CHAPTER LXXXVII

BREWING BLOOD

THE prelude to the Crimean War offers a perfect picture of what was meant by the old diplomacy.

In the year 1844, London had a pleasant surprise:

June 10, 1844: For the last week this town has been kept in a fever by the brief and unexpected visit of the Emperor of Russia. Brunnow told me he was at Petersburg, and had given up all idea of coming here, and the very next day the telegraph announced that he was at The Hague, and would arrive in London in twenty-four hours. Nobody knows now what was the cause of this sudden and rapid expedition, for he travelled without stopping, and with extraordinary rapidity, from Petersburg, with the exception of twenty-four hours at Berlin, and forty-eight at The Hague. He alighted at the Palace, embraced the Queen, and after his interview went to establish himself at Brunnow's. He immediately visited all the Royal Family, and the Duke of Wellington. The Duke attired himself in the costume of a Russian Field Marshal to receive the Emperor. On Monday he went to Windsor, Tuesday to Ascot, Wednesday they gave him a Review, which went off very badly, owing to mistakes and bad arrangement, but with which he expressed himself very well satisfied. The sight was pretty, glorious weather, 3,000 or 4,000 Guards, Horse, Foot, and Artillery in the Park, the Queen *en calèche* with a brilliant suite. It was striking when the Duke went and put himself at the head of his regiment, marched past, and saluted the Queen and Emperor. The air resounded with acclamations as the old warrior passed, and the Emperor rode up to him and shook him by the hand. He did the same by the Prince and Duke of Cambridge as they respectively marched by at the head of their regiments, but neither of them was so cheered as the Duke. There was a blunder about the artillery. The Queen cannot endure firing, and the Duke had ordered that the guns should not be fired till she

left the ground. By some mistake (of William de Ros's, who probably interfered) contrary orders were given, and they advanced and fired not far from her Majesty. The Duke was furious, and would not be pacified, though Emperor, Queen, and Prince did their best to appease him; he blew up, and swore lustily, and ordered the luckless artillery into the rear. It was a mighty small concern for the Emperor, who reviews 100,000 men, and sees 15,000 mount guard every day; but he expressed his satisfaction, and when the Queen said her troops were few in number, he told her that she must consider his troops at her disposal exactly the same as her own.

On Thursday they went to Ascot again, where they were received very well by a dense multitude; on Friday to London, where they gave him a stupid party at the Palace, omitting to ask half the remarkable people, especially of the Opposition. On Saturday a breakfast at Chiswick, a beautiful *fête*, and perfectly successful. Everything that was distinguished in London was collected to see and be seen by the Emperor. All the statesmen, fine ladies, poets, artists, beauties, were collected in the midst of a display of luxury and magnificence, set off by the most delicious weather. The Emperor lunched in a room fitted up with his arms and ensigns, and afterward held a sort of circle on the grass, where people were presented to him, and he went round talking to one after another. His appearance on the whole disappointed me. He is not so tall as I had heard he was—about 6 feet 2, I should guess; and he has no remains of the beauty for which he was once so celebrated, and which at his age, forty-eight, need not have so entirely faded away; but the cares of such an Empire may well have ravaged that head on which they sit not lightly. He is become bald and bulky, but nevertheless is still a very fine and grand-looking personage. He accepts his age and its consequences, and does not try to avert them by any artificial appliances, and looks all the better for so doing. Though he has a very imposing air, I have seen much nobler men; he does not bear the highest aristocratic stamp; his general appearance is inferior to that of Lord Anglesey or Lord Granville (both twenty-five years older), and to others. He gives me more the idea of a Thracian peasant raised to Empire, than of a descendant of a line of kings; still his head, and especially his profile, is very fine, and his manners are ad-

mirable, affable without familiarity, cordial yet dignified, and particularly full of deference and gallantry to women. As he moved round the circle all smiling and urbane, I felt a sensation of awe mixed with that of curiosity at reflecting that I saw before me a potentate so mighty and despotic, on whose will and pleasure or caprice depended the fortune, the happiness and the lives of millions of creatures; and when the condition of these subject millions and the frequent exercise of such unbounded power flitted over my mind, I felt a pleasant consciousness that I was beyond the sphere of its influence, free as the birds in the air, at least from him, and I enjoyed that involuntary comparison of my freedom with the slavery of his subjects, which is in itself happiness, or something like it.

The Emperor seems to have a keen eye for beauty, and most of the good-looking women were presented to him. He was very civil to Lord Harrowby, Lord Granville, Lord Lansdowne, to Clarendon, whom he had known in Russia, and to Palmerston. Lord John Russell was not presented to him, which was very wrong and ill-managed. Of all men he ought to have made acquaintance with the remarkable leader of the Whig party; but the Queen in very bad taste and very odiously had not asked him to her party the night before, so that he never approached the Emperor at all. His Majesty thanked Lord Melbourne for having come to the breakfast, and afforded him the opportunity of making his acquaintance. He went away early, and the departure was pretty; the Royal equipages, the escort of Lancers with their pennons glancing in the sun, the steps and balcony clustered over with women to speed the parting guest; and as he bade the Duke of Devonshire a kind farewell, and mounted his carriage, while the Russian Hymn struck up, and he took his departure for ever from the gay scene and brilliant assemblage, proceeding on the march of his high and hard destiny, while we all turned to our humble, obscure, peaceful, and uneventful occupations, it was an exhibition to stir the imagination and excite busy thoughts.

