CHAPTER XCI

ALL FOR NOTHING

"PAM" was at last Prime Minister. His Secretary for War was Lord Panmure "who never knows anything and is just as confident and positive as if he was well informed." And "in derision, his colleagues call him . . . the God of War."

Palmerston is interested in:

Hatchford, October 8, 1857: . . . the management of no department but that of Foreign Affairs, in which he does pretty much as he likes, but in all else he is quite inefficient and he is besides entirely under the influence of Panmure.

November 17, 1857: . . . It is his long course of insolent and overbearing conduct, which has alienated all Europe from us, and made us universally disliked. Clarendon said this to me again this evening, and he is now on the best and most intimate terms with Palmerston, but I take it in his capacity of Minister for Foreign Affairs he finds himself perpetually met and embarrassed by the effects of this incorrigible propensity.

Lord Palmerston did not bring in at once, as had been hoped, his new heaven and his new earth.

In his Valhalla, there were soon some vacant pews. For the Peelites only joined the Cabinet on the understanding that there be no enquiry affecting their conduct of the war. And when Palmerston (February, 1855) had to "knock under about the Roebuck Committee," they resigned.

On that investigation, it is enough to say that, in due course (July, 1853), there was "a very good case for the late government, especially Newcastle."

February 2, 1855: . . . Last night the Duke of Newcastle defended himself in the House of Lords against John Russell, and replied to his statements in the House of Commons, and did it very successfully, carrying the House with him. . . .

The Duke's statement was crushing, and appears to me not to admit of a rejoinder. It ought to cover him and his wretched clique with confusion; but they will probably attempt to brazen it out, and doggedly to insist that John was justified in all he did. The discussion last night was very characteristic of Derby. If ever there was an occasion in which seriousness and gravity seemed to be required of a man in his position, it would seem to be that of last night; but his speech was nothing but jeering at the late Cabinet and chaffing Newcastle; it was really indecent, but very smart and funny, if it had not been so unbefitting the occasion.

There were proposals for what later came to be called a khaki election:

February 8, 1855: Now that all is settled there is a momentary lull, and people are considering what sort of an arrangement it is, and how it is likely to succeed. Many of those who know better what Palmerston really is than the ignorant mob who shout at his heels, and who have humbugged themselves with the delusion that he is another Chatham, entertain grave apprehensions that the thing will prove a failure, and that Palmerston's real capacity will be exposed and his *prestige* destroyed. Some wish for a dissolution while his popularity is still undiminished, fancying it will give him a sure majority and will protect him against any change of opinion.

February 20, 1855: Nothing certainly could be more mortifying than the reception Palmerston met from the House of Commons on the first night when he presented himself as Minister, nothing more ungracious or more disheartening.

March 2, 1855: . . . There seems something like a lull here for the moment, and less of excitement and violence than there was. Palmerston has not been in office a fortnight, and already he is enormously *baissé;* his speeches night after night are miserable. . . . Then he seems supine and undecided; he does not fill up the vacant places or seemingly endeavour to do so, and he does not put good men in the places he does fill up, all of which does him harm in general estimation. Clarendon has told Lady Palmerston very frankly that he will soon ruin himself in public opinion if he goes on in this way. Few things are more extraordinary than the notion that was abroad of Palmerston's

fitness and efficacy. Never was there a greater delusion, and never one that is so rapidly being dissipated.

Palmerston's style in Parliament did not affect, however, the events in the Crimea:

March 31, 1855: . . . The war goes languidly on, and I hear Raglan and Canrobert are squabbling instead of acting.

Early in the struggle, Greville had written:

August 29, 1854: . . . The French particularly, who have lost the most, are said to be completely demoralized and disheartened, and to abhor the war which they always disliked from the beginning.

But, in the final attack on Sebastopol, it was the French who carried the Malakoff while the British were repulsed at the Redan:

September 28, 1855: No fresh news, but a letter from Charles Windham (the hero of the Redan), in which he gives an account of that affair which corresponds very closely with the report of Russell, the *Times* Commissioner. He gives a poor character of the generals in the Crimea, and says the troops, except some of the old soldiers, behaved by no means well. The whole thing seems to have been grievously mismanaged on our part.

