before it vanished, further developments of a menacing nature had taken place.

In an evil moment the Sultan acting with the best intentions, had

sent out to Angora in Asia Minor, in a position of some importance, a young man of between thirty and forty years. Mustapha Kemal Pasha, a man of forceful personality, quickly gathered round him all the elements of discontent, including various members of the Committee of Union and Progress who had contrived to escape from the prisons of Stambul, and raised the standard of revolt against the Government in Constantinople. He provided a focus for the anti-Christian and anti-European elements which were rapidly rallying in face of the apparent impotence of the Allied Powers. And, if anything had been needed to bring the waverers down on the side of the champion of Turkish nationalism, it would have been the action of the Peace Conference in authorising the landing of the Greeks at Smyrna. To Lord Curzon at any rate it was abundantly clear that ever since this unfortunate step, no living Turk could have any feeling except one of profound sympathy with the cause of patriotism and nationality which Mustapha Kemal represented.

Before the end of the year America had ceased to count as a possible factor in the settlement of the Near and Middle East; and on the occasion of a visit to London in November, M. Pichon suggested to Lord Curzon that it was desirable that the matter should be discussed between the two Governments before it was taken in hand by the Peace Conference as a whole. Lord Curzon went further. He would welcome any opportunity, he said, of taking part in such a discussion as a preliminary to more formal proceedings; but he urged consideration of the whole question of a Turkish peace by the Allied Powers with the least possible delay and preferably in London in the course of the coming month.

In due course conversations took place. M. Clemenceau, who had been persuaded to come to London in person, had at first been opposed to the ejection of the Turks from Constantinople. But in course of the discussion of the matter he had been convinced by the arguments brought to bear by Lord Curzon and Mr. Lloyd George and had agreed to the establishment at Constantinople of an international organisation. Further conversations between Lord Curzon and M. Berthelot, towards the end of December, resulted in substantial agreement between France and Great Britain in favour of a settlement on the broad lines consistently advocated by the

British Foreign Minister, and the way at last seemed clear for the negotiation of a satisfactory peace.

No sooner, however, had agreement been reached with France than opposition manifested itself in another quarter. On January the 6th, 1920, the Cabinet met to consider the Eastern question; and, in spite of the fact that on this particular issue he had the powerful support of the Prime Minister, Lord Curzon was defeated on his policy of ejecting the Turk from Europe. The next day he drew up an emphatic protest against this decision.

"I ask to place on record my earnest and emphatic dissent from the decision arrived at by the majority of the Cabinet yesterday—in opposition to the advice of the Prime Minister and two successive Foreign Secretaries—to retain the Turk in Constantinople. I believe this to be a short-sighted and, in the long run, a most unfortunate decision.

"In order to avoid trouble in India—largely manufactured and in any case ephemeral—and to render our task in Egypt less difficult—its difficulty being in reality almost entirely independent of what we may do or not do at Constantinople—we are losing an opportunity for which Europe has waited nearly five centuries, and which may not recur. The idea of a respectable and docile Turkish Government at Constantinople, preserved from its hereditary vices by a military cordon of the Powers—including be it remembered, a permanent British garrison of 10,000 to 15,000 men—is in my judgment a chimera. Nor will it be found that the decision, if carried into effect in Paris, will either solve the Turkish problem or calm the Eastern World.

"The Turk at Constantinople must have very different measure meted out to him from the Turk at Konia. He will retain a Sovereignty which will have to be a mere simulacrum, and those who have saved him will, unless I am mistaken, presently discover that his rescue has neither satisfied him nor pacified Islam. But beyond all I regret that the main object for which the war in the East was fought and the sacrifice of Gallipoli endured—namely the liberation of Europe from the

Ottoman Turk—has after an almost incredible expenditure of life and treasure been thrown away in the very hour when it has been obtained, and that we shall have left to our descendants—who knows after how much further sacrifice and suffering?—a task from which we have flinched.

"I may add that the refusal of the Cabinet to endorse the scheme prepared by M. Berthelot and myself was resolved on without any consideration by them of what the rival scheme will be, i.e., a Turkish State, still centred at Constantinople but under international supervision. When produced it may cause some surprise."

His own share in the proceedings caused him endless worry. "I have been presiding all the morning over Allied Conferences," he told Lady Curzon on March the 11th, "and am now, 3 p.m., trying to piece together some material for my two speeches this afternoon. I am worried by it all, for the Treaty with Turkey is going badly and we are in for great trouble at Constantinople."

It is on record in Lord Curzon's own handwriting[1] that, following upon this decision, the principles of a Treaty to be imposed upon Turkey were laid down at a meeting of the Supreme Council presided over by Mr. Lloyd George in Downing Street; that a Conference of the Ambassadors under his own chairmanship was charged with the task of filling in the details in accordance with the principles laid down; and that the Treaty in its final form was debated and decided in Mr. Lloyd George's presence and largely under his influence at San Remo in the following April.