At the Opera, which was crowded from top to bottom, he [the Emperor of Russia] was very well received, and would have been better, if the Queen had had the tact and the grace to bring him forward to receive the burst of acclamations with which the audience was ready to hail him, but she did not, and

he could not present himself of his own accord. They say he is excessively disgusted with the dullness of the Court, and well he may be. The Queen has no conversation, and no attempt was made to amuse him. Lady Glanricarde, to whom he paid a visit, told me that she was struck with his saying not one word expressive of admiration or satisfaction about anybody or anything at Court; not a syllable in praise of the Queen or Prince.

Greville's next entry was that "while we were still gossiping about the Emperor's visit and discussing in great tranquillity all its incidents, we were roused by a rumour, which, as it swelled into importance, soon consigned his Imperial Majesty to oblivion." The Government had been defeated over some sugar duties.

To the press, to Parliament, even to the Cabinet, there was not a hint of the inner meaning of the Czar's visit. The statesmen responsible were as secretive as thieves and Greville wrote and indeed died without an inkling of the one fact that determined the whole situation.

So completely in the dark was Greville that, in March, 1847, he suggests, not that Russia and England had been negotiating apart from France but that Russia and France had been negotiating in "semi-hostility to England." The Czar deposited £2,000,000 in the Bank of France and "the political and commercial world were struck with astonishment."

Behind the back of Europe, the Czar, Sir Robert Peel, then Prime Minister, the Duke of Wellington and Lord Aberdeen, then Foreign Secretary—to quote Reeve—"drew up and signed a Memorandum, the spirit and scope of which was to support Russia in her legitimate protection of the Greek religion and the holy shrines, and to do so without consulting France. To obtain this agreement was doubtless the object of the Emperor's journey. It bore his own personal signature. The existence of this Memorandum was a profound secret known only to the Queen and to those Ministers who held in succession the seals of the Foreign Department, each of whom transmitted it privately to his successor."

Particulars of this secret treaty are to be found in Lord Malmesbury's *Memoirs* (Vol. I, p. 402). The Treaty "hitherto

unknown, throws an entirely new light on the causes of the Crimean War. The Emperor of Russia naturally relied on the support of the very ministers who had signed the agreement and were again in power, whilst Lord Aberdeen was conscious of having entered into an engagement wholly at variance with the course of policy into which he was reluctantly driven."

. . .

As the Czar believed, Britain thus stood pledged to support his ecclesiastical interests in Turkey. Indeed, this was not the whole story. The Czar used to call Turkey "the sick man of Europe." And, after his visit to London, he submitted to Great Britain a memorandum, indicating his view of what should be done with Turkish territory when the end came. From these opinions, Britain expressed no dissent. She accepted the memorandum and, by her silence, appeared to acquiesce in it.

These commitments, real or presumed, and dated 1844, were in the Czar's mind, nine years later. The British Ambassador at St. Petersburg was Sir Hamilton Seymour. From Lord Clarendon, the Foreign Secretary, Greville heard how, with the utmost candour, the Czar had discussed the very aims which he had submitted to Great Britain in 1844 without encountering dissent:

. . .

March 24, 1853: . . . I learnt the state of our relations with France and Russia in reference to the Turkish business, and he gave me to read a very curious and interesting despatch (addressed to John Russell) from Seymour, giving an account of a long conversation he had had with the Emperor Nicholas about Turkey and her prospects and condition, and his own intentions and opinions, which were amicable toward us, and very wise and moderate in themselves, contemplating the dissolution of the Turkish Empire, disclaiming in the strongest terms any design of occupying Constantinople—more than that, declaring that he would not do it—but supposing the event to happen, not thinking the solution of the problem so difficult as it is generally regarded. He threw out that he should have no objection, if a partition was ever to take place, that we should appropriate Egypt and Candia to ourselves.

Constantinople was the strategic point of diplomacy and Great Britain was represented there by Stratford Canning, an

Ambassador animated by bitter resentment against Russia and the Czar who, as we have seen, had refused to receive him.

November 10, 1853: Reeve is just returned from . . . Constantinople, and he came home by Vienna. Lord Stratford treated him with great kindness and hospitality, and talked to him very openly. He says that Stratford exercised a great but not unlimited influence and control over the Turkish Government, and of course is very jealous of the influence he possesses; for example, he boasted to Reeve that he had carried a great point and had procured the appointment of the candidate he favoured as Greek Patriarch, an interference which, if it had been made by the Emperor of Russia, whose concern it is much more than ours, would have excited in us great indignation. Such an exercise of influence and in such a matter, of which the Russians are well aware, is calculated to exasperate them.