The fall of the city, when it came, was sudden:

September 17, 1855: . . . We were kept in suspense all Sunday, but on Monday morning read in the *Times* that the Malakoff was taken, but we had no idea then that the city with all its vast defences would fall immediately after, but I heard it the same night at the Huntingdon station.

The nation had grown incredulous of all save ill news. In fact, a new war had to be considered:

December 4, 1855: . . . Pélissier has sent word he is in a fix, as he cannot advance or expel the Russians from their positions; and James Macdonald told me the Duke of Cambridge is going again to Paris to represent us at a grand council of war to be held there, to decide on future operations.

Impotent in war, as Greville thought, the British and French governments displayed impotence also when the task was to make peace.

Amid the "madness," there stood forth one man and only one whose majesty of wisdom no cynicism has been able to assail. He was John Bright, the Quaker.

April 2, 1854: . . . The war fever is still sufficiently raging to make it impossible for any man who denounces the war itself to obtain a patient hearing. Nobody ventures to cry out against it but Bright in the House of Commons, and Grey in the House of Lords, but already I see symptoms of disquietude and alarm. Some of those who were most warlike begin to look grave, and to be more alive to the risks, difficulties, and probably dangers of such a contest. I cannot read the remonstrances and warnings of Bright without going very much along with him; and the more I reflect on the nature of the contest, its object, and the degree to which we are committed in it, the more uneasy I feel about it, and the more lively my apprehensions are of our finding ourselves in a very serious dilemma, and being involved in great embarrassments of various sorts.

John Bright published his views, first in the *Times*, then "with *pièces justificatives* extracted from the Blue Books and other sources," in a pamphlet. In Greville's opinion, "he makes out a capital and unanswerable case."

December 11, 1854: . . . He does not, indeed, prove, nor attempt to prove, that the Emperor of Russia is in the right absolutely, but he makes out that he is in the right as against England and France, and he shows up the conduct of the Western Powers very successfully. But in the present temper of the country, and while the war fever is still raging with undiminished violence, all appeals to truth and reason will be totally unavailing. Those who entertain such opinions either wholly or in part do not dare to avow them, and all are hurried along in the vortex. I do not dare to avow them myself; and even for holding my tongue, and because I do not join in the senseless clamour which everywhere resounds, I am called "a Russian."

"Bright," adds Greville on February 28, 1855, "made an admirable speech, the peroration of which was very eloquent."

During the South African War, Lord Rosebery pleaded for "a wayside inn" where friend and foe could meet. In 1855, the wayside inn was Vienna.

Soldiers were dying by the thousand. The Czar himself succumbed to that winter. And yet there was doubt over the aims of the war. And it was "no easy matter to get the Cabinet to agree upon the wording of the communications" sent to Russia. It was only "by degrees" that Greville could "unravel the truth." Granville, from the Cabinet, admitted that they "were in a great diplomatic mess; France always finessing and playing a game of her own."

The Points at issue with Russia were not Fourteen but Four:

1. That Russia should abandon all control over Moldavia, Wallachia, and Servia.

2. That Russia should relinquish her claims to control the mouths of the Danube.

3. That all treaties calculated to give Russia a preponderance in the Black Sea should be abrogated.

4. That Russia should renounce the claim she made to an exclusive right to protect the Christians in the Ottoman Dominions.

When the Czar accepted all these points as a basis of discussion (January 12th) he was "suspected" of perpetrating "a dodge to paralyse Austria." And Aberdeen (January 19th) said, "the negotiations will not last half an hour."

It was the third point that caused the trouble. Was Russia or was she not to be predominant in the Black Sea?

January 14, 1855: . . . Gortschakoff, in a passion, said, "I suppose you mean to limit our naval force, or to dismantle Sebastopol, or both"; to which they replied, "Yes"; but nothing was put in writing to this effect. This makes a great difference, but I do not despair.

Austria was the outstanding neutral. And British diplomacy had a double aim, not only to make peace, but to bring Austria into the war as a belligerent. Lord John Russell told Greville "that Austria has never given in her adherence to our condition of making the destruction of Sebastopol a *sine qua non* of peace," and (March 31st) she "will not join us in forcing hard conditions on Russia."

Despite "his recent misdeeds," Lord John was, as we have seen, back in a Cabinet over which Palmerston presided. And, by "a happy stroke of Clarendon's," it was Lord John who was sent to Vienna "as Plenipotentiary to treat for peace." M. Drouyn de Lhuys, the Foreign Minister, represented France.