The Treaty thus agreed upon at the Conference at San Remo contained two outstanding provisions to which Lord Curzon had always been opposed and against the acceptance of which he had constantly striven. In accordance with the decision of the Cabinet above referred to the Turk was to remain in Europe; and, as if in the nature of a set off to this, a Greek enclave was to be recognised in the coastal region of Asia Minor with Smyrna as its centre. Up to the last moment Lord Curzon used his influence against what he regarded as a fatal decision. Shortly before the meeting at

[1] In a Memorandum written by Lord Curzon and kept with his private papers.

San Remo he caused to be circulated to the Cabinet a Despatch from the British High Commissioner at Constantinople in which the latter, after explaining that the views which he put forward were shared by his advisers—" men for the most part with life-long experience of Near Eastern affairs "—described the provisional occupation of Smyrna by the Greeks as " the canker in the Near Eastern situation since last May," and asserted that its proposed perpetuation would be a canker for years to come, a constant irritant which would lead to bloodshed in Asia Minor for generations. Did the British people realise, Admiral de Robeck asked, that the proposal to dismember Ottoman provinces of Turkey in the interests of Greece would drive the remaining Turks into the arms of the Bolsheviks and set the Near East and all Central Asia aflame ? But the die had been cast and Lord Curzon's warnings remained unheeded.

The document embodying the decisions of the San Remo Conference, which came to be known as the Treaty of Sèvres, was signed at that place on August the 10th, 1920, by the representatives of the thirteen nations associated, for one reason or another, with the negotiation of peace in the Near East. Little more need be said of it, for by the time that it had been finally approved and signed it had ceased to be within the sphere of what was practical. Throughout the months during which the Allied Powers had been pondering the matter, Mustapha Kemal had been consolidating his position. Depicting the Sultan in Constantinople as a puppet in the hands of the Powers, he had appealed with complete success to the sentiment of the Turkish people. He had, in fact, set on foot a formidable movement which, with great dexterity, he presented to the Turkish people, sometimes in the guise of pan-Islamism with its irresistible appeal to their religious sentiment, at others in the form of pan-Turanianism directed towards the goal of ethnic unity. During the early part of 1920, forces acting at his instigation, if not under his direct orders, had inflicted a heavy defeat on French arms in Cilicia. The French had been compelled to evacuate Marash, the most considerable city of Cilicia, and in the course of their retreat in which they had been accompanied by many thousands of the population, the victorious Turks had indulged in wholesale massacres which had shocked the civilised world. The victims of this holocaust, in the

main Armenians, were variously estimated at from 15,000 to 30,000 souls. Mustapha Kemal had shown, however, that he possessed considerable constructive ability. A National Assembly had been convened, Government institutions had been set up; and by the time that the twenty-six representatives of the thirteen nations had appended their signatures to the Treaty of Sèvres, Mustapha Kemal, claiming for his Government in the highlands of Anatolia, that it was the true fount of Turkish nationality, found himself strong enough to repudiate the action of the Sultan's Government in assenting to the document and on behalf of the Turkish people to reject absolutely the terms embodied in it.

Mustapha Kemal had not miscalculated. The Treaty of Sèvres remained a dead letter, and early in 1921, representatives of the *de jure* Government in Constantinople and of the *de facto* Government in Angora were invited to London to discuss the matter. The Conference which ensued, if it did nothing else, proved beyond all reasonable doubt that so far as Turkey was concerned, the real force lay at Angora and not at Constantinople. Proposals were eventually put forward by the Allies with a view to bringing about a peace between Greece and Turkey. They met with no success because, to Lord Curzon's profound regret, they were brought to nought by the military operations embarked on by the Greeks. Though it was not apparent at the time, this shortsighted action on their part was in reality the first step towards their ultimate ruin.

The Conference, at which mediation was offered, was held at St. James's Palace in March, and was presided over by Mr. Lloyd George himself. Yet for all the proceedings at the Conference, the Greek delegates undoubtedly gained the impression during their stay in London that the British Prime Minister would not in his heart be sorry to see the proposals for mediation rejected and a renewal of the Greek offensive. Mr. Lloyd George had certainly never attempted to disguise his personal sympathy for the Greeks throughout their struggle against the Turks; and at a later date—in August 1922—the Greek authorities were undoubtedly encouraged to continue the fight at a critical moment in their history by his openly proclaimed sympathy with them. It is necessary to make this clear, since it has a definite bearing upon the attempt

which was subsequently made to hold Lord Curzon responsible for the disaster which befell them. No greater injustice could have been done Lord Curzon than to attribute to him a calamity which, as the narrative will make clear, he strove throughout to avert.

With the failure of the Conference of March, 1921, the Near Eastern question may be said to have entered upon its second phase.