February 9, 1854: . . . Stratford's despatches are very able, and very well written, but they leave the impression (which we know to be the truth), that he has said and done a great deal more than we are informed of; that he is the real cause of this war, and that he might have prevented it, if he had chosen to do so, I have no doubt whatever. His letters have evidently been studiously composed with reference to the Blue Book, and that he may appear in a popular light. I find he has been all the time in correspondence with Palmerston, who, we may be sure, has incited him to fan the flame, and encourage the Turks to push matters to extremities. I should like to know what Palmerston would have said, when he was at the Foreign Office, if one of his colleagues had corresponded with any one of his Ministers abroad, in a sense differing from that in which he himself instructed him.

Sir James Graham, though in the Cabinet, "fancied" (September 4, 1853) that Palmerston, though only Home Secretary, "has been in communication with Stratford." Palmerston's "hatred of Russia is not extinguished":

February 9, 1854: . . . Granville told me that one day when they were discussing the Eastern question (i. e., Palmerston, Aberdeen, and I don't know who besides), Palmerston said in reference to something, "I have had a letter from Stratford," and pulled a letter out of his pocket and began to read it.

"I have done what I could, and although I don't know how it will be taken at home, *you*, I am sure, will agree with me," when he suddenly stopped and said, "Oh, no, I have made a mistake, this is not the letter," and put it in his pocket again, showing the sort of communication which passed between them.

February 20, 1854: . . . It is disgusting to hear everybody and to see all writers vying with each other in laudation of Stratford Canning, who has been the principal cause of the war. They all think that, if he had been sincere in his desire for peace, and for an accommodation with Russia, he might have accomplished it, but on the contrary he was bent on bringing on war. He said as much to Lord Bath, who was at Constantinople. Lord Bath told him he had witnessed the fleets sailing into the Black Sea, when he replied, "You have brought some good news, for that is *war*. The Emperor of Russia chose to make it a personal quarrel with me, and now I am revenged." This Lord Bath wrote to Lady Ashburton, who told Clarendon. I asked John Russell yesterday why he sent Stratford back to Constantinople. He said when he sent him the quarrel was between France and Russia, and only about the Holy Places; they knew nothing there of Menschikoff's demands, and nobody was so qualified as Stratford to assist in settling the original affairs.

Russia, on her side, sent Prince Menschikoff, also the most violent man who could have been selected to counteract Stratford.

The Emperor Napoleon completed the trio.

November 10, 1853: . . . Nobody knows what is his real motive for sending Baraguay d'Hilliers to Constantinople. Francis Baring, when I told him of this appointment, said it could be only for the purpose of quarrelling, for he was the most violent of men, and was certain to quarrel with whomsoever he had to deal. If this be so, his quarrelling with Lord Stratford is inevitable, and it is by no means improbable that Louis Napoleon is tired of playing second fiddle to us, and sends this General there for the express purpose of counteracting our superior influence, and, by the tender of military counsel and aid, to substitute his own for ours.

Clarendon attributed the action of France to "wounded vanity."

Baraguay d'Hilliers enjoyed an "accompaniment of French officers."

In his zeal to defend the Holy Places, the Czar was not "entirely his own master." He was (June 13, 1853) "pushed on by an ardent and fanatical party in Russia" and (May 30th) was "naturally provoked with the French, who are in fact the real cause of this by their intrigues and extortions about the Holy Places." Also he was "provoked at the Montenegrin affair having been settled by Austria without his having a finger in that pie":

March 24, 1853: . . . Clarendon told me he had seen Brunnow, and after recapitulating to him all the various causes for alarm, resting on facts or on rumours, especially with regard to Russia and her intentions, he said that our government had received the word of honour of the Emperor that he had no sinister or hostile intentions, and disclaimed those that had been imputed to him, and that on his word they relied with such implicit confidence that he had not the slightest fear of disquietude. Brunnow was exceedingly pleased, and said that was the way to treat the Emperor, who would be excessively gratified, nothing being dearer to him than the confidence and good opinion of this country, and he said he would send off a courier the next day, and Clarendon should dictate his despatch. The instructions given to Menschikoff have been enormously exaggerated, the most serious and offensive parts that have been stated (the nomination of the Greek Patriarch, &c.) being totally false. I asked what they were, and he said nothing but a string of conditions about shrines and other ecclesiastical trifles.

Napoleon was conscious that France also was a Defender of the Faith in the East.