The question was at once whether the peace was to be dictated or negotiated:

Bath, July 19, 1855: . . . They were not the bearers of an ultimatum, they did not go to give law to Russia, or as judges to pronounce sentence upon her. They went to confer and to negotiate, to endeavour to obtain the precise terms which would be entirely satisfactory to their two Governments, and failing in this to see what they could obtain.

The authority to negotiate was the more timely because the Czar had just died:

March 2, 1855: . . . A disputed succession is not impossible, as it has long been reported that the Grand Duke Constantine was disposed to contest the succession with the Cesarewitch, but this will probably turn out to be a fable. It is supposed the new Emperor has been all along inclined to peace, and that he was in disgrace with his father on that account.

Yet "the hopes of peace" (March 31st) "waxed faint." Lord Cowley, in Paris, thought that "the continuance of the war [was] unavoidable." If it had been left to him, said Clarendon, "there would have been no peace at all."

April 20, 1855: . . . Clarendon thinks we shall get the better of Russia, but that it will be by blockading her ports and ruining her commerce, and not by military operations, and that this may take two or three years more, but is certain in the end.

On May 21st, Parliament was told that the Conference had broken down. And Guizot (July 6th) described it to Greville as "only a series of diplomatic blunders," including "a wonderful want of *invention*, not to strike out some new means of adjusting this quarrel." And added Greville grimly, "I agree with him."

The Allies (March 31st) had "proposed the reduction of the [Russian] fleet; the Russians refused."

Bath, July 19, 1855: . . . Russia rejected it on the ground of its

incompatibility with her honour and dignity. Then Russia made proposals, which the Allies, Austria included, rejected as insufficient. John Russell and Drouyn de Lhuys appear to have fought vigorously in the spirit of their instructions, but when they found there was no chance of the Russians consenting to the limitation, they both became anxious to try some other plan by which peace might possibly be obtained, and they each suggested something.

"As a last hope and chance," Count Buol, on behalf of Austria, proposed "that each of the powers should have the right to maintain a limited naval power in the Black Sea." Instead of "limitation" of naval power, there was to be "counterpoise." And they:

Bath, July 19, 1855: . . . were the same thing in principle, and the only difference between them one of mode and degree. Buol's counterpoise involved limitation, our limitation was to establish a counterpoise.

The difference was merely one of terms. And both the Plenipotentiaries agreed to it.

Lord Cowley was "a gentleman and a man of honour and veracity" (January 17, 1856) but "sensitive, touchy, and ill-tempered." He insisted that Drouyn de Lhuys had betrayed the Allied cause and demanded of the Emperor Napoleon that the Foreign Minister be repudiated. And the French plenipotentiary resigned.

His successor was Walewski:

January 17, 1856: . . . an adventurer, a needy speculator, without honour, conscience, or truth, and utterly unfit both as to his character and his capacity for such an office as he holds. Then it must be owned that it must be intolerably provoking to Walewski or any man in his situation to see Cowley established in such strange relations with the Emperor, being at least for certain purposes more his Minister for Foreign Affairs than Walewski himself.

The Grove, December 26, 1855: . . . A curious anecdote showing the strange terms the parties concerned are on: One day Cowley was with Walewski (at the time the question of terms was going on between France and Austria) and the courier from Vienna

was announced. Walewski begged Cowley, who took up his hat, not to go away, and said he would see what the courier brought. He opened the despatches and gave them to Cowley to read, begging him not to tell the Emperor he had seen them. In the afternoon Cowley saw the Emperor, who had then got the despatches; the Emperor also gave them to Cowley to read, desiring him not to let Walewski know he had shown them to him!