March 24, 1853: . . . Clarendon is much dissatisfied with the conduct of the French Government, who were in a great hurry to send off their fleet. . . . They did this, although they knew the despatches were on the road, and that a very few hours would put them in possession of the actual state of the case. Moreover,

Cowley [in Paris] moved heaven and earth to induce Drouyn de Lhuys [the French Foreign Minister] to withdraw the order to sail, but without effect. They persisted in it, after they knew we were not going to stir, and Cowley could not see the Emperor, who he says was evidently avoiding any communication with him. Still very friendly language continues to pass between us, and our government are inclined to attribute this unwise proceeding to the vanity of the French, their passion for doing something, and above all the inexperience and want of *savoir faire* in high matters of diplomacy of the Emperor and his Ministers. There is not one amongst them who is fit to handle such delicate and important questions, the Emperor, who governs everything by his own will, less than any; and Drouyn de Lhuys, who has been for many years engaged more or less in the Foreign Office, is a very poor and inefficient minister.

The British fleet held back. "It is lucky Dundas is a prudent man, and refused to carry his fleet up to the vicinity of the Dardanelles at Rose's invitation, or mischief might have ensued."

But Stratford Canning (March 24, 1853) also wanted to use warships as arguments and asked for "discretionary authority" to summon the fleet. Clarendon "refused."

Even Lord John Russell wrote a letter to Clarendon "full of very wild talk of strong measures to be taken and a fleet sent to the Baltic to make peremptory demands on the Emperor of Russia."

June 13, 1853: . . . The great event has been the sailing of our fleet from Malta to join the French fleet at the mouth of the Dardanelles, to the unspeakable satisfaction of the French Government, who desire nothing so much as to exhibit to all Europe an *entente cordiale* with us; and Walewski said to me that, however the affair might end, this great advantage they had at all events obtained. The Emperor of Russia will be deeply mortified when he hears of this junction; for besides that it will effectually bar the approach of his fleet to Constantinople, if he ever contemplated it; there is nothing he dislikes and dreads so much as the intimate union of France and England.

The first peril was that Russia would fight Turkey and break her up:

May 30, 1853: Great alarm the last two or three days at an approaching rupture between Russia and Turkey, as, if it takes place, nobody can pretend to say what the consequences may be. Vast indignation, of course, against the Emperor of Russia, who certainly appears to have departed from the moderate professions which he made to Seymour a short time ago, and the assurances that were given to us and France. But Clarendon, whom I saw yesterday, is rather disposed to give him credit for more moderate and pacific intentions than his conduct seems to warrant. He says that he is persuaded the Emperor has no idea of the view that is taken of his proceedings here.

The Emperor was about to invade those Turkish provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia which are now Rumania:

June 13, 1853: . . . His Majesty is now so greatly excited that nothing can stop him, and he told Seymour the other day that he would spend his last rouble and his last soldier rather than give way. Still he professes that he aims at no more than a temporary occupation of the Principalities, and renounces all purpose of conquest. The Russian army will therefore certainly march in.

According to Greville, "nobody here would care one straw about the Russian occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia." That was the view of the "peace party," including Cobden. But Clarendon, though for peace, thought "that any discussion in the House of Commons will elicit a disposition for peace *à tous prix*, which would seriously embarrass affairs and only confirm Russia in the course she is pursuing." Disraeli alone (July 9, 1853), "who cares for nothing but making mischief," tried to bring on a debate.

Palmerston wanted war at once:

June 22, 1853: . . . It appears that Palmerston proposed on Saturday last that the entrance of the Russians into the Principalities should be considered a *casus belli*, in which, however, he was overruled and gave way. The Cabinet did not come to a vote upon it, but the general sentiment went with Aberdeen and Clarendon, and against Palmerston.

July 14, 1853: . . . It is evident that he [Palmerston] is *at*

work, and probably, according to his ancient custom, in some underhand way in the press. His flatterers tell him that a majority of the House of Commons would support *him* and a warlike policy.

Also Palmerston's prestige was rising. He was an excellent Home Secretary, and he was Lord John Russell's deputy in Parliament:

September 2, 1853: . . . There, however, I know from other sources, all the popularity is engrossed by Palmerston and by Gladstone, and Lord John has foolishly suffered Palmerston to take his place as leader very often, because he chose to stay away at Richmond and not come near the House.

November 15, 1853: . . . The Queen told Clarendon an anecdote of Palmerston, showing how exclusively absorbed he is with *foreign* politics. Her Majesty has been much interested in and alarmed at the strikes and troubles in the North, and asked Palmerston for details about them, when she found he knew nothing at all. One morning, after previous inquiries, she said to him, "Pray, Lord Palmerston, have you any news?" To which he replied, "No, Madam, I have heard nothing; but it seems certain *the Turks have crossed the Danube.*"

Aberdeen was in an awkward position. He had signed the secret agreement with Russia. He knew that the Czar was acting under an impression of British policy which had been allowed to go uncontradicted for years—an impression namely that Britain, while not desiring the break-up of Turkey, would not oppose it. And Greville, knowing nothing of the inner significance of his words, writes:

July 12, 1853: . . . Clarendon tells me that he has no doubt Aberdeen has on many occasions held language in various quarters that was not prudent under the circumstances, and was calculated to give erroneous impressions as to the intentions of the Government, and he thinks that the Emperor himself has been misled by what he may have heard both of the disposition and sentiments of the Prime Minister, and of the determination of the House of Commons and the country at large to abstain from war in every case except one in which our own honour and interests were *directly* concerned.

June 22, 1853: The Opposition papers (especially the *Morning Herald* and the *Press*, Disraeli's new journal) have been making the most violent attacks on Aberdeen and Clarendon, calling for their impeachment on the ground of their conduct in this Eastern quarrel, particularly charging them with having been cognizant of and approved of Menschikoff's demands, which have occasioned all the hubbub. At last it was thought necessary to make a statement in reply, which was done by the *Times* on Thursday last.

The Cabinet was divided:

June 5, 1853: . . . He [Clarendon] has a difficult task to perform, taking a middle position in the Cabinet between the opposite opinions of those who are for more stringent measures and those who, like himself, are for patience and moderation. Palmerston, in whom his ancient Russian antipathies are revived, is for vigour, and as in former times "leading John Russell by the nose," Clarendon and Aberdeen for moderation; but he is beset by different opinions and written suggestions and proposals, and all this worries him exceedingly. I asked him how the Court was; and he said very reasonable, their opinions being influenced of course by Aberdeen.

At Russia's quarrel with Turkey, Clarendon, as Foreign Secretary, became "very gloomy" and was "greatly disgusted at having been deceived by the Emperor."

Various proposals for peace were made to Russia, among them, one from France:

July 18, 1853: . . . Castelbajac took it to Nesselrode, who read it very attentively, and said that he liked it very much, but that he could give no positive answer till he had submitted it to the Emperor. The same afternoon he saw the French Minister again, and told him that he had laid the project before the Emperor Nicholas, and that his Majesty was not only satisfied, but grateful for it, "*non seulement satisfait, mais reconnaissant*," and that the only reason he did not at once close with it was that his ally, the Emperor of Austria, had also submitted a proposal, and he did not like to take another from another Court exclusively without previous communication with him.

At this "very important news," there really seemed "a probability of this Turkish question being amicably settled." As Greville wrote, "to my mind, [it] is decisive on the question of peace." Nesselrode liked the British proposals best of all, only asking that such approaches be made "*from Vienna.*" And "in a very handsome letter," Palmerston himself wrote to Clarendon to say he "rejoiced that the management of our foreign affairs was in such able hands."

Yet (August 8th) "Clarendon does not consider that we are *out of the wood* though he expects on the whole it will end well."

London, August 8, 1853: Ever since last Monday, when Clarendon made a speech in the House of Lords on which a bad interpretation was put in reference to the question of peace or war, there has been a sort of panic, and the public mind, which refused at first to admit the possibility of war, suddenly rushed to the opposite conclusion, and everybody became persuaded that war was inevitable. The consequence was a great fall in the funds, and the depreciation of every sort of security.

The position was that—

London, August 8, 1853: . . . the Emperor had signified his willingness to accept the proposal which was then expected from Vienna, and last night fresh news came that the proposal had arrived, and he had said he would take it, if the Turks would send an ambassador with it, exactly as it had been submitted to him. This I heard late last night, and Granville considered it conclusive of an immediate settlement. But this morning I went to Clarendon and found him not so sure, and not regarding the pacific solution as so indubitable; there still remain some important matters of detail to be settled, though certainly the affair wears a much more favourable aspect, and there is every reason to hope it will all end well. But while this proposal was concocted at Vienna, the Cabinet here (last Saturday week) made some small verbal alterations in it, so that ultimately it will not be presented for the Emperor's formal acceptance word for word the same, and if he wants a pretext to back out of his present engagement, he can therein find one, as he only agreed to take it if it was word for word the same.

August 9, 1853: . . . At Court yesterday Aberdeen was quite confident of the settlement of the Eastern affair, and Brunnow,

who was there with the Duchess of Leuchtenberg to see the Queen, very smiling. . . . The Government are in high spirits at the prospect of winding up this prosperous Session with the settlement of the Eastern Question: nothing else is wanting to their success.

August 11, 1853: . . . Yesterday all the world went to the great naval review at Portsmouth, except myself. It appears to have been a fine but tedious sight, for Granville set off at 5.30 A. M., and only got back at one in the morning.

August 27, 1853: . . . The Session closed with *éclat* by a speech of Palmerston's in his most flashy and successful style. John Russell gave a night at last for the discussion of the Turkish question, and made a sort of explanation, which was tame, meagre, and unsatisfactory. After some speeches expressive of disappointment and disapprobation, Cobden made an oration in favour of peace at any price, and this drew up Palmerston, who fell upon him with great vigour and success. The discussion would have ended languidly and ill for the Government but for this brilliant improvisation which carried the House entirely with it. It was not, however, if analysed and calmly considered, of much use to the Government as to their foreign policy, for it was only an answer to Cobden, and Palmerston did not say one word in defence of the policy which has been adopted, nor identify himself with it, as he might as well have done.