There has been a dreadful *rixe* between Walewski and Persigny. I have forgotten exactly the particular causes, but the other day Persigny went over to Paris partly to complain of Walewski to the Emperor. He would not go near Walewski, and told the Emperor he should not; the Emperor, however, made them both meet in his Cabinet the next day, when a violent scene took place between them, and Persigny said to Walewski before his face all that he had before said behind his back; and he had afterward—according to his own account to Clarendon—a very long conversation with the Emperor, in which he told him plainly what danger he was in from the corruption and bad character of his *entourage*, that he had never had anything about him but adventurers who were bent on making their own fortunes by every sort of infamous *agiotage* and speculation, by which the Imperial Crown was placed in imminent danger. "I myself," Persigny said, "am nothing but an adventurer, who have passed through every sort of vicissitude; but at all events people have discovered that I have clean hands and do not bring disgrace on your Government, like so many others, by my profligate dishonesty." "Well," said the Emperor, "but what am I to do? What remedy is there for such a state of things? Persigny replied that he had got the remedy in his head, but that the time was not come yet for revealing his ideas on the subject. . . . His [the Emperor's] own position is very strange, insisting upon being his own Minister and directing everything, and at the same time from indolence and ignorance incapable of directing affairs himself, yet having no confidence in those he employs. The consequence is that a great deal is ill done, much not done at all, and a good deal done that he knows nothing about.

Paris, June 17, 1855: . . . I asked Cowley how Walewski was likely to go, and he said wretchedly, and that he was not of a calibre to fill such a post. . . . The Emperor says it is a great

misfortune that there are no men of capacity or character whose services he can command, nor in fact any men, if he could command their services, in whom the public would be disposed to place confidence.

And then to the "consternation" of England, Lord John Russell (July 19th), from his place in the House of Commons, coolly made an "announcement to the whole world that the English Minister as well as the French one was willing to accept the terms proposed by Austria."

London, July 13, 1855: . . . I found Brooks's in a state of insurrection, and even the Attorney-General [Cockburn] told me that the Liberal party were resolved to go no further with John Russell, and that nothing but his resignation could save the Government, even if that could; that they might be reconciled to him hereafter, but as long as the war lasted they repudiated him.

Lord John Russell was held to be "bereft of his senses," and, like M. Drouyn de Lhuys (July 19th), he had to resign. His brother, the Duke of Bedford (October 7th), thought it "probable that his career as a statesman is closed."

For the difference between "limitation" and "counterpoise," the war went on for eleven months. At the time, it stimulated trade which was "steady and flourishing." And as Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir George Cornewall Lewis said to Greville:

London, August 21, 1855: . . . History recorded nothing like the profusion with which the present House of Commons was inclined to spend money. It was impossible to ask for too much.

But the taxes are stern teachers:

London, November 24, 1855: . . . Our warlike propensities may be probably restrained by the alarming prospect of financial difficulties which Lewis rather gloomily sees looming in the distance. He said to me, "I am sure I do not know how I shall provide ways and means next year, for the enormously high prices will be a great blow to consumption, and the money market is in a very ticklish state." I said, "You will have to

trust to a great loan, and ten per cent. income tax," to which he assented.

But there also began to be (November 27th) "a second edition of the Vienna Conference"—"a prospect of putting an end to this odious war."

"It was universally admitted that every man in France desires peace ardently." On the former occasion (November 27, 1855) Napoleon had "knocked under to us and reluctantly agreed to go on with the war."

He was (December 26th) still "divided between his anxiety to make peace and his determination to have no difference with England." One day "it was not without difficulty that he was deterred from ordering his army away from the Crimea."

Hatchford, January 2, 1856: . . . Clarendon showed me a letter from Francis Baring from Paris the other day, which told him that the Emperor wished to make peace, because he knew that France, with all her outward signs of prosperity, was unable to go on with the war without extreme danger, that she is in fact "using herself up," has been going on at a rate she cannot afford.

Another day, he and Britain—

The Grove, December 26, 1855: . . . were entirely reconciled; they were now agreed as one man, and no power on earth should induce him to separate himself from England or to take any other line than that to which he had bound himself in conjunction with her.

Moreover, though the fact has nothing to do with the reasons for which ostensibly the war was fought, Greville reminds us that Palmerston was now seventy not forty years old. He was thus "by no means so stiff and so bent on continuing the war as was generally supposed."

And yet:

December 4, 1855: . . . I am persuaded Palmerston and Clarendon will do all they can to prevent peace being made on any moderate terms, and the only hope is that the Emperor Napoleon may take the matter into his own hands and employ a *douce violence* to compel us to give way.

Indeed:

November 27, 1855: . . . Charles Villiers told me that Palmerston had already thrown out a feeler to the Cabinet to ascertain if they would be willing to carry on the war without France, but this was unanimously declined. I can hardly imagine that even Palmerston really contemplated such a desperate course.

Sir George Cornewall Lewis expressed—

November 27, 1855: . . . his disgust at the pitiful figure we cut in the affair, being obliged to obey the commands of Louis Napoleon, and, after our insolence, swagger, and bravado, to submit to terms of peace which we have already scornfully rejected; all which humiliation, he justly said, was the consequence of our plunging into war without any reason and in defiance of all prudence and sound policy.

Once more, there arose the question whether peace should be negotiated or dictated.

December 14, 1855: . . . It was quite extraordinary, he said, how eager Palmerston was for pursuing the war. I gathered from him that our government has been vehemently urging that of France, through Cowley, to be firm in pressing the most stringent terms on Russia, and particularly not to consent to any negotiation, and to compel her to accept or refuse.

"My hopes of peace," wrote Greville, "never very sanguine, are now completely dashed."

December 17, 1855: . . . To send to Russia and propose to her to make peace, and accompany the proposal with an ultimatum and an announcement that they would listen to no remonstrances or suggestions, much less any alterations, and that she must say Yes or No at once, is a stretch of arrogance and dictation not justified by the events of the war and the relative conditions of the belligerents, or by any usage or precedent that I ever heard of.

On behalf of Austria:

The Grove, December 26, 1855: . . . Esterhazy was to communicate the project to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, and say he had reason to believe that the Allies would be willing to make

peace on those terms; he was then to wait nine days. If in that time the Russian Government replied by a positive negative, he was, as soon as he got this notification, to quit St. Petersburg with all his embassy; if no answer was returned at the end of nine days, he was to signify that his orders were to ask for an answer in ten days, and if at the end thereof the answer was in the negative, or there was no answer, he was to come away, so that there was to be no ultimatum in the first instance. "But," I said, "what if Russia proposed some middle course and offered to negotiate?" "His instructions were not to agree to this."

Incredible though it may seem, the hope was that Austria and Prussia might be drawn into the struggle:

The Grove, December 23, 1855: . . . He [Lewis] thinks, moreover, that, when Austria has declared war, Russia will attack her defenceless frontier, and that as any attack upon Austria will compel the whole of Germany to assist her and to take part in the war against Russia, this offer will lead to Prussia and the whole of the German States being engaged on the side of the Allies, and that such a confederacy cannot fail to bring the war to a successful issue, because Russia would be absolutely incapable of offering any resistance to it. This is a new view of the policy and motives of France, but I very much doubt if the whole of the Emperor's scheme will be realized. Even though Austria may take up arms, it is probable that Russia will act strictly on the defensive, and will avoid giving any cause to the German States to depart from their neutrality. We both agreed that the conduct of Austria is quite inexplicable, and that Russia will never forgive her for the part she has acted and is acting now.

Over this universal Armageddon, the Cabinet was divided, Palmerston's paper, the *Morning Post* (January 1, 1856), "put forth an article indecently violent and menacing against Prussia."

It had seemed, indeed, that the war fever had abated:

London, November 24, 1855: . . . I think that, in spite of the undiminished violence of the press, the prevailing opinion is that there is the beginning of a change in the public mind, and

an incipient desire for peace; and I agree with Disraeli, who thinks that, when once the current has fairly turned, it will run with great rapidity the other way.

Even Disraeli, representing the Opposition (December 5th), told the Government that he would be "ready to support any peace they may now make." And yet—

London, January 22, 1856: . . . The intelligence of peace being at hand, or probable, gives no satisfaction here, and the whole press is violent against it, and thunders away against Russia and Austria, warns the people not to expect peace, and incites them to go on with the war. There seems little occasion for this, for the press has succeeded in inoculating the public with such an eager desire for war that there appears a general regret at the notion of making peace. When I was at Trentham, I asked Mr. Fleming, the gardener, a very intelligent man, what the general feeling was in that part of the world, and he said the general inclination was to go on with the war until we had made Russia, besides other concessions, pay all its expenses.

Greville wrote to Clarendon begging him "to slacken his desperate course." But, he tells us, "Clarendon's sole wish is to stand well with the country, that is to do anything foolish or ruinous which the country would approve."