By the action of Russia, therefore, the issue was referred to Turkey, and Clarendon feared Constantinople:

September 3, 1853: . . . There is a strong bigoted violent party for war, disposed to dethrone the Sultan and replace him by his brother. This brother (of whom I never heard before) is a man of more energy than the Sultan, and is connected with the fanatical party. The Sultan himself is enervated by early debauchery and continual drunkenness, and therefore in great danger should he by any unpopular measures provoke an outbreak from the violent faction.

The Turks might thus "make difficulties," and the question was whether "Stratford Canning may not raise obstacles instead of using all his influence to procure their agreement."

August 11, 1853: I saw Clarendon yesterday. Nothing new,

but he said he fully expected Stratford Canning would play some trick at Constantinople, and throw obstacles in the way of settlement.

August 27, 1853: . . . Granville told me that what had occurred showed how much more sagacious Aberdeen had been as to this affair than Palmerston, the former having always maintained that there would be no difficulty with the Emperor, but if any arose it would be from the Turks; whereas Palmerston was always sure the Turks would make none, but that the Emperor would refuse all arrangements.

August 28, 1853: It seems the Turks, after a delay of ten days from receiving the proposition, sent it back to Vienna, asking for some not important alterations; but immediately afterward they required a stipulation for the evacuation of the Principalities, and guarantees that they should not be occupied again. It is very improbable that the Emperor will listen to such conditions. Nesselrode has all along told Seymour that they [the Russians] mean in fulfilment of their pledges to evacuate the Principalities, as soon as they have got the required satisfaction, but that it must not be made *a condition*, and entreated him to abstain from any demand which might give an air of compulsion to the act.

September 3, 1853: . . . Clarendon thinks that Stratford has encouraged the resistance of the Divan to the proposals of the Conference, and that he might have persuaded the Turks to accept the terms if he had chosen to do so and set about it in a proper manner; but Clarendon says that he has lived there so long, and is animated with such a personal hatred of the Emperor, that he is full of the Turkish spirit; and this and his temper together have made him take a part directly contrary to the wishes and instructions of his government. . . . Clarendon is very uneasy because he thinks the Emperor Nicholas' pride will not let him accept the Note as modified by *the Turks*, though he would have accepted the same Note if it had been presented originally by the Conference.

Sir James Graham, First Lord of the Admiralty (September 4th), was "very hot against Stratford, to whom he attributes all the difficulties" and was for seeking "the proofs of his treachery" from the Turkish Ministers. Of course, "it would

not do to act on surmises or reports," but only on "clear proofs of Stratford's misconduct, such as will satisfy Parliament." According to Clarendon:

September 8, 1853: . . . It would be impossible to make out any case against him, as he certainly had read to the Turkish Minister all his [Clarendon's] despatches and instructions, and he gave the most positive assurances, which it would be difficult to gainsay, that he had done everything in his power to induce the Turkish Government to give way to the advice of the Conference, and whatever his secret wishes and opinions might be, there was no official evidence to be had that he had failed in doing his duty fairly by his own government; therefore it would be out of the question to recall him.

Clarendon "would lay two to one the Emperor does not accept the modified Note."

The Emperor Napoleon wanted the fleets to "enter the Dardanelles, but only a little way, and not go on to Constantinople; and Clarendon takes the same view, proposing a *mezzo termine.*" He wrote, moreover, to the Duchess of Hamilton "that he believes the Russians will not evacuate the Principalities and that he does not care if they stay there."

September 3, 1853: . . . All these circumstances taken together look very like a little intrigue between the Emperor and the Russian Court, which would also be very consistent with his secret, false, and clandestine mode of conducting his affairs. It is probable enough that he may wish to keep on good terms with Russia and at the same time maintain his intimate connection with England. That he is bent on avoiding war there can be no doubt, and for very good reasons, for France is threatened with a scarcity, and he is above all things bent on keeping the people supplied with food at low prices; and for this object the French Government is straining every nerve and prepared to make any amount of pecuniary sacrifice; but the necessity for this, which absorbs all their means, renders it at the same time particularly desirable to maintain peace in Europe.

As a matter of fact, Clarendon told Greville that (September 20th) "the Russian generals had actually received orders to pre-

pare for the evacuation (of the Principalities) which the Emperor would have commanded the instant he heard that the Turks were willing to send the Vienna Note."

On October 3rd, the Turkish Divan sent Russia an ultimatum, demanding that the Principalities be evacuated within fifteen days. Russia answered by declaring war on the Sultan.

The division in the Cabinet was more acute. Lord Aberdeen (October 6, 1853) told Delane of the *Times* "that he was resolved to be no party to a war with Russia on such grounds as the present, and he was prepared to resign rather than incur such responsibility." That was "the marrow of what he said and very important because not unlikely to lead to some difference in the Cabinet and possibly to its dissolution." Clanricarde suggested that this language was calculated to stiffen "the obstinacy" of the Czar which "was entirely caused by his conviction that France and England would never remain united, and that nothing would induce the latter to make war on Russia."