Indeed, a week or two later, Clarendon went so far as to urge Greville to write to Mme. de Lieven to—

February 7, 1856: . . . suggest to her that it would be a very good thing and very wise policy on his part if the Emperor Alexander were to instruct his plenipotentiaries at the Congress not to haggle and bargain about concessions, but to offer at once to concede all the Allies required, relying on their not asking anything inconsistent with his honour, with a good deal more to the same purpose. . . . I did a letter with which he was quite satisfied, but I was not, and I not only doubt its producing any effect but think it most likely Madame de Lieven will *se moquer de moi*, and think me very extravagant gravely to propose that the Emperor should voluntarily offer to give us all we want merely to enable us to gratify the English public with a greater show of triumph over Russia. The idea of Clarendon seems to me very singular.

It was under these circumstances that the Emperor Napoleon III supplemented inefficiency by eloquence:

Hatchford, January 2, 1856: The speech which Louis Napoleon addressed to the Imperial Guard the day before yesterday, when they marched into Paris in triumph, gives reason for suspecting that the manifesto against Prussia in the *Morning Post* was French, for there is no small correspondence between the speech and the article. In the article Prussia is openly threatened and told, if she will not join the allies in making war on Russia, the allies will make war upon her; in the speech the Guards are told to hold themselves in readiness and that a great French army will be wanted.

In fighting Russia, Great Britain and France had allies, and tried to increase their number:

London, April 2, 1860: . . . *À propos* of the Russian War, I heard lately an anecdote for the first time that surprised me. Everybody knows that we beat up for allies and even mercenary aid against Russia in every direction, but it is not known that our government earnestly pressed the Portuguese Government to join in the war, and to send a contingent to the Crimea, and that on the refusal of the latter to do so, the Ministers made the Queen appeal personally to Lavradio and urge him to persuade his government to comply with our wishes; but Lavradio represented to her Majesty, as he had done to her Ministers, that Portugal had no quarrel with Russia, and no interest in joining in the war; on the contrary, Portugal was under obligations to the Emperor of Russia, and she therefore would have nothing to do with the contest. This was a most extraordinary proceeding, and it was contrary to all usage as well as all propriety to make the Queen interpose in person on such an occasion.

Over the treatment of these Allies in the negotiations for peace, Greville had a talk with Sir George Cornewall Lewis:

The Grove, December 24, 1855: . . . "Think," he said, "that this is a war carried on for the independence of Turkey, and we, the allies, are bound to Turkey by mutual obligations not to make peace but by common consent and concurrence. Well, we have sent an offer of peace to Russia of which the following

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EARL RUSSELL
by Sir F. Grant

are among the terms: We propose that Turkey, who possesses one half of the Black Sea coast, shall have no ships, no ports, and no arsenals in that sea; and then there are conditions about the Christians who are subjects of Turkey, and others about the mouths of the Danube, to which part of the Turkish dominions are contiguous. Now, in all these stipulations so intimately concerning Turkey, for whose independence we are fighting, Turkey is not allowed to have any voice whatever, nor has she ever been allowed to be made acquainted with what is going on, except through the newspapers, where the Turkish Ministers may have read what is passing, like other people. When the French and Austrian terms were discussed in the Cabinet, at the end of the discussion someone modestly asked whether it would not be proper to communicate to Musurus [the Turkish Ambassador in London] what was in agitation and what had been agreed upon, to which Clarendon said he saw no necessity for it whatever; and indeed Musurus had recently called upon him, when he had abstained from giving him any information whatever of what was going on. Another time, somebody suggesting in the Cabinet that we were bound to Turkey by treaty not to make peace without her consent, Palmerston, who is a great stickler for Turkey, said very quietly that there would be no difficulty on that score; in point of fact, the Turk evidently.

Stands like a cypher in the great account.