November 27, 1853: . . . He said he had a regular scene with Aberdeen the other day. After this Note (or whatever it was) had been discussed and agreed to in the Cabinet, and all settled, Aberdeen came into his room, and began finding fault with it, and raising all sorts of objections, when Clarendon, out of all patience, broke out: "Really, this is too bad. You come now, after it has all been settled in the Cabinet where you let it pass, and make all sorts of objections. And this is the way you do about everything; you object to all that is proposed, and you never suggest anything yourself. What is it you want? Will you say what you would have done?" He declares he said all this with the greatest vivacity, being really exasperated. Aberdeen had nothing to say, and knocked under. The truth seems to be that the attacks upon him in the newspapers (though they don't know it) are pretty well justified, and very little exaggerated.

On the other hand, there was Palmerston (October 4th) whose "position is curious":

October 4, 1853: . . . He is certainly very popular, and there is a high idea of his diplomatic skill and vigour. He is lauded to the skies by all the Radicals who are the admirers of Kossuth and Mazzini, who want to renew the scenes and attempts of

1848, and who fancy that, if Palmerston were at the head of the Government, he would play into their hands. On the other hand, he is equally an object of the flattery and praise of the Tories, who cannot get over their being succeeded by a Peelite Prime Minister.

October 7, 1853: . . . Lady Palmerston as usual talks *à qui veut l'entendre* of the misconduct of the whole affair, and affirms that, if Palmerston had had the management of it, all would have been settled long ago.

Palmerston was steadily for war:

September 26, 1853: . . . He [Clarendon] showed me a letter from Palmerston, in which he spoke very coolly of such a contingency as war with Russia and Austria, and with his usual confidence and flippancy of the great blows that might be inflicted on both powers, particularly alluding to the possible expulsion of the Austrians from Italy, an object of which he has probably never lost sight.

October 4, 1853: . . . Granville told me last night he thought Palmerston was not at all displeased at the decision of the Turks [to defy Russia] and as he still clings to the idea that Turkey is powerful and full of energy, and he is quite indifferent to the danger to which Austria may be exposed, and would rejoice at her being plunged in fresh difficulties and threatened with fresh rebellions and revolutions, he will rather rejoice than not at the breaking out of hostilities. He has been speechifying in Scotland, where, though he spoke very handsomely of Clarendon, he did not say one word in defence of Aberdeen.

November 10, 1853: . . . Reeve (having been to Constantinople) has a very poor opinion of the power, resources, and political condition of Turkey, and does not doubt the military success of the Russians. He says that the corruption is enormous—everybody bribes or is bribed. The Greek Patriarch whom Stratford got appointed had to pay large sums to Redschid Pasha and his son. The whole State is rotten to the core.

Aberdeen was thus (November 2d) "always opposing measures of hostility toward Russia and Palmerston for pushing them forward." Were we or were we not "to be dragged into a war at the heels of the Grand Council (of Turkey)

which is an assembly of ruffians and fanatics, by whom it would be utterly inconsistent with the dignity of our Crown that our policy should be governed and influenced?"

November 2, 1853: . . . This is a point on which the Queen feels very strongly, and is exceedingly anxious that the honour and dignity of the Crown should not be compromised. Accordingly Clarendon drew up a despatch to this effect, to which the Cabinet acceded, and Palmerston also, though with some reluctance. However, he not only saw the proposed despatch, but he made some alteration in it with his own hand, thereby of course subscribing to it. Just after this Clarendon went to Windsor, and submitted the despatch to the Queen and the Prince; they objected to it that it was not strong enough in their sense, but Clarendon prevailed upon them to waive their objections, and, as it had been agreed to in the Cabinet, to let it go. But before it was gone Clarendon received a letter from Palmerston, strongly objecting to the despatch altogether, and desiring Clarendon to inform Lord Aberdeen that he would be no party to such a communication. This was extremely embarrassing. Clarendon spoke to Aberdeen, and afterward (at Aberdeen's suggestion) informed the Queen what had occurred. Her Majesty said, "I advise you not to attach much importance to this communication. I know Lord Palmerston from much experience, and it is probably only an attempt to bully, which, if you take no notice of it, you will hear no more of." The result justified the Queen's sagacity, for Clarendon sent off the despatch, and at the same time wrote word to Palmerston that he had done so, giving him sundry reasons why he could not do otherwise, to which he received in reply a very good-humoured letter, merely saying that, as it was gone, it was useless to say any more about it, and probably it would do no harm.

November 15, 1853: . . . The Emperor of Russia has taken the unusual step of writing an autograph letter to the Queen. Brunnow, who was rather puzzled, took the letter to Aberdeen, and asked what he was to do with it. Aberdeen told him to take it to Clarendon, who sent it to the Queen. She sent it to him to read, and he suggested certain heads of an answer, but did not communicate the letter, nor the fact of its having been received, to anyone but Aberdeen. The Queen wrote an answer in French, and he says a very good one.