Then there was the King of Sardinia, visiting Queen Victoria:

London, December 11, 1855: . . . The King and his people are far better satisfied with their reception here than in France, where, under much external civility, there was very little cordiality, the Emperor's intimate relations with Austria rendering him little inclined toward the Piedmontese. Here the Queen was wonderfully cordial and attentive; she got up at four in the morning to see him depart. His Majesty appears to be frightful in person, but a great, strong, burly, athletic man, brusque in his manners, unrefined in his conversation, very loose in his conduct, and very eccentric in his habits. When he was at Paris his talk in society amused or terrified everybody, but here he seems to have been more guarded. It was amusing to see all the religious societies hastening with their

addresses to him, totally forgetting that he is the most debauched and dissolute fellow in the world; but the fact of his being excommunicated by the Pope and his waging war with the ecclesiastical power in his own country covers every sin against morality, and he is a great hero with the Low Church people and Exeter Hall. My brother-in-law said that he looked at Windsor more like a chief of the Heruli or Longobardi than a modern Italian prince, and the Duchess of Sutherland declared that, of all the Knights of the Garter she had seen, he was the only one who looked as if he would have the best of it with the Dragon.

London, December 11, 1855: . . . [Clarendon] thinks well of the King, and that he is intelligent, and he has a very high opinion indeed of Cavour, and was especially struck with his knowledge of England, and our Constitution and constitutional history. I was much amused, after all the praises that have been lavished on Sardinia for the noble part she has played and for taking up arms to vindicate a great principle in so *unselfish* a manner, that she has after all a keen view to her own interest, and wants some solid pudding as well as so much empty praise. The King asked Clarendon what the Allies meant to do for him, and whether he might not expect some territorial advantage in return for his services. Clarendon told him this was out of the question, and that, in the state of their relations with Austria, they could hold out no such expectation; and he put it to the King, supposing negotiations for peace were to take place, and he wished his pretensions to be put forward by us, what he would himself suggest that a British Minister could say for him; and the King had the candour to say he did not know what answer to give. Cavour urged the same thing, and said the war had already cost them forty millions of francs, instead of twenty-five which they had borrowed for it and was the original estimate, and they could only go on with it by another loan and fresh taxes, and he did not know how he should propose these to the Chambers without having something advantageous to offer to his own country, some Italian acquisition. They would ask for what object of theirs the war was carried on, and what they had to gain for all their sacrifices and exertions. Clarendon said they must be satisfied with the glory they had acquired and the high honour their conduct

had conferred on them; but Cavour, while he said he did not repent the part they had taken, thought his countrymen would be very little satisfied to have spent so much money and to continue to spend more without gaining some Italian object. They complained that Austria had, without any right, for a long time occupied a part of the Papal territory, and suggested she should be compelled to retire from it; but Clarendon reminded him that France had done the same, and this was a very ticklish question to stir.

From Windsor, Lord John Russell wrote:

December 6, 1855: . . . "I asked Cavour what was the language of the Emperor of the French; he said it was to this effect: France had made great efforts and sacrifices, she would not continue them for the sake of conquering the Crimea; the alternative was such a peace as can now be had by means of Austria, or an extension of the war for Poland," etc. The Sardinians, Ministers and King, are openly and warmly for the latter course. I suspect Palmerston would wish the war to glide imperceptibly into a war of nationalities, as it is called, but would not like to profess it openly now. I am convinced such a war might suit Napoleon and the King of Sardinia; but would be very dangerous for us in many ways. Cavour says, if peace is made without anything being done for Italy, there will be a revolution there. Clarendon is incredulous and unfavourable.

A general war was thus the great idea!

Hatchford, January 2, 1856: . . . Nothing is more within the bounds of probability than that the Emperor may determine, if he is obliged to make war, to make it for a French object, and on some enemy from whom a good spoil may be taken, a war which will gratify French vanity and cupidity, and which will therefore not be unpopular. He may think, and most probably not erroneously, that in the present temper of this country the people would be quite willing to let him do what he pleases with Prussia, Belgium, or any other part of the Continent, if he will only concur with us in making fierce war against Russia. But though this I believe to be the feeling of the masses, and that their resentment against Prussia is so strong that they would rejoice at seeing another Jena followed by similar

results, the minority who are elevated enough in life to reason and reflect will by no means like to see France beginning to run riot again, and while we have been making such an uproar about the temporary occupation of the Principalities and the crossing of the Pruth by Russia, that we should quietly consent to, nay, become accomplices in the passage of the Rhine and an aggression on Germany by France. The very possibility of this shows the necessity of putting an end to a war which cannot continue without so many and such perilous contingencies. Nothing, in fact, can exceed the complications in which we can hardly help being plunged, and the various antagonistic interests which will be brought into collision, creating perplexities and difficulties which it would require the genius of a Richelieu to unravel and compose. The earth under our feet may be mined with plots; we know not what any of the Great Powers are really designing; the only certainty for us is that we are going on blindly and obstinately spending our wealth and our blood in a war in which we have no interest, and in keeping Europe in a state of ferment and uncertainty the ultimate consequences of which it is appalling to contemplate.

London, January 9, 1856: . . . Colloredo called on Clarendon the other day, and after some unimportant talk, asked him if he had ever heard, or had reason to believe, that Russia had made a communication to France to the effect that if France had a mind to take the Rhenish Provinces and make peace with her, she should not oppose such a design. Clarendon replied that he knew nothing of it, but thought it not at all improbable.

Bernstorff had a conversation with Reeve the other day in which he told him that he was much put out at the isolated condition of Prussia, and gave him to understand that he should like the King to join the alliance, but he did not think anything would induce him to do so. It might perhaps be prudent, but it would be enormously base if Prussia were to come *au secours des vainqueurs* and, now that Russia is in exceeding distress, to join England and France, to whom she certainly is under no obligations, in crushing her.

But Russia had had enough of it:

December 6, 1855: . . . The terms which it will be most difficult for her to swallow are the neutralization of the Black Sea,

which as worked out is evidently worse than limitation, for she is to have no fortress and no arsenal there, so that she will, in fact, be quite defenceless, while the other powers can at any time collect fleets in the Bosphorus and attack her coasts when they please. Then she is to cede half Bessarabia to the Turks, including the fortress of Ismail, the famous conquest of Souvaroff when he wrote to the Empress Catherine, "*L'orgueilleuse Ismailoff est à vos pieds*"; and they are not to repair Bomarsund, or erect any fortress on the Aland Isles.

January 16, 1856: . . . Nobody will approve of the continuation of the war merely to obtain an Austrian object, which the cession of Bessarabia is, and the article about Bomarsund, which has nothing to do with the avowed object of the war. I have not the least doubt one half of the Cabinet, at least, are in their hearts of this opinion, but I am afraid they will not have the courage to stand forth, avow, and act upon it.

January 17, 1856, 12 o'clock: Payne has just rushed in here, to say that a telegraphic message, dated Vienna, ten o'clock last night, announces that "Russia accepts *unconditionally* the proposals of the allies."

The explanation of the peace was curious:

January 18, 1856: . . . The conditions offered to Russia contained none of the points insisted on by our government. I believe that the French and Austrians believed, very likely were certain, that if they had been sent Russia would have refused them, and, being bent on peace, they resolved to leave them out, and excuse themselves to England as they best could.

Russia was told by France, through Austria, that unless she accepted the mutilated proposition, "nothing would . . . prevent the English points being brought forward and made absolute conditions of any fresh preliminaries." Russia thus closed the deal and "Austria positively refuses to send on supplementary conditions to St. Petersburg." It was indeed "impossible [that] the *entente cordiale* with France can go on when the people here are passionate for war and in France they are equally passionate for peace."

It is an ill wind that blows nobody any good:

January 17, 1856, 12 o'clock: . . . The consequence of this

astounding intelligence was such a state of confusion and excitement on the Stock Exchange as was hardly ever seen before. The newspapers had one and all gone on predicting that the negotiations would lead to nothing, and that the war would go on, so that innumerable people continued to be "bears," and they were all rushing to get out as fast as they could. It remains yet to be seen whether it is really true; if it is, the Russians will be prodigiously provoked when they find that this concession was superfluous; and that the allies would have accepted *their* terms.

January 18, 1856: Though the account in the *Times* was not exactly correct, it proved substantially so. The right message came from Seymour soon after. There was such a scene in the Stock Exchange as was hardly ever witnessed; the funds rose three per cent., making five in the last two days. The newspapers had gone on telling their readers that there was sure to be no peace, that there was therefore a prodigious scramble to get out and a regular panic among the sellers. The Rothschilds, and all the French who were in the secret with Walewski, must have made untold sums.

April 1, 1856: . . . News of peace reached London on Sunday evening, and was received joyfully by the populace, not from any desire to see an end of the war, but merely because it is a great event to make a noise about. The newspapers have been reasonable enough, except the *Sun*, which appeared in deep mourning and with a violent tirade against peace.