The break came:

December 12, 1853: . . . The Duke of Bedford . . . called on Clarendon on Saturday, when he said to Clarendon that he was very uneasy about Palmerston, and thought he was meditating something, though he did not know exactly what he was at. Clarendon interrupted him—"Certainly; he is meditating breaking up the Government; in fact, he told me so." At this moment it was announced that two or three foreign Ministers were waiting to see him, when he abruptly broke off the conference, and they parted.

London, December 17, 1853: Yesterday morning the news of Palmerston's resignation was made public. It took everybody by surprise, few having been aware that he objected to the Reform measure in contemplation.

On November 30th, the Russians, in the course of their naval operations, had destroyed the Turkish squadron at Sinope. Palmerston wanted action:

Hatchford, December 21, 1853: . . . Delane went to Aberdeen, and asked him for his version of the affair, when he said that the Eastern Question was the cause and the sole cause of Palmerston's resignation. . . . Delane observed, if this was true, Palmerston had acted a very high-minded and disinterested part.

London, December 22, 1853: I went to town this morning, called on Lady Palmerston, found her in good spirits and humour, and vastly pleased at all the testimonies of approbation and admiration he has received. She exclaimed with exultation, "He is always in the right in everything he does," a position I could not confirm, and which I did not care to dispute.

With Britain pushed into the abyss of bloodshed, Palmerston decided, after all, to remain in the Cabinet:

December 24, 1853: . . . On Thursday at the Cabinet the resolution was taken which amounts to war. The French sent a proposal that the fleets should go into the Black Sea, repel any Russian aggression, and force any Russian ships of war they met with to go back to Sebastopol, using force in case of resistance. We assented to this proposal, and orders were sent accordingly. This must produce hostilities of some sort, and

renders war inevitable. It is curious that this stringent measure should have been adopted during Palmerston's absence, and that he had no hand in it. It will no doubt render the reconciliation more agreeable to him. This incident of his resignation and return, which has made such a hubbub not only here but all over Europe for several days, is certainly extraordinary, and will hardly be intelligible.

January 6, 1854: . . . The Black Sea is so dark they can take no observations, and so deep it cannot be sounded, perpetual fogs (which make the darkness) and no harbour where the fleets can take refuge.

Bowood, December 26, 1853: . . . The Tories and the Radicals are equally puzzled, perplexed, and disgusted, and do not know what to say. They accordingly solace themselves with such inventions and falsehoods as it suits their several purposes to circulate.

Greville (December 26th) thought that Palmerston "has made a great fool of himself." But his letter of reconciliation was "artful and cunning." Palmerston, however, was "quite at his ease and just as if nothing had happened, which was exactly like him."

January 6, 1854: All going on very amiably in the Cabinet, and Pam and Johnny the best friends possible, cutting their jokes on each other, and Palmerston producing all his old objections to the Reform Bill just as if it was discussed for the first time.

January 25, 1854: . . . . One faint ray of hope for peace has dawned. The Emperor, on receiving our Note, has not recalled Brunnow, but ordered him to ask for explanations, and he is only to withdraw if the answer is of a certain tenor. Clarendon told him he could not give him an answer at the moment, and Seymour had said in the P. S. of his last despatch, "For God's sake, don't give Brunnow any answer for three days." It is clearly one of two things—the Emperor meditates making peace, or he wants to gain time.

February 1, 1854: Parliament met yesterday, a greater crowd than usual to see the procession. The Queen and Prince were very well received, as well as usual, if not better; but all the *enthusiasm* was bestowed on the Turkish Minister, the mob

showing their sympathy in his cause by vociferous cheering the whole way.

February 9, 1854: Nobody now thinks of anything but of the coming war and its vigorous prosecution. The national blood is up, and those who most earnestly deprecated war are all for hitting as hard as we can now that it is forced upon us. The publication of the Blue Books has relieved the Government from a vast amount of prejudice and suspicion. The public judgment of their management of the Eastern Question is generally very favourable, and impartial people applaud their persevering efforts to avert war, and are satisfied that everything was done that the national honour or dignity required. I have read through the thick volumes, and am satisfied that there is on the whole no case to be made against the Government, though there are some things that might perhaps have been better done.

February 15, 1854: Several days ago there was a short discussion in the House of Lords, in which the Government did not cut a good figure. Aberdeen made a declaration in favour of peace, saying "war was not inevitable," which produced an explosion against him, and it was so imprudent *in him*, and so calculated to mislead, that Clarendon was very angry with him and insisted on his rising again and saying that no negotiations were going on, threatening to do so himself if Aberdeen did not. . . . This morning appears in all the newspapers the autograph letter of the Emperor Napoleon to the Emperor Nicholas, which has been so much talked of. If the Emperor of Russia at once closes with it, he will place us in a great dilemma, but it may produce peace. . . . Clarendon told me this was only one of many instances in which the conduct of the French had been very *louche* and insincere. . . . A fine prospect to be married to such a people on a great question; but what can be expected from the Government of such a Sovereign and such Ministers? It confirms my long-settled opinion, that we are always in extreme danger of being thrown over by them.